Judgment :- P.R. Shivakumar, J. 1. The petitioner who claims to be a human rights activist and hence interested in the under trial prisoner Sundaramurthy S/o. Vedi, presently confined in Central Prison, Puzhal, Chennai, has brought forth this habeas corpus petition seeking issue of a writ of habeas corpus or a direction in the nature of such a writ to produce the detenu Sundaramurthy before this Hon’ble Court and to ‘set him at liberty. 2. In the affidavit filed in support of the habeas corpus petition the petitioner has made the following averments: The petitioner is a human rights activist and interested in the welfare of one Sundaramurthy S/o. Vedi, a TADA prisoner concerned in C.C.No.6 of 1993 on the file of Designated Court-II, Chennai who is in Jail since 7. 2007. The prolonged custody of the said detenu is illegal. There is none else to espouse the cause of the detenu and on humanitarian consideration, the petitioner is espousing the cause of the above said prisoner. There is no incriminating material in the evidence adduced on the side of the prosecution in the trial conducted before the designated Court excepting the alleged confession statement of one Sisubalan, who was prosecuted and convicted in a separate trial in C.C.No.3 of 1993, which has got to be rejected as inadmissible against the detenu, as the detenu was not tried along with the said Sisubalan in the same trial as required in the proviso to Section 15 (1) of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act. Furthermore, the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (herein after called ‘the TADA Act’) expired and hence proceeding with the criminal case under the TADA Act infringes the right of appeal of the detenu to the High Court. On the above said ground alone the detention of Sundaramurthy becomes illegal and violative of article 21 of the Constitution. 3. Based on the above said allegations, the petitioner has sought for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus directing the production of the under trial prisoner Sundaramurthy and to set him at liberty. In addition to the grounds raised in the original affidavit, the petitioner has also raised additional grounds by filing a miscellaneous petition in M.P.No.2 of 2010 in the above said habeas corpus petition. The additional grounds raised therein are as follows: .(a) TADA Act expired on 25. In addition to the grounds raised in the original affidavit, the petitioner has also raised additional grounds by filing a miscellaneous petition in M.P.No.2 of 2010 in the above said habeas corpus petition. The additional grounds raised therein are as follows: .(a) TADA Act expired on 25. 1995 and the cases under the said Act are to be reviewed in the light of the existing threat to public order. TADA being a stringent law, should be invoked only in exceptional cases where the situation cannot be tackled under the normal law. Continuing the proceedings under the TADA Act after 15 years of its expiry, is an example of oppression and in violation of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. .(b) Detenu Sundaramurthy had no intention to throw the Government established by law in India and hence after the expiry of TADA Act, the case should be tried under the ordinary law of India as no offence under Sections 3(2), 4, 5 and 6 of the TADA Act is made out and hence, the continued detention of the detenu Sundaramurthy is illegal. .(c) The entire prosecution is vitiated as the material placed would not constitute any offence under TADA Act. 4. In the counter filed by the second respondent, which was also filed on behalf of the first respondent, the above said contentions raised by the petitioner have been refuted, it has been prayed that the petition should be dismissed as the prayer made therein is untenable. The gist of the averments made in the counter affidavit are as follows: i) The Detenu concerned in this habeas corpus petition was absconding and evading process in Crime No.80 of 1992 registered on the file of Dharmapuri Railway Police for various offences including the offence under the provisions of TADA, which necessitated the splitting up of the case against him from the case against the co-accused Sisubalan and another. ii) The TADA case was taken on file by the Designated Court II, TADA, Chennai in 1993 itself as C.C.No.3 of 1993. Since the detenu concerned in this habeas corpus petition was absconding, his case was split up from the main case and taken on file as C.C.No.6 of 1993. After such splitting up of the case, C.C.No.3 of 1993 was proceeded against the co-accused Sisubalan. Since the detenu concerned in this habeas corpus petition was absconding, his case was split up from the main case and taken on file as C.C.No.6 of 1993. After such splitting up of the case, C.C.No.3 of 1993 was proceeded against the co-accused Sisubalan. The said case in C.C.No.3 of 1993, which was proceeded against Sisubalan, ended in his conviction and infliction of a sentence of 5 years R1 on him by the Designated Court II, TADA, Chennai on 210. 