Judgment :- This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree in O.S.No.4387/2005 dated 21.8.2009 on the file of the 44th Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bangalore. The appellant was the defendant in the suit and the respondent was the plaintiff. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to by their respective ranking before the trial Court. 2. The plaintiff filed the above suit for ejectment of the defendant from the suit schedule property and for certain other reliefs. It is the case of the plaintiff that he is employed at United State of America. As such, he has executed a power of attorney dated 4.2.2004 in favour of his father C.M.Mallikarjunaiah. Acting on the said power of attorney, C.M.Mallikarjunaiah purchased the suit schedule property from the defendant, for and on behalf of the plaintiff by a deed of sale dated 20.7.2004. On the same day, the plaintiff took the possession of the suit schedule property through his attorney. On 30.07.2004, Bangalore Mahanagara Palike transferred the Katha of the property in his favour. The defendant requested the plaintiff to lease the suit schedule property for a short duration. Therefore, the plaintiff represented by his attorney executed a rent agreement in favour of the defendant dated 22.7.2004. The rent agreed upon was Rs.10,000/- per month. The defendant has paid a sum of Rs.2 lakhs towards security deposit to the plaintiff. The duration of the lease was from 23.7.2004 to 31.12.2004. It is further contended that the defendant did not pay the rent at the rate of Rs.10,000/- per month. On the other hand, he used to credit a sum of Rs.8,000/- per month to the bank account of C.M.Mallikarjunaiah towards rents. Though the time under the agreement expired on 31.12.2004, the defendant failed to vacate and hand over the vacant possession of the property to the plaintiff. The plaintiff requires the property for the use and occupation of his father who is residing in a rented premises. The plaintiff got issued a notice dated 20.4.2005 terminating the tenancy of the defendant. Since the defendant failed to comply with the demand made in the notice, he has filed the suit for the reliefs stated above. 3. In response to the summons issued by the Court, the defendant has entered appearance and has filed hi written statement. The plaintiff got issued a notice dated 20.4.2005 terminating the tenancy of the defendant. Since the defendant failed to comply with the demand made in the notice, he has filed the suit for the reliefs stated above. 3. In response to the summons issued by the Court, the defendant has entered appearance and has filed hi written statement. He has admitted the tenancy of the suit schedule property on a monthly rent of Rs.8,000/-. It is his case that he has not breached any of the conditions of the rent agreement. The notice issued terminating the tenancy is not in accordance with law. In paragraph 13 of the written statement, he has contended that the general power of attorney holder has no knowledge of the case. Therefore, the plaintiff cannot maintain the suit through his general power of attorney holder. He has prayed for dismissal of the suit. 4. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the court below has framed the following issues: “(i) Whether the termination of tenancy of the defendant is valid and is in accordance with law? (ii) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for possession of the suit property from the defendant? (iii) Whether the defendant proves that the suit is not properly valued and proper court fee is not paid? (iv) Whether the defendant proves that the suit filed by PA Holder is not maintainable? (v) What order?” 5. The power of attorney holder of the plaintiff was examined as P.W.1 and the documents Ex.P1 to Ex.P10 have been marked in his evidence. The defendant has not let in any evidence. On appreciation of the materials on record, the court below has held that the notice terminating the tenancy issued by the plaintiff is valid and that the plaintiff is entitled for vacant possession of the suit schedule property. The court below has further held that the suit filed by the plaintiff through his power of attorney holder is maintainable. The defendant was directed to vacant and hand over vacant possession of the property to the plaintiff within a period of three months. The court below has directed for holding of an enquiry with regard to the payment of damages under Order 20 Rule 12 of the CPC. The suit was accordingly decreed on 21.8.2009. 6. The defendant was directed to vacant and hand over vacant possession of the property to the plaintiff within a period of three months. The court below has directed for holding of an enquiry with regard to the payment of damages under Order 20 Rule 12 of the CPC. The suit was accordingly decreed on 21.8.2009. 6. I have heard Sri K. Giridhar, learned Counsel for the appellant/defendant and Sri S.Rajendra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent/plaintiff. 