Judgment K.Kannan, J. 1. I. The cases, parties and their versions The Insurance Company which denies the accident is in appeal before this Court. The appeal by the Insurance Company is in FAO No.3448 of 2006 and the claim for enhancement of award is in FAO No.3143 of 2006. (a) Claimants version 2. The representatives of the deceased Malvinder Singh filed the case contending that Malvinder Singh, who was a Lambardar, was going in his scooter on 01.04.2003 when Toyata Qualis vehicle owned by the 2nd respondent, hit against the deceased that resulted in his death. The complaint which had been given on the same day on the basis of which, FIR had been recorded made reference merely to an unknown vehicle as having caused the accident and requested the police to undertake the investigation. An additional statement was said to have been taken on 18.06.2003 on the basis of which the driver was arrested and the vehicle was seized. The registration of the complaint by police against the insureds vehicle was taken as the basis for proving that the vehicle had been involved. (b) Evidence tendered 3. At the trial, the evidence had been given through witnesses amongst whom one Kuldip Singh was said to be an eye-witness. The eye-witness version was said to be corroborated by an alleged extra judicial confession by the driver of the vehicle to one Gur- charan Singh that he was involved in an accident by collision with the scooter that resulted in the death of a person. The inspector, who had registered a complaint and who had prepared the Section 173 report, was also examined. (c) Insurers defence 4. The Insurance Company had the benefit of defence under Section 170 to contest the case on all grounds. The contention of the learned counsel for the insurer was that the vehicle had not been involved at all and the Tribunals finding must be based on what evidence is tendered before it and a mere registration of a case on suspicion cannot be taken as proof of the involvement of a particular vehicle in the accident. The contention of the learned counsel for the insurer was that the vehicle had not been involved at all and the Tribunals finding must be based on what evidence is tendered before it and a mere registration of a case on suspicion cannot be taken as proof of the involvement of a particular vehicle in the accident. The learned counsel for the claimants however would rely on the fact that even an acquittal by a Criminal Court finding that the vehicle had not been involved, cannot be material for a Tribunal and refers to a judgment of this Court in Pepsu Road Transport Corporation, Patiala v. Joginder Kaur, (2001-2)128 P.L.R. 685. The Tribunal found that the accident involving the insureds vehicle had been proved and granted the compensation. II. Relevance of Criminal Court records, statements and judgment before Tribunal (a) Conviction or acquittal, how far relevant 5. The relevance of a Criminal Courts judgment in the proceeding before Motor Vehicles Act have been considered in several judgments as a proposition of law. It could be stated that where after a criminal trial, Criminal Court convicts the driver for rash and negligent driving, the judgment of the Criminal Court has been takea as relevant evidence that the particular vehicle was involved in the accident and that the driver was guilty of rashness and negligence. On the other hand, if there is an acquittal by a Criminal Court, it can neither prove absence of rashness or negligence nor can it prove the non-involvement of the vehicle in proceedings before a Tribunal. In such a situation, the Tribunals endeavour must be to examine the evidence tendered before it and see whether a case as contended by the claimant is made out or not. (b) Statement, if collusive, how established 6. Filing of written statement admitting to an accident and/or conviction in a Criminal Court on confession are other situations which will have important bearing to a claimant in a case and they could be relied on by the claimant as proof of the involvement of the vehicle against the driver and the owner. The same statement cannot be used as binding on an insurer, where the insurer contends that there has been a collusion between the claimant and the owner and driver. The same statement cannot be used as binding on an insurer, where the insurer contends that there has been a collusion between the claimant and the owner and driver. The reason for this is obvious, for, when a collusion is attributed, it cannot be expected that there is even a denial by a driver of the accident. A collusion is a secret arrangement and it is a matter for inference and the person, who alleges collusion must be in a position to bring about circumstances that will enable a Court to deduce such collusion. Normally in a case before a Tribunal, this comes