JUDGMENT T. NK. Singh, J. 1. In the present writ petition, the petitioner is assailing the order of the Revisional Authority being No. F.11. (46)-GA(AR)/06/1400-1402, dated Agartala, the 8th September, 2009 for remanding the disciplinary proceedings drawn up against him to the Disciplinary Authority to conduct further inquiry into the matter after recording evidence of all the material witnesses of the case hitherto not examined, on the ground that a fresh inquiry (second inquiry) on identical charge is impermissible. The relevant portions of the order being No. F.11 (46)-GA(AR)/06/1400-1402, dated Agartala, the 8th September, 2009 read as follows: ORDER WHEREAS, Disciplinary Proceeding was drawn up against Shri Amar Das Director of Agriculture (Retd.) under Rule 14 of the CCS (CC and A) Rules, 1965 vide. Memorandum F.11(46)-GA(AR)/2006/1979-82 dated 25th September, 2007; AND ... ... ... Whereas, the Disciplinary Authority on consideration of the said representation of the A.O. dropped the proceedings drawn up against Shri Amar Das, Director, Agriculture (Retd.) vide order No. F.11(46)-GA (AR)/06/1026-1028 dated 29.6.2009; AND Whereas, the appellate authority, under Rule 29(1) of the CCS (CC and A) Rules, 1965, called for the records of the instant proceedings; AND Whereas, after careful consideration of all aspects, the Appellate Authority is of the view that the process of inquiry conducted by the I.A. cannot be considered to be complete since the possibility to bring two vital witnesses and record their statement was not explored properly, and the findings of the LA seems to be sketchy. NOW, THEREFORE, the Revisional Authority on careful consideration of different aspects of the case, set aside the order of the Disciplinary Authority vide No. F.11(46)-GA(AR)/06/1026-1028 dated 29.6.2009 whereby the instant disciplinary proceeding was dropped, and remands the matter to the Disciplinary Authority to conduct further inquiry into the matter after recording evidence of all material witnesses of the case hitherto not examined. By and on behalf of the Governor of Tripura Sd/- (Shyamalima Banerjee) Commissioner & Secretary to the Government of Tripura. 2. By and on behalf of the Governor of Tripura Sd/- (Shyamalima Banerjee) Commissioner & Secretary to the Government of Tripura. 2. Now the question posed for consideration in the present writ petition is; whether the revisional authority issued the impugned order dated 8.9.2009 for remanding the disciplinary proceeding which was drawn up against the petitioner to the Disciplinary Authority to conduct further inquiry into the matter or, whether the Revisional Authority under the impugned order dated 8.9.2009 had remanded to the Disciplinary Authority for conducting a fresh inquiry (second inquiry) on identical charge or not. 3. Heard Mr. D.K. Biswas, learned Counsel for the petitioner and also Mr. S. Deb, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. B. Dutta, learned Counsel for the respondents. Factual background: 4. While the petitioner was in service the Disciplinary Authority issued a memorandum dated 25.9.2007 for holding disciplinary enquiry against the petitioner for the article of charges mentioned in Annexure-I to the memorandum and list of witnesses by whom the article of charge framed against the petitioner proposed to be sustained was also annexed as Annexure-IV to the said memorandum. For easy reference. Article of Charges for which the said Disciplinary Enquiry was initiated and list of witnesses by whom the article of charges framed against the petitioner proposed to be sustained furnished to the petitioner are quoted hereunder : STATEMENT OF ARTICLE OF CHARGES FRAMED AGAINST SHRI AMAR DAS, THAS, GR.I, DIRECTOR OF AGRICULTURE, GOVERNMENT OF TRIPURA, AGARTALA Article I That the said Sri Amar Das, THAS, Gr. I while functioning as Director of Agriculture, Government of Tripura during the period from 5.1.2004 till date failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty insofar as Shri Das as Head of the Department failed to initiate disciplinary action against Shri Ranjit Saha Bhowmik, THAS Grade IV, Superintendent of Agriculture for misappropriation of Government money amounting to Rs. 10,000.18,60,934.00 and, thus, causing financial loss to the State Government. The above act of Shri Amar Das had been an act of gross misconduct quite unbecoming of a Government servant and thus, Shri Das violated Rule 3(1) of Tripura Civil Service (Conduct) Rules, 1988. 