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2010 DIGILAW 27 (PAT)

SUDHIR KUMAR THAKUR v. STATE OF BIHAR

2010-01-10

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ORAL JUDGMENT (HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE JYOTI SARAN) As all these writ petitions involve common issues of facts and law, hence they have been taken up together for hearing and disposal on merits. Upon perusal of the records of the proceeding it is to be found that although C.W.J.C. No. 13769 of 2004 and C.W.J.C. No. 15767 of 2004 were admitted for hearing vide order dated 9.10.2006 recorded in C.W.J.C. No. 13769 of 2004 but C.W.J.C. No. 1608 of 2004 being heard by a learned Single Judge of this Court, although was referred to the Division Bench under the order dated 26.11.2007 in view of the commonness of the issues raised in the three writ petitions but no orders admitting the same for hearing has been passed. In the aforesaid circumstances, C.W.J.C. No. 1608 of 2004 is admitted for hearing and has been taken up along with other connected writ petitions. As all the contesting parties to the proceedings have appeared and have filed their respective affidavits, no fresh notice needs to be issued. For the sake of convenience, we shall be referring to the facts exposit from C.W.J.C. No. 1608 of 2004 and Annexures appended thereto unless specified with specific reference to the other writ petitions. The facts in brief giving rise to the present proceedings is that a Land Acquisition proceeding was initiated by the State as far back as in the year 1981 when a Notification dated 25.3.1981 under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) was published in the District Gazette, Bhagalpur on 1.4.1981 in connection with acquisition of 29.38 acres of land owned by a firm namely M/s Soorajmull Nagarmull situated within the Bhagalpur Municipality, Ward No. 3, Mohalla Barari (Sundarban), District-Bhagalpur for public purpose viz. Construction of the office of the Conservator of Forests and for construction of residential premises. Copy of the Notification is placed at Annexure-A to the supplementary counter affidavit filed on behalf of the State respondents. Following the Notification under Section 4, a declaration was issued under Section 6 of the Act on 25.3.1981 which also was published in the District Gazette, Bhagalpur on 1.4.1981 (Annexure-B). Copy of the Notification is placed at Annexure-A to the supplementary counter affidavit filed on behalf of the State respondents. Following the Notification under Section 4, a declaration was issued under Section 6 of the Act on 25.3.1981 which also was published in the District Gazette, Bhagalpur on 1.4.1981 (Annexure-B). As the acquisition was made under the emergency provisions of Section 17(4) of the Act, hence waiving the requirements as provided under Section 5A of the Act, the possession of the land was taken over on 20.8.1981(Annexure-3 to C.W.J.C. No. 15767/2004) under the order dated 27.6.1981(Annexure-D), whereby the State Government directed the Collector, Bhagalpur under Section 17(1) of the Act to take possession of the land in question upon expiry of 15 days from the date of declaration made under Section 6 of the Act. A mistake in relation to the area of proposed acquisition in the Notification and the declaration dated 25.3.1981 led to issuance of a corrigendum on 19.10.1981 (Annexure-C) which was published in the District Gazette on 16.8.1982. Even while the proceeding initiated in 1981 remained inconclusive for reasons unknown, a second proceeding was initiated by the respondent State when they issued a notice under Section 4 of the Act dated 24.5.1995 published in the District Gazette, Bhagalpur on 1.6.1995 in relation to a proposed acquisition of land measuring 0.55 acres situated at Ward No. 3, Sundarban within the Bhagalpur Municipality. The said Notification was followed by another Notification dated 17.8.1996 issued under the emergency provisions of Section 17 of the Act, thus waiving of the requirements as provided under Section 5A of the Act. Copies of the Notifications are placed at Annexures-2 and 3 to the writ petitions. The petitioner Kishori Lal Jalan, the land owner, challenged the proceedings by filing a writ petition giving rise to C.W.J.C. No. 3339 of 1997 which was heard and allowed by a Bench of this Court vide order passed on 22.7.1998 (Annexure-4). The Notification dated 13.8.1996 was set aside. Following the order of this court (supra), the respondents took steps to withdraw the second proceedings vide memo dated 8.9.2003 (Annexure-5) and 13.9.2003 (Annexure-6). The withdrawal proceedings culminated in a Notification issued under Section 48 of the Act dated 17.11.2003 which was published in the District Gazette, Bhagalpur on 24.11.2003 (Annexure-1). The Notification dated 13.8.1996 was set aside. Following the order of this court (supra), the respondents took steps to withdraw the second proceedings vide memo dated 8.9.2003 (Annexure-5) and 13.9.2003 (Annexure-6). The withdrawal proceedings culminated in a Notification issued under Section 48 of the Act dated 17.11.2003 which was published in the District Gazette, Bhagalpur on 24.11.2003 (Annexure-1). It is at this stage that petitioner Kishori Lal Jalan claiming partnership in the Land owner firm