about in situations where the driver and the owner remain ex parte or they do not cooperate with the insurer for the proper contest of the case or there could be some other intrinsic facts which will make possible such an inference. The Court that grants permission on a request to an insurer to contest the case on all grounds under Section 170 of the MV Act does not engage in a roving enquiry to satisfy itself about possibility of collusion and grants permission. The mere fact that a Tribunal has granted permission under Section 170 cannot conclude the issue whether there had been any collusion or not. It is merely the starting point for undertaking an exercise for the Tribunal at the trial to find whether there existed collusion or not. It may ultimately turn out even in cases where the Tribunal has granted permission to hold at the time of judgment that the statement by a driver was true and there was no collusion at all. (c) Filing or non-filing of FIR 7. The fact that the there was no FIR or the FIR does not make a reference to the involvement of the particular vehicle or the driver against whom allegations are made are not again decisive factors. The reasons for non-disclosure could be explained at the trial. If there are wrong details given in the FIR, it can still be corrected by appropriate evidence. The Tribunal will consider therefore all the contentious cases and take an appropriate decision. (d) Standard of proof before Tribunal 8. The scheme of the Act, while admitting the claim for compensation merely provides for a summary enquiry. If there are wrong details given in the FIR, it can still be corrected by appropriate evidence. The Tribunal will consider therefore all the contentious cases and take an appropriate decision. (d) Standard of proof before Tribunal 8. The scheme of the Act, while admitting the claim for compensation merely provides for a summary enquiry. The nature of proof that will be adduced is not an extracting standard in the sense of proof beyond reasonable doubt as contemplated in criminal trial. The standard of proof is preponderance of probabilities. Indeed the burden of proof in a case of negligence where an accident is admitted is light but when the accident itself is not admitted, there has to be some proof in order that a Court makes an award against the insured and the insurer. (e) Setting the context 9. The chaborate preface has become necessary only in order to set about the task of exploring the latitudinal limits of enquiry that would require to be undertaken in this case where the Tribunal has already held the involvement of the insureds vehicle to be true and the insurer assails the award by stating that the Tribunal has relied on evidence which proved nothing and the ultimate decision was clearly erroneous. There could be no doubt that the Tribunal is entitled to take a view on the involvement of the vehicle irrespective of any decision that may have been rendered by the Criminal Court. It is another way of saying that the finality of involvement of the vehicle before awarding compensation shall rest only in the hands of the Tribunal. III. Evidence at the trial-an elaborate consideration (a) Neither complainant nor claimant was an eyewitness 10. As far as the claimants themselves are concerned, they were not eye-witnesses and, therefore, the evidence of the wife is not anyway helpful. PW2 is Baljinder Singh, who has given the complaint and who was the author of the FIR. He has stated in his evidence that "I did not see the accident with my own eyes. I came to know about the accident later on." The evidence of PW2 is also therefore not helpful. (b) PW4 s version, not corroborated 11. Gurcharan Singh was PW4 and he was also a Lambardar. He has stated in his evidence that "I did not see the accident with my own eyes. I came to know about the accident later on." The evidence of PW2 is also therefore not helpful. (b) PW4 s version, not corroborated 11. Gurcharan Singh was PW4 and he was also a Lambardar. Incidentally, the deceased was also a Lambardar in an adjoining village, Gurcharan Singh himself has tendered his evidence saying that he was not a witness to the accident, but he came to know about the accident when the driver confessed to him about the accident. Since he was not himself an eyewitness, the most crucial thing would be whether such an extra judicial confession statement said to have been made by the driver could be true or not. The cross-examination of Gurcharan Singh has yielded the following version:- "The accident had taken place on 1.4.2003 whereas the accused had come to me on 18.6.2003. The respondent Sarabjit Singh (accused) is resident of my ward and was known to me. The respondent No.1 had come to me earlier. We had been meeting with each other during this period from 1.4.2003 to 