JUDGMENT : R.N. Biswal, J. - This appeal is directed against the order dated 7.4.2009 passed by the learned District Judge, Cuttack in ARBP No. 41 of 2009 rejecting the petition filed under Section-9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) filed by the appellant. 2. The appellant was the petitioner and the respondent was the opp. party in the Court below. As per the case of the petitioner, they married in the year, 1988. Both of them belong to Hanafi School of Muslim law. After the marriage, they left for Riyadh, where opp. party pursued higher study, while the petitioner was working and supporting the family. As the opp. party could not complete the course, the couple decided to return India and run the Nursing Home after the name "M/s. Janasevak Clinic and Nursing Home" established by the father of the opp. party. On return to India, they found that the Nursing Home was in shambles. So, the petitioner invested all her savings and earned from Riyadh. Her father also contributed cash of about Rs. 4,00,000/-for payment towards arrear electricity bill and debts incurred by the Nursing Home. At the time of partnership business, consisting of the partners-Smt. Noorjahan Begum, Dr. Tabasum Begum, the mother and sister of the opp. party respectively and the opp. party himself, the aforesaid Nursing Home sustained loss as they were incapable of managing the partnership business. So, it was decided that the partnership would be reconstituted. Accordingly, Noorjahan Begum and Dr. Tabasum Begum retired from partnership business and the partnership was reconstituted with the petitioner and the opp.party as equal partners. It was decided that in the reconstitution partnership, the petitioner shall be responsible for the maintenance of accounts and administration of the business while the opp. party would look after the treatment side. The partnership firm was duly registered. After the petitioner took over the management and administration of the partnership business, she plugged the loopholes to prevent the leakage of the business fund. Due to her hard labour and efficient management, the income of the Nursing Home increased manifold. When the income increased, opp. party developed a lavish life style and played ducks and drakes with the partnership money. He quarreled with his mother and sister, but at the intervention of the close relatives of the petitioner, the differences between them were amicably settled. When the income increased, opp. party developed a lavish life style and played ducks and drakes with the partnership money. He quarreled with his mother and sister, but at the intervention of the close relatives of the petitioner, the differences between them were amicably settled. Thereafter, the opp.party and his mother started torturing the petitioner in many a way. Once the opp. party locked the petitioner and a sweeper of the Nursing Home in one room for more than 8 hours. In another occasion, he called upon the pharmacist of the Nursing Home to bring kerosene, so that he would set fire on the room in which the petitioner was staying. 3. In January, 2008 since the father of the petitioner fell ill, she took him to Hyderabad for immediate medical intervention and when she returned from Hyderabad she was prevented from entering into the Nursing Home, for which she was compelled to return to her father's house, at Cuttack. Shortly thereafter, the petitioner was served with Talakanama annulling her marriage with the opp.party. The petitioner requested the opp. party in several occasion to give her share in the partnership business, but in vain. On 21.3.2009, the petitioner got reliable information that opp. party was going to dispose of all the assets of the partnership business and siphoning away all the profits of the partnership business. Since the partnership deed provides for settlement of disputes between the partners through arbitration and the petitioner was taking steps for seeking appointment of an arbitrator, she filed an application under Section-9 of the Act before the District Judge, Cuttack which was registered as ARBP No. 41 of 2009, with prayer to appoint a Commissioner to make complete inventory of all assets of M/s. Janasevak Clinic & Nursing Home situated at Kapaleswar under Choudwar P.S., injunct the opp. party from selling, assigning, encumbering any of the assets of the said clinic and to appoint a receiver to take charge of the book of accounts and to handle all financial transactions of the Nursing Home. 4. In his show cause, opp. party contended that the so-called partnership deed dated 28.7.2007 was a fraudulent one and that he had already taken step to move the competent Court of law for declaring it as void. 4. In his show cause, opp. party contended that the so-called partnership deed dated 28.7.2007 was a fraudulent one and that he had already taken step to move the competent Court of law for declaring it as void. According to him, he never made any application to the Inspector General of Registration for registration of partnership deed in the prescribed form. The opp. party had lodged an F.I.R. against the petitioner vide Choudwar P.S. Case No. 31 of 2008, specifically alleging that on 4.3.2008 she forcibly took his signatures on some blank stamp papers