filed the writ petition giving rise to C.W.J.C. No. 1608 of 2004, seeking, inter alia, amongst others, a direction commanding the respondents to release the land in question and handover its possession to him after removing their movables. In and around the same time the Forest Department also filed a writ petition giving rise to C.W.J.C. No. 15767 of 2004, through the Divisional Forest Officer challenging the action of the State authorities in withdrawing the acquisition proceedings and seeking a further direction for restraining the concerned authorities of the State Government from dispossessing the Forest Department from the land in question which had since been declared a protected forest under the provisions of Section 29 of the Indian Forest Act. A Public Interest Litigation also joined the two writ petitions filed on behalf of a public spirited person Sunil Kumar Singh claiming to be an advocate, a social activist and a public spirited person having keen interest in the protection of forest. The writ petition was registered as C.W.J.C. No. 13769 of 2004. While the writ petitions were pending consideration before this Court an award purportedly in continuity of the 1981 Acquisition proceedings was made for an amount of Rs.73,05,076/- on 27.9.2006 (Annexure-G) followed by a notice, issued under Section 12(2) of the Act on the same date by the Land Acquisition Officer (Annexure-H to the supplementary counter affidavit). As the writ petitions raised common issues, hence they have been taken up together with a view to its final disposal. Mr. Surjit Mitra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the land owner, claiming precedence over counsel representing other writ petitioners in view of the registered seniority of his writ petition, questioned the jurisdiction of the authorities of the State Government as well as Forest Department in not taking appropriate steps for handing over the possession of land in question despite the withdrawal notification as contained in Annexure-1. Learned counsel with reference to the State amendment to Section 17 of the Act incorporated under the Land Acquisition (Bihar Amendment) Act, 1960 (11 of 1961), submits that as per the State amendment, Section 17(1) of the Act only applied to waste and arable land notwithstanding the extinction of forest, orchard or trees. He submits that the land in question is within the Bhagalpur Municipality and hence it is neither situate in a village nor can be termed as waste or arable. He thus submits that in absence of fulfillment of this prerequisite to Section 17(1) of the Act, the impugned action becomes sustainable. Learned counsel in support of his submission relies upon a judgment rendered in the case of Sadruddin Suleman Jhaveri Vs. J.H. Patwardhan & Ors. reported in A.I.R. 1965, Bombay 224. Learned counsel further with reference to Section 17(3) of the State amendment goes on to submit that in absence of any offer made and compensation paid in relation to the standing trees and orchards present over the land in question the said condition does not stand satisfied rendering the acquisition void ab initio. Learned counsel relies upon a judgment rendered in the case of Hukumchand Shyam Lal versus Union reported in (1976) 2 SCC 128 , in support of the proposition that where a statute prescribes that an act be performed in a particular manner, it can only be done in that manner alone and all other modes would be strictly forbidden. Learned counsel contends that the very initiation of the second proceeding in and around the period 1995-96 by itself manifests that the first proceeding initiated in the year 1981 stood lapsed. Learned counsel questioning the invocation of the urgency clause by the respondents for acquisition of the land in question submits that the very march of event belies the urgency clause invoked by the State. He further submits that the absence of proper expression in the Notification demonstrating urgency, also has vitiated the proceeding. It is contended that construction of residence and office does not satisfy the invocation of urgency clause. Learned counsel in support of his submission relied upon the following judgments of the Supreme Court: (i) (2002) 7 SCC 98 (Union of India & Ors. Vs. Shakuntala Gupta); (ii) (2004) 8 SCC 453 (Union of India & Ors. Vs. Kishan Lal Arneja & Ors.), paragraph 16,21, 29 and 30. Learned counsel in support of his submission relied upon the following judgments of the Supreme Court: (i) (2002) 7 SCC 98 (Union of India & Ors. Vs. Shakuntala Gupta); (ii) (2004) 8 SCC 453 (Union of India & Ors. Vs. Kishan Lal Arneja & Ors.), paragraph 16,21, 29 and 30. Learned counsel submits that the provisions of Section 17(4) of the Act entails a publication of declaration after the Notification and as in the present case both the Notifications under Section 4 as well as the declaration under Section 6 were issued on the same date i.e. 25.3.1981 and published in the District Gazette on 1.4.1981, hence they were issued in contravention of the explicit provisions of Section 17(4) thus vitiating the proceedings. Learned counsel in support of his contention relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Raghunath & Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. reported in A.I.R. 1988 SC 1615, paragraph-9. Learned