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2010 DIGILAW 275 (CHH)

Om Prakash Agrawal v. Ashok Gupta

2010-11-26

T.P.SHARMA

body2010
ORDER T.P. Sharma, J. 1. By this miscellaneous appeal under Order 43 Rule 1(r) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short 'the Code'), the Appellant has challenged legality and propriety of the order dated 7-4-2010 passed by the 9th Additional District Judge (F.T.C.), Raipur in Civil M.J.C. No. 6/2010, whereby learned Additional District Judge has passed order for civil jail of one month to the Appellant herein for disobedience of the order of the Court passed under Order 39 Rule 2-A of the Code. 2. As per pleadings of the parties, the Appellant herein entered into an agreement for purchasing the suit property from Respondent No. 4 herein Kailash Shukla on 30-11-98, thereafter, Respondent No. 4 entered into agreement with Respondents No. 1 to 3 herein to sell the same property on 2-2-99 and sale deed was executed by Respondent No. 4 in favour of the Appellant on 17-4-2000. Suit for specific performance of contract was filed by Respondents No. 1 to 3 against Respondent No. 4 and the Appellant i.e. the purchaser in which application for temporary injunction was also filed. On 1-5-2000 the trial Court has passed order for not selling the suit property on the basis of undertaking of Defendant No. 2. Reply to the injunction application was filed on behalf of Defendant No. 2 on 8-4-2000, through his Attorney Holder and Advocate. On 9-5-2000 order of status quo relating to the nature of property was passed and on that day counsel for the Appellant herein i.e. Defendant No. 2 informed the Court that the Appellant herein/Defendant No. 2 will not sell the land. Finally, by-party injunction was passed on 24-9-2001 relating to alienation and construction. On 6-8-2002, Respondents No. 1 to 3 herein filed application for breach of injunction and for punishment, against the Appellant herein & Respondent No. 4 herein on the ground that they have started construction and they are changing the nature of property, thus they have violated the orders dated 9-5-2000 & 24-9-2001. 3. On 6-8-2002, Respondents No. 1 to 3 herein filed application for breach of injunction and for punishment, against the Appellant herein & Respondent No. 4 herein on the ground that they have started construction and they are changing the nature of property, thus they have violated the orders dated 9-5-2000 & 24-9-2001. 3. After providing opportunity of hearing to the parties and adducing evidence, vide order dated 7-4-2010, the trial Court has arrived at a finding that the Appellant or Respondent No. 4 have not violated the order relating to construction, but the Appellant has violated the order dated 9-5-2000 by alienating the land vide sale deed dated 7-7-2001, and has passed order directing civil imprisonment for one month to the Appellant. 4. I have heard learned Counsel for the parties, perused the order impugned and other relevant documents. 5. Mr. Ravish Chand Agrawal, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the Appellant, vehemently argued that in the present case, vide order dated 9-5-2000 the Court has directed for maintaining status quo relating to nature of property. Counsel for the Appellant has informed the Court below that the Appellant will not sell the land and this has been treated as undertaking on behalf of the Appellant. Respondents No. 1 to 3 have filed application for taking suitable action against the Appellant & Respondent No. 4 for breach of injunction on the basis that they have made some construction or that they have tried to change the nature of property, which has been decided as negative against Respondents No. 1 to 3. The sole ground for the alleged breach of injunction against the Appellant & Respondent No. 4 was not found sustainable or proved against the Appellant or Respondent No. 4. By filing reply to the application, the Appellant himself has informed the Court that he was not having any knowledge of such undertaking or of any stay and, therefore, under bona fide belief, he has sold the land which was owned by him to Smt. Sarita Goyal and, therefore, in absence of any knowledge of undertaking or order of the Court he has sold the land, he has not committed any breach of the order passed by the civil Court or disrespected the order of the Court. Even otherwise, finally the suit filed on behalf of the Plaintiffs/Respondents No. 1 to 3 herein has been dismissed. Even otherwise, finally the suit filed on behalf of the Plaintiffs/Respondents No. 1 to 3 herein has been dismissed. The Appellant has further submitted that he has tendered unconditional apology and, therefore, considering the circumstances, the Court below was under obligation to drop the proceeding, but instead of dropping the proceeding or passing the order of attachment at the first instance, the Court below has straightaway ordered for civil imprisonment. Mr. Ravish Chand Agrawal further argued that the alleged undertaking or order was not within the knowledge of the Appellant, the Appellant was represented before the Court below by his Attorney and Advocate, his Attorney has not intimated the order dated 9-5-2000 to the Appellant and unfortunately, the Appellant has also not received any intimation or information from his Advocate who has subsequently left practice at Raipur and started practicing in the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur. Therefore, in absence of knowledge the Appellant has bonafidely sold the land. The Appellant is the person who has informed the Court by replying the notice relating to sale and it was his bona fide act, otherwise, he would have suppressed the matter because no prejudice of injunction has been claimed by Respondents No. 1 to 3 on the basis of alienation. 