2003. Nearly after a lapse of 4 years from the date of the said judgment, Sundaramurthy, the detenu concerned in this habeas corpus petition was arrested on 7. 2007 in execution of a non-bailable warrant issued by the Designated Court under POTA in respect of Crime Nos.1004, 1005 and 1006 of 2002 on the file of Uthankarai Police Station and Crime No.434 of 2002 on the file of Kallavi Police Station and was remanded to judicial custody in those cases on 7. 2007. Subsequently, the Designated Court II, TADA, Chennai issued a P.T. Warrant, pursuant to which, he was produced in C.C.No.6 of 1993. On his production before the Designated Court II, TADA, Chennai, he was taken in police custody and during the course of such custody, he made a voluntary confession leading to the recovery of 6 numbers of rifle round and 9 catridges of 12 bore from Mookanur Hills, Dharmapuri District in connection with a case viz., Cr.No.232 of 2007 registered on the file of Periakulam Police Station. iii) The occurrence concerned in C.C.No.6 of 1993 took place on 10. 1992 when TADA Act was very much in force. Hence the continuation of the proceedings under TADA is not illegal and the contention of the petitioner in this regard should be rejected as untenable. iv) The contention of the petitioner that the confession of Co-accused Sisubalan is inadmissible cannot be sustained. v) The further contention raised by the petitioner that continuing the proceedings under TADA, even after the expiry of the ACT on 25. 1995, would infringe the right of appeal of the detenu and hence the detention of the detenu is illegal and violative of Article 21 of the Constitution, is incorrect and misconceived. The detenu concerned in this habeas corpus petition, having absconded and thereby delayed the proceedings, caused the filing of a previous habeas corpus petition viz. 1995, would infringe the right of appeal of the detenu and hence the detention of the detenu is illegal and violative of Article 21 of the Constitution, is incorrect and misconceived. The detenu concerned in this habeas corpus petition, having absconded and thereby delayed the proceedings, caused the filing of a previous habeas corpus petition viz. H.C.P.No.142 of 2008 after he was remanded in the above said case, contending that his judicial custody was illegal. The same was dismissed by this Court on 13. 2009. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said habeas corpus petition, another habeas corpus petition viz., H.c.P.No.1580 of 2009 was filed and the same was also dismissed on 11. 2009 with an observation that the Designated Court should complete the examination of the witnesses by the end of December 2009. In accordance with the said observation, the trial Court completed examination of prosecution witnesses and prosecution evidence was closed on 212. 2009 and the questioning of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C was also over. Arguments were heard on 13. 2010 and the case stood adjourned to 23. 2010 for judgment. In the above said circumstances, a petition was filed under Section 18 of TADA Act stating that no TADA offence was made out and hence, the case should be transferred to the regular Court having Jurisdiction to try the rest of the offences. Such a petition was filed on 13. 2010, in which counter was filed by the prosecution on 23. 2010. vi) Meanwhile, a writ petition in W.P.No.5690 of 2010 was filed before this Court for the very same relief. When the said writ petition was pending, the petitioner filed a petition in Crl.M.P.No.7 of 2010 before the Designated Court ii seeking the very same relief and thus, the case was adjourned to 4. 2010. Not content with the same, the detenu filed a petition in Crl.M.P.No.12 of 2010 before the Designated Court II under Section 233 Cr.P.C seeking permission for examination of defence witnesses in the above said case. Hence, the hearing of the case was advanced to 23. 2010, the petition seeking permission for the examination of the defence witnesses was allowed on 23. 2010 itself and the main case was adjourned at the request of the detenu to 4. 2010 for the examination of the above said Sisubalan as a defence witness. Hence, the hearing of the case was advanced to 23. 2010, the petition seeking permission for the examination of the defence witnesses was allowed on 23. 2010 itself and the main case was adjourned at the request of the detenu to 4. 2010 for the examination of the above said Sisubalan as a defence witness. In such circumstances, in order to stall the proceedings in C.C.No.6 of 1993 pending on the file of Designated Court II, TADA, Chennai, the present habeas corpus petition has been filed and the same should be dismissed as unsustainable. 5. We heard the submissions made by Mr. R. Sankarasubbu, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. P. Kumaresan, learned Public Prosecutor who appeared on behalf of the respondents. The materials produced on both sides were also taken into consideration. 