10,000.18,60,934.00 and, thus, causing financial loss to the State Government. The above act of Shri Amar Das had been an act of gross misconduct quite unbecoming of a Government servant and thus, Shri Das violated Rule 3(1) of Tripura Civil Service (Conduct) Rules, 1988. Article II That during the aforesaid period and while functioning as Director of Agriculture, the said Shri Amar Das, THAS, Grade I failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty in so far as Shri Das has intentionally excluded the name of Sri Ranjit Saha Bhowmik, THAS, Grade IV, Superintendent of Agriculture from the proposal initiated by Shri Das for taking disciplinary action against some other employees of Agriculture Department for negligence and misconduct; and misappropriation of fund of the State Government. The above act of Shri Das had been an act of gross misconduct quilt; unbecoming of a Government servant and thus, Shri Das violated Rule 3(1) of Tripura Civil Service (Conduct) Rules, 1988. Article III That during the aforesaid period and while functioning as Director of Agriculture, the said Shri Amar Das, THAS, Grade I failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty in so far as Shri Das has failed to examine the rates quoted by the Tripura Horticulture Corporation Limited North Eastern Regional Agriculture Marketing Corporation Ltd. (NERAMAC) and National Seeds Corporation (NSC) in regard to procurement of various certified seeds (Kharif) during the year 2005-2006. It was prima-facie established that magnified rate was quoted and estimate was submitted before the Supply Advisory Board for approval and Shri Ranjit Saha Bhowmik, the ten Managing Director, Tripura Horticulture Corporation Ltd was involved for quoting such higher rate. Shri Amar Das, Director of Agriculture has shown gross negligence in submitting the proposal to the Supply Advisory Board and subsequently, when the matter was detected Shri Das failed to take appropriate action by issuing show-cause notice to the said Shri Saha Bhowmik, the then Managing Director, Tripura Horticulture Corporation Limited. The above act of Shri Das has been an act of gross misconduct quite unbecoming of a Government servant and thus, Shri Das violated Rule 3(1) of Tripura Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1988. The above act of Shri Das has been an act of gross misconduct quite unbecoming of a Government servant and thus, Shri Das violated Rule 3(1) of Tripura Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1988. Article IV That during the aforesaid period and while functioning as Director of Agriculture, the said Shri Amar Das, THAS, Grade I failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to "duty insofar as Shri Das willfully disobeyed the instructions of his superior authority in two occasions. Shri Das failed to take follow up action of the instructions of his higher authority relating to decision by Supply Advisory Board in its special meeting held on 8th April, 2005 and also issuing of show-cause notice to Sri Ranjit Saha Bhowmik, Superintendent of Agriculture in spite repeated instructions from his higher authority. The above act of Shri Das had been an act of gross misconduct quite unbecoming of a Government servant and thus, Shri Das violated Rule 3(1) of Tripura Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1988. ... ... ... Annexure IV LIST OF WITNESSES BY WHOM THE ARTICLE OFCHARGES FRAMED AGAINST SRI AMAR DAS, THAS, GRADE I, DIRECTOR OF AGRICULTURE, GOVERNMENT OF TRIPURA, AGARTALA ARE PROPOSED TO BE SUSTAINED. 1. Dr. G.S.G, Ayyangar, IAS, Commissioner and Secretary to the Government of Tripura, Agriculture Department. 2. Shri R.K. De Choudhury, IAS, Addl. Secretary to the Government of Tripura, Finance Department (now Special Secretary, Finance). 3. Shri S. Shome, Asstt. Director, Seeds, Government of Tripura, Agartala. 5. The said disciplinary enquiry initiated under the said memorandum dated 25.9.2007 was continued even after retirement of the petitioner on superannuation from service w.e.f. 30.4.2008. The Inquiry Officer who conducted the said Disciplinary Enquiry against the petitioner submitted enquiry report that the charges against the petitioner were not held proved. The Disciplinary Authority disagreed with the finding of the Inquiry Officer in the said report that the charges levelled against the petitioner were not held proved and, accordingly, the Disciplinary Authority issued memorandum being No. F.11(46)-GA(AR)/06/580-587 dated 8.4.2009 to show cause to the petitioner on the tentative findings of the disagreement that (1) the inquiry process suffers from certain procedural lapses and as a result important prosecution witnesses were not examined; and (2) the inquiry report is sketchy, within fifteen days, as per the provision of Rule 15 of the CCS (CC and A) Rules, 1965. Pursuant to the said memorandum dated 8.4.2009 the petitioner submitted his report and there after, the Disciplinary Authority passed order dated 29.6.2009 that the charges framed