7. The submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant is two fold. Firstly, it is contended that the plaintiff has not authorised his father C.M.Mallikarjunaiah to initiate action for recovery of possession of the suit schedule property from the defendant. In Ex.P1, the power of attorney, the plaintiff has authorised his father of purchase the property as an investment. It is argued that C.M.Mallikarjunaiah cannot be treated as the recognised agent of the plaintiff under Order 3 Rule 2 of CPC. In Ex.P1, the plaintiff has not authorised C.M.Mallikarjunaiah to act as his power of attorney either for terminating the tenancy or to file a suit for ejectment of the defendant. In this connection, he has relied upon the decision of the Bombay High Court in WESTERN INDIA THEATRE LTD. VS. ISHWARBHAI SOMABHAI PATEL (AIR 1959 BOMBAY 386) and the decision of the apex Court in TIMBLO IRMAOS LTD., MARGO VS. JORGE ANIBAL MATOS SEQUEIRA AND ANOHER [ (1977) 3 SCC 474 ]. Secondly, it is argued that the court below has not afforded reasonable opportunity to the defendant either to cross-examine P.W1 or to lead his evidence. It is contended that the defendant has filed applications-I.A.Nos.12, 13 and 14 on 5.8.2009 for recalling of P.W1. The said applications have been illegally dismissed by the court below. The application filed under Section 151 of the CPC on 17.8.2009 seeking permission to adduce evidence of the defendant has also been rejected by the court below. The appellant is entitled to raise these contentions under Section 105 of the Code of Civil Procedure as it has affected the decision of the case. 3. 8. On the other hand, learned Counsel appealing for the respondent has sought to justify the impugned judgment and decree. The appellant is entitled to raise these contentions under Section 105 of the Code of Civil Procedure as it has affected the decision of the case. 3. 8. On the other hand, learned Counsel appealing for the respondent has sought to justify the impugned judgment and decree. It is argued that the power of attorney at Ex.P1 executed by the plaintiff if favour of his father C.M.Mallikarjunaiah authorises him not only to purchase the properties but also to let out the properties to the tenants, to terminate the tenancy and also to initiate proceedings for ejectment of the tenants. Even otherwise, the plaintiff has ratified the action taken by his father C.M.Mallikarjunaiah. He points out that in the evidence, P.W1 has stated that he has been conducting the case as per the instructions of the plaintiff. The plaintiff has not been cross-examined by the defendant. In the objections filed before this Court to the application-I.A.No.1, the plaintiff has stated that his father used to take instructions as and when it was required over telephone from time to time starting from the date of purchase of the suit schedule property. It is further contended that defendant has been delaying the matter on one pretext or the other. He has taken me through the entire order sheet maintained by Trial Court. It is further submitted that the Court below has granted sufficient opportunity to the defendant. However, the defendant has failed to avail the same. The defendant has not paid the damages for use and occupation of the property for the last one and half years even at the admitted rate. He prays for dismissal of the appeal. 9. In the light of the argument of the learned Counsel made at the Bar, the following points arise for consideration in this appeal: i) Whether the general power of attorney Ex.P1 authorises the father of the plaintiff to initiate action for ejectment of the defendant from the suit schedule property? (i) Whether the defendant has been afforded reasonable opportunity to defend his case? Reg. Point No.(i): 10. Order 3 Rule 1 of the CPC provides for appearance of the party in Court either in person or by recongnised agent or by pleader. (i) Whether the defendant has been afforded reasonable opportunity to defend his case? Reg. Point No.(i): 10. Order 3 Rule 1 of the CPC provides for appearance of the party in Court either in person or by recongnised agent or by pleader. The intendment of this provision is that an appearance, application or act cannot be made or done by any person other than the party himself or by his recognised agent or by a pleader. Order 3 Rule 2(a) of the CPC defines recognised agents of the parties. It states that the recognised agents of the parties by whom such appearances, applications and acts may be made or done are the persons holding power of attorney, authorizing them to make and do such appearances, applications and acts on behalf of such parties. Thus, a holder of a power of attorney is the recognised agent of the party for the purpose of Order 3 Rule 1 of the CPC. 11. Section 1-A of the Power of Attorney Act, 1882 as amended by Act No.55/1982, defines a power of attorney to include any instrument empowering a specified person to act for and in the name of the person executing it. According to Osborn’s Concise Law Dictionary, a power of Attorney means a formal instrument by which one person empowers another to represent him, or act in his stead, for certain purposes, usually in the form of a deed poll, and attested by two witnesses. The donor of the power is called the principal or constituent; the donee is called the attorney. In the Law Lexicon by P.Ramanatha Aiyar, a power of attorney is defined as an authority given by a formal instrument whereby one person who is called the donor or principal, anthorises another person, who is called donee, attorney or agent to act on his behalf. Section 182 of the Indian Contract Act, defines an ‘agent’ and the ‘principal’. An ‘agent’ is a person employed to do any act for another or to represent another in dealings with third persons. The person for whom such act is done or who is so represented is called the ‘principal’. 