6. Thebrief facts leading to the filing of the present habeas corpus petition are as follows: In a case registered as Cr.No.80 of 1992 on the file of Dharmapuri Railway Police for the commission of various offences under IPC and Explosive Substance Act and TADA as against Sundaramurthy, the detenu concerned in this case and two others, a final report was submitted in 1992 itself. The same was taken on file as C.C.No.3 of 1993 on the file of the Designated Court-II, TADA, Chennai. Sundaramurthy, the detenu concerned in this HCP was absconding. Hence the case as against Sundaramurthy was split up and taken on file as C.C.No.6 of 1993 in the file of Designated Court II, TADA, Chennai. The prosecution of the co-accused in C.C.No.3 of 1993 ended in conviction and imposition of a sentence of 5 years rigorous imprisonment by the judgment of the Designated Court II, TADA, Chennai dated 210. 2003. Even thereafter, Sundaramurthy, the detenu concerned in this petition was absconding and evading process. However, on 7. 2007, he was arrested in execution of the Non-bailable warrant issued in three cases registered on the filed of Uthankarai Police Station and one case registered on the file of Kallavi Police Station, which cases were dealt with by the Designated Court under POTA. Only thereafter the said Sundaramurthy was produced before the Designated Court II, TADA, Chennai in the criminal case concerned in this habeas corpus petition viz., C.C.No.6 of 1993. He was remanded in the said case and the trial in the said case progressed thereafter. Only thereafter the said Sundaramurthy was produced before the Designated Court II, TADA, Chennai in the criminal case concerned in this habeas corpus petition viz., C.C.No.6 of 1993. He was remanded in the said case and the trial in the said case progressed thereafter. Meanwhile, two earlier habeas corpus petitions viz., H.C.P.No.142 of 2008 and H.C.P.No.1580 of 2009 were filed to set aside the detention of Sundaramurthy pending trial and set him at liberty. Both the habeas corpus petitions were dismissed on 13. 2009 and 11. 2009 respectively, but a direction to the Designated Court II, TADA, Chennai, was issued in the order dated 11. 2009 to complete the examination of the witnesses on the side of prosecution by the end of December 2009. In strict compliance with the said direction, the Designated Court II, TADA, Chennai completed the examination of the prosecution witnesses on 212. 2009. Subsequently, after the accused was questioned under Section 313 Cr.P.C, the case stood adjourned for judgment, as the accused informed the Court that he had no defence witness to be examined on his side. At that juncture, petitions were filed as Crl.M.P.No.7 of 2009 before the Designated Court under Section 18 of TADA Act and before this Court as a writ petition in W.P.No.5690 of 2010 for transferring the case to the Regular Court having jurisdiction to try the rest of the offences as per the final report, contending that no TADA offence was made out. A petition was also filed before the Designated Court II seeking permission to examine defence witnesses, which was taken on file as Crl.M.P.No.12 of 2010 and was allowed on 23. 2010. Consequently, the case was adjourned to 4. 2010 for the examination of the above said Sisubalan as a defence witness. Under such circumstances alone, the present habeas corpus petition seems to have been filed seeking the relief as indicated supra. 7. Thecontinued custody of the detenu Sundaramurthy concerned in this habeas corpus petition as an under trial prisoner in C.C.No.6 of 1993 on the file of Designated Court II, TADA, Chennai is assailed as illegal by the petitioner on the following grounds: i) The Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 lapsed on 25. 7. Thecontinued custody of the detenu Sundaramurthy concerned in this habeas corpus petition as an under trial prisoner in C.C.No.6 of 1993 on the file of Designated Court II, TADA, Chennai is assailed as illegal by the petitioner on the following grounds: i) The Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 lapsed on 25. 1995 and therefore, the continuation of the proceedings under TADA is illegal and unsustainable, ii) Even assuming that the proceedings initiated regarding the occurrence that took place when TADA was in force could be continued under the said Act, even after the lapse of TADA, the periodical remand in the TADA case without considering the necessity to do so is violative of the fundamental right to life and liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. iii) Prosecution completed its evidence and the accused on being questioned under Section 313 Cr.P.C urged the Court that there was no material to make out a case for an offence under TADA. Even thereafter, the Designated Court II, TADA, Chennai, without applying its mind to the fact that there was no incriminating material excepting the confession statement of the co-accused Sisubalan, an inadmissible piece of evidence as he was not prosecuted along with the detenu in one and the same trial, mechanically passed periodical orders of remand directing the detenu to be kept in judicial custody and the said orders, being violative of the fundamental right of right to life and personal liberty are illegal and hence, the detenu should be set at liberty forthwith. 