Judgment : Against the order of dismissal of the claim petition, legal representatives of the deceased, Manoharan have filed the present appeal has been filed. 2. Initially, the claim petition in M.C.O.P. No. 83 of 2003 was preferred by one Mr. Manoharan (since deceased) for the injuries said to have been sustained by him, in an accident, which occurred on 6. 2003. 3. The averments made in the Claim Petition are as follows: On 6. 2003, the claimant (since deceased) trying to board a bus bearing Registration No. TN-29-N-0900 at Dharmapuri Town Bus Stand following other passengers, the driver of the bus, without noticing the passengers, suddenly started the bus, in a rash and negligent manner and due to which, he fell down and his left leg was crushed. Immediately, he was taken to Dharmapuri Government Hospital and thereafter, referred to St. John’s Medical Hospital at Bangalore for better treatment. Prior to the accident, he was engaged in rearing cattle and earned Rs. 5,000/- per month. A case in Cr. No. 748 of 2003, was registered against the driver of the bus on the file of the Dharmapuri B-1 Town Police Station under Sections 279 and 338 IPC. He claimed a compensation of Rs.5,00,000/-. 4. Disputing the manner of accident, the respondent-Transport Corporation submitted that the claimant (since deceased) under the influence of Alcohol, was boarding and alighting in standing buses at Dharmapuri bus stand, causing nuisance to the public. After permitting the passengers to board, the driver of the respondent-Transport Corporation started the bus. At that time, the claimant (since deceased), who was in an intoxicated and erratic mood, by standing on the window. He lost his balance, fell down and sustained injuries. Since the bus was fully crowded, the crew could not notice the claimant (since deceased). However, it was later on known to them. In these circumstances, the respondent-Transport Corporation submitted that there was no negligence on the part of the driver of the bus and hence, prayed for dismissal of the claim petition. 5. Before the Tribunal, the claimant (since deceased) examined himself as PW.1 and PW.2, is the Doctor, who examined the claimant (since deceased) with reference to medical records. In these circumstances, the respondent-Transport Corporation submitted that there was no negligence on the part of the driver of the bus and hence, prayed for dismissal of the claim petition. 5. Before the Tribunal, the claimant (since deceased) examined himself as PW.1 and PW.2, is the Doctor, who examined the claimant (since deceased) with reference to medical records. Exhibit P—FIR, Exhibit P-2 – Wound Certificate, Exhibit P-3 – Charge Sheet filed against the driver of the bus, Exhibit P-4 – Discharge Summary, Exhibit P-5 – Medical bill memo, Exhibit P-6 – Photographs, Exhibit P-7 – Car Rent receipts, Exhibit P-8 – Motor Vehicles Inspector report, Exhibit P-9 – Wound Certificate and Exhibit P-10 – X-Ray were marked on the side of the appellants/claimants. The driver of the bus was examined as RW.1 and no document was filed on behalf of the respondent – Transport Corporation. On evaluation of pleadings and evidence, the Tribunal has dismissed the claim petition. 6. The claimant (since deceased) died on 9. 2006. Thereafter, wife and children have filed M.P. No. 1 of 2009 to permit them to prefer the present Civil Micellaneous Appeal against the judgment and decree in M.C.O.P. No. 83 of 2003, dated 15. 2005 on the file of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal” (Additional District Judge), Dharmapuri and to accept the cause title. They have also filed M.P. No. 2 of 2009, seeking leave to file an appeal. Record of proceedings shows that both the Miscellaneous Applications were ordered by this Court on 27. 2009 and 18. 2009 respectively. However, there was a delay of 1142 days in filing the appeal. Having regard to the plea of the appellants that due to financial constraint, they could not pursue the statutory appeal in time, this Court, by order, dated 3. 2010 in M.P.No. 3 of 2009, condoned the delay in filing the appeal, despite the objections of the respondent-Transport Corporation. 7. Taking this Court through the contends of Exhibit P-1-FIR and Exhibit P-3 – Charge sheet filed against the driver of the respondent-Transport Corporation bus in Cr. 2010 in M.P.No. 3 of 2009, condoned the delay in filing the appeal, despite the objections of the respondent-Transport Corporation. 7. Taking this Court through the contends of Exhibit P-1-FIR and Exhibit P-3 – Charge sheet filed against the driver of the respondent-Transport Corporation bus in Cr. No. 748 of 2003, under Sections 279 and 338 IPC, proof affidavit filed by the claimant (since deceased) in the Claim Petition M.C.O.P. No. 83 of 2003 and his evidence in cross-examination, learned counsel for the appellants/legal representatives of the claimant (since deceased), submitted that the Tribunal has misunderstood the statement of the claimant (since deceased) and erred in observing that the claimant (since deceased) himself had lodged a complaint to the Police in Exhibit P-1-FIR, that while he was attempting to board a moving bus through the front entrance, the driver of the bus, without noticing him, had started the bus, and due to which, he fell down and sustained injuries. 8. According to the learned counsel for the appellants/claimants that it is the categorical statement of the claimant (since deceased) that in the anxiety to catch the bus, he only ran to board the bus stop and while boarding the bus through front entrance, the driver started the bus, without noticing him. He further submitted that at the time of accident, there were nearly 30 persons tried to board the bus and the claimant (since deceased), in order to get a seat, he was rushing from a distance and when it was not the case of the claimant (since deceased) that he attempted to board a moving bus, the conclusion of the Tribunal that the claimant (since deceased) attempted to board a moving bus and the further observation that when all the passengers were boarding a stationary bus, there was no reason as to why the claimant (since deceased) should state in Exhibit P-1 FIR that he ran and thereafter, boarded the bus, are erroneous. 9. 9. Learned counsel for the appellants/claimants further submitted that on the basis of the erroneous understanding of the contents of Exhibit P-1 FIR, the Tribunal had presumed that the accident could have occurred due to the negligence of the claimant (since deceased) and eventhough the Police have laid Exhibit P-3-Charge sheet against the driver of the bus, the Tribunal has erroneously held that more filing of the Charge Sheet alone is not sufficient to conclude the aspect of negligence on the driver of the respondent-Transport Corporation bus. 10. Taking this Court through the contents in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent-Transport Corporation before the Tribunal, proof affidavit and the cross-examination of RW.1, driver of the bus, learned counsel for the appellants/claimants submitted that when the case of the respondent-Transport Corporation that the claimant (since deceased) was under intoxication, was not proved by any medical evidence, the Tribunal ought to have found that the claimant (since deceased) had proved his case, by adducing sufficing oral and documentary evidence. Exhibit P-1 FIR and Exhibit P-2 – Charge Sheet. 