against the petitioner is hereby dropped. The revisional authority of the said order of the Disciplinary Authority dated 2.9.6.2009, in exercise of his power under Rule 20 of the CCS (CC and A) Rules, 1965, within the limitation period for exercising revisional power, issued the impugned order dated 8.9.2009, which has been quoted above, for setting aside the said order of the Disciplinary Authority dated 29.6.2009 and remanding the matter to the Disciplinary Authority to conduct further inquiry into the matter after recording evidence of all material evidence of the case hitherto not examined. Hence, the present writ petition for assailing the order dated 8.9.2009 as stated above, on the ground that the revisional authority has no power for fresh inquiry (second inquiry) on identical charge. 6. The respondents have filed their affidavit in opposition wherein it is categorically stated that the impugned order dated 8.9.2009, which itself speaks that the disciplinary proceedings drawn up against the petitioner vide order dated 25.9.2007 had been remanded to the Disciplinary Authority to conduct further inquiry, is not the order for conducting fresh disciplinary enquiry against the petitioner for the identical charge; and also that revisional authority had taken up suo motu revision to examine the decision of the Disciplinary Authority dropping the charges when the allegation was so serious against the high official regarding embezzlement of Government fund and taken up the matter suo motu calling for records. During the said exercise, it has been brought to the notice that the Inquiry Authority could not-even satisfy whether the notice was issued to Shri Ayyanger, IAS to appear before him; and also that no attempt was made to examine the vital witnesses cited in the list of witness by whom article of charges framed against the petitioner are proposed to be sustained. The relevant portions of Rule 29 of the CCS (CC and A) Rule, 1965, are quoted hereunder: 29. [Revision] (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules- (i) the President; or (ii)... (iii)... (iv)... The relevant portions of Rule 29 of the CCS (CC and A) Rule, 1965, are quoted hereunder: 29. [Revision] (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules- (i) the President; or (ii)... (iii)... (iv)... (v) the appellate authority, within six months of the date of the order proposed to he [revised]; or (vi) any other authority specified in this behalf by the president by a general or special order, and within such time as may be prescribed in such general or special order; may at any time, either on his or its own motion or otherwise call for the records of any inquiry and [revise] any order made under these rules or under the rules repealed by Rule 34 from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred or from which no appeal is allowed, after consultation with the Commission where such consultation is necessary, and may - (a) confirm, modify or set aside the order; or (b) confirm, reduce, enhance or set aside the penalty imposed by the order, or impose any penalty where no penalty has been imposed; or (c) remit the case to the authority which made the order to or any other authority directing such authority to make such further enquiry as it may consider proper in the circumstances of the case; or (d) pass such other orders as it may deem fit: Provided that no order imposing or enhancing any penalty shall be made by any revising authority unless the Government servant concerned has been given a reasonable opportunity of malting a representation against the penalty proposed and where it is proposed to impose any of the penalties specified in Clauses (v) to (ix) of Rule 11 or to enhance the penalty imposed by the order sought to be revised to any of the penalties specified in those clauses, and if an inquiry under Rule 14 has not already been held in the case, no such penalty shall be imposed except after an inquiry in the manner laid down in Rule 14 subject to the provisions of Rule 19, and except after consultation with the Commission where such consultation is necessary. Under Rule 29 of the CCS (CC and A) Rules, 1965, the Appellate Authority could exercise the revisional power and for the purpose of this rule, i.e., Rule 29(1)(v) of CCS (CC and A) Rules, 1965, the Appellate Authority is also the Revisional Authority. 