8. The answer to the first contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is found in Section 1(4) of TADA Act, 1987, which reads as follows: Section 1(1) to (3) ……….. .(4) It shall remain in force for a period of eight years from the 25. 8. The answer to the first contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is found in Section 1(4) of TADA Act, 1987, which reads as follows: Section 1(1) to (3) ……….. .(4) It shall remain in force for a period of eight years from the 25. 1987, but its expiry under the operation of this sub-section shall not affect, .(a) the previous operation of, or anything duly done or suffered under, this Act or any rule made thereunder or any order made under any such rule, or .(b) any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under this Act or any rule made thereunder or any order, made under any such rule, or .(c) any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence under this Act or any contravention of any rule made under this Act or of any order made under any such rule, or .(d) any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid, and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if this Act had not expired. As per Section 3, the Act is deemed to have come into force on 25. 1987. As per Section 1(4), it was to be in force for a period of eight years from 25. 1987. Therefore, it is correct to state that the Act expired with 25. 1995. However, the saving clause found in Section 1(4) will make it amply clear that the proceedings started before the lapse of the Act shall not lapse and the same shall be continued as if the Act had not expired. This position has been held so by a Division Bench of this Court in S. Viola Selvin v. I. State of Tamil Nadu represented by the Secretary, Department of Home, Fort St. George, Madras-600 009; Inspector of Police, Palayamkottai, Tirunelveli-2 1996-1-L.W. (Crl.) 138. 9. The second and third contentions are taken up together for discussion as they overlap each other. In support of the said contentions, the learned counsel for the petitioner cited several judgments and contra judgments were also placed for our perusal by the learned Public Prosecutor. George, Madras-600 009; Inspector of Police, Palayamkottai, Tirunelveli-2 1996-1-L.W. (Crl.) 138. 9. The second and third contentions are taken up together for discussion as they overlap each other. In support of the said contentions, the learned counsel for the petitioner cited several judgments and contra judgments were also placed for our perusal by the learned Public Prosecutor. They are being discussed here under: i) In an unreported judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Jainullah v. State represented by Deputy Superintendent of Police, CBI, Chennai H.C.P.No.595 of 2002, wherein a contention regarding continued custody during the prolonged trial of the case for several years was challenged, this Court made the following observation: “While it is essential that innocent people should be protected from terrorists and disruptionists, it is equally necessary that the offenders are speedily tried and punished. The delay in the trial causes irreparable damage to innocent persons who may have been wrongly accused of the crime if they are ultimately acquitted and they have to remain in jail for a long period pending the trial because of the stringent provisions for the grant of bail under TADA.” The entire discussion made in the said case was regarding the prolonged trial after the accused was arrested and accordingly, the Division Bench of this Court came to the conclusion that the accused therein should be released on bail subject to stringent conditions. The said decision to release the accused therein on bail was taken based on the fact that the accused concerned in the said case was arrested on 24.01.1994 and was in jail as under-trial prisoner for more than 9 years and still the finality of the trial could not be achieved. The said case has no application to the facts of the case on hand. In this Case, the detenu was absconding for about 14 years and was arrested only in 2007. Thereafter, the trial came to the stage of completion and the case was listed for pronouncing the judgment on 23. 2010. Only at that point of time, the petitions in the form of Criminal Miscellaneous petitions before the Trial Court, writ petition before this Court and habeas corpus petitions before this Court came to be filed. Thereafter, the trial came to the stage of completion and the case was listed for pronouncing the judgment on 23. 