counsel submits that though the respondents have published an award under Section 12(2) of the Act purported to be in continuation of the acquisition proceedings initiated in the year 1981 and copy whereof is placed at Annexures-G and H of the supplementary counter affidavit filed on behalf of the State but in view of the accompanying circumstances where the State itself treating the first proceeding as having lapsed and having gone in for a second acquisition proceeding which has since been quashed by a Bench of this Court and not questioned by any of the parties before any superior Court and thus having attained finality and having become binding on the respective parties, the award is wholly without jurisdiction and void ab initio. Learned counsel submits that the action of the respondents in making the award in 2006 after having issued the withdrawal notification on 17.11.2003, published in the Gazette on 24.11.2003, is a malafide act aimed at circumventing the order passed by this Court quashing the 1996 acquisition proceedings. Learned counsel, however, admits not having challenged either the first acquisition proceeding initiated in the year 1981 or the award published pursuant thereto as present at Annexures-G and H of the supplementary counter affidavit, inter alia, on grounds of the proceedings having lapsed as per the statutory provisions and the publication of award in the circumstances was void ab initio. Learned counsel, however, admits not having challenged either the first acquisition proceeding initiated in the year 1981 or the award published pursuant thereto as present at Annexures-G and H of the supplementary counter affidavit, inter alia, on grounds of the proceedings having lapsed as per the statutory provisions and the publication of award in the circumstances was void ab initio. Learned counsel concluding his arguments submits that in view of the judicial pronouncement present at Annexure-4 of the writ petition, the respondent authorities of the State including the Forest Department are under a duty and obligation to forthwith remove their movables from the land in question and hand over its possession to the petitioners. The arguments on behalf of the beneficiary Forest Department was led by Mr. Vinod Kumar Kanth, learned senior counsel appearing for the Divisional Forest Officer, Sudhir Kumar Thakur in C.W.J.C. No. 15767 of 2004. As indicated, the writ petition was filed seeking a restraint from handing over the possession of the land in question to the land owner, inter alia, on grounds of the same having the only forest adjoining the township of Bhagalpur supporting a large flora and fauna including variety of birds and animals, some of which were on the verge of extinction by reason of the growing menace of denudation of forests. The petitioner has also questioned the withdrawal Notification issued under Section 48 of the Act dated 17.11.2003 (Annexure-12 to C.W.J.C. No. 15767 of 2004) as well as the order dated 26.12.2003 (Annexure-13 to C.W.J.C. No. 15676 of 2004) issued by the Collector, Bhagalpur directing the Forest Officer to hand over the land in question to the petitioner in compliance of the order passed in C.W.J.C. No. 3339 of 2007. Learned counsel for the petitioner Divisional Forest Officer questioning the action of the authorities in issuing the Notification of withdrawal and the direction regarding handing over of the possession of the land in question to the land owner submitted that the directions are contrary to the express provision of the Land Acquisition Act. Learned counsel with reference to a letter dated 13.11.1979 (Annexure-1 to C.W.J.C. No. 15767 of 2004), submits that the Commissioner, Bhagalpur Division had opined for establishment of a forest division at the Sundarban. Learned counsel with reference to a judgment reported in A.I.R. 1984 Patna 45, (Mangtoo Ram Vs. Learned counsel with reference to a letter dated 13.11.1979 (Annexure-1 to C.W.J.C. No. 15767 of 2004), submits that the Commissioner, Bhagalpur Division had opined for establishment of a forest division at the Sundarban. Learned counsel with reference to a judgment reported in A.I.R. 1984 Patna 45, (Mangtoo Ram Vs. State of Bihar & Ors.) paragraph 13, submits that the Notifications under Sections 4 and 17(4) can be simultaneously issued. Learned counsel with reference to a letter dated 27.6.1981 (Annexure-2 to C.W.J.C. No. 15767 of 2004) submits that a direction, in the light of the Notification under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6, was issued to the Collector, Bhagalpur for taking possession over the land in question and pursuant whereto the possession was handed over on 20.8.1981 which is evident from the certificate issued under Form-19 placed at Annexure-3 of the writ petition. Learned counsel with reference to a Notification dated 4.9.1990 (Annexure-7 to C.W.J.C. No. 15767 of 2004), submits that a declaration under Section 29 of the Indian Forest Act has been made declaring the land in question as protected forest. He submits that the withdrawal of the second proceeding in the light of the judgment and order passed by this Court in C.W.J.C. No. 3339 of 1997 in no manner affected the first proceeding initiated in the year 1981 and which remained valid as no Notification under Section 48 of the Act withdrawing the said proceeding was ever issued by the State. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the records of the proceedings itself shows that the land in question indeed was acquired under the first proceeding initiated in the year 1981, the possession taken over and vested in the Forest Department as back as in the year 1981 itself and that the said proceeding could not be annulled simply by reason of initiation of the second proceeding. Learned counsel in support of his proposition relied upon the following judgments of the Supreme Court, namely: (i) (1970) 2 SCC 149 (LT. Governor of Himachal Pradesh & Anr. Vs. Sri Avinash Sharma), paragraph- 4, 5, 7 and 8. (ii) (1972) 1 SCC 714 (M/s. Jethmull Bhojraj Vs. State of Bihar & Ors.), paragraph-10. Learned counsel in support of his proposition relied upon the following judgments of the Supreme Court, namely: (i) (1970) 2 SCC 149 (LT. Governor of Himachal Pradesh & Anr. Vs. Sri Avinash Sharma), paragraph- 4, 5, 7 and 8. (ii) (1972) 1 SCC 714 (M/s. Jethmull Bhojraj Vs. State of Bihar & Ors.), paragraph-10. Learned counsel further submits that the provisions of Section 11A is not applicable to an acquisition proceeding initiated under the urgency provisions of Section 17(1) of the Act and thus the delay caused in preparation of the award pursuant to the 1981 acquisition proceedings would not vitiate the proceedings, however the Land owner would be at liberty to claim interest for the delay as per the statutory provisions. He relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in (1993) 4 SCC 369 (Satendra Prasad Jain & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.), paragraph-14 and 15. He thus submits that the non-challenge of the first proceeding by the land owner pursuant whereto the possession of the Lands have been taken over by the State and vested in the forest department has created a vested legal right in the Forest Department and which cannot be annulled by reason of the withdrawal Notification issued under Section 48 of the Act withdrawing the second proceeding initiated in the year 1996. He, with reference to the judicial pronouncement on the issue submits that a land acquisition proceeding initiated under the emergency provisions cannot be nullified merely on delay in the publication of the award nor can the possession vested in the beneficiary be nullified. He submits that these important relevant facts could never be brought to the notice of the learned Judge passing the order in C.W.J.C. No. 3339 of 1997 for the reason that the Divisional Forest Officer or the concerned department was never arrayed as a party respondent to the said proceeding. Mr. Kanth, learned senior counsel concluding his arguments submitted that in the circumstances that the 1981 proceeding was never put to challenge by the land owner coupled with the fact that the land in question has been declared protected forest and that the Forest Department is in possession of the land right since 1981 pursuant to emergency acquisition, the petitioners cannot be divested of their possession. Mr. Shambhu Saran Singh, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner Mr. Mr. Shambhu Saran Singh, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner Mr. Sunil Kumar Singh in the Public Interest Litigation bearing C.W.J.C. No. 13769 of 2004 supported the arguments advanced on behalf of the Forest Department and submitted that any interference with the possession of the Forest Department over the land in question would adversely affect the flora and fauna of the area and that the area having been declared a protected forest under section 29 of the Indian Forest Act, the occasion does not warrant interference with the possession of the Forest Department over the land in question in the larger Public Interest involved. Mr. Lalit Kishore, learned Additional Advocate General No. 3 appearing on behalf of the State more or less proceeding from where Mr. Kanth and Mr. Singh had concluded their respective arguments, submits that the owner of the land in question was a firm by the name and style of M/s. Soorajmull Nagarmull having its registered office at Kolkata. He submits that the firm never chose to question the proceedings rather one of the partners has chosen to raise the issue before this Court. He submits that the acquisition proceeding initiated in the year 1981 was never questioned either by the firm or the present petitioner nor the same has been questioned in the present proceedings. He submits that in absence of any challenge to the 1981 proceeding the same would be deemed to be in accordance with law. Learned counsel submits that the 1995-96 proceeding was wholly unwarranted and could not have an effect of annulment of the earlier proceeding under which the title and possession had already passed on to the State. Learned counsel with reference to the Notification issued under Section 17(4) read with Section 4 of the Act dated 25.3.1981 (Annexure-A) and the declaration under Section 6 of the Act dated 25.3.1981 (Annexure-B), submits that the same having been published in the District Gazette manifests the commencement of the acquisition proceeding and pursuant whereto orders were issued to the Collector on 27.6.1981 for taking over of the possession of the land