18.6.2003, but he did not disclose this fact earlier to me. The police did not record my statement............." The evidence of this witness could hardly support the contention of the involvement of the vehicle. His evidence must be tested in the context of how, he being a Lambardar himself and he could have been therefore interested in supporting the family of another person holding the same rank in an adjoining village. His evidence is artificial that the driver, who had met him for nearly two months, had never disclosed this accident and had come on his own to disclose this event two months later. It is really doubtful whether such a voluntary statement could have been made, for, if he had come by such an important information which must have been a huge revelation to an otherwise a case of mystery, he could not have remained without informing this to the police. He was not illiterate person. He was an important village functionary. He has admitted in his evidence that the police did not record any statement from him. If the police did not, there was no reason why he had himself not volunteered any statement to the police. He was not illiterate person. He was an important village functionary. He has admitted in his evidence that the police did not record any statement from him. If the police did not, there was no reason why he had himself not volunteered any statement to the police. I cannot therefore take the evidence of PW4 to enter a finding of involvement of the vehicle. (c) Version of alleged eyewitness-not a witness for truth 12. Kuldip Singh, the only eyewitness to this incident, has been examined as PW5 and, therefore, of utmost importance. He had stated: "I had seen the accident with my own eyes. It is incorrect to suggest that no accident had taken place in my presence. Respondent No.l Sarabjit Singh was driving the offending Qualis vehicle and I was knowing him earlier (sic). Next day morning 1 had narrated the entire accident before the police and the police had come at the place of accident with respect to the investigation of the accident in question. However, 1 do not know whether the police had recorded my statement in the criminal case or not..................I had narrated the occurrence before Balwinder Singh (PW2) also later on when he made enquiry from me. It is incorrect to suggest that I am a false introduced witness and never saw the accident. It is also incorrect to suggest that I was never knowing (sic) respondent No.l Sarabjit Singh." The narration of the incident by Kuldip Singh that he had told the police the very next day about the accident cannot be true for the investigator who has been examined as RW2, has stated that no such statement had been given by Kuldip Singh. If his evidence was that he knew the driver Sarabjit Singh earlier and he had seen the Qualis vehicle as involved in the accident, then it is impossible that he could have omitted to make a mention about the name of the driver or the victim of the Qualis vehicle to Balwinder Singh to whom he is reported to have narrated about the accident. We have already seen Balwinder Singh (mentioned as Baljinder Singh in some places) is the author of FIR and in his complaint, he has merely referred to an unknown vehicle as causing the accident, meaning thereby that Balwinder Singh had no information from Kuldip Singh that Sarabjit Singh was driving the vehicle or a Qualis vehicle was involved in the accident. The evidence of Kuldip Singh cannot be therefore true. The mismatch of the evidence of the author of FIR and the evidence of Kuldip Singh, the only alleged eyewitness, is crucial for this case. It is impossible to record a finding of involvement without recording a finding of the credibility of the versions of these two witnesses. (d) Investigating Officers evidence exposes infirmities in evidence 13. If all these evidence must be read in the light of what the Investigating Officer states, it drives the last nail in the coffin wherein lies embedded the tissue of lies. RW2 has stated that: "the FIR was lodged against an unknown vehicle and unknown person. Sarabjit driver was arrested on 18.6.2003 and the offending vehicle was also taken into possession on the same day. On 8.6.2003 the supplementary statement of the complainant was recorded in which he had stated that the offending vehicle was HR-25-A4064 and he had also told the name of respondent No.1 Sarabjit as the driver of the vehicle................ Statement of Gurcharan Singh (the person to whom the extra-judicial confession is reported to have been made) was not recorded by me under Section 161 Cr.P.C. In the supplementary statement of Baljinder Singh it is not recorded that the information about the offending vehicle and name of driver was given to him by Gurcharan Singh and Kuldip Singh (the alleged eye witness). I had not recorded the statement of Kuldip Singh under Section 161 Cr.P.C." Reference to the names of three persons by the inspector have immediate relevance to us. The additional statement of Gurcharan Singh, on the basis of which, the arrest of the driver was made, is said to have obtained information from the alleged eyewitness Kuldip Singh. Significantly, the Investigating Officer states that Gurcharan Singh himself had not given any statement that he knew about the name of the driver from Kuldip Singh. The additional statement of Gurcharan Singh, on the basis of which, the arrest of the driver was made, is said to have obtained information from the alleged eyewitness Kuldip Singh. Significantly, the Investigating Officer states that Gurcharan Singh himself had not given any statement that he knew about the name of the driver from Kuldip Singh. If the driver had made an extra judicial confession to Gurcharan Singh, the Investigating Officer also states that Baljinder Singh was not an eyewitness and Baljinder Singh gave information about the identity of the driver as information secured from Kuldip Singh. The most natural conduct by the police would have been to examine Kuldip Singh; that also was not done. (e) Versions of claimantswitnesses hopelessly disjointed 14. I am not examining any criminal case to look for extracting proof. I am only examining the evidence of each witness and want to test on a plain reading whether the version on behalf of the claimants could be true. They are hopelessly disjointed, They contain no grain of truth. The whole case is of fabrication. IV. Untruth at trial-desperation fueled by inadequacy of compensation under hit- and-runsituations 15. It is truly a pity that there was an incident of a motor vehicle accident that resulted in death of a person. The person that died, was himself an important village functionary. The persons, who are bringing about the case with the police had secured the whole edifice of a version involving the insureds vehicle two months later. If the respective versions of the witnesses of the claimants were true, it was not as if there was no eyewitness. The alleged eyewitness was reported to have informed the police the next day. The police could not have waited for two months to take an additional affidavit from the complainant to arrest the driver. The police would have proceeded to arrest the driver immediately the next day itself. The difficulty of securing awards in hit- and-run cases pushes the parties to the edge. The most immediate temptation is to make some story and obtain a willing party to make a confession of involvement. If only it can support the case of a wailing family in distress, the statutory recompose for a hit-and-run case is a claim against the State from the consolidated fund which is capped to an unrealisticaliy low amount of Rs.50,000/-. The most immediate temptation is to make some story and obtain a willing party to make a confession of involvement. If only it can support the case of a wailing family in distress, the statutory recompose for a hit-and-run case is a claim against the State from the consolidated fund which is capped to an unrealisticaliy low amount of Rs.50,000/-. It is under these circumstances that a case like this gets to be filed. Filing of false cases and securing awards is not a new happening. It has been a recurrent theme and in several cases, Courts have expressed anguish to brake this unholy chain of ambulance chasers and stock witnesses in active connivance of some persons of the legal fraternity itself. In United Insurance Company v. Rajinder Singh, (2000-2)125 P.L.R. 787 (S.C.), the Honble Supreme Court adverted to tainted claims in this jurisdiction and held that the Tribunal would have inherent jurisdiction to recall awards, tainted with fraud. The Madras High Court ordered a CBI investigation in National Insurance Company v. State of Tamil Nadu, 3 2005(1) Law Weekly 176. An intervention under Articles 226 and 227 was made directing the Criminal Branch of Tamil Nadu to conduct reinvestigation of a criminal case in National Insurance Company v. K. Nandvalan,4 2005(2) Law Weekly 249. We will never see the end of these types of litigation till we secure to representatives of deceased persons in hit-and-run cases an adequate compensation. Even apart from a State aided fund, a fund created by a consortium of Insurance Companies in the manner it has been done in UK through constitution of a Motor Insurance Bureau (MIB) will go a long way in alleviating the representatives of victims of hit and run cases. V. Conclusion-Dismissal of claim 16. The award of the Tribunal is set aside and the appeal by the Insurance Company in FAO No.3448 of 2006 is allowed. The appeal filed by the claimants in FAO No.3143 of 2006 is dismissed.