2010. Only at that point of time, the petitions in the form of Criminal Miscellaneous petitions before the Trial Court, writ petition before this Court and habeas corpus petitions before this Court came to be filed. After the remand of the detenu in the TADA case concerned in this habeas corpus petition, the trial of the said case has been proceeded without unnecessary delay on the part of the prosecution. It was the detenu who caused two habeas corpus petitions to be moved meanwhile, one in the year 2008 and the other in the year 2009 for the issue of writ of habeas corpus to set aside the remand orders and to set him at liberty. Both the habeas corpus petitions were dismissed and in the second of the habeas corpus petitions, there was a direction to complete the examination of the witnesses before a particular date, which direction was scrupulously complied with by the trial Court. This was “done despite the efforts made on behalf of the detenu to cause delay in the proceedings and come out on bail showing the delay as a ground for seeking bail. In the above said judgment cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the fact that the accused therein was in remand for more than 9 years without there being any remarkable progress in the trial of the case weighed with the Court, and the same resulted in the direction to release him on bail. The same is not the position in the case on hand. The case is at the last lap of trial and there is no such inordinate delay after the arrest of the detenu in this case. Therefore, the said ratio is inapplicable to the case on hand. ii) In another unreported decision in H.C.P.No.1487 of 2003 in F.M. Ahmed Gnaniar v. State represented by Deputy Superintendent of Police, CBI, Chennai this Court referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Shaheen Welfare Association v. Union of India and Others AIR 1996 SC 2957 : (1996) SCC (Cr) 366 the accused under TADA had been categorized into four categories, where under the accused concerned in the said case, were found to be coming under Category (b) viz. those persons who would have to be differently dealt with, if they had been in prison for five years or more and their trial is not likely to be completed within the next six months. Holding that the accused therein fell within the said category, the Division Bench chose to grant condition bail. The said ratio shall not apply to the facts of the case, since the detenu concerned in this case has not been in jail for not less than 5 years as under trial prisoner and the further contention that the judgment cannot be expected within the next 6 months is not available in this case. iii) The judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Maharashtra and Others v. Bhaurao Punjabrao Gawande AIR 2008 SC 1705 : (2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 128: (2008) 2 MLJ (Crl) 419 cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner is not relevant to the present case, since in the said case the question of legality of preventive detention alone was considered. iv) In Shaheen Welfare Association v. Union of India and Others (supra), which was referred to in the first of the authorities cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner and was discussed supra, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has classified the TADA under trial prisoners into four categories. The relevant paragraph in the said judgment is reproduced: “13. For the purpose of grant of bail to TADA detenus, we divide the undertrials into three (sic four) classes, namely, (a) hardcore undertrials whose release would prejudice the prosecution case and whose liberty may prove to be a menace to society in general and to the complainant and prosecution witnesses” in particular; (b) other undertrials whose overt acts or involvement directly attract Sections 3 and/or 4 of the TADA Act; (c) undertrials who are roped in, not because of any activity directly attracting Sections 3 and 4, but by virtue of Section 120-B or 147, IPC and; (d) those undertrials who were found possessing incriminating articles in notified areas and are booked under Section 5 of TADA.” The Hon’ble Supreme Court advocated different approaches to be made in respect of persons falling under the said categorise. According to the observation made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, those who fall under Category (a) cannot receive liberal treatment and those who fall under Category (b) would be differently dealt with, in that if they have been in prison for five years or more and their trial is not likely to be completed within the next six months, they can be released on bail. Such an observation is also super added with a rider that such release on bail can be made only if the Court does not come to the conclusion that their antecedents are such that releasing them may be harmful to the lives of the complainant, the family members of the complainant, or witnesses. The understrial prisoners falling under the Categories (c) and (d) can be dealt with leniently and they can be released on bail, if they had been in jail for three years and two years respectively. 