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2010 DIGILAW 278 (GAU)

Abdul Ahad Choudhury v. State of Mizoram

2010-04-23

P.K.MUSAHARY

body2010
JUDGMENT P.K. Musahary, J. 1. The accused petitioner charged with offence under Sections 489B and 489C, IPC, without being committed by the Magistrate concerned and having been forced to stand trial before the Court of Additional District and Sessions Judge, Aizawl in Mizoram approaches this Court mainly for quashing the criminal proceeding on the ground of violation of provisions under Section 209, Code of Criminal Procedure and precisely on the ground that committal by the Magistrate is a must, if the offence is exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions. This claim is based on prosecution case narrated as under : One Md. Roshid (respondent No. 2) of Zawlnuam, who deals in condemned iron and steel, having a stock of about 10 quintals and 35 kgs, lodged FIR on 14.9.2005 with Zawlnuam Police outpost under Kanhmunph Police Station stating that Md. Ahad Choudhury (Petitioner) from Karimganj, wanted to buy his collection for an amount of Rs. 13,000/- and paid Rs. 10,000/-as advance on 12.9.2005 and took the stock loaded in a vehicle. Latter on, he found the said amount of Rs. 10,000/- is fake Indian currencies. The police registered a crime being Kanhmunph PS Case No. 21 of 2005 under Sections 489B and489C of the IPC and accordingly arrested and produced the accused petitioner before the Magistrate on 26.9.2005. He was released on bail on 28.9.2005. On completion of the investigation, police submitted charge-sheet on 28.1.2006. 2. I have heard Md. M.M. Ali, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner and Mr. N. Sailo, learned Public Procedure, appearing on behalf of the State of Mizoram. 3. Mr. Ali, learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that : (i) The learned Magistrate did not commit the case as required under Section 209, Code of Criminal Procedure for trial before the Court of Sessions and the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Aizawl, took cognizance of the alleged offence, which is exclusively triable by the learned Court of Sessions. (ii) Even assuming that the case was committed, it was incumbent upon the learned Additional Sessions Judge to issue or serve summons on the petitioner after taking cognizance of the case but it was not done so at any point of time, and as such, the criminal proceeding, not being sustainable in law, is liable to the quashed. (ii) Even assuming that the case was committed, it was incumbent upon the learned Additional Sessions Judge to issue or serve summons on the petitioner after taking cognizance of the case but it was not done so at any point of time, and as such, the criminal proceeding, not being sustainable in law, is liable to the quashed. (iii) The charge-sheet dated 28.1.2008 does not show that any fake Indian currency was recovered and/or seized from the possession of the petitioner inasmuch as there is no mention in the charge-sheet that the aforesaid amount of Rs. 10,000/-allegedly paid by the petitioner as advance to the informant on 12.9.2005, was seized from the possession of the petitioner. (iv) A conjoint reading of FIR and the charge-sheet does not prima facie disclose any offence and make out a case against the petitioner and as such, the continuance of the criminal proceeding against him would be an abuse of process of Court and unsustainable in law. (v) It has further been submitted that the petitioner was suffering from various ailments and he was under treatment in hospital as an indoor patient during the period from 3.6.2006 to 30.7.2009 for which he could not appear before the Court. The petitioner's bailer, on the basis of false certificate obtained from the Registrar birth and death, Karimganj submitted an application dated 31.6.2007 for discharging him from the liability of a bailer before the learned Additional Sessions Judge stating that the accused-petitioner has died. (vi) The learned Additional Sessions Judge without making any inquiry or obtaining any report from the police or from the authority and without application of mind issued warrant of arrest dated 27.3.2009 against the petitioner without first issuing any summons as provided under Section 87of the Code of Criminal Procedure, when is unsustainable under the exiting law. Before execution of the warrant of arrest, the accused-petitioner made an application dated 5.10.2009 for recalling the same and in its place prayed for issuance of summons for appearance but the learned Additional Sessions Judge vide his order dated 6.10.2009 (17.4.2009) refused to recall the warrant of arrest and directed the counsel to produce the accused-petitioner before his Court on 9.11.2009. Such refusal to recall the warrant of arrest and direction to the counsel to produce the accused-petitioner in the Court, according to Mr. Ali, is absolutely without jurisdiction, which has resulted in miscarriage of justice. Such refusal to recall the warrant of arrest and direction to the counsel to produce the accused-petitioner in the Court, according to Mr. Ali, is absolutely without jurisdiction, which has resulted in miscarriage of justice. 