11. Placing reliance on the decisions made in N.K.V. Bros. (P) Ltd. v. M. Karumai Ammal and Others, AIR 1980 SC 1354 (1980) 3 SCC 457 , Pallavan Transport Corporation v. Jaganathan 2002 (9) SCC 728 and Metropolitan Transport Corporation, Division-I, Chennai v. K. Shankar (1) 2002 ACC 488, learned counsel for the appellants/legal representatives of the claimant (since deceased) submitted that it is the bounden duty of the conductor and driver (crew) that whenever passengers board or alight, the driver should ascertain whether any signal is given by the Conductor, that all the passengers have got down or boarded the bus and if there is any lack of coordination between the two, it is bound to result in an accident and in matters relating to road accidents, the Claims Tribunal should take special care to see that the victims are compensated and that the driver and the conductor cannot escape from the liability, because of some doubt or obscurity. He further submitted that the Tribunal, by misunderstanding the words used in Exhibit P-1 FIR, has erred in succumbing to mystic maybe, and failed to consider that the crew of the respondent/Corporation had not discharged their duty for the safety of the passengers, when they were attempting to alight the bus. 12. He further submitted that the Tribunal, by misunderstanding the words used in Exhibit P-1 FIR, has erred in succumbing to mystic maybe, and failed to consider that the crew of the respondent/Corporation had not discharged their duty for the safety of the passengers, when they were attempting to alight the bus. 12. Learned counsel for the appellants/claimants further submitted that the presumption of the/Tribunal that if a passenger falls from a moving bus, there is every possibility of the right leg, being ran over and accepting the contentions of the conductor of the respondent-Transport Corporation bus that if the deceased had attempted to enter the bus through the grill by standing on the diesel tank of the bus, were to be considered, then there is every possibility of his left leg being ran over by the bus, and purely imaginary and such conclusions are nothing but mystic maybes, as observed by the Supreme Court. 13. Learned counsel for the appellants/claimants submitted that there is also a possibility of an injury in the left leg, if a person falls on his back side facing sky. He further submitted that the Tribunal had failed to consider that, had the claimant (since deceased) attempted to enter into the bus, standing on the diesel tank, the crew of the bus could have prevented or atleast cautioned him from doing so, and that the Tribunal, having found that no supportive evidence was let in to prove the case of the respondent-Transport Corporation, ought to have held that the claimant (since deceased) had established negligence on the part of the driver of the respondent-Transport Corporation bus and accordingly, quantified the compensation. 14. Per contra, placing reliance on the proof affidavit filed by RW.1, the driver of the respondent-Transport Corporation bus, Mr. S.S. Swaminathan, learned counsel for the respondent-Transport Corporation submitted that on the fateful day, the bus was stopped in Dharmapuri Bus Stand. After alighting the passengers and when it was coming out of the bus stand, the claimant (since deceased), in a state of drunkenness, without boarding the bus, through the foot board, attempted to enter the bus, through the Window, by keeping his foot on the diesel tank, from the right side of the bus and in the said process, lost his balance, fell down and sustained injuries. 15. 15. Having regard to the nature of injuries sustained in the left leg, learned counsel for the respondent-Transport Corporation submitted that the observations of the Tribunal that there is a possibility of sustaining an injury in the left leg, due to an attempt made by the claimant (since deceased) from the right side of the bus, on the facts of the case and evidence was proper and therefore, the Tribunal has rightly held that the claimant (since deceased) had failed to substantiate negligence on the part of the driver of the Transport Corporation bus. He submitted that the finding cannot be said to be illogical, perverse or arbitrary. 16. Learned counsel for the respondent-Transport Corporation further submitted that when an application is made under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, it is the bounden duty of the claimant (since deceased) to prove negligence, by adducing proper evidence to the satisfaction of the Tribunal and mere registration of FIR or filing of a charge sheet would not ipse dixit amount to proof of negligence. He further submitted that when the respondent-Transport Corporation has let in adequate evidence to show that the contents of Exhibits P-1 FIR or Exhibit P-3 – Charge sheet are not correct, the decision of the Tribunal, dismissing the claim petition, cannot be said to be arbitrary. For the above said reasons, he prayed for dismissal of the appeal. 17. Though the Tribunal has dismissed the claim petition, learned counsel for the respondent-Transport Corporation submitted that in the event of this Court, reversing the finding regarding negligence, the matter may be remitted to the Tribunal for computation of a reasonable compensation. 18. Per contra, learned counsel for the appellants/claimants submitted that when the evidence, relating to nature of injuries, period of treatment and the expense incurred, are already on record, there is no need to remit the matter and since appeal is a continuation of original proceedings, prayed to compute the compensation payable to the legal representatives of the deceased. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. 19. Before adverting to the rival contentions of the parties, it is necessary to have a cursory look at the contents of Exhibit P-1 FIR. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. 19. Before adverting to the rival contentions of the parties, it is necessary to have a cursory look at the contents of Exhibit P-1 FIR. It is the specific case of the appellants/legal representatives of the claimant (since deceased) that when the deceased boarded the Transport Corporation bus at Dharmapuri Bus Stand, the vehicle was stationed, whereas, the respondent-Transport Corporation has contended that claimant (since deceased) attempted to board the moving bus, fell down and sustained injuries. The relevant portion of Exhibit P-1-FIR lodged in Dharmapuri B1 Police Station on 6. 2003, at 17.00 Hours, by the claimant (since deceased), Mr. Manoharan, are as follows: (TAMIL) 20. Perusal of Exhibit P-1 FIR, shows that the accident was stated to have occurred on 6. 2003 at 15.00 Hours and that a report has been given on the same day, at 17.00 Hours. Exhibit P-3, Charge Sheet, has been filed by the Sub-Inspector of Police, Traffic Investigation Wing, dated 16. 