9a. Nothing has been canvassed on the part of the petitioner that the detenu comes either under Category © or under category (d). In fact nothing has been canvassed as to which of those classifications, the detenu concerned in this case comes under. Therefore, we have to arrive at a necessary conclusion that the petitioner has not made out a case for the lenient treatment advocated for the under trial prisoners categorized as (c) and (d) in Shaheen Welfare Association v. Union of India and Other’s (supra) case. 10. The learned counsel for the petitioner also relied on the judgment of another Division Bench of this Court in Elumallai v. State of Tamil Nadu and Others (1984) 1 MLJ (Crl) 246 : 1983 L.W. (Crl.) 121. The said judgment is not applicable to the facts of the present case, as it mainly dealt with the question of arrest, remand and remand extension before the submission of the final report. What was reiterated there is that the practice of submitting an interim report within the mandatory period of 60 days or 90 days, as the case may be, stipulated in Section 167(2) and getting remand extension beyond that period and thereafter filing final report shall not be proper and such mechanical extension of remand is to be termed illegal. The same is not the case on hand. The same is not the case on hand. In this case, the investigation was completed several years before the detenu was arrested and remanded in the case concerned in this habeas corpus petition and in fact during the trial, the trial Court has directed the detention of the detenu in jail as under trial prisoner, exercising the power conferred on the trial Court under Section 309(2) of Cr.P.C. 11. The other two Judgments viz., Deepak Bajaj v. State of Maharashtra and Another AIR 2009 SC 628 : (2009) 3 MLJ 709 and Smt. Icchu Devi Choraria v. Union of India and Others AIR 1980 SC 1983 : 1981 SCC (Cr) 25 relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner also are not applicable to the facts of the present case as the said cases dealt with the cases of preventive detention under COFEPOSA Act. The vires of preventive detention orders passed under the COFEPOSA Act was the subject matter of challenge in the said cases, whereas in the case on hand, the remand order passed by the trial Court during the course of trial is challenged. 12. The only relevant judgment relied by the learned counsel for the petitioner in this regard is the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in Hussainara Khatoon and Others v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar AIR 1979 SC 11360 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 23 : (1980) 1 MLJ (Crl) 86. While dealing with the plight under trial prisoners awaiting their trial, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, taking into account the fact that in many of the cases the imprisonment already undergone was more than the maximum sentence that could be imposed on conviction, chose to give certain directions in the said case. In the said case, referring to an early decision in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India AIR 1978 SC 597 their lordships of the Supreme Court made the following observations: “We have held in that case that Article 21 confers fundamental right on every person not to be developed of his life or liberty except in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law and it is not enough to constitute compliance with the requirement of that article that some semblance of a procedure should be prescribed by law, but that the procedure should be “reasonable, fair and just. If a person is deprived of his liberty under a procedure which is not “reasonable, fair or just”, such deprivation would be violative of his fundamental right under Article 21 and he would be entitled to enforce such fundamental right and secure his release.” The Hon’ble Supreme Court also made the following observation: “There is also one other infirmity of the legal and judicial system which is responsible for this gross denial of justice to the undertial prisoners and that is the notorious delay in disposal of cases. It is a sad reflection on the legal and judicial system that the trial of an accused should not even commence for a long number of years. Even a delay of one year in the commencement of the trial is bad enough: how much worse could it be when the delay is as long as 3 or 5 or 7 or even 10 years. Speedy trial is of the essence of criminal justice and there can be no doubt that delay in trial by itself constitutes denial of justice.” In addition to the above observations, stress was made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the said case, as per the opinion of its Lordship of Justice Pathak, J., that the financial constraint should not be allowed to come in the way of such under trial prisoners being released on bail by imposing onerous conditions requiring a poor under trial prisoner to execute a bond for a hefty amount with sureties. 