7. As per direction of this Court, Mr. S. Deb, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents made the relevant file of the Government available before this Court for perusal. The Governor of Tripura, vide notification of the General Administration (AR) Department, Government of Tripura, being No. F.5(1)-GA (AR)/2002(p-1) dated Agartala, 28.9.2004 makes the Rule called "Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) (Tripura Forty nineth Amendment) Rules, 2004, wherein the Schedule to the CCS (CC and A) Rules, 1965, Parts I and II have been amended and under the amended rules, the appellate authority of Group A Gazetted Officer is the Governor and power of the Appellate authority is delegated to the Chief Secretary. Both the parties admitted that the power of appellate authority is delegated to the Chief Secretary. Note Nos. 119, 120 and 121 of the relevant Government file, wherein the revisional authority had taken decision with approval of the hon'ble Chief Minister of Tripura, for conducting further inquiry of the said disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner read as follows : NOTE No. 119 Examined the case. It seems the Disciplinary Authority could not establish the charges against the Charged Officer Shri Amar Das, Director, Agriculture (Retired) as two vital witness did not appear before the Inquiring Authority (Shri B. Sinha, Principal Secretary) despite issue of letters. 2. The two important Prosecution Witnesses to the case namely Shri G.S.G. Ayyangar, IAS and Shri R.K. Dey Choudhury, IAS were called for their evidence. However, as the case was about to be closed after receipt of the inquiry report from the Inquiring Authority who had recorded in his findings that the "Prosecution could not sustain the charges leveled against Shri Das" mainly for want of statement from the prosecution witness namely Shri G.S.G. Ayyangar, IAS and Shri R.K. Dey Choudhury, IAS, the matter was brought before the then Chief Secretary. 3. The then Chief Secretary discussed the matter with Shri Ayyangar, IAS who informed that he did not receive (Note No. 78) any communication in respect of his appearance before the Inquiring Authority. The Chief Secretary further expressed that the inquiry report is sketchy. 3. The then Chief Secretary discussed the matter with Shri Ayyangar, IAS who informed that he did not receive (Note No. 78) any communication in respect of his appearance before the Inquiring Authority. The Chief Secretary further expressed that the inquiry report is sketchy. It seems possibility to bring two vital witnesses before the Inquiring Authority was not explored properly and the process of the case cannot be considered to be complete. 4. Under the circumstances, the Appealing Authority may consider starting" the inquiry afresh. Sd/- (Shyamalima Banerjee) Commissioner & Secretary, GA (AR) Department, 8.7.2009 In view of the facts noted in para 3 above, it is for orders whether the proceedings of this case need to be revised under provisions of Rule 29(1) of CCS (CCA) Rules and whether the order dated 29.6.2009 (p.228-229) of the disciplinary authority need to be set aside, and, whether the case shall be remitted to the disciplinary authority for making further enquiry after recording evidence of all the material witnesses of the case. Sd/- 8. Rule 9(2)(a) of the Pension Rules of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972 clearly speaks that departmental proceedings, if instituted while the Government servant was in service whether before his retirement or during his re-employment, shall, after the final retirement of the Government servant, be deemed to be proceedings under this rule and shall be continued and concluded by the authority by which they were commenced in the same manner as if the Government servant had continued in service. But where the departmental proceedings are instituted by an authority subordinate to the President (the Governor of Tripura), that authority shall submit a report recording its findings to the President (the Governor of Tripura). Departmental proceedings, if not instituted while the Government servant was in service, shall not be instituted save with the sanction of the President the Governor of Tripura. For easy reference, relevant portions of Rule 9 of the CCS (Pension) Rules, are quoted hereunder : 9. Right of President to withhold or withdraw pension. Departmental proceedings, if not instituted while the Government servant was in service, shall not be instituted save with the sanction of the President the Governor of Tripura. For easy reference, relevant portions of Rule 9 of the CCS (Pension) Rules, are quoted hereunder : 9. Right of President to withhold or withdraw pension. - (1) The President reserves to himself the right of withholding a pension or gratuity, or both, either in full or in part, or withdrawing a pension in full or in part, whether permanently or for a specified period, and of ordering recovery from a pension or gratuity of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to the Government, if, in any departmental or judicial proceedings, the pensioner is found guilty of