Judgment : The petitioner has sought for a mandamus, directing the respondents to pay him a sum of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand Only), as damages along with the future interest and costs, for incarcerating him for his illegal detention and for illegal registration of a false case, in violation of Fundamental Right and liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. .2. Facts leading to the writ petition are as follows: .The petitioner was working as Building supervisor and was also in-charge of maintenance of building of a Firm in Chennai. That on 15. 1998, at 9.30 a.m., when he was at the Airport, to export Mangoes, brought from Illedu Farms, Chunampet, by a van bearing Registration No. TN 01 J 4894, he was ensure dispatch of mangoes to Singapore. As it one of the procedures, namely, getting clearance from Custom authorities. While he was waiting for the representative of Sita World (sic) Travels, clearing agent of Ganapathy Marketing Company, through which company, mangoes were exported, the Inspector of Police, Meenambakkam, respondent herein, arrested him and forcibly took him to the Police Station. .3. On the same day, the petitioner was informed that he was arrested under Section 75 of the City Police Act and later on, was also informed that he was arrested under Section 7(1) of Criminal Law Amendment Act. Though the petitioner gave telephone numbers of certain establishments, like, Lufthansa, Grindlays Banks, National Insurance Company, a government body housed in Kalpana Complex, to verify his credentials and background, the third respondent failed to do so and remanded the petitioner to judicial custody, for the abovesaid offences. Later on, he was released on bail. As the arrest and detention was made in violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner filed Crl. O.P. No. 832 of 1999, under Section 482 Cr.P.C., to quash the proceedings, pending on the file of District Munsif cum Judicial Magistrate, Alandur in Crime No. 363 of 1998, which was registered against the petitioner. The said proceedings were stayed. 4. The petitioner has further submitted that his name was not found in the FIR, but it was included only in the remand report, dated 15. 1998. Thus, the respondents have committed a procedural error. When the quash proceedings came up for final hearing on 12. The said proceedings were stayed. 4. The petitioner has further submitted that his name was not found in the FIR, but it was included only in the remand report, dated 15. 1998. Thus, the respondents have committed a procedural error. When the quash proceedings came up for final hearing on 12. 2001, the petitioner came to know that the charge sheet filed before the concerned Court, was returned for some defects to be complied with and that the same was also represented. However, the FIR was struck off by the learned Judicial Magistrate on 24. 2000, as per Section 468(ii) of Cr. P.C, as barred by limitation. 5. Thepetitioner has further submitted that the Police Officer concerned is duty bound to verify the credentials and bona fides of the petitioner before effecting arrest. The accusation of drunkenness, riotous and indecent officer at 10.30 a.m., in the Cargo Complex of the International Airport has caused mental agony and embarrassment to him, and to the members of the family. It is his further contention that though he was running from pillar to post to ascertain the reasons for his arrest and detention, he was not furnished with the copies of the required documents, which the respondents are Constitutionally bound to do so and taking advantage of the belated filing of the final report which resulted in the FIR being struck off, the falsity, in launching the prosecution against the petitioner, came to be buried and that the petitioner is deprived of an opportunity to prove his innocence. 6. It is the contention of the petitioner that his constitutional right and liberty has been infringed by the careless act of the third respondent, purported to have been done under the guise of enforcement of law and order, which on facts, is nothing but an abuse of order, which on facts, is nothing but an abuse of power and violation of the procedure established by law. It is the grievance of the petitioner that when he was engaged in his lawful business, in the course of his employment, the third respondent and his men have registered a false case and accused him of serious offences under Section 75 of the City Police Act and Section 7(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act and illegally detained him, thus, violating Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 7. 7. According to the petitioner, infringement of his fundamental rights and liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and the injury caused to his name, reputation and humiliation, which he had to face, have to be repaired by awarding appropriate damages. In these circumstances, he has come forward with the present writ petition for the relief as stated supra. .8. TheInspector of Police, Chennai, Airport, Meenambakkam, Chennai, the third respondent herein, in his counter affidavit, has stated that on 15. 1998 at 11.00 Hours, the petitioner was at Cargo Complex International Airport, Chennai, causing nuisance to the public, at 1.00 Hours, the Sub-Inspector of Police, along with Police Constables went for rounds at Cargo area, found that the petitioner was quarrelling with A-1 – Arumalraj, A3 – Mohammed Rafeek and A4 – Kannan. All the four persons were obstructing traffic by their unlawful act. Therefore, all of them were arrested at Cargo point and brought to Airport Police Station, where a case was registered against them. The matter was taken up for investigation and they were remanded on 15. 1998. The third respondent has further submitted that the Sub-Inspector of Police along with a Police Constable witnessed the abusive act of the petitioner directly and in such circumstances, there is no question of verifying the credentials of the petitioner. According to him, there is no illegality in arresting the petitioner. 9. The third respondent has further submitted that the charge sheet submitted that the charge sheet submitted by the Police was returned by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Alandur, Chennai and the represented charge sheet, reached Court on 24. 2000 and as per Section 468(ii) of Cr.P.C., was barred by limitation. According to him, the Police have no bad intention or enmity with the petitioner and that they have done their duty to maintain law and order. Instead of mentioning the Crime number as 363 of 1998, both in the remand request and charge sheet, it was mistakenly mentioned as Crime No. 463 of 1998. Hence, the charge sheet was returned by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Alandur. Subsequently, the investigating Officer, submitted an alteration report, mentioning that a mistake had crept in and that the corrected charge sheet was also sent to the Court with correct Cr. No. 363 of 1998, but it did not reach the Court in time. Hence, on 24. Hence, the charge sheet was returned by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Alandur. Subsequently, the investigating Officer, submitted an alteration report, mentioning that a mistake had crept in and that the corrected charge sheet was also sent to the Court with correct Cr. No. 363 of 1998, but it did not reach the Court in time. Hence, on 24. 2000, the Criminal Court struck of the FIR, as time barred under Section 468(ii) of the Cr.P.C. 10. The third respondent has further submitted that the Sub-Inspector of Police, had directly witnessed the occurrence and the unlawful act of the petitioner and therefore, he is competent to register a criminal case and take up the matter for investigation. According to him, there is no violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Arrest and detention were done in accordance with the procedure and merely because the FIR was struck off, due to non-filing of the final report in time, no mala fide or abuse of power can be attributed to the conduct of the Police Officer and in such circumstances, the petitioner is not entitled to the relief sought for in this writ petition. For the above said reasons, the respondents have prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. 11. Reading passages from a Lecture Series Book, “FREEDOM UNDER LAW” by SIR ALFRED DENNING, a well known Judge of Majestic Court in England, Mr. C. Ramakrishnan, learned senior counsel for the petitioner submitted that when the personal liberty of the petitioner has been deprived of by an arbitrary arrest and detention. Courts in India have to scrutinise the pleadings and evaluate as to whether the procedure contemplated under law are strictly followed by the law enforcing agencies and Courts. As arrest or remand restricts the free movement of an individual and when the right to life and personal liberty, the most precious rights of human being, are violated with impunity, he submitted that Courts should award adequate compensation. 12. With the above prelude, referring to the FIR, annexed at Page 2 of the typed set of papers and the remand report, dated 15. 1998, in Cr. Nos. 462 to 465 of 1998 and the order of the Learned Judicial Magistrate, Saidapet, remanding the petitioner till 6. 1998, learned senior counsel for the petitioner submitted that when the name of the petitioner was not shown as an accused in Cr. Nos. 1998, in Cr. Nos. 462 to 465 of 1998 and the order of the Learned Judicial Magistrate, Saidapet, remanding the petitioner till 6. 