13. The said observations are also not applicable to the case on hand as the facts of that case can be distinguished from the present case. The delay in the disposal of the case cannot be said to be due to the laxity on the part of the trial Court or the inaction on the part of the prosecuting agency. On the other hand, from 1993 till 2007, i.e. for about 14 years the detenu concerned in this habeas corpus petition was absconding and thereby was paralyzing the proceedings which made the criminal proceedings against him a non-starter. Soon after his arrest and remand in the other case was brought to the notice of the prosecuting agency in C.C.No.6 of 1993 on the file of Designated Court II TADA, Chennai, he was produced on P.T. warrant and remanded in the said case also. Soon after his arrest and remand in the other case was brought to the notice of the prosecuting agency in C.C.No.6 of 1993 on the file of Designated Court II TADA, Chennai, he was produced on P.T. warrant and remanded in the said case also. After such remand in the said case, the detenu seems to have taken successive steps to stall the proceedings to the highest extent of his ability by filing habeaus corpus petitions challenging his periodical remand under Section 309 Cr.P.C and even challenging the jurisdiction of the Designated Court under the TADA to try the case on the ground that TADA had expired on 25. 1995 itself. The first habeas corpus petition viz., H.C.P.No.142 of 2008 was the one moved by an advocate on behalf of the detenu and the same was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court by an elaborate order on 13. 2009 S. Sengkodi v. 1. State of Tamil Nadu, rep. by its Chief Secretary to Government, Fort St. George, Chennai-600 009 and Others (2009) 1 L.W. 465 : (2009) 2 MLJ(Crl) 369. Even after the dismissal of the said H.C.P.No.142 of 2008, another petition was filed by the petitioner herein for the very same relief in H.C.P.No.1580 of 2009 and the same was dismissed on 11. 2009 with a direction to the trial Court viz., Designated Court II, TADA, Chennai to complete the examination of the witnesses by the end of December 2009. In fact the said direction was complied with and recording of prosecution evidence was closed on 212. 2009 itself. Later on questioning of accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C was over, the arguments were heard on 13. 2010 as the accused informed the Court that he propose to examine no witness on his side and the case was reserved for judgment to be pronounced on 23. 2010. At the said point of time, the petitioner filed a miscellaneous petition before the trial Court in Crl.M.P.No.7 of 2010 praying for transfer of the case to the regular Court having jurisdiction to try the rest of the offences apart from the TADA offences. Simultaneously, he has filed a writ petition in W.P.No.5690 of 2010 for the very same relief. Not content with the same, the detenu filed a petition before the trial Court in Crl.M.P.No.12 of 2010 seeking the permission of the Court to adduce evidence by examining defence witnesses. Simultaneously, he has filed a writ petition in W.P.No.5690 of 2010 for the very same relief. Not content with the same, the detenu filed a petition before the trial Court in Crl.M.P.No.12 of 2010 seeking the permission of the Court to adduce evidence by examining defence witnesses. The trial Court was pleased to advance the hearing and allowed the said petition on 23. 2010 itself. However, on request, the case was adjourned to 4. 2010 for examination of defence witness. 14. In A. Lakshmana Rao v. Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Parvatipuram and Others Air 1971 SC 186 : 1971 SCC (Cr) 107, while dealing with the power of the trial Court to remand the accused when adjourning the case under Section 344 of the old Code of Criminal Procedure corresponding to Section 309 of the present code, the Hon’ble Supreme Court rejected the contention raised therein that the power to remand an accused person under Section 344 was ultra vires being arbitrary and unambiguous. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that when a case was postponed or adjourned and the accused was in custody the Court had to exercise its judicial discretion whether or not to continue him in custody by making a remand order and that the Court was neither bound to make an order of remand nor was it bound to release the accused person. The Hon’ble Supreme Court proceeded further to observe that such orders of remand were subject to judicial discretion and were also subject to review by the Supreme Court in accordance with the law and the detention pursuant to an order of remand which appropriately fell within the terms of Section 344 of the old Code was accordingly not open to challenge in habeas corpus. 15. In Sanjay Dutt v. State Thro’ CBI, Mumbai 1994 SCC Cri 1426 : (1995) 1 MLJ (Crl) 176, the Supreme Court has made an observation that when there is a valid order of remand or detention of the accused, as on the date of return of rule, the petition seeking the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus on the ground of absence of a valid order of remand or detention when the rule was issued, should dismissed as custody or detention was on the basis of a valid order. In Kanu Sanyal v. Dist. In Kanu Sanyal v. Dist. Magistrate, Darjeeling and Others AIR 1974 SC 510 : 1974 SCC (Cr) 280 : (1975) 1 MLJ (Crl) 188, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that a writ of habeas corpus cannot be granted when a person is committed to jail custody by a competent Court by an order which prima facie does not appear to be without jurisdiction or wholly illegal. 