6. Mr. Ravish Chand Agrawal, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the Appellant, placed reliance in the matter of Burma Prasad and Ors. v. The State of U.P. and Anr. AIR 1968 SC 1348 in which the Supreme Court has held that in case of disobedience of orders of court, knowledge of the order to such person must be proved and in absence of such knowledge, such person cannot be held to be guilty of contempt or disobedience. Mr. Ravish Chand Agrawal further placed reliance in the matter of Suresh and Ors. v. Imran Khan and Ors. 1995 Supp (3) SCC 306 in which the Supreme Court has held that injunction order not served on the litigant but on his lawyer, then in absence of any evidence to show that the lawyer had communicated the order to the litigant and the litigant was aware of the prohibitory order, it cannot be concluded that the litigant has committed willful breach of the order or acted contrary to or showed disrespect to the order. Mr. Mr. Ravish Chand Agrawal also placed reliance in the matter of Harisingh Munnalalji v. Kadarsingh Daulatsingh and Ors. 1981 MPLJ 50 in which the High Court of Madhya Pradesh has held that purpose of Order 39 Rule 2-A of the Code is to enforce the order of injunction, in case of disobedience of order of interim injunction if no injury caused to person in whose favour order was granted and party committing breach ultimately succeeding, award of punishment not warranted. Mr. Ravish Chand Agrawal relied upon the matter of Paduman v. Bodhuram and Ors. 1977 (2) MPWN (281) in which the High Court of Madhya Pradesh has held that in case of breach of temporary injunction, non-applicants who had committed breach of a temporary injunction tendered unqualified apology in the High Court and suit in which temporary injunction was passed was dismissed by the trial Court, non-applicants had misunderstood the order of temporary injunction, apology should be accepted. Mr. Ravish Chand Agrawal further relied upon the matter of Bhupinder Singh and Anr. v. Parmodh Singh and Anr. AIR 2008 HP 3 in which the High Court of Himachal Pradesh has held that purpose of Rule 2A of Order 39 of the Code is not to punish a person who has disobeyed injunction order, but to enforce it; only willful disobedience invites wrath of penal action as envisaged in said provisions; if Respondent had no knowfedge of injunction order of which breach was alleged, no case of willful disobedience can be made out. Mr. Ravish Chand Agrawal also relied upon the matter of Babu v. Mahila Haripyari 1992 (1) MPJR 329 in which the High Court of Pradesh has held that breach of injunction proceedings are quasi-criminal, order alleged to be breached must be proved to have been duly served on Defendant proceeded against. Mr. Ravish Chand Agrawal placed reliance in the matter of Bichitrananda Swain and Ors. v. Jatakrushna Swain AIR 2000 Ori 145 in which the High Court of Orissa has held that Defendants in spite of injunction order carried on construction of house encroaching suit land, instead of order directing civil imprisonment for two months attachment of Defendants property for six months would be proper. Mr. Ravish Chand Agrawal further placed reliance in the matter of Nawal Kishore Singh and Ors. v. Rajendra Prasad Singh and Ors. Mr. Ravish Chand Agrawal further placed reliance in the matter of Nawal Kishore Singh and Ors. v. Rajendra Prasad Singh and Ors. AIR 1976 Pat 56 in which the Patna High Court has held that in case of breach of injunction it is always not mandatory to detain the person in civil prison, attachment of property is also alternative remedy. Mr. Ravish Chand Agrawal also placed reliance in the matter of Sitaram v. Ganesh Das AIR 1973 Allahabad 449 in which the Allahabad High Court has held that effect of Rule 2-A of Order 39 of the Code is not punitive but seeks to enforce injunction order. 