1998, learned senior counsel for the petitioner submitted that when the name of the petitioner was not shown as an accused in Cr. Nos. 460 to 463 of 1998, on the file of the Airport Police Station, Chennai, the arrest made by the third respondent in the above said Crime No. 463 of 1998, is illegal and consequently, the remand made by the learned Judicial Magistrate, is without any basis. 13. Referring to the remand order, learned senior counsel for the petitioner further submitted that whenever an accused is produced by the Police, with a request for remand, the learned Magistrate, has got a duty to verify the basis of arrest and also to record his reasons for remand, so that the arrestee knows the reasons for arrest and remand. As arrest is so important and affects the personal liberty of an individual, arrest cannot be made indiscriminately and had the learned Magistrate been prudent in questioning the Police or applied his mind to the facts of the case, remand would not have been made. He further submitted that the Police who had registered serious offences against the petitioner under Section 75 of the City Police Act and Section 7(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, imputing riotous and indecent behaviour, without verifying his credentials cannot come forward with an absurd statement that the FIR number was wrongly mentioned in the remand report, and that the grave error committed by the Police, by their careless act cannot be allowed to be condoned. He further submitted that from the above, it is evident that FIR in Cr. No. 363 of 1998, was not even filed before the Criminal Court and that the learned Magistrate, without verifying the details, mindlessly has remanded the petitioner for detention, thus depriving the petitioner’s precious right of liberty enshrined in the Constitution. 14. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner submitted that there are several instances in the country where arrest is made indiscriminately by Police, without ascertaining as to whether such arrest, is required on the facts of the case and with enormous police powers, liberty is not properly valued in the country. 14. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner submitted that there are several instances in the country where arrest is made indiscriminately by Police, without ascertaining as to whether such arrest, is required on the facts of the case and with enormous police powers, liberty is not properly valued in the country. Reverting back to the facts of this case, learned senior counsel for the petitioner submitted that neither the petitioner nor his relatives were informed of the full particulars of arrest and even from he remand report, he could not know the reasons for his arrest. Magistrate, he submitted that when personal liberty is involved, the Magistrate should not have mechanically ordered remand of the petitioner. In this context, he referred to the duties, to be discharged by the Police officials, as mandated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in D.K. Bass v. State of West Bengal AIR 1997 SC610 (1997) 1 SCC 416 . 15. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner further submitted that when the FIR pertaining to the Crime Nos. 460 to 463 of 1998 on the file ofthe Airport Police Station, produced along with the remand report, dated 15. 1998 did not contain the name of the petitioner accused, it should be construed that production of the petitioner in some other crime number and the consequential remand, which curtailed the freedom of liberty of the petitioner as illegal. 116. Further, pointing out the non-speaking order of remand, learned senior counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner was kept in dark about the reasons for his arrest and detention which is a violation of the fundamental right of life and liberty and the principles contained in the above cited judgment. Inviting the attention of this Court to the nature of offences, registered against the petitioner, he submitted that as arrest restricts Article 21 of the Constitution of India, the Police Officer, ought to have conducted some preliminary enquiry. According to him, the petitioner about the credentials of the petitioner with his employers, there would not have been any need or arrest and detention. .17. Further, even assuming that a charge is laid, the petitioner would have proved his innocence and that the imputation levelled against him by the police by filing a false case, would have been wiped out. .17. Further, even assuming that a charge is laid, the petitioner would have proved his innocence and that the imputation levelled against him by the police by filing a false case, would have been wiped out. Imputations levelled against him that he was found behaving in a violation, riotous or indecent behaviour and in such other manner, as stated in Section 75 of the Madras City Police Act and molesting a person, prejudice of employment or business, would not have been sustained by evidence. He further submitted that on account of the time barred report to the Criminal Court and by giving a closure to the criminal case, the falsity in launching prosecution and detention, at the instance of the police, where curtailed, should not be taken lightly and that the police cannot be permitted to escape from their liability to pay compensation to the victim and that, in that context, the facts have to be meticulously scrutinized and if in the opinion of this Court, infringement of Fundamental Right is made out, then the respondents should be a saddled with appropriate compensation for their careless and callous act of depriving the personal freedom, one of the mot precious right enshrined in the Constitution. In this context, he also referred to a passage of the report of the Royal Commission on Police powers and procedure. 118. Placing reliance on a decision of the Court of Appeal of England in Taylor v. Chief Considerable of Thames Valley Police 2004 EWCA Civ 858, learned senior counsel for the petitioner submitted that even for a few hours of wrongful detention, appropriate damages have been awarded and prayed to apply the abovesaid decision to the facts of this case. 119. Learned senior counsel for he petitioner further submitted that investigation is an important process in Criminal Law, arrest and detention cannot be made without following the procedure contemplated under law. If at the whims and fancies of Police Officers, arrests are made and if the criminal cases are given a quietus in the manner stated supra, then, having regard to the valuable right of freedom of liberty enshrined in the Constitution of India, there is a breach of law, warranting damages. 120. If at the whims and fancies of Police Officers, arrests are made and if the criminal cases are given a quietus in the manner stated supra, then, having regard to the valuable right of freedom of liberty enshrined in the Constitution of India, there is a breach of law, warranting damages. 120. Humility andsuffering, which the petitioner was subjected to, has to be redressed by awarding adequate damages and when the facts are per se apparent on the face of record, there is no need for the petitioner to take re-course to public law. In these circumstances, he submitted that the writ petition is maintainable and the alternative remedy of approaching the Civil Court, is not necessary. According to him, when deprivation of Fundamental Right is put to issue, the remedy under mental Right is put to issue, the remedy under Article 226 is more efficacious, than Public-Law remedy and driving the petitioner to Civil Court would only extend the period of litigation, which would again affect speedy justice, now recognised as a Fundamental Right. 121. Per contra, Mr. P. Subramanian, Additional Government Pleader, made a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the writ petition on two grounds, that a) when the Crl. O.P. No. 832 of 1999, was disposed of by this Court on 112. 2001, this Court, after considering the submissions of wrongful detention by registering a false case under Section 75 of the City Police Act and Section 7 (1) of Criminal Law Amendment Act and the complaint of torture made, this was not inclined to award any damages, but only granted liberty to the petitioner to file a suit for damages, against the officials concerned, with reference to the allegation leveled against them, in the affidavit filed in support of a quash petition cannot invoke the extraordinary remedy under Article 226 of the constitution of India. 22. Learned Additional Government Pleader further submitted that when the petitioner has neither chosen to lodge a private complaint against the officials concerned for filed a suit for damages, the allegations made in form of an affidavit do not stand the test of proof and in such circumstances, no liability can be fastened either on the third respondent or the State for the alleged excess in discharging his duty. According to him, vicarious liability would arise only if the facts alleged are proved in the manner known to law and in the absence of filing of any suit and findings recorded, no mandamus need not be issued. 23. Learned Government Pleader further submitted that unless the petitioner is able to prove that there is a bona fide and willful action, award of damages is not automatic. According to him, a case in Cr. No. 363 of 1998, was duly registered by the Sub-Inspector of Police, Airport Police Station, under Section 75 of the City Police Act and Section 7(1) of criminal Law Amendment Act and since the offences were cognizable in nature, the arrest made by the Police Officer, cannot be said to be illegal. However, he fairly admitted that an inadvertent mistake had crept in, when the remand report, dated 15. 1998, was filed before the learned Judicial Magistrate, Alandur, and instead of Cr. No. 363 of 1998, it was wrongly mentioned as Cr. No. 463 of 1998. 