and some plain papers, besides taking away a Santro Zin car and cash of Rs. 5,00,000/- from him. The petitioner lodged an F.I.R. against the opp. party and others in 12.2.2008 making false allegation of dowry torture, which resulted in Registration of Choudwar P.S. Case No. 3 of 2008 under Sections 498-A/323/34 of I.P.C., and, as such, it was inconceivable that the petitioner made an application before the Inspector General of Registration for registration of the partnership firm. Moreover, the deed of family settlement dated 10th April, 2007 indicates that the opp. party had been suffering from Psychiatric ailment and was under treatment of Dr. S.N. Parida, Senior Psychiatrist, Capital Hospital, Bhubaneswar. So, it cannot be believed that opp. party executed the so-called partnership deed on 28.7.2007. It is the specific case of opp. party that the so called partnership deed reveals that he made 100% capital investment. As such, the claim of the petitioner that she invested all her savings earned from Riyadh and cash of Rs. 4,00,000/-,given by her father in the Nursing Home is baseless. The original partnership firm having partners-Smt. Noorjahan Begum, Dr. Tabasum Begum and opp. party, was never reconstituted. The so called partnership deed dated 28.7.2007 is nothing but an act of fraud on the part of the petitioner, and, therefore, she cannot claim any benefit on basis of the said deed. The opp. party denied all the allegations of torture and the allegation that the petitioner was prevented from entering into the Nursing Home. In fact the petitioner has no right over the Nursing Home and that the opp. party has already divorced her on 4.2.2008 pronouncing Talaq thrice. On all such grounds, opp. party prayed to dismiss the petition filed u/s 9 of the Act. 5. In fact the petitioner has no right over the Nursing Home and that the opp. party has already divorced her on 4.2.2008 pronouncing Talaq thrice. On all such grounds, opp. party prayed to dismiss the petition filed u/s 9 of the Act. 5. After going through the pleadings of the parties and the documents filed, the Court below, prima facie, disbelieved the reconstitution of the partnership firm between the petitioner and the opp. party and registration thereof. It also held that the deed of family settlement where the petitioner was said to have given 50% share of the Nursing Home had no evidential value, since it was not registered, and, therefore, rejected the petition filed by the petitioner u/s 9 of the Act. Being aggrieved with the said order, the petitioner has preferred the present appeal. 6. Mr. Rajat Rath, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent submitted that respondent never made any application for registration of the so called partnership deed in the prescribed formant provided by the office of the Inspector General of Registration. He never signed on any deed of partnership. His signatures were taken on some blank stamp and plain papers, which were subsequently utilized by the appellant for creating the partnership deed. The said partnership deed being a fraudulent one, the appellant ought to have been directed by the trial Court to establish her right, before the competent civil Court. In support of his submission he relied on the judgment dated 1.7.2008 of this Court in the case of Dushashan Sahoo & another vs. Smt. Geetarani Mohanty & others (ARBA no. 7 of 2008), G.E. Capital Transportation Financial Services Ltd. Vs. Amritajit Mitra, 2009 (3) Arb LR 51, India Household and Healthcare Ltd. Vs LG Household and Healthcare Ltd, AIR 2007 SC 1736, Atul Singh and Others Vs. Sunil Kumar Singh and Others, . 7. On the contrary, learned counsel appearing for the appellant contended that in the case of Dushashan Sahoo (supra) since Geetarani Mohanty was not a party to the reconstituted partnership deed, it was held that she could only approach the civil Court of competent jurisdiction for seeking the desired relief and accordingly her application u/s 9 of the Act was held to be not maintainable. The case of Atul Singh (supra) relates to a petition under. Section 8(1) of the Act. The case of Atul Singh (supra) relates to a petition under. Section 8(1) of the Act. In G.E. Capital Transportation Financial Services Limited (Supra) the apex Court held that in a petition u/s 9 of the Act, the District Judge can prima facie decide whether the agreement containing arbitration clause is void or valid. The case of India Household and-Healthcare Ltd (supra) relates to a petition u/s 11 of the Act. Moreover, according to learned counsel for the appellant, in the present case there is nothing to show that the partnership deed was an outcome of fraud. So, according to him the aforesaid decisions are not applicable to the present case. 8. In view of the rival submissions of learned counsel for the parties, it is to be seen whether the trial Court ought to have asked the appellant to approach the civil Court of competent jurisdiction seeking a decision as to the validity or otherwise of the partnership deed. As rightly submitted by learned counsel for the appellant, in the case of Dushashan Sahoo & another (supra), Smt. Geetarani Mohanty was not a party to the reconstituted partnership deed. So, it was held that she could only approach the