grave misconduct or negligence during the period of service, including service rendered upon re-employment after retirement: ... ... (2)(a) The departmental proceedings referred to in Sub-rule (1), if instituted while the Government servant was in service whether before his retirement or during his re-employment, shall, after the final retirement of the Government servant, be deemed to be proceedings under this rule and shall be continued and concluded by the authority by which they were commenced in the same manner as if the Government servant had continued in service; Provided that where the departmental proceedings are instituted by an authority subordinate to the President, that authority shall submit a report recording its findings to the President: (b) The departmental proceedings, if not instituted while the Government servant was in service whether before his retirement or during his reemployment, - (i) shall not be instituted save with the sanction of the President, (ii) shall not be in respect of any event which took place more than four years before such institution, and (iii) shall be conducted by such authority and in such place as the President may direct and in accordance with the procedure applicable to departmental proceedings in which an order of dismissal from service could be made in relation to the Government servant during his service. In the case in hand, as stated above, disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner was initiated while he was very much in service and continued even after his retirement on superannuation from his service and, therefore, the sanction of the Governor is not required for further proceeding of the said disciplinary enquiry already initiated against the petitioner. 9. In the case in hand, as stated above, disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner was initiated while he was very much in service and continued even after his retirement on superannuation from his service and, therefore, the sanction of the Governor is not required for further proceeding of the said disciplinary enquiry already initiated against the petitioner. 9. Mr. D.K. Biswas, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner placed heavy reliance on the decision of the Apex Court (Constitution Bench) in K.R. Deb v. The Collector of Central Excise, Shillong AIR 1971 SC 1447 in support of his contention that a fresh inquiry (second (inquiry) on identical charge is impermissible. The Apex Court in K.R. Deb's case (supra) clearly held that if there is some defect in the inquiry conducted by the Inquiry Officer, the Disciplinary Authority can direct the Inquiry Officer to conduct further inquiry in support of that matter but it cannot direct a fresh inquiry to be conducted by some other officer. Para 13 of the AIR in K.R. Deb's case (supra) reads as follows : 13. It seems to us that Rule 15, on the face of it, really provides for one inquiry but it may be possible if in a particular case there has been no proper inquiry because some serious defect has crept into the inquiry or some important witnesses were not available at the time of the inquiry or were not examined for some other reason, the Disciplinary Authority may ask the Inquiry Officer to record further evidence. But there is no provision in Rule 15 for completely setting aside previous inquiries on the ground that the report of the Inquiring Officer or Officers does not appeal to the Disciplinary Authority. The Disciplinary Authority has enough powers to reconsider the evidence itself and come to its own conclusion under Rule 9. 10. The Apex Court considered the ratio laid down in K.R. Deb's case (supra) in Union of India and Ors v. P. Thyagarajan (1999) 1 SCC 733 and held that if in a particular case, where there has been no proper enquiry because of some serious defect having crept into the enquiry or some important witnesses were not available at the time of enquiry or were not examined, the disciplinary authority may ask the enquiry officer to record further evidence. Para Nos. Para Nos. 7 and 8 of the SCC in P. Thyagarajan's case (supra) reads as follows: 7. What is contemplated in Rule 27(c)(2) is that evidence material to the charge would be either oral or documentary and, if oral (i) it shall be direct; (ii) it shall be recorded by the officer conducting the enquiry himself or by any officer; and (iii) the accused shall be allowed to cross-examine the witness. When reliance is sought to be placed on oral evidence of witnesses, it will have to be obtained in the manner indicated in the said Rule and the oral statement has to be recorded by the officer himself conducting the enquiry in the presence of the parties and it cannot be done in any other manner. The procedure taking