12. Thus, a power of attorney is an authority given by a formal instrument whereby one person, who is called the donor or principal, authorises another person, who is called the donee, attorney, or agent, to act on his behalf. The person for whom such act is done or who is so represented is called the ‘principal’. 12. Thus, a power of attorney is an authority given by a formal instrument whereby one person, who is called the donor or principal, authorises another person, who is called the donee, attorney, or agent, to act on his behalf. A general power of attorney is one by which authority is given to act for the principal in all matters, or in all matters of a particular nature, or concerning a particular business. A special power of attorney is one by which authority is given to do some particular specified act. The law relating to powers of attorney is a branch of the law of agency. Where the authority of the agent is required to be conferred by a deed, or the circumstances require to appoint an agent formally to act for the principal in one transaction, or a series of transactions, or to manage the affairs of the principal generally, the necessary authority is conferred by an instrument known as power of attorney. It is a document of convenience, which gives a right to the donee to use the name of the principal. 13. Like any other document, a power of attorney may also need judicial interpretation on the facts and circumstances of each case. Normally, the donor will either give restricted or qualified power in favour of the agent or he may give absolute and general power. One has to look at the manner in which the power is given in order to ascertain the extent of power. In BOWSTEAD ON AGENCY – 15TH EDITION at page 98, the author has pointed out the rules of construction applicable to the powers of attorney. They are as under: “(a) The operative part of the deed is controlled by the recitals where there is ambiguity. (b) Where authority is given to do particular acts, followed by general words, the general words are restricted to what is necessary for the proper performance of the particular acts. (c) General words do not confer general power but are limited to the purpose for which the authority is given and are construed as enlarging the special powers only when necessary for the purpose. (d) The deed must be construed so as to include all incidental powers necessary for its effective execution”” 14. (c) General words do not confer general power but are limited to the purpose for which the authority is given and are construed as enlarging the special powers only when necessary for the purpose. (d) The deed must be construed so as to include all incidental powers necessary for its effective execution”” 14. The Privy Council in BANK OF BENGAL VS. RAMANATHAN CHETTY & OTHERS – AIR 1915 PC 121, ha held as under: “Where an act purporting to be done under a power of attorney is challenged as being in excess of the authority conferred by the power, it is necessary to show that on a fair construction of the whole instrument the authority in question is to be found within the four corners of he instrument either In express terms or by necessary implication. Where under a power of attorney the agent had express authority to borrow on behalf of the principal for purposes of leading money to others. The authority to borrow implied an authority to pledge the credit of the principal for the purpose of obtaining or securing advances from others to constituents.” 15. In SYNDICATE BANK, BANGALORE VS. I.K.AMITHA & OTHERS – AIR 1985 KARNATAKA 213, a Division Bench of this Court has laid down the principles, which may be applied for construction of powers of attorney, which are as under: “The following principles may be applied for the construction of powers of attorney, (1) the operative part of the deed is controlled by the recitals where there is ambiguity; (20 where authority is given to do particular acts, followed by general words, the general words are restricted to what is necessary for the proper performance of the particular acts. Rule 1 referred to above will come into operation only when there is ambiguity. If there is no ambiguity, in the conferment of power, then the first principle extracted above need not be applied or referred to.” 16. Section 188 of the Indian Contract Act provides for the extent of agent’s authority. It states that an agent having an authority to do an act, has authority to do every lawful thing, which is necessary in order to do such act. An agent having an authority to carry on a business, has authority to do every lawful thing necessary for the purpose, or usually done in the course, of conducting such business. 17. It states that an agent having an authority to do an act, has authority to do every lawful thing, which is necessary in order to do such act. An agent having an authority to carry on a business, has authority to do every lawful thing necessary for the purpose, or usually done in the course, of conducting such business. 