4. The main submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that although the spirit of Code of Criminal Procedure has been made applicable to the criminal trial in the State of Mizoram, there is no escape from strict compliance of committal proceeding under Section 209 as provided under Chapter XVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the said procedure having not been complied, the impugned criminal proceeding is liable to be quashed. In order to bring home his above submissions, Mr. Ali, would rely on : (i) Ashok Chaturvedi and Ors. v. Shitul H. Chanchani and Anr. reported in (1998) 7 SCC 698 . (ii) Babu Verghese and Ors. v. Bar Council of Kerela and Ors. reported in (1999) 3 SCC 422 . (iii) State of U.P. v. Lakshmi Brahman and Anr. reported in (1983) 2 SCC 372 . 5. As opposed to above, Mr. Sailo, learned P.P. submits that as provided under Section 1(2)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the provisions under Chapter XVI have been excluded from applicability in the "tribal areas" within the meaning of paragraph 20 of the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution of India and therefore, there is no bar on the Court of Sessions in taking cognizance of the offence and proceeding with the trial without being committed by the Magistrate. According to him, it is the spirit of law alone, which would guide the Court in taking up proceeding with the criminal trial without compliance of the procedure under Chapter XVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and as such, the proceeding in question is not liable to be quashed as demanded by the petitioner. 6. The rival submissions of the learned Counsel for the parties center round the applicability of the Code of Criminal Procedure to "tribal areas". Is it the letters or spirit alone that should govern the criminal proceeding in the State of Mizoram? Before answering this question one may first require to refer to the provision contained in Chapter XVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. They read : CHAPTER XVI PRELIMINARY 1. Is it the letters or spirit alone that should govern the criminal proceeding in the State of Mizoram? Before answering this question one may first require to refer to the provision contained in Chapter XVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. They read : CHAPTER XVI PRELIMINARY 1. Short title extent and commencement : (1) This Act may be called the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. (2) It contends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir Chapter-VIII, X and XI thereof, shall not apply : (a) To the State of Nagaland, (b) To the tribal areas, but the concerned State Government may, by notification apply such provisions or any of them to the whole of the State of Nagaland or such tribal areas, as the case may be with such supplemental, incidental or consequential modifications, as may be specified under the notification. The above provisions were incorporated first in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 and they have survived the numerous amendments so far made to the Code of Criminal Procedure. 7. The offence under Sections 489B and 489C of the IPC are exclusively tribal by the Court of Sessions and it is an admitted position that the case was sent up by the Magistrate without committing it for trial in the Court of Sessions as required under Section 209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This provision under Section 209 is included in Chapter XVI as provided under Section 1(2)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This Chapter comes within the applicability of the Code in "tribal areas". As per explanation to above conclusion, the "tribal areas" means the territories, which immediately before the 21st day of January 1972 were included in the "tribal areas" of Assam as referred to in paragraph 20 of the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution of India other than those within the local limits of municipality of Shillong. This explanation is to be read with paragraph 20 of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India. The "tribal areas" so for as it relates to the State of Mizoram, as per part-Ill of the table appended to the said paragraph, comprises the districts of Chakma, Mara and Lai. Before creation of the State of Mizoram, it was known as Lushai Hills District and it was a part of the State of Assam. The "tribal areas" so for as it relates to the State of Mizoram, as per part-Ill of the table appended to the said paragraph, comprises the districts of Chakma, Mara and Lai. Before creation of the State of Mizoram, it was known as Lushai Hills District and it was a part of the State of Assam. The name of the Lushai Hills District was changed to Mizoram Hills District by the Lushai Hills District (Changes of Name) Act, 1954. For better appreciation and disposal of the present case one has to refer briefly to Government of India Act, 1919. Under Section 52-A(2) of the said Act, the Governor General in Council was given powers to declare any territory in British India to be a "backward tract". It was also given powers to direct that any Act of Indian Legislature shall not apply to the territory in question or any part thereof or shall apply to the same or any part thereof subject to such exceptions or modifications as the Governor General thought fit. On the strength of the provisions under Section 52-A(2), the Governor General in Council issued a notification declaring the following territories in the provinces of Assam as backward tracts : (i) The Garo Hills District, (ii) The British Portions of Khasi and Jainitia Hills District other than Shillong Municipality cantonment. (iii) The Mikir Hills (now Nowgong and Sibsagar Districts) (iv) The North Cachar Hills (Cachar District) (v) The Naga Hills District, (vi) The Lushai Hills District, (vii) The Sadiya Frontier Tract, (viii) The Balipara Frontier Tract (ix) The Lakhimpur Frontier Tract. 