letters as statements is in violation of Rule 27(c)(2). Therefore, the contention put forth on behalf of the appellant and the reasons set forth in the course of the order setting aside the enquiry is justified. What Shri Tulsi urged with reference to the decision in K.R. Deb, (1971) 2 SCC 102 is that there is no power in the disciplinary authority to set aside an earlier enquiry and to order a fresh enquiry. We may, in particular, refer to para 12 of the said decision which is as follows : (SCC p. 105) 12. It seems to us that Rule 15, on the face of it, really provides for one enquiry but it may be possible if in a particular case there has been no proper enquiry because some serious defect has crept into the enquiry or some important witnesses were not available at the time of the enquiry or were not examined for some other reason, the disciplinary authority may ask the enquiry officer to record further evidence. But there is no provision in Rule 15 for completely setting aside previous enquiries on the ground that the report of the enquiring officer or officers does not appeal to the disciplinary authority. The disciplinary authority has enough powers to reconsider the evidence itself and come to its own conclusion under Rule 9. 8. But there is no provision in Rule 15 for completely setting aside previous enquiries on the ground that the report of the enquiring officer or officers does not appeal to the disciplinary authority. The disciplinary authority has enough powers to reconsider the evidence itself and come to its own conclusion under Rule 9. 8. A careful reading of this passage will make it clear that this Court notices that if in a particular case where there has been no proper enquiry because of some serious defect having crept into the enquiry or were not examined, the disciplinary authority may ask the enquiry officer to record further evidence but that provision would not enable the disciplinary authority to set aside the previous enquiries on the ground that the report of the enquiry officer does not appeal to the disciplinary authority. However, in the present case, the basis upon which the disciplinary authority set aside the enquiry was that the procedure adopted by the enquiry officer was contrary to relevant rules and affects the rights of the parties, and not that the report did not appeal to him. When important evidence, either to be relied upon by the department or by the delinquent official, is shut out, this would not result in advancement of justice but on the other hand, would result in a miscarriage thereof Therefore, Rule 27(c) enables the disciplinary authority to record his findings on the report and to pass an appropriate order including ordering of a de novo enquiry in a case of present nature. (emphasis supplied) 11. The Apex Court also considered the ratio of K.R. Deb's case (supra) in the case of Kanailal Bera v. Union of India and Ors. (2007) 11 SCC 517 and held that once a disciplinary proceeding has been initiated, the same must be brought to its logical end meaning thereby a finding is required to be arrived at as to whether the delinquent officer is guilty of charges leveled against him or not. In a given situation further evidence may be directed to be adduced but the same would not mean that despite holding a delinquent officer to be partially guilty of the charges leveled against him another inquiry would be directed to be initiated on the selfsame charges which could not be proved in the first inquiry." 12. The Apex Court in Kanailal Bera's case (supra) (para Nos. The Apex Court in Kanailal Bera's case (supra) (para Nos. 5 and 6 of the SCC p.520) held that: 5. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant in support of his appeal submitted that the High Court in a situation of this nature should not have refused to entertain the writ petition as also the letters patent appeal preferred by the appellant herein only on the ground of delay and laches as a result whereof manifest injustice has been caused to him. Learned Counsel would point out that in terms of Rule 27 of the Central Reserve Police Force Rules, the respondent could not have initiated a second inquiry after having found that the charges have been partially proved in the first inquiry. It was furthermore, contended that in the Central Reserve Police Force Act and the Rules framed there under, there does not exist any provision for imposition of punishment of confinement to Civil Lines which was applicable only to the persons governed by the Army Act. 6. The question as to whether a punishment of confinement to Civil Lines could have been directed or not should not detain us as we agree with the contention raised by learned Counsel for the appellant that the purported order dated 