17. It is thus clear that the scope of the power has to be gathered from the language of the document. There is no magic in the nomenclature of a power of attorney being a general power of attorney. The extent of power given by the principal to his agent has to be spelled out on a fair interpretation of the language used therein. The operative part of deed is controlled by the recitals where there is ambiguity. When authority is given to do particular acts followed by general words, the general words are restricted to what is necessary for the proper performance. If power is given to do a particular job, then all the powers usually are necessary to do that job may be assumed. It is not necessary to set out all those powers in detail. It is construed as including all incidental powers necessary for carrying out its object effectively. 18. Keeping the above statutory provisions and principles in mind, let us now examine whether the plaintiff has authorized his father to terminate the tenancy of the defendant and to initiate proceedings for his ejectment under Ex.P.1. In paragraph 1, the donor has stated that he intends to purchase the immovable properties (sites or house property) in and around Bangalore City. But, he has to go back to USA again. As such, it will not be possible for him to contact the owners (sellers) of the property, negotiate with them for purchase of site/house property, to enter into agreement of sale and to pay advance and pay sale consideration in respect of the site/house property to be purchased on his behalf. Therefore, he is appointing, nominating and authorising his father to do the acts, deeds and things stated therein. Clauses 4, 5, 6, 7, 11 and 12 of Ex.P1 are relevant for the purpose of this case, which are as under: “4. Therefore, he is appointing, nominating and authorising his father to do the acts, deeds and things stated therein. Clauses 4, 5, 6, 7, 11 and 12 of Ex.P1 are relevant for the purpose of this case, which are as under: “4. To look after, manage and taken all such measures as my attorney may consider appropriate for protecting my interest in immovable assets and to insure the same against any risk, damage or loss and to present my witness in respect thereof in such manner, as my attorney may consider proper. My Attorney is also authorized to dispose off the immovable property by way of sale for good price to the prospective purchaser/s, receive sale consideration on my behalf, execute sale deed/s and present the same before the Jurisdictional Sub Registrar/s. admit execution of the same and hand over physical possession of the immovable property/s to the prospective purchaser/s. 5. To institute, prosecute and/or defend any manner of action, suit or proceedings and carryout/implement/enforce any agreement decree, order or direction and for any of the purpose thereof to take appropriate measures and institute proceedings. 6. To instruct and employ Solicitors, Attorneys, Advocates, Engineers, Contractors, Chartered Accountants and/or other Professionals and/or consultants for any purpose aforesaid. 7. To ask, demand, sue for recover or receive all moneys or dues or properties now payable or deliverable or hereafter to become payable or deliverable to me on any account whatsoever from any person/s and to give good and valid receipts and discharge thereof. 8. xxxx xxxx xxxx 9. xxxx xxxx xxxx 10. xxxx xxxx xxxx 11. To take all lawful proceedings including distrait action for the recovery of all money and other assets now belonging to me or hereafter to belong to me from any person/s or recovery of damages for breach of any contracts or wrong. 12. AND GENERALLY to do all other acts deed/s and things necessary or expedient in respect of immovable property/s to all intents and purposes as effectively and completely as I myself could do if personally present and acting. 19. The main contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant is that the purpose of executing the general power of attorney by the plaintiff is to authorise his father to purchase and sell the properties with a profit motive. In paragraph 2 of the written statement, the defendant has disputed the execution of power of attorney. 19. The main contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant is that the purpose of executing the general power of attorney by the plaintiff is to authorise his father to purchase and sell the properties with a profit motive. In paragraph 2 of the written statement, the defendant has disputed the execution of power of attorney. In paragraph 13, it is stated that the power of attorney holder has no personal knowledge about the case of the plaintiff and he cannot maintain the suit on the basis of the general power of attorney alleged to have been executed by him in favour of his father. There is absolutely no ambiguity with regard to the power given to the attorney. The purpose of executing the power of attorney is not merely to purchase and sell the properties. Clause 11 of the power of attorney has authorised the attorney to initiate action for recovery of assets belonging to him or hereafter belong to him from any person. Thus, the donor has authorised the donee in clear terms to institute suit against the tenants. If that is so, it should be assumed that all the