24. Learned Additional Government Pleader further submitted that when a final report was submitted to the Court, the said mistake was pointed out by the Court and that the charge sheet was returned. Though a revised charge sheet was returned. Though a revised charge sheet was sent with the Court in time and consequently, on 24. 2000, the FIR was struck off, as per Section 468(ii) of Cr. P.C, as it was barred by limitation. According to him, a Police Officer, who had witnessed the occurrence, is empowered to make arrest for a cognizable offence and that there is no need to enquire with the employer or any body for verifying the credentials and bona fides of a person, involved in a cognizable offence. 25. For the above said reasons, learned Additional Government Pleader submitted that the arrest made by the Police, for the petitioner’s unlawful and indecent behaviour, cannot be said to be illegal and the report, dated 15. 1998 inadvertently made, cannot give rise to a charge of deprivation or violation of fundamental rights, as claimed by the petitioner. According to him, there is no infringement of any constitutional or legal right, warranting exercise of extraordinary remedy under Article 226 of he Constitution of India and in such circumstances, the relief prayed for, is unsustainable and hence, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. 26. According to him, there is no infringement of any constitutional or legal right, warranting exercise of extraordinary remedy under Article 226 of he Constitution of India and in such circumstances, the relief prayed for, is unsustainable and hence, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. 26. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. .27. Before adverting to the facts of this case, it is necessary to have a cursory look at the provisions required for adjudication of the issues. Part-III of the Constitution of India deals with the Fundamental Rights. Article 21 mandates that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty, except according to procedure established by law. Article 22 states that, (1) No person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest not shall be denied the right to consult, and to be defended by, a legal practitioner of his choice and (2) Every person who is arrested and detained in custody shall be produced before the nearest magistrate within a period of twenty-four hours of such arrest excluding the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the Court of the magistrate and no such person shall be detained in custody beyond the said period without the authority of a magistrate. .28. Section 2(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure defines, “cognizable offence” and it reads as follows: .“Cognizable offence” means an offence for which, and “cognizable case” means a case in which, a police officer may, in accordance with the First Schedule or under any other law for the time being in force arrest without warrant.” 29. Chapter V of the Code deals with the Arrest of person’s and as per Section 429. Chapter V of the Code deals with the Arrest of person’s and as per Section 4(1)(a), any police officer may without an order from a Magistrate and without a warrant arrest any person, (a) who has been concerned in any cognizable offence, or against whom a reasonable complaint has been made, or credible information has been received, or a reasonable suspicion exists, of his having been so concerned and such other instances, as enumerated in the above said Section. As per Section 41(2), any officer in charge of a police Section, may, in like manner, arrest or cause to be arrested any person, belonging to one or more of the categories of persons specified in Section 109 of Section 110. 30. Section 50 of the Code deals with the person arrested to be informed of grounds of arrest and right to bail and it read as follows: “(1) Every police officer or other person arresting any person without warrant shall forthwith communicate to him, full particulars of the offence for which he is arrested or other grounds for such arrest. (2) Where a police officer arrests without warrant any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence, he shall inform the person arrested that he is entitled to be released on bail and that he may arrange for sureties on his behalf.” 31. Section 50-A of the Code deals with the obligation of person making arrest to inform about the arrest, etc to a nominated person and it reads as follows: “(1) Every police officer or other person making any arrest under this Code shall forthwith give the information regarding such arrest and place where the arrested person is being held to any of his friends, relatives or such other persons as may be disclosed or nominated by the arrested person for the purpose of giving such information. .(2) The police officer shall inform the arrested person of his rights under sub-section (1) as soon as he is brought to the police station. .(3) An entry of the fact as to who has been informed of the arrest of such person shall be made in a book to be kept in the police station in such form as may be prescribed in this behalf by the State Government. .(4) It shall be the duty of the Magistrate before whom such arrested person is produced, to satisfy himself that the requirements of sub-section (2) and sub-section (3) have been complied with in respect of such arrested persons.” 32. Section 167(1) and (2) speaks about the procedure when investigation cannot be completed in 24 hours and it is extracted hereunder: “167. Section 167(1) and (2) speaks about the procedure when investigation cannot be completed in 24 hours and it is extracted hereunder: “167. Procedure when investigation cannot be completed in twenty-four hours—(1) Whenever any person is arrested and detained in custody, and it appears that the investigation cannot be completed within the period of twenty-four hour fixed by Section 57, and there are grounds for believing that the accusation information is well-founded, the officer in charge of the police station by the police officer making the investigation, if he is not below the rank of sub-inspector, shall forthwith transmit to the nearest Judicial Magistrate a copy of the entries in the diary hereinafter prescribed relating to the case, and shall at the same time forward the accused to such Magistrate. (2) The Magistrate to whom an accused person is forwarded under this Section may, whether he has or has not jurisdiction to try case, form time to time, authorise the detention of the accused in such custody as such Magistrate thinks fit, for a term not exceeding fifteen days in the whole; and if he has no jurisdiction to try the case or commit it for trial, and considers further detention, unnecessary, he may order the accused to be forwarded to a Magistrate having such jurisdiction: Provided that— .(a) the Magistrate may authorise the detention of the accused person, otherwise than in the custody of he police, beyond the period of fifteen days, if he is satisfied that “adequate grounds” exist for doing so, but no magistrate shall authorise the detention of the accused person in custody under this paragraph for a total period exceeding—“ As per Section 167(3) of the Code, a Magistrate authorizing under this Section detention in the custody of the police shall record his reasons hereunder: 33. Section 172 of the Code speaks about the diary of proceedings in investigation and it is extracted hereunder: “172. Diary of proceedings in investigation—(1) Every police officer making an investigation under this Chapter shall day by day enter his proceedings in the investigation in a diary, setting forth the time at which the information reached him, the time at which he began and closed his investigation, the place or places visited by his, and a statement of the circumstances ascertained through his investigation. .(2) Any Criminal Court may send for the police diaries of case under inquiry or trial in such Court, and may use such diaries, not as evidence in the case, but to aid it in such inquiry or trial. .(3) Neither the accused nor hi agent shall be entitled to call for such diaries, nor shall he or they be entitled to see them merely because they are referred to by the Court; but if they are used by the police officer who made them to refresh his memory; or if the Court uses them for the purpose of contradicting such police officer, the provisions of Section 161 or Section 145, as the case may be, of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), shall apply.” 34. As per Section 173 of the Code, every investigation under this Chapter shall be completed without unnecessary delay. As soon as it is completed, the officer in charge of the police station shall forward to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence on a police report, a report n the form prescribed by the State Government, containing the particulars set out in the said Section. 35. As per Section 460, certain irregularities committed by any Magistrate do not vitiate the proceedings. The said Section is extracted hereunder: “460. Irregularities which do not vitiate proceedings- If any Magistrate not empowered by law to do any of the following things namely: .(a) to issue a search-warrant under Section 94; .(b) to order, under Section 155, the police to investigate an offence; .(c) to hold an inquest under Section 176; .(d) to issue process under Section 187, for the apprehension of a person within his local jurisdiction who has committed an offence outside the limits of such jurisdiction; .(e) to take cognizance of an offence under clause (a) or (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 190; .(f) to make over a case under sub-section (2) of Section 192. .(g) to tender a pardon under Section 306; .