7. On the other hand, Mr. N.L. Soni, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of Respondents No. 1 to 3, vehemently opposed the appeal and submitted that the Appellant herein has willfully and deliberately violated the order dated 9-5-2000, his counsel has given undertaking that the Appellant will not alienate the land, but during the subsistence of order dated 9-5-2000, the Appellant knowingly, deliberately and willfully alienated the land with a view to defeat the rights of the Plaintiffs/Respondents No. 1 to 3 herein. Counsel for the Appellant herein/Defendant No. 2 duly instructed by the Appellant herein/Defendant No. 2 has given undertaking on behalf of the Appellant herein/Defendant No. 2, same was binding upon the Appellant herein/Defendant No. 2 who has examined himself, his agent and his Advocate but their conduct and evidence are not natural. By examining himself, the Appellant herein has tried to show that for more than 1 1/2 years he has not contacted his lawyer and has not taken information relating to present status of the case especially when the previous order of status quo, dated 9-5-2000 was passed against him. This shows that he has deliberately violated the order of the Court and with a view to save himself from penal consequences, he has tried to depose that he was not having any knowledge of such order, though civil suit has been dismissed and appeal is pending. However, only on the ground of dismissal of civil suit, his act of violating the order of competent Court cannot be ignored or diluted. 8. Mr. N.L. Soni, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of Respondents No. 1 to 3, placed reliance in the matter of Smt. Kasturba Devi and Ors. v. Shri Dilip Kumar and Ors. However, only on the ground of dismissal of civil suit, his act of violating the order of competent Court cannot be ignored or diluted. 8. Mr. N.L. Soni, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of Respondents No. 1 to 3, placed reliance in the matter of Smt. Kasturba Devi and Ors. v. Shri Dilip Kumar and Ors. 2007 (1) MPHT 168 in which the High Court of Madhya Pradesh has held that the person disobeying the order of the Court is liable for action under Order 39 Rule 2-A of the Code even after dismissal of suit Mr. N.L. Soni further placed reliance in the matter of C. Elumalai and Ors. v. A.G.L. Irudayaraj and Anr. AIR 2009 SC 2214 in which the Supreme Court has held that in case of deliberate and willful violation of order, exemplary cost would be just and proper, and for proper administration of justice and to ensure due compliance with orders, Court should not hesitate in wielding potent weapon of contempt. Mr. N.L. Soni also placed reliance in the matter of Patni Dhanjibhai Saybabhai v. Patni Mohanbhai Saybabhai 2010 (1) Civil LJ 724 in which the Gujarat High Court has held that Court is empowered to impose any or both of the punishment i.e. attachment of property and detention in civil prison. Mr. N.L. Soni relied upon the matter of Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Pvt. Ltd. etc. AIR 1997 SC 1240 in which the Supreme Court has held that even in case of suit dismissed on the ground of jurisdiction the Court is competent to punish the person who violates the order. Mr. N L. Soni further relied upon the matter of Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza AIR 1986 Ker 63 in which the Kerala High Court has held that undertaking given before Court if violated is punished under Order 39 Rule 2A of the Code. Mr. N.L. Soni also relied upon the matter of Smt. Jagannathiya v. State of U.P. and Ors. 2006 (4) Civil LJ 917 in which the Allahabad High Court has held that provisions of Order 39 Rule 2-A of the Code are special and prevail over provisions of Contempt of Courts Act. 9. Mr. N.L. Soni also relied upon the matter of Smt. Jagannathiya v. State of U.P. and Ors. 2006 (4) Civil LJ 917 in which the Allahabad High Court has held that provisions of Order 39 Rule 2-A of the Code are special and prevail over provisions of Contempt of Courts Act. 9. In the present case, as per the documents, submissions and order impugned, it is not disputed that the Appellant herein entered into agreement with Respondent No. 4 herein for purchasing the suit property on 30-11-98, thereafter on 2-2-99 Respondents No. 1 to 3 herein entered into agreement for purchasing the suit property from Respondent No. 4 and on 17-4-2000 sale deed was executed by Respondent No. 4 in favour of the Appellant. Suit for specific performance of contract was filed by Respondents No. 1 to 3 against the Appellant & Respondent No. 4 in which Respondents No. 1 to 3 also applied for temporary injunction. Suit was contested by the Appellant i.e. Defendant No. 2 through his duly appointed Attorney Mr. P.R. Bangale and his counsel Mr. Thakur Vijay Singh. On 1 -5-2000 counsel for the Appellant has given undertaking relating to alienation and on the basis of such undertaking while passing the order of status quo, the trial Court has directed not to sell the suit property. Again on 9-5-2000 the trial Court has directed not to change the nature of property and on that day counsel for the Appellant i.e. Defendant No. 2 has also intimated that the Appellant will not alienate the property. Thereafter, on 24-9-2001 by-party injunction order was passed. 10. Respondents No. 1 to 3 herein have filed application under Order 39 Rule 2-A of the Code for violation of injunction orders dated 9-5-2000 & 24-9-2001 against the Appellant herein & Respondent No. 4 herein on 8-8-2002 on the ground that they have started construction and are substantially changing the nature of property which was duly replied by the Appellant herein supported by affidavit stating that the order dated 9-5-2000 was not within his knowledge, it was not communicated to him by his attorney or his counsel and under bona fide belief, he has sold the land on 7-7-2001. 