civil Court of competent jurisdiction for seeking the desired relief. In the case of G.E. Capital Transportation Financial Services Ltd (supra) the apex Court held that if a party took a plea that the agreement containing the arbitration clause was vitiated by fraud, such a plea could only be decided by the civil Court and not by the arbitrator. As defined u/s 2(1)(e) of the Act, "Court" means the principal civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject-matter of a suit, but does not include any civil Court of a grade inferior to such principal civil Court, or any Court of Small causes. Clause 9 of the Act, which deals with interim relief, insists that once approached in that behalf, the Court shall have the same power for making orders as it has for the purpose of, and in relation to, any proceeding before it. Clause 9 of the Act, which deals with interim relief, insists that once approached in that behalf, the Court shall have the same power for making orders as it has for the purpose of, and in relation to, any proceeding before it. So the District Judge, before whom an application u/s 9 of the Act is made for interim relief, can examine for its prima facie satisfaction, as to whether an agreement containing arbitration clause is a valid or void one. The decision in India Household and Healthcare Ltd. (supra) refers to an application under sub-section 5 and 6 of Section 11 of the Act. In that case L.G. Logo which belongs to L.G. Corporation was not a party to the agreement. It also filed a separate suit. So this decision is not applicable to the present case. The decision in the case of Atul Singh (supra) dealt with a petition filed u/s 8(1) of the Act for referring the dispute to an arbitrator. The plaintiff-appellants were not parties to the agreement. The apex Court held:- The first relief claimed by the plaintiffs in the suit is a decree for declaration that the reconstituted partnership deed dated 17.2.1992 was illegal and void and there was no intention or desire of Shri Rajendra Prasad Singh, to retire from the partnership and further that the plaintiffs being heirs of Shri Rajendra Prasad Singh will be deemed to be continuing as partners to the extent of his share. It is true that the plaintiffs have also sought rendition of accounts and their share of profits from the partnership as well as interest over the unsecured loan and the principal amount of unsecured loan on rendition of accounts. For getting this relief, the plaintiffs undoubtedly rely upon the partnership deed dated 13.1.1989. However, this deed of 1989 could be relied upon and from the basis of the claim of the plaintiffs only if the partnership deed dated 17.2.1992 was declared as void. If the deed dated 17.2.1992 was not declared as void and remained valid and operative, the plaintiff could not fall back upon the earlier partnership deed dated 13.1.1989 to claim rendition of accounts and their share of profits. If the deed dated 17.2.1992 was not declared as void and remained valid and operative, the plaintiff could not fall back upon the earlier partnership deed dated 13.1.1989 to claim rendition of accounts and their share of profits. Therefore, in order to get their share of profits from the partnership business, it was absolutely essential for the plaintiff-appellants to have the partnership deed dated 17.2.1992 declared as illegal, void and inoperative.' The relief for such a declaration could only be granted by the civil Court and not by an arbitrator as they or Shri Rajendra Prasad Singh through whom the plaintiffs derive title, are not party to the said deed. The trial Court had, therefore, rightly held that the matter could not be referred to arbitration and the view to the contrary taken by the High Court is clearly illegal. In the present case as held earlier in a petition u/s 9 of the Act, the District Judge can examine for its prima facie satisfaction, whether the agreement containing the arbitration clause, is illegal void and inoperative or otherwise. So, the aforesaid decision is also not applicable to the present case. Accordingly, it is held that the Court below was not required to ask the appellant to approach the civil Court of competent jurisdiction seeking a decision as to the validity or otherwise of the agreement. It is also held that District Judge has power u/s 9 of the Act to examine for its prima facie satisfaction, whether an agreement containing arbitration clause is illegal, void, inoperative or otherwise, while going to pass an interim order there under. 