(h) to recall a casedand try it himself under Section 410; or .(i) to sell property under Section 458 or Section 459, erroneously in good faith does that thing, his proceedings shall not be set aside merely on the ground of his not being so empowered.” 36. In the case on hand, the petitioner has been arrested on 15. 1998 in Cr. In the case on hand, the petitioner has been arrested on 15. 1998 in Cr. No. 363 of 1998, by Thiru. P. Raju, Sub Inspector of Police, Airport Police Station, Meenambakkam, for the offences alleged to have been committed under Section 75 of the Tamil Nadu City Police Act, 1988 and Section 7(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1932, between 10.30 Hours and 11.00 Hours. The above said provisions are extracted hereunder: “75. Penalty for drunkenness or riotous or indecent behaviour in public place.- .(1) Whoever, in any public place, offence, station-house or Court, or in any place of public amusement or on board of any passenger boat or vessel, is— .(a) found drunk and incapable of taking care of himself ;or .(b) found drunk and under the influence of liquor or drug; or .(c) found behaving in a violent or boisterous or disorderly or riotous or indecent manner or using any threatening, abusive or insulting words which causes or is likely to cause a breach of public peace. .(2) Whoever is – .(a) found drunk and behaving in a violent or riotous or indecent manner in a private place, or causing nuisance or annoyance to the public or to neighbours or. .(b) found drunk and under the influence of liquor or drug while driving or riding a vehicle, shall be liable on conviction to imprisonment not exceeding six months or fine not exceeding one thousand rupees. 7. .(b) found drunk and under the influence of liquor or drug while driving or riding a vehicle, shall be liable on conviction to imprisonment not exceeding six months or fine not exceeding one thousand rupees. 7. Molesting a person to prejudice of employment or business.- .(1) Whoever- .(a) with intent to cause any person to abstain from doing or to do any act which such person has a right to do or to abstain from doing, obstructs or uses violence to or intimidates such person or member of his family or person in his employ, or loiters at or near a place where such person or member or employed person resides or works or carries on business or happens to be, or persistently follows him from place to place, or interferes with any property owned or used by him or deprives him of or hinders him in the use thereof, or .(b) loiters or does any similar act at or near the place where a person carries on business, in such a way and with intent that any person may thereby be deterred from entering or approaching or dealing at such place, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extent to six months, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both. Explanation – Encouragement of indigenous industries or advocacy of temperance, without the commission of any of the acts prohibited by this Section is not an offence under this Section. (2) NoCourt shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under this Section except upon a report in writing of facts which constitute such offence made by a police officer not below the rank of officer in charge of a police station.” 37. As per Section 9(ii) and (iv) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, an offence punishable under Section 5 and 7 shall be cognizable by the Police and an offence punishable under Section 7 shall be non-bailable. 38. The relevant entries made in the register maintained by the respondent-police relating to registration of criminal cases against the petitioner and others are as follows: Crime No. Sections Date and Time Investigating Officer Name of the accused age and address 362 of 1998 75 of the MCP Act and 7(1) of the CLA Act 15. 1998/10.30-11.00 Thiru. P. Raju Sub-Inspector of Police, Air Port Police Station Meenambakkam Thiru. 1998/10.30-11.00 Thiru. P. Raju Sub-Inspector of Police, Air Port Police Station Meenambakkam Thiru. Arumai Rock, aged 24 years, S/o. Stephen Jeyaraj, No. 2, Pandian Road, Meenambakkam, Chennai. 363 of 1998 -do--do--do-Thiru K. Thangappan, aged 56 years, S/o. M. Karuppapillai, No. 87, Rukmani Nagar, Adyar, Chennai-27. 364 of 1998 -do--do--do-Thiru. Mohammed Rafiq, aged 30 years, S/o. Anifa No. 59, Neelam Basha Tharga, Chennai-5. 365 of 1998 -do--do- -do- Thiru. Kannan, aged 28 years, S/o. Chellaiya, No. 45, Hospital Road, Saidapet, Chennai. 460 of 1998 Under Section 4(1) Cr.P.C. 25. 1998/00. 05 – 00.30 Thiru. Jeyachandran, Sub-Inspector of Police, Airport Police Station, Meenambakkam. Thiru. Kulliki, aged 22 years, S/o. Chinnathurai, No. 8, Nehru National Highways, Na. Pa. Nagar, Chennai-114. 461 of 1998 -do- -do- -do- Thiru. Ravi, aged 19 years, S/o. Gurusamy, No. 18, First Katcheri, Palavaram. 462 of 1998 -do- -do- -do- Thiru. Gopi. Aged 18 years, S/o. Chetty No. 18/4, Ambal Nagar, Ekatuthangal, Chennai. 463 of 1998 -do- -do- -do- Thiru. Vinod Kumar, aged 18 years, S/o. Angar, No. 9, IInd Street, Nehru Colony, Chennai-61. 39. SIR ALFRED DENNING, Justice of His Majestic Court of Appeal, England, in his lecture series, in his own inimitable way, has explained the importance of personal freedom and liberties and as to how the Courts should give priority, when they are approached with a complaint of infringement rights. The extract from the lecture series is quoted hereunder: “Whenever one of the King’s Judges takes his seat, there is one application which by long tradition has priority over all others, counsel has but to say ‘My Lord, I have an application which concerns the liberty of the subject’ and forthwith the judge will put all other matters aside and hear it. It may be an application for a writ of habeas corpus, or an application for bail, but, whatever form it takes, it is heard first.” 40. The learned Judge has explained the personal freedom as follows: “By personal freedom I mean the freedom of every law-abiding citizen to think what he will, to say what he will, and to go where he will on his lawful occasions without let or hindrance from any other persons. Despite all the great changes that have come about in the other freedoms, this freedom has in our country remained intact. Despite all the great changes that have come about in the other freedoms, this freedom has in our country remained intact. It must be matched, of course, with social security, by which I mean the peace and good order of the community in which we live. The freedom of the just man is worth little to him if he can be preyed upon by the murderer or thief. Every society must have the means to protect itself from marauders. It must have powers to arrest, to search, and to imprison those who break the laws. So long as those powers are properly exercised, they are themselves the safeguards of freedom. But powers may be abused, and, if those powers are abused, there is no tyranny like them. It leads to a state of affairs when the police may arrest any man and throw him into prison without cause assigned. It leads to the search of his home and belongings on the slightest pretext – or on none. It leads to the hated Gestapo and the police State. It leads to extorted confession and to trials which are a mockery of justice. The moral of it all is that a true balance must be kept between personal freedom on the one hand and social security on the other hand and social security on the other. It has been done here, and is being done. But how?” 41. Let me consider the case law relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In Elumalai v. State of Tamil Nadu (1984) 1 MLJ (Crl) 246: 1983 LW (Crl) 121, this Court had an occasion to consider the duties of the judicial Magistrate, while remanding or passing extension of remands, and keeping in min d the importance of the liberty of a person and its value, held as follows at p. 260 of MLJ (Crl): “29. Import of Section 167(2) of the Code: Section 167 of the new Code corresponds to Section 167 of the Old code. Apart from certain minor changes from the old provision, provisos (a) and (b) and Explanations 1 and 2 under the provisos (a) to (c) have been added to sub-section(2). Sub- section (5) and (6) of this Section are new introductions. Apart from certain minor changes from the old provision, provisos (a) and (b) and Explanations 1 and 2 under the provisos (a) to (c) have been added to sub-section(2). Sub- section (5) and (6) of this Section are new introductions. This Section 167 comes under Chapter XII of the Code under the heading Information to the Police and Their Powers to Investigate” covering Sections 154 to 176. As pointed out supra. Section 57 provides that no person shall be detained in custody by a police officer without warrant for a longer period than under all the circumstances of the case is reasonable, and such period shall not, in the absence of a special order of Judicial Magistrate under Section 167, exceed 24 hours exclusive of the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest of the Magistrate Court. Therefore, if the police wants to detain the accused for a longer period for the purpose of investigation, the police has to follow the procedure prescribed in this behalf under Section 167, which provides that if that if any person is arrested and detained in custody and it appears that the investigation cannot be completed with a period of 24 hours fixed by Section 57, and there are grounds for believing that the accusation or information is well-founded, the officer in charge of the police station or the officer making the investigation shall forthwith transmit to the nearest Judicial Magistrate a copy of the entries in the diary relating to the accused and shall at the same time