in question within 15 days of Section-6 declaration. Learned counsel with reference to Annexure-3 of C.W.J.C. No. 15767 of 2004 dated 20.8.1981, submits that the same is a certification that the possession of the land in question was handed over to the Forest Department. Learned counsel with reference to Annexure-3 of C.W.J.C. No. 15767 of 2004 dated 20.8.1981, submits that the same is a certification that the possession of the land in question was handed over to the Forest Department. Learned counsel for the State submits that once the possession of the land was taken over by the State the title vested in the State and could not be annulled by any subsequent proceeding. He submits that the second proceeding initiated in the year 1996 was under a misconception and was rightly withdrawn under the Notification dated 17.11.2003 published in the Gazette on 24.11.2003 (Annexure-1). Learned counsel for the State submits that the Notification dated 4.9.1990 declaring the land in question as protected forest under Section 29 of the Indian Forest Act further strengthens the cause of the State and the object for which the lands were acquired. Learned counsel with reference to a judgment rendered in the case of P. Chinnanna & Ors. Vs. State of A.P. & Ors. reported in (1994) 5 SCC 486 , paragraph-10 submits that any infirmity in the subsequent Notification would not have an adverse effect on the earlier proceeding which can be driven to its logical conclusion following the provisions of the Act and the parameters set out thereunder. Learned counsel in support of his submissions submit that the provisions of Section 11A does not apply to acquisition proceeding initiated under Section 17 of the Act and relies upon a judgment reported in (1996) 3 SCC 124 (U.P. Jal Nigam, Lucknow through its Chairman & Anr. Vs. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd., Lucknow), paragraph-3. Learned counsel for the State concluding his arguments submits that though the writ petitioner-land owner was aware that the first proceeding initiated in 1981 was never withdrawn, he did not choose to challenge the said proceeding or to amend his relief and in which view no relief could be granted to the petitioner in the present proceeding. Learned counsel in support of his submission relied upon a judgment rendered in the case of Smt. Mridula Chandra & Ors. Vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. reported in 1995 (2) P.L.J.R. 619, Paragraph-14. Mr. Learned counsel in support of his submission relied upon a judgment rendered in the case of Smt. Mridula Chandra & Ors. Vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. reported in 1995 (2) P.L.J.R. 619, Paragraph-14. Mr. Surjit Mitra, learned senior counsel responding to the arguments made by the learned counsel appearing in the other two writ petitions as well as learned State counsel submits that the subsequent development of declaration of the land in question as a protected forest cannot affect the issue as to whether the acquisition proceeding satisfied the procedural norms set out under the Act. He submits that neither the counsel appearing on behalf of the State nor the counsel appearing for the Department of Forest have responded to the issue raised by the petitioner that the nature of acquisition did not demonstrate any urgency inasmuch as acquisition with purpose of construction of residential houses and office cannot be a good ground for invoking the urgency clause. He submits that there is no document on the record of the proceeding demonstrating the taking over of the possession by the Collector. He further submits that the State Government or the Forest Department have also not responded to the issue raised by the land owner regarding non compliance of the provisions of Section 17(3) of the State Amendment. Learned counsel in response to the issue raised by the State and the Department of the Forest that in absence of the challenge to the 1981 proceeding no relief can be granted to the petitioner, submits that there was no requirement for the petitioner to challenge the same in view of the categorical statement made by the State counsel in the earlier proceeding and taken note of by the learned Judge disposing of the writ petition bearing C.W.J.C. No. 3339 of 1997 that the earlier proceeding stood lapsed. He nevertheless submits that reply of the petitioner to the supplementary counter affidavit of the State contains all the challenges and objections to the acquisition. He submits that the vesting of title has to be in accordance with law and State cannot adopt a circuitous method contrary to the legal position. He submits that the case laws relied upon by the Department of Forest as well as State-respondent were in circumstances where the State authority was trying to avoid acquisition. He submits that the vesting of title has to be in accordance with law and State cannot adopt a circuitous method contrary to the legal position. He submits that the case laws relied upon by the Department of Forest as well as State-respondent were in circumstances where the State authority was trying to avoid acquisition. Learned counsel in support of the objection raised by the State regarding the locus of the petitioner to question the proceeding, submits that the petitioner being the only