9. Learned counsel for the respondent further submitted that, in the instant case there was no agreement for arbitration. The so called arbitration clause does not speak of any adjudication of dispute, in absence of which, the agreement cannot be treated as an arbitration agreement. In support of his submission he relied on the decisions K.K. Modi Vs. K.N. Modi and Others Bharat Bhushan Bansal Vs. U.P. Small Industries Corporation Ltd., Kanpur State of Orissa and another etc. Vs. Sri Damodar Das, and State of U.P. Vs. Tipper Chand. In the decision K.K. Modi (supra), the Memorandum of Understanding recorded the settlement of various disputes as between Group-A and Group-B in terms of the Memorandum of Understanding. K.N. Modi and Others Bharat Bhushan Bansal Vs. U.P. Small Industries Corporation Ltd., Kanpur State of Orissa and another etc. Vs. Sri Damodar Das, and State of U.P. Vs. Tipper Chand. In the decision K.K. Modi (supra), the Memorandum of Understanding recorded the settlement of various disputes as between Group-A and Group-B in terms of the Memorandum of Understanding. In terms of the settlement, the shares and assets of various companies were required to be valued in the manner specified in the agreement. The valuation was to be done by M/s. S.B. Billimoria and Co. Three companies, which had to be divided between the two Groups in accordance with the Scheme to be prepared by Bansi S. Mehta & Co. In the implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding which was to be done in consultation with the financial institutions, any dispute or clarifications relating to implementation were to be referred to the Chairman, IFCI or his nominees, whose decision would be final and binding. The purport of Clause 9 of the agreement was to prevent any further disputes between Groups A and B. Because the agreement required division of assets in agreed proportions after their valuation by a named body and under a scheme of division by another named body, clause 9 was intended to clear any other difficulties which might arise in the implementation of the agreement by leaving it to the decision of the Chairman, IFCI. So, the apex Court held that Clause 9 did not contemplate any judicial determination by the Chairman of the IFCI. He was entitled to nominate another person for deciding any question. Thus clause 9 was not intended to be for any different decision that what was already agreed upon between the parties to the dispute. Accordingly, looking to the scheme of the Memorandum of Understanding and the purpose behind clause 9, the apex Court held that it was not an agreement to refer dispute to arbitration. 10. Thus clause 9 was not intended to be for any different decision that what was already agreed upon between the parties to the dispute. Accordingly, looking to the scheme of the Memorandum of Understanding and the purpose behind clause 9, the apex Court held that it was not an agreement to refer dispute to arbitration. 10. In the decision Bharat Bhushan (supra), Clause 23 and 24 of the agreement read as follows; Decision of the Executive Engineer of the U.P.S.I.C. to be final on certain matters: Clause-23:-Except where otherwise specified in the contract, the decision of the Executive Engineer shall be final, conclusive and binding on both the parties to the contract on all questions relating to the meaning, the specification, design, drawings and instructions hereinbefore mentioned, and as to the quality of workmanship or materials used on the work or as to any other question whatsoever in any way arising out of or relating to the designs, drawings, specification, estimates, instruction, orders or otherwise concerning the works or the execution or failure to execute the same whether arising during the progress of the work, or after the completion thereof or abandonment of the contract by the contractor shall be final and conclusive and binding on the contractor. Decision of the M.D. of the U.P.S.I.C. on all other matters shall be final: Clause-24: Except as provided in Clause 23 hereof the decision of the Managing Director of the U.P.S.I.C. shall be final, conclusive and binding on both the parties to the contract upon all questions relating to any claim, right, matter or thing in any way arising out of or relating to the contract or these conditions or concerning abandonment of the contract by the contractor and in respect of all other matter arising out of this contract and not specifically mentioned. Reading clauses 23 and 24 together, the apex Court held that: It is quite clear that in respect of questions arising from or relating to any claim or right, matter or thing in any way connected with the contract, while the decision of the Executive Engineer is made final and binding in respect of certain types of claims or questions, the decision of the Managing Director is made final and binding in respect of the remaining claims. Both the Executive Engineer as well as the Managing Director are expected to determine the question or claim on the basis of their own investigations and material. Neither of the clauses contemplates a full fledged arbitration covered by the Arbitration Act. Accordingly, it was held that the aforesaid clauses did not spell out any intention to refer any disputes and differences between the parties for arbitration. In the decision, State of Orissa and another (supra), the question raised before the apex Court was whether there was any arbitration agreement for resolution of the disputes between the parties. The relevant clause in the agreement read as follows; 25. Decision of public Health Engineer to be final-Except where otherwise specified in this contract, the decision of the Public Health Engineer for the time being shall be final, conclusive and binding on all parties to the contract upon all questions relating to the meaning of the specifications; drawings and instructions hereinbefore mentioned and as to the quality of workmanship or materials used on the work, or as to any