11. The Court below has provided opportunity of hearing to the parties. Respondent No. 1 has examined himself. The Appellant has examined himself, his counsel Mr. 11. The Court below has provided opportunity of hearing to the parties. Respondent No. 1 has examined himself. The Appellant has examined himself, his counsel Mr. Thakur Vijay Singh and his duly appointed Attorney Mr. RR. Bangale. After hearing the parties, the impugned order dated 7-4-2010 has passed by which the trial Court has directed for one month civil imprisonment to the Appellant for breach of injunction relating to alienation of the suit property. On 7-4-2010 the trial Court has arrived at finding that the Appellant herein & Respondent No. 4 herein have not changed the nature of property deliberately, but the Appellant has alienated the property in violation of the order dated 9-5-2000 and the trial Court has passed the order of one month civil imprisonment against the Appellant. Finally the suit was dismissed against which the appeal is pending before this Court. 12. In order to punish a person in violation of order of the Court under Order 39 Rule 2-A of the Code, if the Court arrives at finding of disobedience or breach of the order passed by the Court, then the Court may pass order for attachment of property of the person who has violated the order and may also order for his detention in civil prison for a term not exceeding three months. 13. As held in the matters of Smt. Kasturba Devi 2007 (1) MPHT 168 (supra) and Kochira Krishnan AIR 1986 Ker 63 (supra) by the M.P. High Court and the Kerala High Court, respectively, breach of undertaking given by the party is also breach of order passed by the Court and same is punishable under Order 39 Rule 2-A of the Code. In the matter of Smt. Jagannathiya 2006 (4) Civil LJ 917 (supra), the Allahabad High Court has also held that provisions of Order 39 Rule 2-A of the Code are special and prevail over provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act. 14. In the present case, it is not disputed that the Appellant has violated the order dated 9-5-2000 passed by the trial Court. 14. In the present case, it is not disputed that the Appellant has violated the order dated 9-5-2000 passed by the trial Court. As per the contention of the Appellant, the Appellant was not having any knowledge of such order on the ground that his duly appointed attorney has left the job on account of illness, the Appellant has not contacted his lawyer and his lawyer has also not intimated him and, therefore, in absence of any knowledge bona fidely, he has sold the land. Further contention of the Appellant is that originally, Respondents No. 1 to 3 herein have filed application for punishment on the ground that the Appellant herein & Respondent No. 4 herein have violated the order by starting construction over the suit property, at that time, Respondents No. 1 to 3 were not having knowledge about such sale deed, it is the Appellant who has bona fidely informed the Court and the opposite parties by filing reply that he has alienated the property and, at that time, he was not having any knowledge of such order. 15. While dealing with the question of punishment and need of drastic action, the Supreme Court in the matter of C. Elumalai AIR 2009 SC 2214 (supra) has held that if for proper administration of justice and to ensure due compliance with the orders passed by a Court, it is required to take strict view, it should not hesitate in wielding the potent weapon of contempt. In this case, the apology offered by the contemnors has not been considered on the ground that it was not offered at the earliest opportunity and in good grace. Considering willful and deliberate violation of order, exemplary cost of Rs. 2,00,000/- was imposed on each of the contemnors. The case of C. Elumalai AIR 2009 SC 2214 (supra) was deliberate and willful case of disobedience and the contemnors have created third party interest. The Supreme Court has observed in para 13 of the said judgment as follows: 13. From the above decisions, it is clear that punishing a person for contempt of Court is indeed a drastic step and normally such action should not be taken. At the same time, however, it is not only the power but the duty of the Court to uphold and maintain the dignity of Courts and majesty of law which may call for such extreme step. At the same time, however, it is not only the power but the duty of the Court to uphold and maintain the dignity of Courts and majesty of law which may call for such extreme step. If for proper administration of justice and to ensure due compliance with the orders passed by a Court, it is required to take strict view, it should not hesitate in wielding the potent weapon of contempt. 