surviving partner in the firm had complete locus to question the validity of the proceeding. He thus submits that there is no merit in the contentions raised in the other two writ petitions or in the statement of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State and which are fit to be rejected and that the writ petition filed on behalf of the land owner bearing C.W.J.C. No. 1608 of 2004 is fit to be allowed in terms of the relief prayed therein and the possession of the land in question should be handed over to the petitioner-land owner without any further delay. We have heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners in the three writ petitions and the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State and have perused the materials on record of the proceeding. The issues which require consideration of this Court can be broadly classified as follows: (I) Whether the 1981 acquisition proceedings would deem to have lapsed upon non preparation of award within 2 years of section 6 declaration in terms of section 11A of the Act or would stand protected under the statutory provisions of section 17(1) as held by the judicial pronouncements and the preparation and publication of the award in the year 2006 would be sufficient compliance of the statutory provisions. (II) The second acquisition proceeding initiated in 1996 having been quashed under the orders of this Court dated 22.07.1998 passed in C.W.J.C. No. 3339 of 1997 as present at Annexure-4 to the writ petition followed by the withdrawal notification (Annexure-1 ) would it impliedly, also bring to end the acquisition proceedings of 1981. (II) The second acquisition proceeding initiated in 1996 having been quashed under the orders of this Court dated 22.07.1998 passed in C.W.J.C. No. 3339 of 1997 as present at Annexure-4 to the writ petition followed by the withdrawal notification (Annexure-1 ) would it impliedly, also bring to end the acquisition proceedings of 1981. (III) Whether, notwithstanding the order of this Court as present at Annexure-4 and the withdrawal notification Annexure-1, the State yet can exercise domain over the land in question by reason of the first proceeding initiated in the year 1981 pursuant to the notifications and declarations present at Annexures-A, B and D to the supplementary counter affidavit read with Annexure-3 to C.W.J.C. No. 15767/2004, more particularly for the reason that the same have neither been withdrawn by the State in exercise of power under Section 48 of the Act nor has been challenged by the petitioner. (IV) Whether the petitioner land owner never having questioned the validity of the first acquisition proceeding the same would deem to have attained finality upon taking over of the possession and vesting of the same in the State in its Forest Department as manifest from Annexure-D and Annexure-3 to C.W.J.C. No. 15767 of 2004 (V) If the propositions set out above is rendered against the petitioner-land owner then what would be the amount of compensation, solatium and interest payable to the petitioner. In normal circumstances, there would have been no hesitation in accepting the prayer of the petitioner and directing the restoration of the possession of the lands in question to him by reason of the orders present at Annexure 4 passed by this Court which was followed by the withdrawal notification under section 48 of the Act as contained in Annexure-1. In fact, no issue for contest does arise in so far as the second acquisition proceedings initiated in 1996 is concerned and the proceedings would cease to exist upon issuance of the Gazette Notification dated 24.11.2003. The issue still remains whether the said eventuality in any manner acts favourable to the petitioner. Undisputedly, rather admittedly, the 1981 acquisition proceedings neither has been withdrawn by the state Government nor at any stage challenged by the petitioner or the firm to which he claims to be a partner to the extent of 16 annas. The issue still remains whether the said eventuality in any manner acts favourable to the petitioner. Undisputedly, rather admittedly, the 1981 acquisition proceedings neither has been withdrawn by the state Government nor at any stage challenged by the petitioner or the firm to which he claims to be a partner to the extent of 16 annas. It is in this back ground that this Court is required to test whether first acquisition proceedings initiated in the year 1981 survives on its own merits notwithstanding the initiation and setting aside of the second proceedings in the year 1996 by this court followed by the withdrawal notification published on 24.11.2003. The notification issued under section 4 read with section 17(4) of the Act and the declaration issued under Section 6; both dated 25.3.1981 was published in the district gazette on 1.4.1981 and were followed by a direction dated 27.6.1981 (Annexure-D) of the State Government directing the Collector, Bhagalpur under section 17(1) of the Act to take possession of the lands in question. The Collector, Bhagalpur took possession of the lands in question and handed its possession to the Forest Department vide certification dated 20.8.1981 as contained in Anncxure-3 to C.W.J.C.No.15767 of 2004. It is thus abundantly clear that the possession of the lands in question and the title