5.4.1995 of the disciplinary authority was unsustainable in law. Rule 27 of the Central Reserve Police Force Rules, 1955, inter alia, lays down the procedure for conducting a departmental inquiry. Once a disciplinary proceeding has been initiated, the same must be brought to its logical end meaning thereby a finding is required to be arrived at as to whether the delinquent officer is guilty of charges levelled against him or not. In a given situation further evidence may be directed to be adduced but the same would not mean that despite holding a delinquent officer to be partially guilty of the charges levelled against him another inquiry would be directed to be initiated on the selfsame charges which could not' be proved in the first inquiry. (emphasis supplied) 13. In a given situation further evidence may be directed to be adduced but the same would not mean that despite holding a delinquent officer to be partially guilty of the charges levelled against him another inquiry would be directed to be initiated on the selfsame charges which could not' be proved in the first inquiry. (emphasis supplied) 13. From the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in K.R. Deb's case (supra), P. Thyagarajan's case (supra) Kanailal Bern's case (supra) it is clear that second departmental enquiry or/fresh departmental enquiry would not be directed to be initiated for the same charge which could not be proved in the first inquiry and direction to conduct further inquiry of the same departmental enquiry which has already been initiated for further evidence could be made. The fact of K.R. Deb's case (supra) is diametrically different from that of the present case. 14. In Ambica Quarry Works v. State of Gujarat (1987) 1 SCC 213 (vide SCC p. 221 para 18) Apex Court observed- 18....The ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case. It has been said long time ago that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides, and not what logically follows from it. In Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P.) Ltd. (2003) 2 SCC 111 (vide SCC p. 130, para 59) Apex Court observed - 59....It is also well settled that a little difference in facts or additional facts may make a lot of difference in the precedential value of a decision. 15. The Apex Court in Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. and Anr. v. N.R. Vairamani and Anr. (2004) 8 SCC 579 (para 9 to 1.2 pp.584 585) held that: 9. Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of courts are neither to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of a statute and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of courts are not to be construed as statutes. Observations of courts are neither to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of a statute and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. In London Graving Dock Col Ltd v. Horton 1951 AC 737 (AC at p.761) Lord Mac Dermott observed: (All ER p. 14 C-D) The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the ipsissima verba of Wiles, J, as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished judge.... 10. In Home Office v. Dorset yacht Co. (1970) 2 All ER 294 (All ER p.297 g-h) Lord Reid said, "Lord Atkin's speech...is not to be treated as if it were a statutory definition. It will require qualification in new circumstances". Megarry, J in Shepherd Homes Ltd v. Sandham, (No. 2) (1971) WLR 1062observed : "One must not, of course, construe even a reserved judgment of Russel, L.J as if it were an Act of Parliament." And, in Herrington v. British Railways Board (1972) 2 WLR 537 Lord Morris said : (All ER p.761 c) There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or a judgment as though they were words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances made in the setting of the facts of a particular case. 11. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper. 12. The following words of Lord Denning in the matter of applying precedents have become locus classicus. 11. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper. 12. The following words of Lord Denning in the matter of applying precedents have become locus classicus. Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one ease and another is not enough because even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect, in deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by Cardozo) by matching the colour of one case against the colour of another. To decide therefore, on which side of the line a case false, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive. * * * I Precedent should be followed only so far as it marks the path of justice, but you must cut the dead wood and trim off the side branches else you will find yourself lost in thickets and branches. My plea is to keep the path to justice clear of obstructions which could impede it. 16. For the foregoing reasons, the core question posed for consideration in the present writ petition is answered in favour of the State respondents inasmuch as the impugned order dated 8.9.2009 had set aside the order dated 29.6.2009 for dropping the disciplinary proceeding initiated against the petitioner vide order No. F.11(46)-GA (AR)/2006/1979-82 dated 25th September, 2007 and remanded the disciplinary proceedings to the Disciplinary Authority to conduct further inquiry into the matter after recording evidence of all the material witnesses of the case, i.e., the witnesses mentioned in Annexure-IV to the said memorandum dated 25.9.2007 for holding disciplinary proceedings; and the impugned order dated 29.6.2009 had not ordered for fresh inquiry for the same article of charges against the petitioner. 17. At the conclusion of the hearing, Mr. D.K. Biswas, made a faint attempt that Rule 29 is not applicable in the present case inasmuch as revisional authority cannot exercise the power under Rule 29(1) of the CCS (CC and A) Rules, 1965 for that Rule 14(15) of the CCS (CC and A) Rules does not permit the Disciplinary Authority to allow the Presenting Officer or/Prosecution to produce new evidence to fill up any gap in the evidence. For easy reference Rule 14(15) of the CCS (CC and A) is quoted hereunder : 14. Procedure for imposing major penalties ... ... ... (15) If it shall appear necessary before the close of the case on behalf of the Disciplinary Authority, the Inquiring Authority may, in its discretion, allow the Presenting Officer to produce evidence not included in the list given to the Government servant or may itself cal for new evidence or recall and re-examine any witness and in such case the government servant shall be entitled to have, if he demands it, a copy of the list of further evidence proposed to be produced and an adjournment of the inquiry for three clear days before the production of such new evidence exclusive of the day of adjournment and the day to which the inquiry is adjourned. The Inquiring Authority shall give the Government servant an opportunity of inspecting such documents before they are taken on the record. The Inquiring Authority may also allow the Government servant to produce new evidence, if it of the opinion that the production of such evidence is necessary in the interest of justice. Note- New evidence shall not be permitted or called for or any witness shall not be recalled to fill up any gap in the evidence. Such evidence may be called for only when there is an inherent lacuna or defect in the evidence which has been produced originally. 18. On bare perusal of Rule 14(15) of the CCS (CC and A) Rules it is clear that the Disciplinary Authority may, in his discretion, allow the Presenting Officer or/Prosecution to produce evidence not included in the list given to the Government servant or may recall itself for new evidence or recall and re-examine any witness and in such case the Government servant shall be entitled to have, if he demands it, a copy of the list of further evidence proposed to be produced and also that the Inquiry Authority may also allow the Government servant to produce new evidence, if he is of opinion that production of such evidence is necessary in the interest of justice. 19. 19. In the case in hand, as stated above, the two witnesses mentioned above, proposed to be examined in the further proceedings of the disciplinary proceeding already initiated against the present petitioner are the witnesses mentioned in the list of witnesses (Anexure 4 to the memorandum dated 25.9.2007 for holding disciplinary inquiry against the petitioner); and, those two witnesses are not new witnesses and as such, by no stretch of imagination and hypothesis, the said two witnesses can be treated as new witnesses. Over and above. Rule 29 of the CCS (CC and A) Rules, started with the opening words "notwithstanding anything contained in these Rules:" therefore, it is clear that Rule 29 of the CCS (CC and A) Rules is open with the non-obstinate clause, which intended to preclude, in advance any interpretation contrary to Rule 29 of the CCS (CC and A) Rules. Therefore, Rule 29 of the CCS (CC and A), 1965 shall have the overriding effect to Rule 14(15) of the CCS (CC and A) Rules, even if it is presumed that Rule 14(15) of the CCS (CC and A) Rules bar the revisional authority to pass the impugned order dated 8.9.2009, but in fact, Rule 14(15) of the CCS (CC and A) Rules, does not bar the revisional authority to pass the impugned order dated 9.7.2009. Accordingly, the present writ petition is devoid of merit and hereby dismissed. Petition dismissed