2003, against Mr. Natarajan of Dharmapuri District, driver of the bus, owned by the respondent-Transport Corporation, bearing Registration No. TN 29 N 0900 (Route No. 30A). 21. Perusal of the charge sheet filed under Sections 279, 338 IPC, by Dharmapuri Police in C.C. No. 748 of 2003, shows that the Police have enquired few witnesses to prove the culpability of the driver of the Transport Corporation bus. In the proof affidavit, dated 18. 2005, the claimant (since deceased) had contended that about 3.15 p.m., in order to go to his native place, he was waiting in Dharmapuri new bus stand. At that time, he boarded the Transport Corporation bus, bearing Registration No. TN29 N 0900 (Route No. 30A), through front entrance. Even before the Conductor could give signal, the driver of the aid bus started the same suddenly, due to which, he fell down and the back wheel of the bus ran over his left leg, causing fracture. During cross-examination, the witness had asserted that he boarded the bus through the front entrance. There was a huge crowd and through front entrance, 30 persons entered the vehicle and through the back entrance, another 30 persons boarded. According to him, when he had kept his foot on the foot board, the driver suddenly started the vehicle. During cross-examination, the witness had asserted that he boarded the bus through the front entrance. There was a huge crowd and through front entrance, 30 persons entered the vehicle and through the back entrance, another 30 persons boarded. According to him, when he had kept his foot on the foot board, the driver suddenly started the vehicle. He had specifically denied the suggestion that he had fallen down from the vehicle, when he attempted to enter the bus through the window by placing his foot on the diesel tank. 22. In the proof affidavit, dated 9. 2005, RW.1, driver of the said Transport Corporation bus, has stated that after boarding the passengers, the bus came out of Dharmapuri Bus Stand and when the claimant (since deceased), instead of using the foot board, attempted to enter the bus through the window, by placing his foot on the diesel tank, on the right side of the bus, fell down and sustained injuries. However, during cross-examination, he admitted that the Police, on investigation, has laid a charge sheet against him. 23. Upon perusal of the contents of Exhibit P-1 FIR, the Tribunal has observed that the claimant (since deceased) himself had stated that he attempted to board the moving bus and therefore, the accident had occurred purely due to the negligence of the claimant (since deceased). Perusal of the award shows that though the respondent-Transport Corporation has projected a case, as if the claimant (since deceased) had attempted to enter through window, on the right side of the vehicle, by keeping his foot on the diesel tank, the Tribunal has clearly observed that no evidence has been let in by the respondent-Transport Corporation to prove their case. However, the Tribunal has presumed that there was a possibility of sustaining an injury in the left leg, if any attempt was made to enter through the right side of the bus. It is also to be noted that the Tribunal has found that both the parties have not chosen to examine any independent witness to prove the case, as projected by them. 24. Perusal of the judgment shows that there is absolutely no medical evidence let in by the respondent-Transport Corporation to prove that the claimant (since deceased) was in the state of drunkenness at the time of accident. 24. Perusal of the judgment shows that there is absolutely no medical evidence let in by the respondent-Transport Corporation to prove that the claimant (since deceased) was in the state of drunkenness at the time of accident. When the Tribunal has categorically arrived at a conclusion that the respondent-Transport Corporation to failed to prove their case, the conclusion of the Tribunal that there was a possibility of sustaining an injury in the left leg, is purely on surmises and conjectures. The nature of injury, whether it is on the right or left leg, depends upon the fall and the position of the body, voluntary or involuntary movement of the limbs, due to the sudden fall. It also depends upon the speed of the vehicle. Therefore, it is manifestly clear that in the absence of any clear medical evidence and when the case of the respondent-Transport Corporation had been held as not proved, it is not open to the Tribunal to presume, without any basis and therefore, as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the legal representative of the deceased, the presumption is nothing but a case of mystic may be. 25. Let me now consider some of the decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the appellants/claimants. 26. In N.K.V. Bros. (P) Ltd. v. M. Karumai Ammal and Others (supra), the driver of the bus hit an over-hanging high tension wire, resulting in 26 casualties, out of which, 8 proved to be instantaneously fatal. However, he was acquitted on the ground that the tragedy that happened was an act of God. The Accidents Claims Tribunal held that despite the screams of the passengers about the dangerous over-hanging wire ahead, the rash driver sped towards the lethal spot, which resulted in the accident. The High Court confirmed that the accident had taken place due to the rashness and negligence of driver of the bus and consequently, the Transport Company was held vicariously liable to pay compensation to the claimants. Aggrieved by the same, the Transport Company went on appeal to the Supreme Court, contending inter alia that criminal case had ended in acquittal and that therefore, the civil suit must follow suit. While testing the correctness of the impugned judgment of the Madras High Court, the Supreme Court opined that. “3. Aggrieved by the same, the Transport Company went on appeal to the Supreme Court, contending inter alia that criminal case had ended in acquittal and that therefore, the civil suit must follow suit. While testing the correctness of the impugned judgment of the Madras High Court, the Supreme Court opined that. “3. Road accidents are one of the top killers in our country, specially when truck and bus drivers operate nocturnally. This proverbial recklessness often persuades the Courts, as has been observed by us earlier in other cases, to draw an initial presumption in several cases based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Accidents Tribunals must take special care to see that innocent victims do not suffer and drivers and owners do not escape liability merely because of some doubt here or some obscurity there. Save in plain cases, culpability must be inferred from the circumstance where it is fairly reasonable. The Court should not succumb to niceties, technicalities and mystic maybes. We are emphasizing this aspect because we are often distressed by transport operators getting away with it thanks to judicial laxity, despite the fact that they do not exercise sufficient disciplinary control over the drivers in the matter of careful driving. The heavy economic impact of culpable driving of public transport must bring owner and driver to their responsibility to their ‘neighbour’. Indeed, the State must seriously consider no fault liability by legislation. A second aspect which pains us is the inadequacy of the compensation or undue parsimony practiced by tribunals. We must remember that judicial tribunals are State organs and Article 41 of the constitution lays the jurisprudential foundation for state relief against accidental disablement of citizens. There is no justification for niggardliness in compensation. A third factor which is harrowing is the enormous delay in disposal of accident cases resulting in compensation, even if awarded, being postponed by several years. The states must appoint sufficient number of tribunals and the High Courts should insist upon quick disposals so that the trauma and tragedy already sustained may not be magnified by the injustice of delayed justice. Many states are unjustly indifferent in this regard.” 