16. It is brought to the notice of this Court that the detenu concerned in this case, having obtained an order of stay in the other writ petition in W.P.No.5690 of 2010, has made all efforts at his disposal to cause every hurdle to the disposal of the case and having done so, citing such delay in the disposal of the case, the detenu through the petitioner has chosen to seek his release on bail when the case is expected to be disposed of within a week or so, if the detenu cooperates. The antecedent of the detenu in absconding for about 14 years and the strenuous efforts made by him after his remand in the present case in 2007 to get him released on Bail will make it clear that the detenu is not interested in having the disposal of the case at an early date and the detenu has made a number of attempts and taken every effort to see that the proceedings are stalled one way or other. The unrelenting efforts even at the fag end of the trial, on the part of the detenu, to come out on bail by invoking the powers of the High Court under article 226 for the issue of writ of habeas corpus will make obvious the object sought to be achieved by the detenu. His main aim seems to be to avoid a judgment being pronounced. If at all the detenu is of the view that there was no incriminating material available in the evidence adduced on the side of the prosecution, then he could have very well cooperated with the Court by submitting his arguments without entering upon his defence. His main aim seems to be to avoid a judgment being pronounced. If at all the detenu is of the view that there was no incriminating material available in the evidence adduced on the side of the prosecution, then he could have very well cooperated with the Court by submitting his arguments without entering upon his defence. Even if he has got any grievance that he should not have been called upon to enter defence and an order of acquittal should have been passed under Section 232, Cr.P.C, the remedy available to him is to invoke the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The alternative course available to him is to invite a judgment of the trial Court on merit. When such alternative reliefs are available, the petitioner cannot sustain the present habeas corpus petition seeking a direction for the release of the detenu. 17. Referring to the judgment of Shaheem Welfare Association v. Union of India and Others (supra) classifying the under trial prisoners into four categories, an order was sought for in P. Ravichandran v. State represented by Deputy Superintendent of Police, Cuddalore (2006) 2 MLJ (Crl.) 815 in respect of an accused in a TADA case contending that he fell under category of “C”. This Court, after considering the observations made therein by the Supreme Court, observed that there was no material to show that the claim of the detenu therein would come under any one of the categories ‘c’ and ‘d’, listed in Shaheen Welfare Association v. Union of India and Others (supra) case and hence the plea could not be sustained. In that case also the detenu was in prison for 5 long years. However, the Division Bench of this Court, taking note of the fact that the other co-accused who had been granted bail were absconding, expressed an opinion that no case was made out for the grant of any relief to the detenu therein. There are also clear guidelines issued by the Supreme Court in Shaheen Welfare Association v. Union of India and Others (supra) regarding grant of bail to persons facing TADA charges. The detenu concerned in this case could have very well moved a bail application before the trial Court or before the High Court and in case of failure, he would have approached the Supreme Court. The detenu concerned in this case could have very well moved a bail application before the trial Court or before the High Court and in case of failure, he would have approached the Supreme Court. When an effective and efficacious alternative remedy is available, the invocation of the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under article 226 for the issue of writ of habeas corpus against the valid order of remand shall not be proper and for that reason also the petition shall fail. Therefore, this Court comes to conclusion that the second and third contention raised by the learned counsel on behalf of the petitioner also cannot be sustained and the same are deserve to be rejected. 18. For all the reasons stated above, this Court comes to the conclusion that there is no merit in the petition and that there is no bonafide on the part of the petitioner and that the petition has been filed with mala fide intention of avoiding a judgment being pronounced in the case, which is due for judgment and that therefore, the petition deserves to be dismissed. Accordingly, the present habeas corpus petition is dismissed. Consequently, M.P. No.2 of 2010 is dismissed.