powers usually necessary to do that act such as terminating the tenancy has to be assumed. It is not necessary to set out all those powers in detail. It is construed as including all incidental powers necessary for carrying out its object effectively (see AIR 1972 GAUHATI 122, between SARDAR BIRSINGH Vs. NOOR AHMED AND OTHERS). It is also to be noted here that the property in question was purchased by the power of attorney as per the sale deed at Ex.P2 dated 20.7.2004 for and on behalf of the plaintiff. The property was let out t the defendant by the plaintiff through the attorney. The defendant had no objection for letting out the property in his favour by the attorney. I am of the view that Ex.P1 confers express power to the attorney to initiate proceedings fro eviction of the defendant from the suit schedule property. 20. In WESTERN INDIA THEATRES LTD. (Supra) relied on by the learned Counsel for the appellant, the Bombay High Court has held that Order 3 Rule 2 of CPC recognises agents on the same footing as the party himself or his pleader. 20. In WESTERN INDIA THEATRES LTD. (Supra) relied on by the learned Counsel for the appellant, the Bombay High Court has held that Order 3 Rule 2 of CPC recognises agents on the same footing as the party himself or his pleader. Therefore, so long as the power of attorney had the necessary authorisation, no further question as to the nature of the power of attorney had to be considered and the person holding the power of attorney would be able to act as a recognized agent within the meaning of Order 3 Rule 2. It has been further held that although the power of attorney must authorise the agent to do necessary acts, this authority must appear not in a special power of attorney but a general power of attorney. The interpretation of the expression “general power of attorney” must be made on general principles of law and not in the light of any provision contained in Order 3 Rule 2 itself, because all that Order 3 Rule 2 requires is that whatever be the power of attorney, that power of attorney must confer the necessary power upon the agent. In TIMBLO IRMAOS LTD., MARGO (Supra), the Apex Court has held that the most important factor in interpreting a power of attorney is the purpose for which it is executed, which must appear primarily from the terms of the power of attorney itself and it is only if there is an unresolved problem left by the language of the document, there is a need to consider the manner in which the words used could be related to the facts and circumstances of the case or the nature or course of dealings. Both the decisions are not applicable to the facts of this case having regard to the clear language contained in Ex.P.1. 21. Even otherwise, it is clear from the materials on record that the plaintiff has ratified the action initiated by the power of attorney holder to evict the defendant from the suit schedule property. In this regard, it is relevant to look into clause 13 of Ex.P1, which is as under: “13. AND HEREBY agree and undertake at all times hereafter to ratify and confirm all and whatever my Attorney may lawfully do by virtue of these present.” 22. In this regard, it is relevant to look into clause 13 of Ex.P1, which is as under: “13. AND HEREBY agree and undertake at all times hereafter to ratify and confirm all and whatever my Attorney may lawfully do by virtue of these present.” 22. ‘Ratification’ means adoption by a person, as binding on himself, of an act done in such relations that he may claim it as done for his benefit, although done under such circumstances as would not bind him, except for his subsequent assent, as where an act was done by a stranger having at the time no authority to act as his agent, or by an agent not having adequate authority. In The Law Lexicon by Sri.P.Ramantha Aiyar, the meaning assigned to the word ‘ratify’ is to make valid, to confirm, to sanction an act already done, to give sanction and validity to something done without authority, to give validity to the act of another, usually to approve or confirm by a principal what has been done by an agent or one assuming to act for another. A ratification when fairly made, will have the same effect as an original authority has, to bind the principal, not only in regard to the agent himself but in regard to third persons, and the ratification relates back to the inception of the transaction, and has a complete retroactive efficacy. The ratification is equivalent to antecedent authority. This rule is recognised in Section 196 of the Indian Contract Act, which states that where acts are done by one person on behalf of another, but without his knowledge or authority, he may elect to ratify or to disown such acts. If he ratifies them, the same effect will follow as if they had been performed by his authority. 