27. In Pallavan Transport Corporation Ltd. v. Jagannathan 2001 ACJ 5, 1997(1) LW 226 due to an accident, the respondent therein sustained injuries and in the result, his left leg has been amputated. Many states are unjustly indifferent in this regard.” 27. In Pallavan Transport Corporation Ltd. v. Jagannathan 2001 ACJ 5, 1997(1) LW 226 due to an accident, the respondent therein sustained injuries and in the result, his left leg has been amputated. The appellant-Transport Corporation has contended inter alia that when the bus was slowly moving due to the traffic congestion, the respondent/injured attempted to get down from the moving bus and in that process, he sustained injuries. It was further contended that the injured ignored the instructions of the conductor of the bus. The Claim Petition was dismissed, granting Rs. 12,000/- towards No Fault Liability. The injured preferred an appeal and the High Court held that the compensation cannot be denied to injured and accordingly, quantified the same. The High Court, while reversing the finding and while considering the duties and responsibilities of the crew carrying passengers, observed as follows: “It is always important to have coordination between the conductor and the driver, whenever passengers start getting down or are led to get down, to see that before any signal is given by the conductor, in any form, as normally there is a bell in most of the buses which, conductor rings signaling the driver to start the bus, the driver should not restart the bus. In the absence of coherence of lack of coordination between the two it is bound to result in accident which has happened in the present case. This would constitute to be a negligence on the part of both the conductor and the driver. Once this evidence is accepted, which has been in this case, there is no scope to reassess the evidence in the present proceedings, about which attempt has been made, unless it can be said that this finding is based on no evidence or is perverse.” 28. Once this evidence is accepted, which has been in this case, there is no scope to reassess the evidence in the present proceedings, about which attempt has been made, unless it can be said that this finding is based on no evidence or is perverse.” 28. In Metropolitan Transport Corporation (Chennai Div.-1) Ltd. v. K. Shankar 1 (2002) ACC 488, a learned single Judge of this Court, while considering the oral testimony of the driver, who deposed that the injured attempted to board the bus in motion, observed that even assuming that the accident took place in the manner as suggested by the driver of the bus, that would not have the effort of exonerating the driver and owner from the liability to pay compensation, since it is well settled that a person attempting to alight from a moving bus, as also a person trying to board a moving bus will nevertheless be a passenger for the purpose of awarding compensation in a road traffic accident. The learned Single Judge also took note of the decision rendered in Jaganathan M. v. Pallavan Transport Corporation Ltd. (supra), wherein it has been held that it is the fundamental duty of both the driver as well as the conductor to verify specifically whether any passenger is getting into the bus or getting down from the bus before actually the bus is moved from the bus stop where it is stopped, irrespective of the fact whether the place of stopping is a bus stop or not. It was further observed that the driver of the bus which carries passengers owes a duty fort he safety of passengers and that while driving he must avoid acts of commissions which can reasonable by foresee to injure them and in deciding what acts or omissions he should avoid, he must bear in mind the normal habits of passengers. 29. In the case of hand, it is the contention of the claimant (since deceased) that there were about 30 and odd passengers, waiting for the bus and in order to secure a seat, he only ran and entered the bus through the front entrance. When he attempted to board the bus along with others, the driver started the bus, before he could enter the bus and due to the sudden movement, he fell down and that the wheel ran over his left leg, causing fatal injuries. 30. When he attempted to board the bus along with others, the driver started the bus, before he could enter the bus and due to the sudden movement, he fell down and that the wheel ran over his left leg, causing fatal injuries. 30. One cannot lose sight of the fact that due to the population explosion, commuters have increased, but correspondingly, Cities and Towers have to manage with the existing roads and not many buses are put to operation. As rightly observed by the Division bench of this Court in Jaganathan M. v. Pallavan Transport Corporation Ltd. (supra), if many passengers are waiting at the bus stand and as soon as the bus arrives, the normal habit of the passengers would be to secure a seat or to stand in a convenient place inside the bus. In such view of the matter, there is every possibility for the bus, the claimant (since deceased) would have ran to board the bus and secure a seat. When the Tribunal has categorically observed that the Transport Corporation has failed to substantiate their case, by adducing any independent witness, it should have considered the evidence of the claimant (since deceased) in proper perspective, with reference to the principles of preponderance of probability. 31. Visualising the scene of occurrence, there is every possibility of a person, trying to get into the bus, among others, falling down, if the vehicle is suddenly moved from the bus stand, without verifying as to whether all the passenger shave safely got into the bus. As stated supra, when the allegation of drunkenness and trying to enter into the bus through window by keeping his foot on the diesel tank on the right side of the bus, has been rejected, the assumption of the Tribunal that since the injury was on the left leg, there is every possibility of trying to enter the bus from the right side of the bus, is purely on conjectures and surmises. In this context, it is also to be noted that the averments in the counter affidavit are to the effect that since the bus was fully crowded, the crew could not notice the claimant (since deceased) and they came to know later on. Thus, it is also evident that the evidence of the driver is only hearsay and not supported by any independent witness. 