8. After enactment of Government of India Act, 1935, those backward tracts were described either as "excluded area" or "partly excluded area". These areas were to be administered by the Governor himself in his discretion. So far Assam is concerned, the excluded and partly excluded area are as under : Excluded Areas. (1) North East Frontier (Sadiya Balipara and Lakhimpur Tracts) (2) The Naga Hills District. (3) The Lushai Hills District. (4) North Cachar Hills Sub-Division of Cachar District. Partly Excluded Areas. (1) The Garo Hills District. (2) The Mikir Hills (Now Nowgong and Sibsagar Districts) (3) The British Portions of Khasi and Jaintia Hills District other than the Shillong Municipality and Cantonment, Shillong. (3) The Lushai Hills District. (4) North Cachar Hills Sub-Division of Cachar District. Partly Excluded Areas. (1) The Garo Hills District. (2) The Mikir Hills (Now Nowgong and Sibsagar Districts) (3) The British Portions of Khasi and Jaintia Hills District other than the Shillong Municipality and Cantonment, Shillong. These areas were placed under the special responsibility of the Governor with powers to override advice of the Minister in his individual judgment. 9. It is provided under Section 92(1) of the 1935 Act that the Executive Authority of a province extends to excluded and partially excluded areas therein, but, notwithstanding in this Act, no Act of the Federal Legislature or of the Provincial Legislatures, shall apply to an excluded area or a partially excluded area, unless the Governor by public notification so directs, and the Governor General in giving such a direction with respect to any Act may direct that the Act shall in its application to the area or to any specified part thereof, have effect subject to such exceptions or modifications as he thinks fit. 10. The backward tracts or what is later called excluded or partly excluded areas were created mainly on the ground of backwardness of the tribal people living therein with their peculiar ways of living with different dialects, culture, tradition and customs. It was considered necessary to help these people preserve their own identity with their dialects, culture, tradition and custom by way of proving separate autonomous administrative set up in the form of Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India in the backward areas; excluded or partly excluded, which are now called "scheduled areas" or "tribal areas". The chiefs of the tribes at the grass root use to settle all disputes according to their customs or unwritten customary laws. The Mizos in Lushai Hills District were/are no exception. 11. It is found that in November, 1906,. the British Government for the first time, in exercise of powers conferred under Section 6 of the Scheduled Districts Act, 1874, issued notification promulgating the rules for regulation of the procedure of officers appointed to administer justice in the Lushai Hills. It is also found that another notification was issued on 27.7.1915 promulgating the rules regarding "Sentences of death in the Lushai Hills" for regulating the cases of awarding "Death Sentences". Under the 1935 Rules, a sentence of death or transportation requires confirmation by the Lt. It is also found that another notification was issued on 27.7.1915 promulgating the rules regarding "Sentences of death in the Lushai Hills" for regulating the cases of awarding "Death Sentences". Under the 1935 Rules, a sentence of death or transportation requires confirmation by the Lt. Governor while a sentence of imprisonment for 7 years and above requires confirmation by the Commissioner under Rule 9 of the 1906 Rules. After the enactment of Government of India Act, 1935, the aforesaid Rules of 1906 ceased to operate. The aforesaid Rules of 1915 also stood repealed with the incorporation of similar provision in 1935 Rules in respect of death sentence in Lushai Hills District. It is worth noting that similar to 1935 Rules, there came into force separate rules in the said backward tracts namely the Rules for Administration of justice and police in Naga Hills District, 1937; the Rules for Administration of Justice in NC Hills, 1937; the Rules for Administration of Justice in Garo Hills District, 1937; the Rules for Administration of Justice and Police in Khasi and Jahatia Hills, 1937; the Rules for Administration of Justice and Police in Sibsagar and Nowgong and Mikir Hills Tracts, 1937; and three others Rules for Administration of Justice in Balipara Frontier Tract; Lakhimpur Frontier Tract and Sadiya Frontier Tract, which were later on consolidated into one set of rules called as "the Assam Frontier (Administration of Justice) Regulation, 1945". The said Rules had unfettered and uniform applicable to all classes of persons in the respective areas/hills district including the persons residing in Lushai Hills District of Assam as substitute for Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 and for the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. It is to be noted that the Code of Criminal Procedure had a very limited application in Lushai Hills District while the Code of Civil Procedure had no application at all in it. A major change took place with the promulgation of separate rules for Lushai Hills Autonomous District (Administration of Justice) Rules, 1953 providing constitution of two types of Court namely, the village Court and sub-ordinate district council Court with jurisdiction to try both the criminal and civil cases. A major change took place with the promulgation of separate rules for Lushai Hills Autonomous District (Administration of Justice) Rules, 1953 providing constitution of two types of Court namely, the village Court and sub-ordinate district council Court with jurisdiction to try both the criminal and civil cases. With the Constitution of the said Courts under 1953 Rules, the 1937 Rules ceased to apply to cases or suits in which any or all the parties belong to a Scheduled Tribe or tribes within Lushai Autonomous District, now Mizoram, save and except the suits and cases mentioned in Rule 23 of 1953 Rules. 