23. Te power of attorney holder of the plaintiff was examined as P.W1. In his evidence, he has stated that the plaintiff has executed general power of attorney dated 4.2.2004 in his favour and the same is registered in the office of the Sub-Registrar, Jayangar, Bangalore. In his cross-examination, he has stated that he is conducting the case as per the instructions of the plaintiff. The plaintiff has filed objections to the application Misc.Cvl.22886/2009 filed by the appellant seeking stay of the impugned judgment and decree. In his cross-examination, he has stated that he is conducting the case as per the instructions of the plaintiff. The plaintiff has filed objections to the application Misc.Cvl.22886/2009 filed by the appellant seeking stay of the impugned judgment and decree. In his objections, he has stated that he had executed the power of attorney appointing his father as his agent/attorney, authorising him to look after, manage and take all such measures as he considers appropriate for protecting his interest in the immovable property including power to institute, prosecute and defend in any manner of suit or proceedings for any purpose. He has farther stated that his father used to keep him informed and would take instructions as and when it was required orally either in person or over telephone from time to time starting from the date the schedule property was purchased from the appellant and subsequent dates when the appellant was inducted to the schedule property as a tenant, issuance of quite notice, filing of the suit, giving evidence and prosecute the matter. As such, he had authorised his father to do the above acts. He had filed the execution petition by himself, as he is currently in Bangalore. He has ratified all the acts done by his father. From the conduct of the plaintiff, it is manifest that even if it is assumed that express power ha not been granted under Ex.P.1, the plaintiff has ratified the action of the attorney in terminating the tenancy of the defendant, filing of suit for his ejectment from the property and pursuing the suit at every stage till the date of decree. Point No.(i) if answered accordingly. Reg. Point No.(ii): 24. Learned Counsel for the appellant contends that the appellant/defendant was not afforded reasonable opportunity to defend the suit. The applications-I.A.Nos.12, 13 and 14 filed by him have been illegally rejected by the court below. In order to ascertain as to whether the appellant was afforded reasonable opportunity or not, it is necessary to look into the order sheet maintained by the trial Court. The plaintiff was examined in chief as P.W.1 on 17.1.2006. He was cross-examined on 30.1.2006 and on 17.2.2006, he was further cross-examined. The suit was posted to 10.3.2006 for the evidence of the defendant. On that day, time was sought by the defending and the matter was posted to 17.3.2006. The plaintiff was examined in chief as P.W.1 on 17.1.2006. He was cross-examined on 30.1.2006 and on 17.2.2006, he was further cross-examined. The suit was posted to 10.3.2006 for the evidence of the defendant. On that day, time was sought by the defending and the matter was posted to 17.3.2006. However, the defendant did not lead evidence and the matter was posted to 23.3.2006. On that day also, the defendant did not lead his evidence. Therefore, the evidence of the defendant was treated as ‘nil’ and the matter was posted for arguments on 28.3.2006. At the request of the defendant, the matter was posted again to 7.4.2006. On the day, the defendant filed an application I.A. No.3 to recall the order dated 23.3.2006 and to permit him to lead his evidence. The application was allowed on payment of cost of Rs.200/- and the matter was posted for defendant’s evidence to 18.4.2006. Even on that day, the defendant did not lead evidence and the matter was again posted to 2.6.2006, 13.6.2006, 14.7.2006. On all these dates, the defendant did not lead evidence. On that date, the case was posted to 5.9.2006 for filing objections to I.A.No.5 filed under Order 1 Rule 10(2) of the CPC by S.R. Akash and S.R. Preetham, the sons of the defendant. The case was again posted for hearing of the applications to 6.3.2007, 17.3.2007, 28.5.2007, 2.6.2007, 10.7.2007 and 6.8.2007. On that day, I.A.No.6 was filed by the plaintiff seeking a direction to the defendant to pay or deposit a sum of Rs.1,20,000/- being the arrears of damages for use and occupation of the suit schedule property. Thereafter, the case was posted to 22.8.2007 and 11.9.2007. On 11.9.2007, since objections to I.A.6 objection was not filed, the matter was posted for hearing I.A.Nos.5 and 6 to 12.10.2007 and 3.11.2007. On 3.11.2007, I.A.No.7 was filed by the plaintiff to recall the order dated 11.9.2007. Thereafter, the case was posted on different dates. On 11.2.2008, I.A.No.5 foiled by the applicants was dismissed and I.A.No.6 filed by plaintiff was allowed in part. Again, the case was posted to 25.3.2008 and thereafter to different dates. On 15.9.2008, the defendant filed I.A.No.10 to adjourn the case beyond 15 days. The said application was allowed on payment of costs of Rs.500/- and the case was posted to 20.10.2008 for the evidence of the defendant as a last chance. Again, the case was posted to 25.3.2008 and thereafter to different dates. On 15.9.2008, the defendant filed I.A.No.10 to adjourn the case beyond 15 days. The said application was allowed on payment of costs of Rs.500/- and the case was posted to 20.10.2008 for the evidence of the defendant as a last chance. On 20.10.2008, another application I.A.No.11 was filed under Order 1 Rule 10(2) of the CPC by S.R.Akash, son of the defendant for impleading himself as defendant No.2. Thereafter, the case was posted to 5.11.2008 and again to 21.11.2008. On 2.12.2008, I.A.No.11 was dismissed