32. Thus, it is also evident that the evidence of the driver is only hearsay and not supported by any independent witness. 32. When an act of negligence is pleaded, the Tribunal is enjoined with a duty to formulate its conclusions on the basis of oral and documentary evidence available on record and it cannot record any finding by discarding the evidence let in by the claimant, by giving unacceptable reasons and that any conclusions arrived at, should satisfy the test of preponderance of probability. The Tribunal, ought to have seen that strict proof of evidence, as required in a criminal case for adjudging the culpability of the offence, is not required to be produced before the Tribunal. In the light of the duties and responsibilities of the crew, a observed in the above referred decisions, this Court is of the considered view that the Tribunal has grossly erred in assessing the evidence in proper perspective and in all probabilities, the accident would have occurred in the manner, as put forth by the claimant (since deceased). 33. It is further to be noted that Exhibit P-1 FIR and Exhibit P-3 – Charge Sheet have been laid against the driver of the bus, owned by the respondent-Transport Corporation. As against the oral testimony of the appellants/claimants corroborated by Exhibit P-1 – FIR and Exhibit P-3 – Charge Sheet and the evidence of RW.1, driver of the bus, which has been rejected in toto, as not proved, consequentially, the Tribunal ought to have considered the probability of the case on the basis of claimant’s evidence and held that the claimant (since deceased) has established negligence on the part of the driver of the bus. 34. Testing the findings recorded by the Tribunal on the principles of preponderance of probability, this Court is of the considered view that preversity in the finding is per se apparent and therefore, it requires reversal. Though the proceedings are held to be summary with an intention to award a just and reasonable compensation to mitigate the hardship faced by the injured or dependants of the deceased, dismissal of a claim petition should be made only if the evidence let in by the accident victims is not legally acceptable, remote to the cause of accident or it is a case of no evidence. If some legally acceptable evidence is let in by accident victims, then the Claims Tribunal/Court has to access the evidence, keeping in mind that the legislation is intended to benefit the accident victims, who have sustained injuries, lost their limbs, disabled and that the dependants of the deceased would face inexplicable agony and hardship, due to untimely death of the breadwinner. Dismissal of the Claim Petition should be done only in a rare cases, where there is absolutely no evidence to prove negligence on the part of the driver. 35. In such view of the matter, this Court is of the considered view that the dismissal of the claim petition is erroneous. There is miscarriage of justice and this Court holds that the driver of the Transport Corporation bus a negligent for causing the accident and consequently, the Corporation is liable to pay compensation to the appellants/claimants. 36. Now the only question to be considered by this Court is with regard to computation of quantum of compensation. Before the Tribunal, the claimant (since deceased) has deposed that the rear-wheel of the bus ran over his left leg and that he sustained a fracture and other bodily injuries and thereafter with the help of others, he was taken to Dharmapuri Government Hospital for treatment. Since the injuries were grievous he was referred to St. John Hospital, Bangalore, where he took treatment as inpatient between 6. 2003 and 27. 2003. It is his further case that during the period of hospitalization, a surgery was performed and plates were fitted to fuse the bones. According to him, he had incurred a sum of Rs.75,000/- towards medical expenses. To support, his contention that he had sustained fractures, bodily injuries and treated in the abovesaid hospitals, he had produced Exhibit P-2 – Wound Certificate, wherein, it is recorded as follows: ”Injuries: 1. Extensive degloving injury o the left leg 30 x 10 cm to the Left Knee a clinical fracture of Left Tibia. 2. Multiply Brusies/injury on he right elbow. X-Ray No. 13.22/AE/02.0603 Fracture Left Tibia Opinion: No. 1 injuries is GREVIOUS. No. 2 injuries is simple in nature. Sd/xx Dr.K.S. Sampth, MBBS., C.A.S. Govt. H.Q. Hospital, Dharmapuri. 37. Exhibit P-4, discharge summary issued by St.John Hospital, Bangalore 1 shows that he was hospitalized between 6. 2003 and 27. 2003. 2. Multiply Brusies/injury on he right elbow. X-Ray No. 13.22/AE/02.0603 Fracture Left Tibia Opinion: No. 1 injuries is GREVIOUS. No. 2 injuries is simple in nature. Sd/xx Dr.K.S. Sampth, MBBS., C.A.S. Govt. H.Q. Hospital, Dharmapuri. 37. Exhibit P-4, discharge summary issued by St.John Hospital, Bangalore 1 shows that he was hospitalized between 6. 2003 and 27. 2003. The claimant (since deceased) was also examined PW.2, doctor who assessed the disability at 35% and issued Exhibit P-9-Disability Certificate. In addition to the above, the claimant had also marked Exhibit P-5 – Medical Memo, Exhibit P-6 – Photographs, Exhibit P-7 0 Rental charge for engaging car, Exhibit P-8 – Motor Vehicles Inspectors’ report and Exhibit P-10 – X-Ray. Though initially the claimant (since deceased) had sought for a compensation of Rs.5,00,000/- under various heads, after the passing of the judgment on 111. 2005, he died on 9. 2006. Thereafter, the appellants have obtained permission from this Court in M.P. No. 2 of 2009, to prosecute the appeal for compensation. At paragraph Nos. 2 and 3 of the supporting affidavit filed in the above Miscellaneous Petition, the appellants have contended that the claimant (since deceased) died on 9. 2006 at Dharmapuri, in a road accident. 38. The claim was instituted on 9. 2003. After the discharge summary issued in July 2003, no other document has been filed before the Tribunal to show that the claimant (since deceased) continued his treatment. However, considering the nature of injuries and the advice given by the doctors, it could be reasonable presumed that the claimant would have taken treatment for some time. But perusal of Exhibit P-6 – Photograph produced before the Tribunal shows that the wound had healed to a certain extent and P.W.2 doctor has also stated as follows: (TAMIL) “39. Though the appellants have claimed that the injuries have caused his death, no additional evidence has been filed before this Court to prove that the death was due to the injures. In view of the above, this Court is not inclined to quantify the damages as that of a fatal case, but the principle of Actio Personalis Moritur-cum-personna can be made applicable. In view of the above, this Court is not inclined to quantify the damages as that of a fatal case, but the principle of Actio Personalis Moritur-cum-personna can be made applicable. Actio Personalis Moritur-cum-personna is held applicable in cases where suit for damages and defamation, assault or other personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff, which had resulted in a decree in favour of the plaintiff because in such a case, the case of action merges with the decree and the decretal debt forms part of the plaintiff estate and the appeal from the decree by the defendant becomes a question of benefit or detriment to the estate of the plaintiff which his legal representatives are entitled to uphold. 