thereof vested in the State Government and completed the acquisition proceedings under the emergent provisions notwithstanding the delayed preparation and publication of the award and the payment of the compensation amount. The initiation of the acquisition proceedings under the emergency provisions vide notification dated 25.3.1981 as contained in Annexure-A, the declaration as contained in Annexure-B, the direction of the State for taking over the possession of the lands in question as contained in Annexure-D and the handing over of the same to the Forest Department satisfies the statutory provisions underlying the exercise of acquisition and vesting of the lands in question in the State Government under the emergency provisions of the Act. The issue yet remains whether non publication of the award within two years of the publication of the Section 6 declaration dated 25.3.1981 would mean that the proceedings stood lapsed. This issue would not detain this Court for long in view of the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel representing the Forest Department as well as the State Government. The Supreme Court in the case of Lt. Governor Himachal Pradesh Vs. This issue would not detain this Court for long in view of the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel representing the Forest Department as well as the State Government. The Supreme Court in the case of Lt. Governor Himachal Pradesh Vs. Shri Avinash Sharma reported in (1970) 2 SCC 149 while considering a similar issue has held in para-8 as follows: “8.xxx It is clearly implicit in the observation that after possession has been taken pursuant to any notification under section 17(1), the land is vested in the government and the notification cannot be cancelled under section 21 of the General Clauses Act nor can the notification be withdrawn in exercise of the powers under section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act. Any other view would enable the State Government to circumvent the specific provision by relying upon a general power. When the possession of the land is taken under section 17(1), the land vests in the government. There is no provision by which the land statutorily vested in the government reverts to the original owner by mere cancellation of the notification.” Similar views were again expressed in the judgment rendered in the case of M/s Jethmull Bhojraj (supra). The fate of an acquisition proceedings initiated under section 17 of the Act qua non publication of an award within two years of the Section 6 declaration in the backdrop of the statutory provisions of Section 11A of the Act came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Satyendra Prasad Jain Vs. State of U.P. (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, Divisional Forest Officer as well as the State Government. The Supreme Court in paras-14 and 15 of the judgment held that the moment the possession of the land is taken over by the government, the owner is divested of the title which vests in the government. In context to section 11A, it was held that the said provision did not have any application in case of acquisitions made under section 17 of the Act because the lands already stood vested in the government and that there was no provision in the Act under which a land statutorily vested in the government could revert back to the owner. Identical views were expressed by the Supreme Court in para-3 of the judgment rendered in the case of U.P. Jal Nigam (supra). Identical views were expressed by the Supreme Court in para-3 of the judgment rendered in the case of U.P. Jal Nigam (supra). Such being the position, coupled with the all important fact that neither the petitioner nor his firm ever chose to question the legality or the validity of the 1981 proceedings not even in the present proceedings, I am afraid the issues raised by Sri Mitra would not merit consideration and the possession and the title of the State over the lands in question stands perfected in its Department of Forests by reason of the direction as contained in Annexure-D and the handing over documents placed at Annexure-3 to C.W.J.C.No.15767 of 2004. The non publication of the award within the statutory period of two years in no manner would affect the 1981 proceedings though it would statutorily vest the petitioner to claim a higher compensation, solatium and interest under the provisions of the Act. Having held as such, the propositions framed hereinabove are decided in favour of the State and the Forest Department and against the petitioner. As a consequence thereof, C.W.J.C.No.1608 of 2004 is dismissed. C.W.J.C.No.15767 of 2004 is allowed in terms of the relief prayed thereunder. C.W.J.C.No.13769 of 2004 filed in the public interest is disposed of accordingly. This, however, would not preclude the petitioner land owner Kishori Lal Jalan to question the determination of compensation as shown in Annexures-G and H by applying for reference under section 18 of the Act to the concerned authority and claim a higher compensation, solatium and interest as per the statutory provisions of Sections 23, 26, 27, 28 and 34 of the Act and which shall be considered and disposed of by the statutory authority in accordance with law. Orders accordingly. Parties to bear their own costs.