12. Rule 44(1) of the Lushai Hills Autonomous District (Administration of Justice) Rules, 1953 ("1953 Rules" in short) provides as under : In Criminal cases, the procedure of the sub-ordinate district council Courts, additional sub-ordinate district council Courts and the district council Courts shall, subject to the provisions of these rules be in the spirit of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 so far as it is applicable to the circumstance of the district and not inconsistent with these rules. 13. A 5-Judge Bench of the Apex Court had an occasion to decide the constitutional validity of the similar rules namely the Rules for Administration of Justice and Police in the Naga Hills Districts made in 1906 and subsequently revised in 1937 in State of Nagaland v. Ratan Singh and Ors. reported in AIR 1967 SC 212 . Speaking for the Bench, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Hidayatullah, as His Lordship was then, made a detailed discussion on the background and lifestyle of the tribal people living in a backward tracts, which necessitate relaxation in applying letters of the Code of Criminal Procedure in those areas. What is meant by the terms "Spirit of the Code" has been discussed in details and exceptions fully in the said case. It needs no further discussions but only to reproduce the paragraphs 30 and 31 as under : 30. Laws of this kind are made with an eye to simplicity. People in backward tracts cannot be expected to make themselves aware of the technicalities of a complex Code. What is important is that they should be able to present their defence effectively unhampered by the technicalities of complex laws. Laws of this kind are made with an eye to simplicity. People in backward tracts cannot be expected to make themselves aware of the technicalities of a complex Code. What is important is that they should be able to present their defence effectively unhampered by the technicalities of complex laws. Throughout the past century the Code of Criminal Procedure has been excluded from this area because it would be too difficult for the local people to understand it. Instead the spirit of the Code of Criminal Procedure has been asked to be applied so that justice may not fail because of some technicality. The argument that this is no law is not correct. Written law is nothing more than a control of discretion. The more there is of law the less there is of discretion. In this area it is considered necessary that discretion should have greater play than technical rules and the provision that the spirit of the Code should apply is a law conceived in the best interest of the people. The discretion of the Presiding Officer is not subjected to rigid control because of the unsatisfactory state of defences which would be offered and which might fail if they did not comply with some technical rule. The removal of technicalities, in our opinion, leads to the advancement of the cause of justice in these backward tracts. On the other hand, the imposition of the Code of Criminal Procedure would retard justice, as indeed the Governors-General, the Governor and the other heads of local Government have always thought. We think, therefore, that Article 21 does not render the Rules of 1937 ineffective. 31. A similar attempt is made by comparing these Rules with the Code of Criminal Procedure applicable in the rest of India. It is contended that this leads to discrimination. We think that the exigency of the situation clearly demands that the Code of Criminal Procedure should not apply in this area. It is not discrimination to administer different laws in different areas. The Presidency Towns have got special procedures, which do not obtain in other areas. We have known of trial by jury in one part of India for an offence, which was not so triable in another. Similarly, what is an offence in one part of India is not an offence in another. The Presidency Towns have got special procedures, which do not obtain in other areas. We have known of trial by jury in one part of India for an offence, which was not so triable in another. Similarly, what is an offence in one part of India is not an offence in another. Regional differences do not necessarily connote discrimination and laws may be designed for effective justice in different ways in different parts of India if people are not similarly circumstanced. These backward tracts are not found suitable for the application of the Code of Criminal Procedure in all its rigour and technicality, and to say that they shall be governed, not by the technical rules of the Code but by the substance of such rules is not to discriminate this area against the rest of India. 