forward the accused to such Magistrate. The Magistrate, to whom the accused is thus forwarded, may, whether he has or has not jurisdiction to try the case, from time to time authorize the detention of the accused in such custody-police or judicial as such Magistrate thinks fit, for a term not exceeding 15 days in the whole. If the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to try the case or commit for trial and considers further detention unnecessary, he may order the accused to be forwarded to a Magistrate having such jurisdiction. Thus, it follow that under sub-section (2) the duration of detention, police or judicial – to be ordered by the Magistrate with or without jurisdiction, is limited to a maximum period of 15 days in the whole and not sine die. Thus, it follow that under sub-section (2) the duration of detention, police or judicial – to be ordered by the Magistrate with or without jurisdiction, is limited to a maximum period of 15 days in the whole and not sine die. Under the old Code, in cases involving serious and complicated offences, where investigation could not be completed within fifteen days, the police developed a practice of filing an incomplete report known as preliminary report before the Magistrate having jurisdiction and then moving for further remand of the accused and getting his judicial detention extended from time to time by resorting to section 344 (corresponding to Section 309(2) of the new Code) See Natarar Parida v. State of Orissa. The validity of this procedure was very much doubted because that Section 344 was intended to operate only after the Magistrate had taken cognizance of the offences which could be properly done only after a final report under Section 173 had been received and not while the investigation was still proceeding. Therefore, on the recommendation of the Law Commission, proviso (a) to Section 167 (2) was introduced empowering the Magistrate, having jurisdiction to authorise detention of the accused person, otherwise than in the custody of the police beyond the period of 15 days and the Magistrate being satisfied that adequate grounds exist for so doing, for a maximum period of 90 days if the investigation relates to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term not less than ten years, and for a period of 60 days if the investigation relates to any other offence. On the expiry of the period of 90 days or 60 days, as the case may be, the accused is entitled to be released on bail subject to the conditions contemplated therein. Of course, as per Explanation 1, notwithstanding the expiry of the above-mentioned period, the accused is liable to be detained in custody so long as he does not furnish bail.” 42. In Johindar Kumar v. State of U.P. AIR 1994 SC 1349 : 4 SCC 260, the Supreme Court, dealing with the power of arrest of the Police Officer and his duties to inform the accused about his arrest has held as follows: “9. A realistic approach should be made in this direction. In Johindar Kumar v. State of U.P. AIR 1994 SC 1349 : 4 SCC 260, the Supreme Court, dealing with the power of arrest of the Police Officer and his duties to inform the accused about his arrest has held as follows: “9. A realistic approach should be made in this direction. The law of arrest is one of balancing individual rights, liberties and privileges, on the one hand, and individual duties, obligations and responsibilities on the other, of weighing and balancing the rights, liberties and privileges of the single individual and those of individuals collectively; of simply deciding what is wanted and where to put the weight and the emphasis; of deciding which comes first – the criminal or society, the law violator or the law abider; of meeting the challenge which Mr. Justice CARDOZO so forthrightly met when he wrestled with a similar task of balancing individual rights against society’s rights and wisely held that the exclusion rule was bad law, that society came first, and that the criminal should not go free because the constable blundered. In People v. Defore Justice CARDOZO observed: “The question is whether protection for the individual would not be gained at a disproportionate loss of protection for society. On the one side is the social need that crime shall be repressed. On the other, the social need that law shall not be flouted by the insolence of office. There are dangers in any choice. The rule of the Adams case (people v. Adams) strikes a balance between opposing interests. We must hold it to be the law until those organs of government by which a change of public policy is normally effected shall give notice to the Courts that change has come to pas.” 43. Reference has also been made to Paragraphs 13 to 16 of the report of the National Police Commission, regarding the quality of arrest and system to be followed. 44. In a historical judgment of D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal (supra), the Supreme Court, at paragraphs 22, 36, 37 and 39 has held as follows: “22. Custodial death is perhaps one of the worst crimes in a civilized society governed by the rule of law. The rights inherent in Articles 21 and 22(1) of the Constitution require to be jealously and scrupulously protected. We cannot wish away the problem. Custodial death is perhaps one of the worst crimes in a civilized society governed by the rule of law. The rights inherent in Articles 21 and 22(1) of the Constitution require to be jealously and scrupulously protected. We cannot wish away the problem. Any form of torture of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment would fall within the inhibition of Article 21 of the Constitution, whether it occurs during investigation, interrogation or otherwise. If the functionaries of the Government become law¬breakers, it is bound to breed contempt for law and would encourage lawlessness and every man would have the tendency to become law into himself thereby leading to anarchanism. No civilized nation can permit that to happen. Doe a citizen shed off his fundamental right to life, the moment a policeman arrests him? Can the right to life of a citizen be put in abeyance on his arrest? These questions touch the spinal cord of human rights’ jurisprudence. The answer, indeed, has to be an emphatic “No”. The precious right guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution of India cannot be denied to convicts, undertrials, detenus and other prisoners in custody, except according to the procedure established by law by placing such reasonable restrictions as are permitted by law. ……. ……. 36. Failure to comply with the requirements hereinabove mentioned shall apart from rendering the official concerned liable for departmental action, also render him liable to be punished for contempt of Court and the proceedings for contempt of Court may be instituted in any High Court of the country, having territorial jurisdiction over the matter. 37. The requirements, referred to above flow from Articles 21 and 22(1) of the Constitution and need to be strictly followed. These would apply with equal force to the other governmental agencies also to which a reference has been made earlier. …… …… 39. The requirements mentioned above shall be forwarded to the Director General of Police and the Home Secretary of every State/Union Territory and it shall be their obligation to circulate the same to every police station under their charge and get the same notified at every police station at a conspicuous place. …… …… 39. The requirements mentioned above shall be forwarded to the Director General of Police and the Home Secretary of every State/Union Territory and it shall be their obligation to circulate the same to every police station under their charge and get the same notified at every police station at a conspicuous place. It would also be useful and serve larger interest to broadcast the requirements on All India Radio besides being shown on the National Network of Doordarshan any by publishing and distributing pamphlets in the local language containing these requirements for information of the general public. Creating awareness about the rights of the arrestee would in our opinion be a step in the right direction to combat the evil of custodial crime and bring in transparency and accountability. It is hoped that these requirements would help to curb, if not totally eliminate, the use of questionable methods during interrogation and investigation leading to custodial commission of crimes. …...” .45. In the case on hand, after the arrest of the petitioner, the third respondent has submitted a remand report dated 15. 1998 citing that the petitioner as an accused in Crime No. 463 of 1998 under Section 75 of the City Police Act read with Section 7(1) of the City Police Act read with Section 7(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act. The remand order, dated 15. 1998 reads as follows: .“Accused produced. No complaint of ill-treatment by police. Remanded till 6. 1998.” .46. FIR in Crime No. 463 of 1998 has been registered on 25. 