other question, claim right, matter or thing, whatsoever in any way arising out of, or relating to, the contracts, drawings specifications estimates instructions, orders or these conditions, or otherwise concerning the works or the execution or failure to execute the same, whether arising during the progress of the work or after the completion or the sooner determination thereof of the contract. The apex Court held that the above quoted relevant clause of the agreement did not expressly or by necessary implication indicated the disputes to be referred to an arbitrator. In the decision State of U.P. (supra) clause 22 of the agreement entered into between the parties read as follows: Except where otherwise specified in the contract the decision of the Superintending Engineer for the time being shall be final, conclusive and binding on all parties to the contract upon all questions relating to the meaning of the specifications, design, drawing and instructions hereinbefore mentioned. The decision of such Engineer as to the quality of workmanship, or materials used on the work, or as to any other question, claim, right, matter or things whatsoever, in any way arising out of or relating to the contract, designs, drawing specifications, estimates', instructions orders, or these conditions, or otherwise concerning the works, or the execution or failure to execute the same, whether arising during the progress of the work, or after the completion or abandonment of the contract by the contractor, shall also be final, conclusive and binding on the contractor. On perusal of the aforesaid clause the apex Court held that it did not contain any expressed arbitration agreement. It also could not be inferred from the said clause that the dispute would be referred to an arbitrator. In the case at hand, the arbitration clause incorporated in clause 8 of the partnership deed reads as follows: That in case of difference of opinion, the matter shall be referred to a single arbitrator selected by both the partners and his/her opinion in the matter shall be final So, none of the aforesaid four decisions cited on behalf of the respondent would be applicable to the present case. 11. Learned counsel for the respondent further submitted that Clause 8 of the partnership deed stipulates that in case of difference of opinion (emphasis supplied) the matter shall be referred to a single arbitrator. "Difference of opinion" would not tantamount to dispute. So the question of deciding the dispute by the arbitrator does not arise. On the contrary, learned counsel appearing for the appellant contended that there is no difference between difference of opinion and dispute. According to him as per Black's Law Dictionary the meaning of 'difference' in reference to an agreement for submission to arbitration means, a disagreement or dispute. So, only because in place of dispute it has been mentioned as difference in clause 8 of the partnership deed, it cannot be said that the dispute between the parties cannot be referred to an arbitrator. I am in agreement with the learned counsel for the appellant in this regard. 12. So, only because in place of dispute it has been mentioned as difference in clause 8 of the partnership deed, it cannot be said that the dispute between the parties cannot be referred to an arbitrator. I am in agreement with the learned counsel for the appellant in this regard. 12. Learned counsel for the respondent further submitted that if the three documents, viz., family settlement, deed of reconciliation and the partnership deed are read together, it would show that the parties are at liberty to move the civil Court for dissolution of the partnership firm and partition u/s 44 of the Transfer of Properties Act. So, there is no mandatory arbitration clause in the partnership deed. In support of his submission, he relied on the decisions in the case of Wellington Associates Ltd. Vs. Mr. Kirit Mehta, and M/s. Sankar Sealing Systems Private Ltd. v. M/s. Jain Motor Trading Co. and another, AIR 2004 Mad 127 . In the case of Wellington Associates Ltd. (supra), the relevant clause of the two agreements were clause 4 and 5, which read as follows:- Clause-4: It is hereby agreed that, if any dispute arises in connection with these presents, only Courts in Bombay would have jurisdiction to try and determine the suit and the parties hereto submit themselves to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Courts in Bombay. Clause-5: It is also agreed by and between the parties that any dispute or differences arising in connection with these presents may be referred to arbitration in pursuance of the Arbitration Act, 1947, by each party appointing one arbitrator and the arbitrators so appointed selecting an umpire. The venue of arbitration shall be at Bombay. The Apex Court held that the words, "means an agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration" in sub-clause (1) of Section 7 of the Act postulate an agreement which mandatorily requires appointment of an arbitrator/arbitrators. Section 7 does not cover a case where the parties agree that they may go to a suit or that they may also go to arbitration. So, accordingly, it was held that there was no arbitration agreement in the aforesaid case. Section 7 does not cover a case where the parties agree that they may go to a suit or that they may also go to arbitration. So, accordingly, it was held that there was no arbitration agreement in the aforesaid case. In the case M/s. Sankar Sealing Systems Private Ltd. (supra), the defendants therein urged to refer the matter to arbitration pursuant to clause 23-A of the agreement, which read as follows: Any disputes arising in relation to this agreement will be settled by the arbitration of a neutral person agreed to by both. There was also another clause, i.e., Clause 23-B, which stipulated that: Courts in Chennai will have exclusive jurisdiction in the event of any legal/judicial proceedings. So, it was held that there was no mandatory arbitration clause in the agreement. 