ORDER : S. Nagamuthu, J. The Petitioner is a company known as Arpejay Investments Pvt. Limited. This is a company incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act (hereinafter referred to as the AIP Ltd.) The company was established on August 31, 1994. In the year 1995, the company entered into three separate lease agreements with yet another company known as Beardsell limited under the first lease agreement, from the month of March 1995, the Petitioner company took possession of the factory and started producing polystrene products. Likewise, in the month of June 1995 under the second lease agreement, it took possession of the factory called as Manali Bitumen and started producing Bitumen. Lastly, as per the third lease agreement, in the month of September 1995, the company took possession of a factory at Manali to produce extended Polystrene products. According to the Petitioner, Beardsell limited is a public limited company, which has nothing to do with the Petitioner company except the lease agreements mentioned above. The accounts of the Petitioner company and other transactions have got nothing to do with the Beardsell limited. The Petitioner company is a private limited company. According to the Petitioner, u/s 16(1)(d) of the Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act 1902 (unamended), the Petitioner company was exempted from paying contribution as per the provisions of the Act during the infancy period of three years from the date on which, the establishment was set up. The said provision was however, deleted from the Statute book from September 22, 1997. Therefore, according to the Petitioner, in respect of the above establishments, the Petitioner company is entitled for the exemption during the infancy period upto September 22, 1997. 2. However, the second Respondent by its' proceedings in H8/TN/40040/Enf/Regl./2000, dated February 17, 2000, directed the Petitioner to pay contribution by passing an order u/s 7-A of the Act. The said order was challenged by the Petitioner before the first' Respondent/Appellate Authority and the same was rejected by order dated November 7, 2000 in case No. ATA209/13/2000. Challenging the above, the Petitioner has come forward with this petition. 3. The said order was challenged by the Petitioner before the first' Respondent/Appellate Authority and the same was rejected by order dated November 7, 2000 in case No. ATA209/13/2000. Challenging the above, the Petitioner has come forward with this petition. 3. It is contended by the Petitioner that Beardsell has got nothing to do with the Petitioner company and as a matter of fact, the establishments of the Petitioner company were-established only during the months of March 1995, June 1995 and September 1995 respectively and therefore, during the infancy period i.e. upto July 22, 1997, the Petitioner company is not liable to pay the contribution as per the provisions of the Act. 4. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner would rely on the judgment of this Court in Regional Provident Fund Commissioner Vs. Prabha Beverages Private Ltd. and The Presiding Officer, Employees Provident Funds Appellate Tribunal, (2009) 3 LLJ 208 , and another decision in M/s Elegant Garments Vs. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner and Others, (1992) 2 LLJ 799, wherein, this Court has constantly held that when there are two companies incorporated, they cannot be clubbed together to hold that the later company/establishment is part of the former so as to deny the infancy benefits. 5. However, the learned Counsel for the second Respondent would submit that overwhelming evidences were available before the authority to hold that the Petitioner company is nothing but a branch of Beardsell Limited and therefore, the Petitioner company is not available for exemption in the above three establishments. In this regard, the learned Counsel for the second Respondent has taken me through the orders of both the Respondents. 6. I have considered the rival submissions and also perused the records. 7. Undisputedly, the Beardsell limited is a public limited whereas the Petitioner company is a private limited company and they are two different organisations. But, a perusal of the order passed by the authorities would go to show that because the factories of both the companies are within the same compound and because Beardsell limited is supplying raw materials and getting them back as finished goods from the above establishments of the Petitioner company and there is a common Director for both companies, they should be treated as part and parcel of the same establishment. In my considered opinion, the said conclusions arrived at by the authorities cannot be accepted. In my considered opinion, the said conclusions arrived at by the authorities cannot be accepted. From the records, it is clear that the Petitioner company has entered into lease agreements with Beardsell limited, under which, the above three factories were taken over by the Petitioner company to start the production of various materials. It may be true that raw materials are supplied by Beardsell Limited and the finished goods are supplied to Beardsell Limited by the Petitioner company. But that will not make the Petitioner company and its establishments as branches of Beardsell limited. Simply because there is a common Director for both companies, it cannot be said that both companies are of the same organisation. Similarly, because the factories are situated in the same compound, it cannot be said that both the companies are one and the same. Thus, the reasons stated by the authorities below cannot be countenanced. The Appellate Authority has however held that in respect of the polystrene factory, it is not a part of Beardsell limited and therefore, he has allowed infancy for the polystrene establishment alone. In respect of other two, he has concurred with the findings of the lower authority. In my considered opinion, even in respect of those two establishments also, the appellate authority ought to have held that they are not part of the Beardsell limited. Therefore, in my considered opinion, all the three establishments run by the Petitioner company are entitled for exemption I for the period upto September 22, 1997. In that view of the matter, I am inclined to interfere with the order passed by the Respondents. 8. In the result, this writ petition is allowed and the impugned orders of the Respondents are set aside. No. costs. 9. It is brought to the notice of this Court that some amount has already been paid by the Petitioner towards contribution that too on the directions of this Court. In view of this final order, the Respondent is at liberty to withdraw and adjust the said amount if any, deposited by 'the Petitioner in pursuance of the orders impugned in this writ petition towards arrears for the subsequent period i.e. after the expiry of the infancy period and the balance shall be refunded to the Petitioner.