40. Some of the case laws decided by various High Courts on this issue are hereunder: “(i) The plain meaning of the maxim “Actio personalis Moritur-cum-personna” is that “a personal action dies with the parties to the cause of action”. The above said maxim is an invention of English Lawyers. In Girija Nandini Devi v. Bijendra Narain AIR 1976 SC 1124, The Supreme Court observed as hereunder, “The maxim “Actio personalis Moitur-cum-personna” means a personal action dies with the person has a limited application. It operates in a limited classof actions ex delicto such as actions for damages, assault or other personal injuries not causing the death of the party, and in other actions where after the death of the party the relief granted could not be enjoyed or granting it would be nugatory. An action for account is not an action for damages ex delicto, and does not fall with the enumerated classes. Nor is such that the relief claimed being personal could not be enjoyed after death, or granting it would be nugatory”. (ii) However, the maxim “Actio Personalis Moritur-cum-personna” relates only to the personal injury, pain and suffering experienced by the deceased on account of injuries and it cannot be extended to the loss of estate of the deceased. Reference can be had to the decision of this Court in Thallammai v. A.V. Mallayya Pillai 1975 ACJ 448, wherein, this Court held that the cause of action in respect of damages to the estate of the deceased survive and it is passed over to the legal representatives/dependants. Reference can be had to the decision of this Court in Thallammai v. A.V. Mallayya Pillai 1975 ACJ 448, wherein, this Court held that the cause of action in respect of damages to the estate of the deceased survive and it is passed over to the legal representatives/dependants. (iii) Explaining the maxim “Acto Personalis Moritur-cum-personna” and its applicability to the Motor Accident cases with reference to Section 306 of the Indian succession Act, the Gujarat High Court in Jennabai v. Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation, 1991 ACJ 585, at Paragraph 10, 16 and 18, held as follows: “10. Tort, frequently, involves a non-pecuniary loss. Even pecuniary loss of the deceased, being personal to him has no proper entitlement to a place in the assessment of the damages which goes to his estate. But for the pecuniary loss suffered by the deceased on account of such injuries, an action would lie or action would survive and would pass over to his heirs or legal representatives. Section 306 of the Indian Act does not exclude right to recover claim on the basis of proprietary right. In a case of personal injuries, arising out of vehicular accident, it may include pecuniary loss as well. This pecuniary loss or any loss which referable to the loss to estate would be a proprietary or right pertaining to property. Therefore, the right to maintain the action or to continue the action for recovery of pecuniary and proprietary loss which are referable or attributable to the loss to the estate, cannot be said to have been taken away by the provisions of Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act. If the provisions of section 306 of the Indian Succession Act are extended to all causes of action, including those affecting proprietary or property, i.e., to the estate, it would be to stultify to a great extent the provisions of Section 212(2). If it is stretched to that, it would be nugatory, which empowers a Hindu, Mohammadan, Buddhist, Sikh, Jain, Indian Christian or Parsi for applying for letters of administration in case of intestacy. Such a construction of Section of the Indian Succession Act would raise a direct conflict with the provisions of Order 22, Rule 3(1) of the Civil procedure Code. If it is stretched to that, it would be nugatory, which empowers a Hindu, Mohammadan, Buddhist, Sikh, Jain, Indian Christian or Parsi for applying for letters of administration in case of intestacy. Such a construction of Section of the Indian Succession Act would raise a direct conflict with the provisions of Order 22, Rule 3(1) of the Civil procedure Code. Moreover, the liability to pay compensation is created immediately on the occurrence of the accident to the person suffering the injury and must amount to a debt payable to him and pass over to the heirs of the workman on his death and does not abate. Thus, provisions of Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act have no application of such cases. Therefore, the maxim Actio Personalisa Moritur-cum-personna on which Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act is based, cannot have a blanket applicability in all actions even in a case of personal injuries wherein the damages flow from the head or under the head of loss to the estate. It may be mentioned that in England, the said maxim has been criticized as harsh, unconscionable and unjust. The rightful claim falling in the realm of pecuniary or proprietary or loss to the deceased’s estate would survive, which is not personal to the deceased. It may also be mentioned that the words ‘personal injury’ occurring in Section 306 mean bodily or physical injury as opposed to the injury to the proprietary right. Therefore, a cause of action in respect of injury to the property or loss referable to the deceased’s estate flowing from the personal injury would not fall within the exception, but would, undoubtedly, survive. But, if interpreted otherwise, as held by the Tribunal, would mean unjust enrichment and benefit to the wrongdoer’s estate and unjustifiable injury to the estate of the deceased. Unfortunately, the Tribunal has failed to address itself to such a vital and important aspect while considering and examining the provisions of Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act. 16. It is very clear from para 7 of the impugned judgment that the deceased had claimed Rs. 2,200/- for Medical expenses and Rs. 575/- for Miscellaneous expenses, etc. The claim under such heads would, undoubtedly, fall within the field of loss to the estate. 