13. In the case at hand, learned counsel for the respondent harped much on Clause (e) of the family settlement to support his argument that there was no mandatory arbitration clause in the partnership deed. Clause (e) of the family settlement read as follows:- If the partnership is dissolved, any one of them may insist on partition of the property and then propose for sale. Such sale shall be subject to all such rights and liabilities enshrined in Section 44 of the Transfer of Property Act and such other law or custom recognizing the right of preemption among the Muslims. Since the partnership in question has not yet been dissolved, this clause cannot be attracted at this stage. So, the aforesaid two decisions cited by the learned counsel for the respondent cannot be applicable to the present case. 14. Now, it is to be seen whether the District Judge was right in rejecting the petition u/s 9 of the Act. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that a registered partnership deed has presumptive value. In support of his submission he relied on the decisions V. Subramaniam Vs. Rajesh Raghuvandra Rao, and Ashok Layland Ltd. vs. State of Tamil Nadu and another, AIR 2004 SC 2836 . In the decision v. Subramaniam (supra) their lordship held: Once a firm is registered under the Act the statements recorded in the Register regarding the constitution of the firm are conclusive proofs of the fact contained therein as against the partner. A partner, whose name appears on the Register cannot deny that he is a partner except the circumstances provided. In the decision v. Subramaniam (supra) their lordship held: Once a firm is registered under the Act the statements recorded in the Register regarding the constitution of the firm are conclusive proofs of the fact contained therein as against the partner. A partner, whose name appears on the Register cannot deny that he is a partner except the circumstances provided. In the decision Ashok Leyland Ltd. (supra), the apex Court held: In the rules of evidence, there exist several presumptions. These presumptions may be rebuttable or irrebuttable. Irrebuttable presumptions are referred to as conclusive presumptions as they stand as conclusive proof of certain facts and are open to challenge only on very meagre grounds. According to learned counsel for the appellant in the present case when the I.G.R. gave certificate that the partnership deed was executed between the appellant and the respondent, it is presumed that the said partnership deed was properly registered. There is no second opinion in this regard. Learned Court below also acceded to this proposition of law. But he held that such presumption was rebuttable. According to it, the record regarding registration of the firm shows that on 6.12.2007 the application form for registration was found to be defective and the parties were asked to rectify the same. As found from the order sheet dated 30.1.2008 defect no. 4 only was rectified but not the other defects. A letter was sent, on 9.2.2008 to rectify the other defects. The compliance report was sent by the appellant alone. Similarly the defect removal report dated 17.1.2008 was signed by the appellant alone. The treasury challan dated 15.10.2007 did not bear the signature of the respondent. The space for signature of the respondent was left blank. The parties filed F.I.R. against each other on 12.2.2008. All these go to show that the matter of registration was pursued by the appellant alone. Even the medical degree of the respondent was submitted by the appellant which corroborated the claim of the respondent that the appellant left his house taking away his car, cash and valuable documents. The respondent explained that the stamp papers were purchased in his name for preparation of the final decree. The appellant had stolen away those stamp papers with signatures of the respondent when she left his house and utilized the same for preparation of the partnership deed. The respondent explained that the stamp papers were purchased in his name for preparation of the final decree. The appellant had stolen away those stamp papers with signatures of the respondent when she left his house and utilized the same for preparation of the partnership deed. So, the District Judge held that there were sufficient materials on record to rebut the presumption that the partnership deed was a genuine one. 15. In clause 9 of the partnership deed, it is clearly stated that all the partners are authorized to represent the firm