JUDGMENT : Rakesh Tiwari, J. – Heard Sri Prakash Sinha, Advocate assisted by Sri Vishal Kahndelwal, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Ram Krishna, learned counsel for the respondents and perused the record. 2. The petitioners are tenants in house in dispute no. 242, Bhagwat Bagh, Atarsuia, Allahabad. Respondent nos. 3 to 7 are landlords of the accommodation in question. 3. The facts in a nutshell are that an application under Section 21(a) of the Rent Control Act was filed by the landlords for release of the accommodation in dispute on ground of bonafide need. The case of the petitioners before the Prescribed Authority was that it was only tenancy of an open land, hence the provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 would not apply. The Prescribed Authority,however, after hearing the parties allowed the release application of the landlords vide its order dated 19.7.2005 holding that there were 21 members in their family and therefore, they have bonafide need and comparative hardship was also in their favour. 4. Aggrieved, the petitioners preferred Rent Control Appeal No. 154 of 2005, Panna Lal and others versus Prem Bahadur and others before the appellate Court, which was also dismissed vide order and judgment dated 10.8.2010. 5. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioners is that the Prescribed Authority has held that according to the landlords's case they were in possession over four rooms set, while other two tenants namely, Ramraj and T.N. Tripathi also vacated four rooms in the premises under their tenancy and have delivered possession thereof to the landlords, hence the landlords have come in possession of total 8 rooms set but the Prescribed Authority has incorrectly allowed the application on the ground that in the possession of the landlords the accommodation is still insufficient for the landlords to live in and that though this finding has not been challenged way of cross-appeal or cross-objection, the appellate Court has yet affirmed the order and judgment of the court below without any basis holding that it could not be proved by the tenant that these two persons have vacated their portion of tenanted premises consisting of four rooms in favour of the landlords. 6. 6. He also submits that the family of the petitioners consists of 32 members while the family of the landlords who is residing in the house consists of he himself, his wife, his two sons and their wives and children and that the landlords are in possession of 14 rooms while the petitioners are in possession of only three Kachchi Kotharies roofed by Kachchi Khaprail of which walls are built by mud and there is no latrine and bathroom, hence the need of the tenants is more pressing than the landlords. 7. It is urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the District Judge has also committed an illegality in holding that since the tenants have purchased land, the need of the tenants is not to be considered in these circumstances and only the bonafide need and comparative hardship of the landlords are to be seen. 8. During the course of arguments it has been fairly conceded by the learned counsel for the petitioners that earlier the tenancy was of an open land on which the father of the petitioners constructed three Kotharies roofed by Kachchi Khaprail and a tin-shed in which the members of the family of the petitioner tenants are residing and are engaged in the business of selling milk. 9. Per contra, Sri Ram Krishna, learned counsel for the respondents submits that had the nature of the land not been changed by the petitioners, their case would not have come the ambit of under U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. Once, the tenants have admittedly constructed three Kachchi Kotharies and a tin-shed etc. in front of the house changing the nature of the open land without consent of the landlords, the construction made by the tenants would fall into the ambit of the 'building' and making of material alteration without written permission of the landlord, it amounts to defacing the building bringing down its value and utility. He has placed reliance upon paragraphs 11 and 12 of the judgment rendered in Shafi Ullah versus Prescribed Authority, Allahabad and others, wherein similar constructions were considered as buildings. Paragraphs 11 and 12 of the judgment are thus:- "11. It is then urged that the disputed premises was a ramshackle roof structure which could not be said to be a building within the meaning of the Act and as such the application was not maintainable. 12. Paragraphs 11 and 12 of the judgment are thus:- "11. It is then urged that the disputed premises was a ramshackle roof structure which could not be said to be a building within the meaning of the Act and as such the application was not maintainable. 12. Though this point was never raised before the Courts below,it is evident from the record itself that it is a case of the petitioner himself that it is a tinned roof structure, which is in a dilapidated condition, still existing at the spot where the petitioner is running his manufacturing business. The Apex Court in the case of A. Satyanarayan Shah v. M. Yadgiri, has considered the term 'building' as used in several rent laws including the U.P. Act, and, after observing that the term 'building' has to be interpreted liberally and not narrowly, has gone to hold that any structure having some sort of permanency and capable of being used for a residential or non-residential purpose, would be a building within the meaning of the Act. It went on to hold that any enclosure made even of mud or thatched hut or an enclosure of poles supporting a tin or asbestos roof would be a building within the meaning of the term. Therefore, this argument also fails." This Court has held that if the nature of the land is changed by construction or material alterations or by raising mud construction the face value and utility of the house diminishes. Once, the petitioners have admitted that they have constructed three Kachchi Kotharies and a Tin-shed on the open piece of land in front of the house of the respondents and they are using for the purpose of residential as well as for commercial use, hence their tenancy cannot be said to be regarding open land only as the very nature of the land has been changed by them. It has also come on record that the petitioners have moved an application themselves that they have purchased the land on which they propose to construct their own house. Admittedly, the petitioners have claimed themselves to be the tenant of an open piece of land, hence they can always shift on the land which they have purchased. 10. It has also come on record that the petitioners have moved an application themselves that they have purchased the land on which they propose to construct their own house. Admittedly, the petitioners have claimed themselves to be the tenant of an open piece of land, hence they can always shift on the land which they have purchased. 10. The Courts below have recorded concurrent findings of facts that the petitioners have failed to prove their bonafide need and comparative hardship as they have admitted that they have purchased open piece of land on which they can construct their own house and can shift therein as such they would suffer less hardship than the landlords where bonafide need exists. Looking into the number of members of the family of the landlords and the accommodation with them, the courts below have recorded a categorical finding of fact that the aforesaid accommodation in possession of the landlords is insufficient for their family to live in and that the tenants have also failed to establish that four rooms had been vacated by two of the tenants as claimed by the petitioners. 11. However, at this stage learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that since some constructions have been made by the petitioners on the open piece of land and the Court has come to the conclusion that it no longer remain beyond the purview of Act No. XIII of 1972, therefore, the petitioners may be granted 9 months' time to raise construction over the land purchased by them. 12. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that six months' time would be sufficient for the petitioners to raise constructions over their land for the purpose of moving into them for residential and commercial purposes. 13. In this view of the matter, the writ petition is dismissed. No order as to costs. 14. The petitioners are allowed six months' time to make constructions over the land which they have purchased and shift in their own building. Petition Dismissed.