1998 at 11.05 p.m. whereas, the petitioner was arrested in Crime No. 363 of 1998. The accused in Crime No. 463 is one Mr. Vinothkumar. The allegations made by the police against him are that he along with some other persons were sitting inside the airport car park, late night covering their faces and that they tried to escape on seeing the police party. The said persons were arrested and after ascertaining that they are not offenders in other police stations and that they were labourers in the Airport, the crime registered against them was closed. Thus, it is manifestly clear that the petitioner has been remanded in a crime number in which he was not an accused. The said persons were arrested and after ascertaining that they are not offenders in other police stations and that they were labourers in the Airport, the crime registered against them was closed. Thus, it is manifestly clear that the petitioner has been remanded in a crime number in which he was not an accused. Though the learned senior counsel for the petitioner submitted that FIR in Crime No. 363 of 198 registered against the petitioner under Sections 75 of the City Police Act read with Section 7(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act and the case diary pertaining to the said crime number was not produced to the learned Judicial Magistrate, Saidapet, along with the remand report, for his subjective satisfaction as to whether there were grounds for believing that the accusation or information against the petitioner was well founded and whether the detention of the petitioner was necessary, the averments made in the counter affidavit are conspicuously silent, as regards production of the copy of FIR in Crime No. 363 of 1998 and the case diary pertaining to the said crime number registered against the petitioner. From the materials on record and in particular, the remand report dated 15. 1998, by which the petitioner was remanded in Crime No. 463 of 1998 till 6. 1998, by one cannot have any doubt in his mind that the third respondent has failed to forward the case diary relating to Crime No. 363 of 1998, but erroneously produced the petitioner to the learned Magistrate alongwith the copy of the entries in case diary pertaining to Crime No. 463 of 1998. At this juncture, it has to be seen whether the learned Magistrate has applied his mind to the proviso of Section 167(2) with explanation II to said Section, before remanding the petitioner to judicial custody. At this juncture, it has to be seen whether the learned Magistrate has applied his mind to the proviso of Section 167(2) with explanation II to said Section, before remanding the petitioner to judicial custody. It is well explained in Elumalai v. State of Tamil Nadu (supra), that the above proviso and explanation have been introduced by the Parliament for the first time, obviously, for the purpose of affording an opportunity to the accused of being heard by the Magistrate in person as to whether he wishes to make any representation and also give him an opportunity of showing cause as to why he should not be accused of being heard by the Magistrate in person as to whether he wishes to make any representation and also give him an opportunity of showing cause as to why he should not be remanded. Reading of Section 167(2) with explanation II and the interpretation given by the Division Bench makes it clear that at the time of remand, the learned Magistrate has to afford an opportunity to the accused of being heard as to whether he wishes to make any representation and also give him an opportunity of showing cause as to why he should not be remanded. Except record that there was no complaint of ill-treatment by the police, the learned Judicial Magistrate seemed to have mechanically passed the order of remand without verifying the case diary pertaining to Crime No. 363 of 1998 and without arriving at the subjective satisfaction about the need for remanding the petitioner. When the Magistrate is enjoined with a constitutional duty to see that the personal liberty is not violated by any public servant arbitrarily and when the right of personal liberty is safeguarded by the Constitution, that no man shall be deprived of his right to personal liberty, except in accordance with law, the learned Magistrate ought to have discharged his constitutional function diligently, instead of mere marking his stamp of approval to the opinion offered by the police which is objective from the point of view of the police for the sole purpose of getting a remand. Had the Magistrate explained the nature of offences and afforded an opportunity to the petitioner in terms of Section 167(2) read with explanation II, and when the same is not reflected in the order of remand, the contention of the learned senior counsel that there has been a total violation of the directions issued in D.K. Basu v. State of Wet Bengal (supra) case that the arrestee was not arrest or to his friend or relative or other person known to him or having interest in his welfare is fortified by the subsequent event when the petitioner was released on bail, in a crime number, for which he was not arrested. It is the duty of the learned Magistrate to verify as to whether the accused was informed of the reasons of arrest. Information by the police that he has been arrested under some penal provisions of law alone is not sufficient but the reasons for such arrest should be made known to the arrestee. This Court is of the view that as per Section 50 of the Code, full particulars of the offences for which he was arrested or other grounds for such arrest should be made known to the arrestee. 47. In Ozhaiir Hussain v. Union of India AIR 2003 Delhi 103, the High Court held that live and liberty have to be given paramount importance by Courts. The Court has held that above rights have to be held to be treated as fundamental, over all other attributes of the political and social order and consequently, the legislature, the executive and the judiciary are to be more sensitive to them, than to other attributes of daily existence. 48. In Deepak Mahajan v. Director of Enforcement and Another 1991 Cr. LJ 1124 Delhi, the Court held if personal liberty has to be in any manner curtailed or restricted, it can be done only by an express provision enacted by the appropriate legislative authority. No doubt, there is an express provision of arrest and remand, but on the facts of this case, it has to be seen as to whether the procedure followed by the police and the learned Magistrate are in accordance with law, for the purpose of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Procedure mans, the manner and form of enforcing law. 49. Procedure mans, the manner and form of enforcing law. 49. In State of Maharahtra v. buddhikota Subha Rao AIR 1989 SC 2292 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that Code of Criminal Procedure is the “law” for the purpose of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 50. In Ram Narain Singh v. State of Delhi 1953 Crl. L.J. 1113, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that those who are called upon to deprive other persons of their personal liberty, in discharge of what they consider to be their duty, must strictly observe the norms and rules of law. 51. In Bijan Haider and Another v. State of West Bengal and Others 1993 Cr. L.J. 3082, held that “it is the constitutional responsibility of the Magistrate to consider the question as to whether any person produced before him under arrest is required to be detained in custody and if so, to direct and authorize detention in proper custody. The very purpose of making provision in the constitution that any person arreted an d detained, obvious by or under the authority of State functionary has to be produced before a Magistrate is to afford such an opportunity to make representation, if he so chooses, to the Magistrate before whom he is produced regarding the question of legality, propriety and necessity etc., of his detention, so that the Magistrate may consider the same, and then if the detention of the arrested persons is considered necessary and permissible in accordance with law, the Magistrate is empowered by the Constitution to authorize detention of such person in custody. .52. In yet another decision in Samaul Haque v. State of U.P. and Another 2008 Cr. LJ 1998 the Allahabad, High Court has held as follows: .“9. According to Section 167 Cr. P.C. whenever any person is arrested and is detained in custody, it appears to the I.O. that the investigation cannot be completed within 24 hours fixed by Section 57 of Cr. LJ 1998 the Allahabad, High Court has held as follows: .“9. According to Section 167 Cr. P.C. whenever any person is arrested and is detained in custody, it appears to the I.O. that the investigation cannot be completed within 24 hours fixed by Section 57 of Cr. P.C. and there are grounds for believing that the acquisition or information is well founded, the officer in charge of the police station concerned, or the police-officer making investigation, shall forthwith transmit to the nearest Magistrate a copy of the entries in the diary and shall at the same time forward the accused to such Magistrate and the Magistrate concerned authorized the detention of the accused in such custody as such the Magistrate thinks fit, for a term not exceeding 15 days, it shows that the judicial remand shall be passed on the subjective satisfaction of the Magistrate on the basis of the relevant police papers, in such circumstances, the perusal of the relevant police papers is essentially required for the application of the judicial mind of the Magistrate concerned, in such process the learned Magistrate concerned is not under obligation to accept the report of the I.O. without applying the judicial mind for passing the judicial remand, it may be accepted or it may be rejected or it may be altered by adding some more offence or deleting some offence, in the presence case also, same issue is evolved.” 