in all departments and office of the Government of Orissa. Further more both the partners were not required to remove the defects. So, the learned Court below ought not to have prima facie suspected the genuineness of the partnership deed, because the appellant alone removed the defects in the application form for registration of the partnership firm. As per the case of respondent, appellant obtained his signatures on some blank stamp and plain papers. But the trial Court held that the stamp papers purchased in the name of the respondent for preparation of the final decree were stolen away by the appellant which were subsequently used as partnership deed is against the pleading. The respondent is a highly qualified person. It appears improbable that his signatures were obtained forcibly and he did not lodge F.I.R. against the appellant immediately after the alleged occurrence. So, the finding of the trial Court that the presumption that the registered partnership deed was a genuine one was rebutted cannot be accepted. To prove a prima facie case in his favour a party is not required to prove his case to the hilt. If he can prove that he has a arguable case, then it is enough to hold that he has a prima facie case in his favour. In my view, in the instant case the appellant has a prima facie case in her favour. 16. The claim of the appellant for 50% share in the partnership business is on the basis of recital made in the family settlement dated 28.7.2007, where it is mentioned that the Nursing Home would be deemed to be joint property of both the parties, irrespective of its title or ostensible title holder and each of the parties shall have 8 annas interest therein. The validity of the said family settlement alienating 50% share of the Nursing Home in favour of the appellant was challenged by the respondent on the ground that it was not registered. On the contrary, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that Mohammedan law allows oral gift (Hiba). The Court below held that when the gift was reduced to writing, it required registration. So, it did not accept the deed of family settlement as a legal document for enforcement of appellant's right over 50% share in the Nursing Home. It also did not believe the plea of contribution of the appellant for the improvement of the Nursing Home. According to the Court below, the Nursing Home originally belonged to the father of the respondent, so the appellant would not suffer any loss, much less irreparable loss, if the petition u/s 9 was not allowed. 17. In clause-A on the deed of family settlement, it has been specifically mentioned that the property described in the schedule of the said deed (Nursing Home) shall be deemed to be joint property of both the appellant and the respondent irrespective of its title or ostensible title holder. So, whether the appellant is entitled to get 50% share of the said property or not is to be decided by the competent civil Court or the arbitrator as the case may be. At this stage, it can not be said that she has no share in the Nursing Home. As per the case of appellant, she came to know from reliable source that the respondent is going to alienate the property of the partnership business. If he succeeds in his attempts the appellant would suffer irreparable injury. Irreparable Injury does not mean that there must be no physical possibility of repairing the injury. It is enough if the injury is a material one. 18. In the instant case, the comparative inconvenience which, is likely to be caused from refusal of the injunction would be greater than which is likely to arise from granting it. So, the trial Court ought to have allowed the prayer for injunction. The prayer for appointment or a Commissioner to make inventory of the assets of the Nursing Home should also have been allowed by the trial Court. The words "make such other order" found in Rule 1 of Order 39 of C.P.C. do not contemplate the appointment of receiver. So, the trial Court ought to have allowed the prayer for injunction. The prayer for appointment or a Commissioner to make inventory of the assets of the Nursing Home should also have been allowed by the trial Court. The words "make such other order" found in Rule 1 of Order 39 of C.P.C. do not contemplate the appointment of receiver. Taking into consideration the business of the partnership firm, a receiver should not be appointed. The District Judge has rightly refused to appoint a receiver. 19. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed in part. The orders of the Court below so far as refusing injunction and denying appointment of a Commissioner are set aside. The respondent is prohibited from selling, assigning, encumbering any of the assets of M/s. Janasevak Clinic & Nursing Home till the matter is finally decided by the Arbitrator or competent civil Court. The District Judge Cuttack is directed to appoint a Commissioner to make inventory of the assets of "M/s. Janasevak Clinic and Nursing Home" within a period of twenty days from the date of receipt of this order and direct the Commissioner to submit the inventory before him within a specific date to be fixed by it. Parties are directed to appear before the District Judge, Cuttack on 20th April, 2010. No cost. Final Result : Allowed