16. It is very clear from para 7 of the impugned judgment that the deceased had claimed Rs. 2,200/- for Medical expenses and Rs. 575/- for Miscellaneous expenses, etc. The claim under such heads would, undoubtedly, fall within the field of loss to the estate. If such amount would not have been spent by the deceased it was to go to the hands of the appellants or legal representatives of the deceased. Likewise, loss of past income awardable to the deceased on account of wrong done to him subject to reasonable expenses which would have been incurred by the deceased for himself would also be a loss to the estate. It can safely be concluded that had the deceased not sustained the injuries, there would not have been loss of income and consequently there would, not have been any detrimental effect on the estate of the deceased. If the unfortunate accident had not occurred the income or expenses falling within the head of loss to the estate would have augmented the estate and same would have gone in the hands of the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased. The loss of past income for the period from the date of accident till the inability on the part of the deceased to earn on account of the injuries, subject to reasonable expenses for himself, would also form a part of estate of the deceased. No doubt, the loss of income occurring after the death of the deceased would not be a loss to the estate. The action for amount of claim which is not attributable to the loss of estate of the deceased could not survive to the appellants. In other words, the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased would not be entitled to and eligible to claim the amount of claim which is not referable to or not attributable to the loss of the estate. Unfortunately, the Tribunal applied the doctrine of actio personalis moritur cum persona along with the provisions of Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act in respect of the entire claim without taking into account the separate claim under the head of loss to the estate of the deceased. Abdul Karim Musa. This proposition of law, unfortunately, could not be brought to the notice of the Tribunal. Abdul Karim Musa. This proposition of law, unfortunately, could not be brought to the notice of the Tribunal. With the result, the approach of the Tribunal insofar as it related to the dismissal of the claim in respect of loss to the estate of the deceased cannot be sustained. 18. Incidentally, it may also be mentioned that could inability to compensate under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923, in case of an employment injury to the workman unconnected with the employment? Suppose, in a given case, the workman files an application for compensation under Section 3 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923, and during the pendency of the proceedings he dies otherwise than as a result o the employment injuries. Would that right be lost in view of the provisions of Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act? If the interpretation made by the Tribunal in the present case is accepted then the liability to compensate him under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923, would abate. Of course, the language in Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act, no doubt, appears to be general. But it is not always that a general import must necessity receive a general and wide meaning divorced from the material facts of the case. The expression “other personal injuries not causing the death of the party” is preceded by the words, ‘defemation, assault’ as defined in the Penal Code. The words ‘other personal injuries….. must, therefore, receive colour from the earlier words and ought to be construed with the words preceding. It is also settled proposition of law that benevolent legislation is required to be construed liberally so as to advance the underlying object and purpose of the provision. It is also well stated that if interpretation of a welfare legislation or any provision of the statute is capable of two constructions, that construction should be preferred which furthers the policy of the Act or provision concerned and which is more beneficiary for the class in whose interest the law has been made.” (iv) In V. Mepherson v. Shiv Charan Singh and Others, 1 (1998) ACC 6, the Delhi High Court, while testing the correctness of the award passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, considered as to whether personal damage awarded to the claimant/injured are inheritable or not. In the said case, the death was not due to the accident. In the said case, the death was not due to the accident. The main contention was that the claim for enhancement for general damages after the death of the objector does not survive. Answering the issue, the Court at Paragraph 3, observed as follows: “3. So far as the contention of Mr. Tarun Johri that claim for damages which was on account of suffering and pain suffered by the deceased, to my mind it would abet on the death of the injured. But so far as other claims under other heads those would not come to an end on he death of the objector. The right to sue would survive even on the death of the objector. As a matter of fact claim on account of special diet, medicine, conveyance etc., are such which related to the loss of the property, therefore, right to sue would not abet on the death of the objector. It would survive to his legal heirs as held by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in the case of Joti Ram and Others v. Chaman Lai and Others, AIR 1985 P&H 2 : 1 (1986) ACC 550.” (v) In Kartar Kaur v. Dayl Singh II (1999) ACC 372 (DB), one of the issues raised before the Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court was about the continuance of the appeal by the Legal Representatives of the injures/claimant (sons of the deceased) based on the Doctrine “Actio Personalis Moritur Cum Perosona”. i.e., a personal claim dies with the person (claimant). Answering the issue, at Paragraph 13, the Division Bench held as follows: “13. In view of the above, we are of the view that where the injured claimant dies as a result of the injuries during the pendency of his claim for compensation, the legal representatives would be entitled to “pursue the claim as in case of death caused in an accident by the use of motor vehicle. Where the injured dies his natural death and not because of injuries suffered in motor accident, the legal representatives would be entitled to pursue the claim to the extent s recognised by Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act, that is, the claim on account of loss to the estate of the deceased. Where the injured dies his natural death and not because of injuries suffered in motor accident, the legal representatives would be entitled to pursue the claim to the extent s recognised by Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act, that is, the claim on account of loss to the estate of the deceased. Where in a case, the compensation has been awarded to the injured and an appeal is preferred and during the pendency of the appeal, claimant injured dies, his legal representatives can continue the appeal for enhancement of compensation.” (vi) A similar issue camp up for consideration before the Division Bench of Karnataka High Court in Sridevi v. Mastak Ahamad I (2002) ACC 262 (DB). In the above reported judgment, a minor, aged about four years, sustained injuries. On the claim made by her father, Rs. 72,000/- was awarded. Aggrieved by the inadequacy of compensation, an appeal was preferred by the injured through her father and during the pendency of the appeal, she died. Legal Representatives were brought on record. It was submitted that the compensation for Medical Expenses, Pain and Suffering, Loss of Amenities and general damages was on the lower side. Following the decision