14. The next important point for discussion is whether committal proceeding has been dispensed with. The scheme of Criminal Procedure under 1953 Rules does not provide, nor even contemplate, Sessions trial. This issue is no longer res integra. In Ratan Singh's case (supra), it is held that under the Criminal Administration of Justice, in the scheduled area, the technical rules are not to prevail over the substance of the matter inasmuch as the Deputy Commissioner, in trying criminal cases, would hold the trial according to the exigency of the case and in so far as the petty cases are concerned, he would follow the summons procedure but in heinous one, he would follow the procedure in a warrant case. It was, therefore, further held therein that the question of a sessions trial could not arise because there is no provision for committal proceeding and there are no Sessions Judges in these areas. There is no dispute that the 1953 Rules have been framed in the similar frame of the Nagaland Rules, 1906 under the similar background/backdrop to meet the same objective but there again a question would obviously arise as to whether the law laid down in Ratan Singh's case (supra) would cover or apply to the present case. There is no dispute that the 1953 Rules have been framed in the similar frame of the Nagaland Rules, 1906 under the similar background/backdrop to meet the same objective but there again a question would obviously arise as to whether the law laid down in Ratan Singh's case (supra) would cover or apply to the present case. The case of Laksmi Bhraman (supra), the law has been settled that taking cognizance of an offence under Section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is a purely judicial function subject to judicial review by the Court of appeal or revision to which the Magistrate is subject to judicial review by Court of appeal or revision to which Magistrate is subject and the cognizance of an offence, even if exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, has to be taken by the Magistrate because Section 193 precludes the Court of Sessions from taking cognizance of an offence. Citing the case of Babu Verghese (supra), emphasis has been made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner on the principle of law that if the manner of doing a particular act is prescribed by any statute, the act must be done in that manner or not at all and this principle has been followed ever since the same was laid down by Lord Roche in Nazir Ahmed v. King Emperor reported in AIR 1936 PC 253. The aforesaid cases referred to by the learned Counsel for the petitioner are not concerned with the criminal proceeding in the "scheduled areas" or "tribal areas" within the meaning of paragraph 20 of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India and therefore, these two cases are of no assistance to the case in hand.. 15. The complaint of non-committal of proceeding under Section 209, Code of Criminal Procedure is to be considered under the provisions of the Lushai Hills Autonomous District (Administration of Justice) Rules, 1953. As mentioned earlier, the said 1953 Rules provides for two sets of Courts in the "scheduled areas" in Lushai Hills District (now Mizoram). Chapter TV of the said Rules provides for powers of village Courts. Rule 14 provides that a village Court shall try suits and cases of certain nature in which both the parties belong to a Scheduled Tribe or tribes residing within its jurisdiction. Chapter TV of the said Rules provides for powers of village Courts. Rule 14 provides that a village Court shall try suits and cases of certain nature in which both the parties belong to a Scheduled Tribe or tribes residing within its jurisdiction. Rule 14(b) also provides that criminal cases falling within the purview of tribal laws and customs and offence of petty nature such as petty theft, pilfering, mischief and trespass of petty nature, simple assault and hurt and affront and affray of whatsoever kind etc. would be triable by the village Courts. Chapter V provides procedure for trial of suits and cases by a village Courts in accordance with customary laws of the village. Under Rule 44(1) of the 1953 Rules, the subordinate district council Courts and district council Courts in trying the criminal cases shall be guided by the spirit of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 so far it is applicable to the circumstance of the district and not inconsistent with such Rules. Thus, it is found that for coming under the jurisdiction of the Courts under the 1953 Rules, the parties to the suits or cases (including the criminal case) must be a member of Scheduled Tribe or tribes residing within the concerned Courts. In the present case, admittedly both the parties, informant and the accused-petitioner, belong to "non-Scheduled Tribe" or "non-tribes". One of the parties namely the accused petitioner is even a non-resident of the State of Mizoram, he being a permanent resident of Karimganj District. The other party i.e. informant may be a resident of Chanmari, Aizawl for his business purpose but he does not belong to any of the tribes or Scheduled Tribes. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is silent as to whether the letters or the spirit should be made applicable in the criminal proceeding involving the "non-scheduled tribe" or "non-tribes" parties. In Ratan Singh's case (supra), although law has been settled that the spirit would apply to the criminal proceeding in the "scheduled areas" but in that case, the appellant was the State of Nagaland and the respondent was a non-tribal person who was serving in the Central Reserve Police Force. In Ratan Singh's case (supra), although law has been settled that the spirit would apply to the criminal proceeding in the "scheduled areas" but in that case, the appellant was the State of Nagaland and the respondent was a non-tribal person who was serving in the Central Reserve Police Force. Yet from the aforesaid judgment, it has been made clear that the principle of applying the spirit of the Code of Criminal Procedure in trying the criminal cases in the "scheduled areas" was adopted to give benefit to the educationally and socially backward tribes and such benefit must not be given to the general people in whose case the Code of Criminal Procedure should be followed in letters. If the preset case involving non-tribal litigants/parties were considered in the light of the law laid down by the Apex Court, it would be beyond the scope of following the spirit of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Obviously it is the letters of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which must govern in trying the criminal case by the Sessions Court at Aizawl in the State of Mizoram. This is because, some changes, in the meantime, have taken place in the Administration of Justice in the State of Mizoram, by way of steps taken by the State Government for separation of judiciary from the executive for speedy trial and rendering justice to the people of the State. Because of this change it has been submitted at the bar that some Fast Track Courts, including the Courts of Sessions, have been established and they are functioning and discharging their duties unattached to the executive i.e. the Deputy Commissioners. 16. For the aforesaid reasons, I am not in a position to accept the submissions made by Mr. Sailo, learned P.P. that the spirit of the Code of Criminal Procedure alone should be applied in the State of Mizoram and there was no irregularity or illegality in not complying with the committal proceeding by the learned Magistrate under Section 209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and taking up the trial by the learned Additional Session Judge without the case being committed to his Court. The concept of applying the spirit of the Code of Criminal Procedure in "scheduled areas" should no longer stand as a general principle without any exception. The concept of applying the spirit of the Code of Criminal Procedure in "scheduled areas" should no longer stand as a general principle without any exception. Here is the case where the distinctive features have been found inasmuch as the parties have been found admittedly from the general caste i.e. non-scheduled tribes and the residents of the neighbouring State of Assam who have business establishment or connection in the State of Mizoram. Since the Courts of Sessions have been established and are functioning with the separation of judiciary from the executive, although the process is not complete to the satisfaction of all concerned, there is no more scope for applying the spirit of Code of Criminal Procedure in the present case and it must be governed by the letters of the Code of Criminal Procedure without any relaxation. In my considered view, the application of spirit alone in criminal proceeding without any exception in the scheduled areas, particularly in the State of Mizoram, has become outdated and the same cannot be made applicable any longer, without exception. 17. Considering the advancement of the Mizo people particularly, in the field of education, they having achieved the highest position in the literacy in the whole of the country, there is sufficient reason for presuming that they have attained the position to understand and follow the uniform statutory law like the Code of Criminal Procedure and time has come that the Code of Criminal Procedure should be made applicable in letters and spirit in the State of Mizoram without any exception. Time has come to review the position in the context of the present development in the State and bring necessary amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure so as to make the letters of the same applicable even if the parties to the suit or case are Scheduled Tribe or tribes. 18. In view of what has been discussed and considered in that light of the decisions of the Supreme Court, it would lead to a natural conclusion that the general concept that the spirit of Code of Criminal Procedure alone should be made applicable to the criminal proceeding in the "scheduled areas" no longer holds the water and it cannot be applied in all the cases in general. This leads to ultimate conclusion that the present case cannot be saved by the aforesaid principle of application of spirit of the Code of Criminal Procedure and accordingly, it must be held that the present case must be guided by the letters of the Code of Criminal Procedure. As a result, it must be held that the criminal proceeding taken up by the learned Additional Sessions Judge without being committed by the Magistrate concerned is totally unsustainable in law and the same is liable to be quashed. Accordingly, the criminal proceeding in the aforesaid Kanhmun PS Case No. 21 of 2005 under Sections 489B and 489C, IPC pending in the Courts of learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, Aizawl stands quashed. 19. The Petition stands allowed. Petition allowed.