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2010 DIGILAW 272 (ORI)

Sankar Prasad v. Tata Iron and Steel Company

2010-04-12

M.M.DAS

body2010
ORDER 12.04.2010 — Heard learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and the learned counsel appearing for the opp.party management. In this writ petition, the petitioner-workman has challenged the order dated 6.9.2006 passed in I.D. Case No.1 of 2002 by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Bhuba¬neswar. In the said order, the Tribunal while directing the opp.party-management to supply a copy of the proceeding to the workman took up the petition filed by the management subse¬quently, where a prayer was made to try Issue No.II as prelimi¬nary issue, pending finalization of the decision on the other issues. Considering such prayer and the nature of Issue No.II, i.e. whether domestic enquiry has been conducted fairly and properly, the Tribunal has recorded in the impugned order that if all the issues are taken up together and thereby the management is asked to adduce evidence on all these issues, then the re¬quirement of Issue No.I would be redundant and it would lead to illegality. Observing thus, the Tribunal allowed the prayer of the management to take up Issue No.II as preliminary issue. Issues in the dispute are as follows : I. Whether the present reference is maintainable ? II. Whether the domestic enquiry has been conducted fairly and properly ? III. Whether the dismissal of the workman from service was justi¬fied and illegal after conducting the domestic enquiry ? IV. To what relief ? Learned counsel for the petitioner relying upon the decision in the case of D.P. Maheswari v. Delhi Administration and others, (1983) 4 SCC 293 , submitted that the order impugned in the writ petition runs contrary to the decision and law as settled by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision. The Supreme Court in the case of D.P. Maheswari (supra) considering injustice that may be caused to the workman by decid¬ing one issue as a preliminary issue by the Industrial Forum has observed as follows : “It was just the other day* - that we are be moaning the unbecoming devices adopted by certain employers to avoid decision of industrial disputes on merits. We noticed how they would raise various preliminary objection, invite decision on those objec¬tions in the first instance, carry the matter to the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and to this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution and delay a decision of the real dispute for years, sometimes for over a decade. We noticed how they would raise various preliminary objection, invite decision on those objec¬tions in the first instance, carry the matter to the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and to this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution and delay a decision of the real dispute for years, sometimes for over a decade. Industrial peace, one presumes, hangs in the balance in the meanwhile. We have now before us a case where a dispute originating in 1969 and referred for adjudication by the Government to the Labour Court in 1970 is still at the stage of decision on a preliminary objection. There was a time when it was thought prudent and wise policy to decide preliminary issues first. But the time appears to have arrived for a reversal of that policy. We think it is better that tribu¬nals, particularly those entrusted with the task of adjudicating labour disputes where delay may lead to misery and jeopardize industrial peace, should decide all issues in dispute at the same time without trying some of them as preliminary issues. Nor should High Courts in the exercise of their jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution stop proceed¬ings before a tribunal so that a preliminary issue may be decided by them. Neither the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution nor the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 may be allowed to be exploited by those who can well afford to wait to the detriment of those who can ill afford to wait by dragging the latter from Court to Court for adjudica¬tion of peripheral issues, avoiding decision on issues more vital to them. Article 226 and Article 136 are not meant to be used to break the resistance of workmen in this fashion. Tribunals and Courts who are requested to decide preliminary questions must therefore ask themselves whether such threshold part-adjudication is really necessary and whether it will not lead to other woeful consequences. After all tribunals like Industrial Tribunals are constituted to decide expeditiously special kinds of disputes and their jurisdiction to so decide is not to be stifled by all manner of the preliminary objections and journeying up and down. After all tribunals like Industrial Tribunals are constituted to decide expeditiously special kinds of disputes and their jurisdiction to so decide is not to be stifled by all manner of the preliminary objections and journeying up and down. It is also worthwhile remembering that the nature of the juris¬diction under Article 226 is supervisory and not appellate while that under Article 136 is primarily supervisory but the Court may exercise all necessary appellate powers to do substantial jus¬tice. In the exercise of such jurisdiction neither the High Court nor this Court is required to be too astute to interfere with the exercise of jurisdiction by special tribunals at interlocutory stages and on preliminary issues.” Applying the ratio of the aforesaid decision to the facts of the present case where the Tribunal has directed to try Issue No.II as preliminary issue, it can be well presumed that in the event Issue No.II is decided against the management in all proba¬bility, the management will approach this Court or the apex Court against such order. This has been deprecated by the Supreme Court in the case of D.P. Maheswari (supra) where the Supreme Court has expressed clearly and unequivocally that the Tribunals particu¬larly those adjudicating labour disputes should decide all issues in the dispute at the same time without trying some of them as preliminary issues as that would cause delay which may lead to misery and jeopardize industrial peace. The Tribunal also in the impugned order has not assigned any cogent reason as to whether by trying Issue No.II as a preliminary issue, it can answer the reference made to it holistically which duty lay upon the Industrial Tribunal while trying an industrial dispute and answering the reference made to it by the competent Government under Sections 10 and 12 of the I.D. Act, 1947. I find the conclusion of the Tribunal to be erroneous and contrary to law as laid down by the Supreme Court in the afore¬said decision. The impugned order dated 6.9.2006 passed in I.D. Case No.1 of 2002 as at Annexure-3 is, accordingly, quashed and the Tribunal is directed to decide the dispute by adjudicating all the issues and passing an award thereon with regard to the refer¬ence made to it. The impugned order dated 6.9.2006 passed in I.D. Case No.1 of 2002 as at Annexure-3 is, accordingly, quashed and the Tribunal is directed to decide the dispute by adjudicating all the issues and passing an award thereon with regard to the refer¬ence made to it. Since the case is pending before the Tribunal for about eight years, the Tribunal shall do well to dispose of the case by the end of this year. The writ petition is, accordingly, allowed. Urgent certified copy of this order be granted on proper application. Petition allowed.