in V. Mepherson’s case, the Division Bench held that the appeal is abated insofar as the claim for damages for pain and suffering I concerned and on he question of expenses of medicines, special diet, conveyance etc., as the expenses relate to loss of estate, they would not abate. (vii) Similar view was taken by the Himachal High Court in Ram Ashari v. H.R.T.C, IV (2005) ACC 379. At paragraph 6 to 8 of the judgment, it is held as follows: “6. It is well settled law that an action in torts for claim of compensation for damages on account of injuries suffered by an injured is a right personal to the injured. This right cannot be continued by the legal heirs or legal representatives. It is no doubt true that the legal heirs or the legal representative can continue the proceedings insofar as they relate to the loss to the estate such as medical expenses, amount spent on treatment etc. This right cannot be continued by the legal heirs or legal representatives. It is no doubt true that the legal heirs or the legal representative can continue the proceedings insofar as they relate to the loss to the estate such as medical expenses, amount spent on treatment etc. However, the claim with regard to pain and suffering, future loss of income and such related matters is an action which is personal to the injured alone and cannot be continued after his death unless it is proved that the death is the result of the injuries suffered in the accident. 7. A Division Bench of this Court in Narinder Kaur v. State of H.P. II (1991) ACC 206: (1991) 2 ACJ 767, held as follows: “(8) We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the records. The principle of action personalis moritur cum persona relates only to the personal or bodily injuries and not to the loss caused to the estate of the deceased by the tort-feasor. In its applicability, the principle stands considerably modified by the provisions of Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act, which clearly lays down that all demands whatsoever and all rights to prosecute or defend any action or special proceedings existing in favour of or against a person at the time of his death survive except causes of action for defamation, assault and other personal injuries not causing death of the party etc., which come to an end with the death of the injured. The loss of the estate is thus not covered by the exceptions contained in Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act. While taking this view, we are fortified by the decisions of the Supreme Court in Melepurath Sankunni Ezhuthassan v. Thekittil Geopalankutty Nair, 1986(1) ACJ 440: AIR 1986 SC 411 : 1986(2) TAC 216, and M. Veerappa v. Evelyn Sequeria, AIR 1988 SC 506 . The claimants as legal representatives of the original claimant were, as such, entitled to be substituted in his place with a view to continue the proceedings in the case and to have a decision on the claim in respect of the loss caused to the estate of the deceased.” 8. The claimants as legal representatives of the original claimant were, as such, entitled to be substituted in his place with a view to continue the proceedings in the case and to have a decision on the claim in respect of the loss caused to the estate of the deceased.” 8. Keeping in view of the settled position of law and the fact that in the present case there is no claim for loss to the estate and the entire claim is based on the personal claim of the deceased Karam Chand, the appeal cannot be continued and prosecuted by the legal representatives.” (viii) A Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court in Uttam Kumar (deceased) v. Madhav and Another, 2002 ACJ 1828 , had an occasion to consider an appeal filed by the legal representatives of the deceased for enhancement of the compensation. Short facts of the reported case are as follows: “In an accident occurred on 1. 1995, where Uttam Kumar sustained injuries. He was admitted in the hospital for his treatment and he incurred expenses. He claimed compensation. The Tribunal awarded Rs. 36,250/- with costs and interest. Not satisfied with the compensation, he preferred an appeal for an enhancement. Pending disposal of the appeal, he died and his aged parents were brought on record. The Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court found that the cause of action will not survive and Lrs., of the deceased claimant will not be entitled to compensation. However, the Division Bench observed that in view of the amended provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and the decision of the Supreme Court in Kannamma v. Deputy General Manager, Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation 1991 ACJ 707 (Karnataka), referred this matter to a Larger Bench. The Full Bench which examined the issue with reference to the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and Indian Succession Act, 1925 and answered as follows:- (i) A claim petition presented under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939, by the person sustaining bodily injuries in a motor accident, claiming compensation for personal injuries as also for compensation towards expenses, loss of income, etc. (loss to the estate) cannot, on such person’s death occurring not as a result or consequence of bodily injuries sustained from a motor accident, be prosecuted by his/her legal representatives; but (ii) A claim petition presented under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, by the person sustaining bodily injuries in a motor accident, claiming compensation for personal injuries as also for compensation towards expenses, loss of income, etc (loss to the estate) can, on such person’s death occurring as a result or consequence of bodily injuries sustained in the motor accident, be prosecuted by his/her legal representatives only insofar as the claim for compensation in that claim petition relates to loss of estate of the deceased person due to bodily injuries sustained in the motor accident.” 41. In view of the legal position stated supra, the respondents are entitled to the actual expenses incurred by the claimant during the period of hospitalization. The claimant (since deceased) has claimed Rs. 75,000/- and the same has to be paid. Considering the nature of injuries including a degloving injury, the claimant would have incurred expenses for nutrition and for speedy recovery. A sum of Rs. 15,000/- can be awarded for nutrition. With fracture and other injuries, he would have incurred some expenses for transportation. He has also produced Exhibit P-8 for engaging a car. For transportation, a sum of Rs. 5,000/- can be awarded. Attendant charges of Rs. 51,000/- is awarded. Hence, the legal representatives of the deceased would be entitled to a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- with interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum from the date of claim, till the date of realisation. Considering the time consumed in the litigation, the respondent Corporation is directed to deposit the compensation awarded by this Court, within two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. The appeal is allowed with the above direction. No costs.