53. In Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar AIR 1966 SC 740 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that if a man can be deprived of his liberty under a rule by the simple process of making of a certain order, he can only be so deprived if the order is in terms of the rule. Strict compliance with the letter of the rule is the essence of the matter. We are dealing with a statute which drastically interferes with the personal liberty of people, we are dealing with an order behind the fact of which a Court is prevented from going. I am not (sic) complaining of that. Circumstances may make it necessary. But it would be legitimate to require in such cases strict observance of the rules. If there is any doubt whether the rules have been strictly observed, that doubt must be resolved in favour of the detenu. .54. I am not (sic) complaining of that. Circumstances may make it necessary. But it would be legitimate to require in such cases strict observance of the rules. If there is any doubt whether the rules have been strictly observed, that doubt must be resolved in favour of the detenu. .54. In Banka Das and Others v. State of Orissa 1993 Crl. L.J. 442 Orissa, a Full Bench of the Orissa High Court observed that in a society governed by the rule of law, an executive arbitrariness transcending the fundamental rights of the citizens cannot be countenanced for a minute. Each authority charged with duties under the laws sanctioned by the Constitution which is the law given by the people unto themselves must be held to be bound by the procedures commanded by the statute which creates the duties and vests responsibility in them to carry them out. When the charge is of violation of a fundamental right guaranteed under the Constitution, or indeed of a statutory right a peremptory answer that the provisions are merely for the guidance of the officers and that they have no mandatory sanction is disagreeable to our constitutional ethos. A legal sanction of such permissiveness to executive vagaries would make deep inroads into the vitals of the constitutional guarantees of a citizen and would leave him helpless and mute spectator unless proper check is applied to strike a balance between the need of the administration and of the society vis-à-vis the dignity of an individual citizen. Lawfully, the function falls to the higher judiciary to discharge, its existence being justified mostly for the purpose. It is for such reason that conclusion has to be reached that a deviation of the provision of law in effecting the arrest and continuing the detention would make the actions declared illegal justifying a restoration of the status quo ante unless the authorities carrying out the functions circumstances the departure. 55. In yet another decision in Ajeet Singh v. State of U.P. and Others 2007 Crl. 55. In yet another decision in Ajeet Singh v. State of U.P. and Others 2007 Crl. L.J. 170 (Allahabad), the Court held in order to effect to the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in D.K. Basu v. State of West Benga (supra) case, Section 50-A Cr.P.C,, requires the Police to give information about the arrest of the person as well as the place where he is being held to anyone who may be nominated by him for sending such information. It further obliges Magistrate concerned to satisfy himself about the fulfillment of the requirements of the said provision when arrested person is produced before him in order to ensure compliance of the said law. The aforesaid provisions are mandatory and any violation thereof can be a ground available to an apprehended person to question the correctness of the arrest by the aforesaid procedure. This is because the aforesaid procedure is designed to protect the fundamental right of a person guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution, subject to reasonable restriction as placed by the law enacted by the Legislature. The interpretation of the aforesaid provisions, therefore, makes it imperative for the investigating agency not to apprehend a person and further for the Magistrate to satisfy himself that the investigating agency had proceeded in accordance with law, which would ensure the safety and liberty of a person from being abused and from preventing any unwarranted arrest. 56. Useful reference can also be made to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab (1994) 3 SCC 569 where the Hon’ble Apex Court held that use of the word “deprive” in Article 21 is of great significance. According to the dictionary, it means “debar from enjoyment”; prevent (child, etc.,) from having normal home life. Since deprivation of right of any person by this State is prohibited except in accordance with the procedure established by law, it has to be construed strictly against the State and in favour of the person whose rights are affected. 57. Thus, alook at the judgments rendered across the country valued the right to life and personal liberty, as the most precious rights governed by rule of law and it embraces both substantive rights and personal liberty and that the procedure provided for deprivation, commanded by statute, rules and code, has to be strictly followed without any deviation. 57. Thus, alook at the judgments rendered across the country valued the right to life and personal liberty, as the most precious rights governed by rule of law and it embraces both substantive rights and personal liberty and that the procedure provided for deprivation, commanded by statute, rules and code, has to be strictly followed without any deviation. In the case on hand, an order of remand ought not be have been made for mere asking by the police, on irrelevant police papers, not pertaining to the petitioner, without due regard to the legality and propriety for the petitioner’s detention in a crime number, in which the petitioner was not involved. 58. From the material on record, it is the case of the petitioner that when he was trying to get clearance from customs authority, he was in a most unexpected manner forcibly taken to police station. Per contra, the respondents have contended that the Sub-Inspector of Police of the abovesaid police station had witnessed the petitioner indulging in an abusive act and therefore, the arrest was necessitated. As per Section 468(ii) Cr. P.C, no Court shall cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub-section 2, after the expiry of period of limitation i.e., six months (a) if the offence is punishable with fine only (b) first year if the offence is punishable with term not exceeding one year (c) three years for the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years. 59 . Perusal of the counter affidavit shows that though the police ought to have submitted the final report under Section 173 without unnecessary delay, the same has been made after the specified period of limitation, provided in Code of Criminal Procedure, knowing fully well that the report submitted under Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. is barred by limitation as provided under Section 468 of the Code. .60. Perusal of the order made in Crl. O.P. No. 832 of 1999 dated 12. 2001 filed for quashing Crime No. 463 of 1998 makes it clear that all along the petitioner was under the impression and made to believe that he was arrested only in Crime No. 463 of 1998, on the file of Airport police station. .60. Perusal of the order made in Crl. O.P. No. 832 of 1999 dated 12. 2001 filed for quashing Crime No. 463 of 1998 makes it clear that all along the petitioner was under the impression and made to believe that he was arrested only in Crime No. 463 of 1998, on the file of Airport police station. When the matter came up for hearing, he learned Government Advocate had submitted that the charge sheet filed before the concerned Criminal Court was returned for some compliance and before the corrected report could reach the Court, the FIR itself was struck off by the Court on 24. 2000, as per Section 468(ii) Cr.P.C. as barred by limitation. The memorandum filed before this Court in the abovesaid Crl. O.P. No. 832 of 1999 filed to quash the same is extracted hereunder. .“Airport P.S. Cr. No. 463 of 1998 under Section 75 M.C.P. Act read with Section and (1) C.L.A. Act Altered as Cr. No. 363 of 1998, under Section 75 M.C.P. Act.” .61. From the above, it is evident that even though the investigation in Crime No. 463 of 1998 registered on 25. 1998 at 11.00 p.m. was stated to have been closed on the same day, the police seemed to have submitted a report against the petitioner under Sections 75 of the Madras City Police Act read with 7(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act. When Section 468(ii) Cr.P.C. Prescribes a specific period of limitation, the police knowing fully well the consequences of a belated report has come forward with a defence if there was no fault on their part. The charges levelled against the petitioner was that he behaved in a violent and rash such other manner, as stated in Section 75 of the City Police Act. Perusal of the memorandum filed in this Court in Crl. O.P. No. 832 of 1999 shows the detenu was arrested on 15. 1998. and remanded to judicial custody on 18.05.1998. He was released on bail on 15. 1998. From the memorandum, it is evident that though the petitioner was alleged to have been involved in offences under Section 75 of the City Police Act read with Section 7(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, he was allegedly charge sheeted only under Section 75 of the City Police Act. He was released on bail on 15. 1998. From the memorandum, it is evident that though the petitioner was alleged to have been involved in offences under Section 75 of the City Police Act read with Section 7(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, he was allegedly charge sheeted only under Section 75 of the City Police Act. In this context, it is relevant to consider as to whether the police was justified in arresting the petitioner without a reasonable satisfaction. The power to make arrest is neither absolute nor it should be performed in a mechanical manner. The power must be judicially exercised so that, in cases that the arrest is not necessary, the liberty of the alleged offender should not be taken away without genuine necessity or in the case of offenders who are likely to obstruct in the Courts of justice is necessary. Reference can be made to the decision in State of Jammu v. Bhera 1997 (Crl.L.J.) 1237. 