16. In the matter of Patni Dhanjibhai 2010 (1) Civil LJ 724 (supra), the Gujarat High Court has held that the Court can order attachment of property or civil imprisonment and it depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case, it is not incumbent upon the Court, to first attach the property and only then, after this option has been exhausted, resort to the option of directing civil imprisonment. Virtually, the Court is required to consider the facts of the case for imposing the order of attachment or detention in civil imprisonment. 17. While dealing with nature of order, the Supreme Court in the matter of Tayabbhai AIR 1997 SC 1240 (supra) has held that flouting of interim order is also punishable. 18. As held by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the matter of Harisingh 1981 MPLJ 50 (supra), purpose of Order 39 Rule 2-A of the Code is to enforce the order of injunction and if, in case, no injury is caused to the person in whose favour the order was granted and the party committing breach ultimately succeeds, award of punishment is not warranted. 19. At the time of taking action under the aforesaid provisions, the Court is required to examine as to whether the injury has been caused to the opposite party and whether the disobedience was deliberate and willful. 20. While dealing with the question of accepting apology the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the matter of Paduman 1977 (2) MPWN (281) (supra) has held that in case of breach of injunction order and dismissal of civil suit finally, the apology prayed for by the contemnor should be accepted. 21. While dealing with the question of taking penal action, the High Court of Himachal Pradesh in the matter of Bhupinder Singh AIR 2008 HP 3 (supra) has held that only willful disobedience is liable for taking penal action. 21. While dealing with the question of taking penal action, the High Court of Himachal Pradesh in the matter of Bhupinder Singh AIR 2008 HP 3 (supra) has held that only willful disobedience is liable for taking penal action. In the matter of Bichitrananda AIR 2000 Ori 145 (supra), the Orissa High Court has held that in case of breach of injunction, civil imprisonment for two months is held, excessive. In the matter of Sitaram AIR 1973 All 449 (supra), the Allahabad High Court has held that effect of Rule 2-A of Order 39 of the Code is not punitive but seeks to enforce injunction order. In the matter of Babu AIR 1973 All 449 (supra), the High Court of Madhya Pradesh has held that proceedings of Order 39 Rule 2-A of the Code are quasi-criminal, order alleged to be breached must be proved to have been duly served on the Defendant. 22. While dealing with same question, the Supreme Court in the matter of Suresh 1995 Supp (3) SCC 306 (supra) has held that in case of injunction order not served on the litigant but on his lawyer, no evidence showing that the lawyer had communicated the order to the litigant and in absence of evidence showing that litigant was aware of the prohibitory order, it cannot be concluded that he committed willful breach of the order or acted contrary to or showed disrespect to the order. 23. Provisions of Order 39 Rule 2-A of the Code are penal in nature. In order to punish a person who has violated the order, the Court is required to satisfy itself that the person has willfully and deliberately disobeyed the order, such order was well within his knowledge and was communicated to him, and thereby caused injury to the opposite party. 24. In the present case, Respondents No. 1 to 3 herein have applied for punishment on the ground of violation of order by the Appellant herein & Respondent No. 4 herein. Respondents No. 1 to 3 were under obligation to prove the fact that the order dated 9-5-2000 was well within the knowledge of the Appellant and the Appellant has deliberately and willfully violated the order and caused injury to them. Initially, application for breach of injunction was filed on the ground that the Appellant & Respondent No. 4 have started construction. Initially, application for breach of injunction was filed on the ground that the Appellant & Respondent No. 4 have started construction. In the said application it has been mentioned by Respondents No. 1 to 3 that the Appellant has violated the order by alienating the property to third person. It is the Appellant who by filing reply has informed Respondents No. 1 to 3 and to the Court that he was not having any knowledge of the order and that he has alienated the property. While deciding the application, the Court below has arrived at finding that the Appellant or Respondent No. 4 has not violated the order by making any construction and, therefore, virtually, the application under Order 39 Rule 2-A of the Code filed on behalf of Respondents No. 1 to 3 was not acceptable in absence of such evidence of change and nature of the property or construction. The order was passed against the Appellant on the basis of information given by the Appellant himself. This, shows that even at the time of filing of such application i.e. till 8-8-2002 it was not within the knowledge of Respondents No. 1 to 3 who have filed application under Order 39 Rule 2-A of the Code. 25. Respondents No. 1 to 3 herein have examined Respondent No. 1 Ashok Gupta who has deposed in his evidence that the injunction order was passed by the Court. He has also deposed that the Appellant herein was having knowledge of the order and, willfully, deliberately and mala fidely, he has alienated the property. But in his detailed evidence, he has not stated anything to show that whether he was having personal knowledge of the fact that the order dated 9-5-2000 was communicated to the Appellant especially when the Appellant was represented through his Attorney and his counsel. 