with cost of Rs.1,000/- and the matter was posted for defendant’s evidence to 19.1.2009 and again to 30.1.2009. The matter was again adjourned to 7.2.2009 at the request of the learned Counsel for the defendant on payment of cost of Rs.500/-. On that day, the defendant filed an application I.A.No.12 under Order 18 Rule 17 of the CPC to recall P.W1 and permit the defendant further cross-examine him. The matter was thereafter adjourned to different dates. On 16.7.2009, I.A. NO.12 was posted for orders to 18.7.2009. On that date, the defendant filed two other applications I.A.Nos.13 and 14 to advance the case and to recall the order dated 16.7.2009. I.A.Nos.12, 13 and 14 were dismissed by the court below on 5.8.2009. Thereafter, the case was posted for evidence of the defendant to 13.8.2009 and on 14.8.2009. On that day, the case was posted for judgment to 20.8.2009. In the meantime (i.e. on 17.8.2009), the defendant filed another application to recall the order dated 14.8.2009, to advance the case on 18.8.2009 and permit him to adduce evidence. On 20.8.2009, the said application was dismissed. It is well settled that a party can challenge the interlocutory orders passed in a suit along with the appeal filed against the original decree if that interlocutory order has affected the decision of the case as provided under Section 105 of the CPC. The court below while dismissing the applications-I.A.Nos.12, 13, and 14 has observed as under: “In my opinion, the application is filed just to delay the matter in spite of giving sufficient opportunity to lead the evidence, the defendant has not lead the evidence. Therefore, the application is belated one and therefore, there is no merit in the applications. Hence, I.A.No.12 is rejected and consequently, I.A.No.14 is also rejected.” 25. Therefore, the application is belated one and therefore, there is no merit in the applications. Hence, I.A.No.12 is rejected and consequently, I.A.No.14 is also rejected.” 25. The application filed on 17.8.2009 under Section 151 of the CPC was dismissed holding that the defendant was granted all kinds of adjournments. The other reason for dismissal of the application was that the case was already posted for judgment. It is well settled that when the mater is posted for judgment, the question of filing an application to re-open the case and record further evidence does not arise (see ARJUN SINGH Vs. MOHINDRA KUMAR – AIR 1964 SC 993 AND ILR 2004 KAR 2215 between RABIYA BI KASSIM M vs. THE COUNTRY WIDE CONSUMER FINANCIAL SERVIES LTD.). The defendant has not availed the ample opportunities granted by the trial court to lead his evidence. He has been protracting the matter in one pretext or the other. In my opinion, the above orders do not call for interference. Point No.(ii) is answered accordingly. 26. Learned Counsel for the plaintiff submits that the conduct of the defendant is such that he should not be granted any time to vacate the property. Normally, while dismissing an appeal filed by the defendant arising out of an ejectment decree, this Court grants reasonable time to vacate the premises. This is not a fit case for exercise of such a discretion. It is well established that a person, who comes in equity, must do equity. The conduct of the defendant is one of the important considerations while exercising such discretion. In this connection, it is apposite to quote a passage from the decision of the Apex Court in NAMDEO LOKMAN LODHI Vs. NARMADA BAI AND OTHERS ( AIR 1953 SC 228 ). Which is as under: “In our opinion, in exercising the discretion, each case must be judged by itself, the delay, the conduct of the parties and the difficulties to which the landlord has been put should be weighed against the tenant. This was the view taken by the Madras High Court in Appayya Shetty V. Mahammad Beari, AIR 1916 MAD 680(2) (U), and the matter was discussed at some length. We agree with the ratio of that decision. This was the view taken by the Madras High Court in Appayya Shetty V. Mahammad Beari, AIR 1916 MAD 680(2) (U), and the matter was discussed at some length. We agree with the ratio of that decision. It is a maxim of equity that a person who comes in equity must do equity and must come with clean hands and if the conduct of the tenant is such that it disentitles him to relief in equity, then the Court’s hands are not tied to exercise it in his favour.” 27. In the present case, the duration of the lease was from 23.7.2004 to 31.12.2004. Instead of vacating the property after the period of lease, the defendant has played every possible tactics to prolong the suit. He has not even paid up to date damages for use and occupation of the property. However, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, I deem it proper to grant time till 31.7.2010 to vacate and handover vacate possession of the property in question to the defendant. 28. In there result, the appeal fails and it is accordingly dismissed. The appellant is granted time till 31.7.2010 subject to his filing an affidavit undertaking to voluntarily vacate and hand over vacate possession of the property in question to the respondent/plaintiff and subject to payment of arrears of damages. The affidavit as above shall be filed within a period of six weeks from today. No costs. Draw the decree accordingly.