62. When the police officer has filed a remand report to the Court of competent jurisdiction for curtailment of the movement of the petitioner which can be done only by strict compliance with the letter and spirit of the rule, which is the essence of the matter and when observance of the procedure and safeguards are breached, it is not open to the respondents to plea inadvertence or mistake in mentioning a wrong crime number. As stated supra, if life or personal liberty is deprived other than in accordance with the procedure commanded by the Court, which creates duties and vests responsibilities on the police, the Magistrate, any deviation of the mandate in effecting arrest and continuing detention, would certainly render the action as illegal and violation of freedom of liberties guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, otherwise, the power of the police to apprehend a person can be exercised in a mechanical manner and by the delay in filing a final report, any criminal case can be allowed to be time barred and given a quietus. Right to life and personal liberty are the most fundamental of all human rights and any decision affecting such right has to be viewed with great circumspection. Right to life and personal liberty are the most fundamental of all human rights and any decision affecting such right has to be viewed with great circumspection. Having regard to the mandate of Article 21 of the Constitution of India to prevent encroachment upon the personal liberty by the executive, otherwise, than provided under law and in accordance with such procedures designed to protect the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, this Court is of the considered view that giving a quietus to a criminal case by filing a time barred report would not wipe out the humility and suffering which the petitioner was subjected to on account of arrest and detention. The question of mala fide does not arise when the detention itself is illegal, is not in accordance with law. As stated supra, the detention based on the remand report, and not an irregularity falling under Section 460 Cr. P.C. Plea of inadvertence of mentioning a crime number registered on 25. 1998, in he remand report, when the petitioner was approached on 15. 1998 cannot be viewed lightly as the issue involves personal liberty of a citizen. 63. In the case of Taylor v. Chief Constable of Thomas Valley Police 2004 (1) W.L.R. 3155, a boy of 10 years was identified by the police from video tapes as having thrown stones towards a farmhouse during an anti-vivisection protest which he attended with his mother. At a subsequent protest several weeks later at the same location which he had also attended with his mother, he was arrested by the police officer who said “I am arresting you on suspicion of violent disorder on 14. 1998 at Hilgrove Farm.” The claimant and his mother, who had not been arrested were then taken to a police station at 7.45 p.m., after he had been processed by the custody sergeant, the claimant was placed in a detention room. The interview of the claimant in the presence of his mother began at 9.21 p.m. and ended at 9.53 p.m. A formal caution was finally administered and the claimant was released at 11 p.m. The claimant subsequently brought proceedings inter alia for ale imprisonment on the grounds that the arrest had been unlawful and the period of detention was excessive and unreasonable circumstances. The Judge held that the words spoken to the claimant on arrest were not sufficient to effect a lawful arrest in the light of Section 28(3) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, and that in any case, the period of time for which the claimant had been detained was of such length as to make an otherwise lawful detention is unlawful. He accordingly allowed the claim and awarded the claimant damages in respect of a period of four hours detention and the Court held that it was for the Chief Constable to prove that the detention of the claimant was lawful throughout it whole period; that the general test was whether the decision of the custody sergeant was unreasonable in the sense to the competing considerations before him could have continued to detain the suspect; that in the circumstances, the Judge held that the claimant had been detained for an excessive period between about 8.15 p.m. and 9.21 p.m. and therefore been falsely imprisoned in respect of that period; and that, accordingly, the award of damages would be set aside and substituted by an appropriate award of damages in respect of one hour’s wrongful detention, to be agreed by the parties. 64. The above judgment though not from our Court, certainly conveys a very strong message that deprivation of personal liberty cannot be taken lightly and any wrongful detention, apparent on the face of record has to be adequately compensated, even if it is for one hour in the abovesaid case. In the case on hand, it is the case of the petitioner that the arrest and detention have caused humiliation and inexplicable agony. Needless to say that imprisonment imposes painful experiences and that the same cannot be wiped out by closure of any criminal case in the manner stated supra. When imputation, incarceration is not justified because of inadvertence or by dereliction of duties, the injuries suffered by the person has to be compensated. The damage caused to the reputation of a person cannot be precisely measured in terms of money. No doubt while disposing of Crl. When imputation, incarceration is not justified because of inadvertence or by dereliction of duties, the injuries suffered by the person has to be compensated. The damage caused to the reputation of a person cannot be precisely measured in terms of money. No doubt while disposing of Crl. O.P. No. 832 of 1999, this Court has given liberty to the petitioner to file a private complaint against the concerned police officer or a suit for damages, yet this Court is of the considered view that any such direction granted in the earlier proceedings is not a bar for invoking the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In the case on hand, it is the admitted position that the petitioner has been remanded in Crime No. 463 of 1998, in which he ws not an accused and that there has been a failure on the part of the police in giving proper records to the Criminal Court. In such view of the matter, this Court is of the considered view that there is no need to direct the petitioner to take recourse to remedy under public law. In this context, it is context, it is useful to refer the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in D.K. Basu v. State of Bengal (supra) AIR Supreme Court at paragraph No.44, 45 held as follows: “44. The claim in public law for compensation for unconstitutional deprivation of fundamental right to life and liberty, the protection of which is guaranteed under the Constitution, is a claim based on strict liability and is in addition to the claim available in private law for damages for tortious acts of the public servants. Public law proceedings serve a different purpose than the private law proceedings. Award of compensation for established infringement of the indefeasible rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution is a remedy available in public law since the purpose of public law is not only to civilise public power but also to assure the citizens that they live under a legal system wherein their rights and interests shall be protected and preserved. Award of compensation for established infringement of the indefeasible rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution is a remedy available in public law since the purpose of public law is not only to civilise public power but also to assure the citizens that they live under a legal system wherein their rights and interests shall be protected and preserved. Grant of compensation in proceedings under Article 32 or Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the established violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 21, is an exercise of the Courts under the public law jurisdiction for penalizing the wrongdoer and fixing the liability for the public wrong on the State which failed in the discharge of its public duty to protect the fundamental rights of the citizen. 45. The old doctrine of only relegating the aggrieved to the remedies available in civil law limits the role of the Courts too much, as the protector and custodian of the indefeasible right of the citizens. The Courts have the obligation to satisfy the social aspirations of the citizens because the Courts and the law are for the people and expected to respond to their aspirations. A Court of law cannot close its consciousness and aliveness to stark realities. Mere punishment of the offender cannot give much solace to the family of the victim – civil action for damages is a long drawn and a cumbersome judicial process. Monetary compensation for redressal by he Court finding the infringement of the indefeasible right to life of the citizen is, therefore, useful and at time perhaps the only effective remedy to apply balm to the wounds of the family members of the deceased victim, who may have been the breadwinner of the family.” 65. Inasmuch as there is a violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, the respondents are liable to compensate the petitioner and he is entitled to the relief sought for. Hence, a direction is issued to the respondents to pay a compensation of Rs.50,000/-(Rupees Fifth Thousand Only), to the petitioner as damages. 66. In the result, the writ petition is allowed. No costs.