26. On the other hand, the Appellant herein has examined himself and has deposed in detail that he was represented through his Attorney Mr. RR. Bangale and his counsel Mr. Thakur Vijay Singh, unfortunately the order dated 9-5-2000 was not communicated to him and he has also not obtained any information relating to such order. His evidence is well corroborated by the evidence of his Attorney Mr. P.R. Bangale and his counsel Mr. Thakur Vijay Singh. 27. RR. Bangale and his counsel Mr. Thakur Vijay Singh, unfortunately the order dated 9-5-2000 was not communicated to him and he has also not obtained any information relating to such order. His evidence is well corroborated by the evidence of his Attorney Mr. P.R. Bangale and his counsel Mr. Thakur Vijay Singh. 27. Respondents No. 1 to 3 herein have cross-examined the Appellant herein at length, but have not been able to succeed in bringing anything in his cross-examination to show that they had communicated the order to the Appellant or that the order was communicated to the Appellant or that the Appellant was having knowledge of such order. 28. In the present case, finally the suit filed on behalf of Respondents No. 1 to 3 herein has been dismissed. Even as per the undisputed facts, the Appellant herein has entered into agreement with Respondent No. 4 herein for purchase of suit property prior to the agreement of Respondents No. 1 to 3 herein. Respondent No. 4 has not executed sale deed in favour of Respondents No. 1 to 3 but has executed sale deed in favour of the Appellant prior to filing of suit. By executing sale deed by the Appellant, the Appellant has not caused any substantial injury to Respondents No. 1 to 3. 29. While considering need of knowledge and deliberate disobedience of order of the Court by a person, the Supreme Court in the matter of Suresh2 (supra) has observed in para 2 of its order as follows: 2. The proceedings in contempt are in the nature of quasi-criminal proceedings and it must be shown that the litigant in defiance or disobedience of the court's order proceeded to do any act which was in violation thereof. Unless the litigant is aware of a prohibitory order made against him by the court there can be no desire or intention on his part to flout the court's order. Therefore, unless it is shown that the litigant was made aware of the order served on his lawyer it may not be possible to hold that despite the knowledge of the order he willfully decided to commit a breach of the order by acting contrary thereto. Therefore, unless it is shown that the litigant was made aware of the order served on his lawyer it may not be possible to hold that despite the knowledge of the order he willfully decided to commit a breach of the order by acting contrary thereto. Proceedings in the nature of contempt being quasi-criminal it must be shown that the litigant was aware of the prohibitory order issued by the court and notwithstanding the same in breach thereof or in total disregard thereof he proceeded to continue with the construction. It being not disputed that there was no evidence to show that the lawyer to whom the prohibitory order was given had communicated that order in any manner whatsoever to the litigant, it is not possible to come to the conclusion that by continuing with the construction the litigant intended to commit a breach of the order or showed disrespect for the order. In that view of the matter if the High Court was disinclined to punish the litigant for contempt, be that under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 or under Article 215 of the Constitution of India, we see no reason why we should interfere with the impugned order in exercise of power under Article 136 of the Constitution. The special leave petition is, therefore, dismissed. No order on the application for impleadment. 30. In the present case, Respondents No. 1 to 3 have not proved the fact that the Appellant was having knowledge of the order. The Appellant himself has proved that he was not having knowledge of the aforesaid order. No injury has been caused to Respondents No. 1 to 3. The Appellant has tendered his apology at the earliest opportunity, at the time of filing reply to the application before the trial Court. In these circumstances, detention of the Appellant in civil prison is neither just nor proper. In absence of any such knowledge, the Appellant was not liable for any penal action under Order 39 Rule 2-A of the Code. 31. Consequently, the appeal is allowed and the order dated 7-4-2010 passed by the 9th Additional District Judge (F.T.C.), Raipur in Civil M.J.C. No. 6/2010 is hereby set aside. No order as to costs.