JUDGMENT Hon’ble Prakash Krishna, J.—The present revision has been preferred under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act 1887 against the judgment and decree dated 20th May, 2005 passed by the Additional District Judge, Court No. 5, Badaun in S.C.C. Suit No. 01 of 2004, Prahlad Kumar Gupta and another v. Sanjay Kumar Tomar, whereby the Court below has decreed the suit for recovery of arrears of rent amounting to Rs.20,250/- and damages for the period of August, 2003 to 10th January, 2004 and Rs. 16,000/- for the period 11th January, 2004 to 21st February, 2004 alongwith pendente lite and forfeiture damages at the rate of Rs. 3000/- per month and for eviction of the defendant, from the property, as described at the foot of the plaint, with costs. 2. Prahlad Kumar Gupta and Ramesh Chandra Gupta (hereinafter referred to as the ‘landlords’) instituted the aforesaid suit against Sanjay Kumar Tomar (hereinafter referred to as the ‘tenant’) for eviction from the premises in question on the allegations that the provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 are not applicable as the rent is more than Rs. 2000/- per month and the building is exempted from the operation of the said Act. It was let out on 25th February, 2000 for a period of 11 months with effect from March, 2000. The defendant tenant is in default of payment of rent since August, 2003 and his tenancy was terminated, by means of a registered notice dated 8th December, 2003. The said suit was contested by denying the relationship of landlords and tenant between the parties as also on the ground that the defendant tenant is not a defaulter. 3. On the pleadings of the parties as many as five points for determination as mentioned in the judgment, were framed by the trial judge. It was found that there is relationship of landlords and tenant between the parties and the agreement dated 25th February, 2000 is admissible in evidence as the rent deed is only for a period 11 months and it does not require any registration. It was found that the tenant is defaulter as pleaded by the landlords and the notice determining the tenancy is valid. 4. Sri. V.K. Singh, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the tenant in revision submits that the following three points for consideration: 1. It was found that the tenant is defaulter as pleaded by the landlords and the notice determining the tenancy is valid. 4. Sri. V.K. Singh, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the tenant in revision submits that the following three points for consideration: 1. The notice determining the tenancy has not been validly served on the tenant. 2. The tenant has deposited the entire arrears of rent etc. and as such he is entitled to get the benefit of Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act 3. The finding that the tenant is in arrears of rent with effect from August 2003, is vitiated. 5. In reply, Shri N.C. Rajvanshi, learned Senior Counsel for the landlord submits that the notice was validly served. It was sent through registered post. The necessary documents were placed before the Court and the tenant failed to appear in the witness box to support his contention that the said notice was never offered to him. The tenant is not entitled to invoke Section 114 of Transfer of Property Act as it was a case of month to month tenancy and the tenancy has been determined under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The finding recorded by the trial judge on the question of default is essentially a finding of fact and no interference in the present revision is possible due to restricted jurisdiction and limited scope of revision as per Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. 6. Considered the respective submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 7. Taking into consideration the first point, it may be noted that before the trial judge no such issue was raised. But there is some discussion with regard to service of notice in the body of the judgment. Specific point relating to service of notice was not formulated. The notice terminating the tenancy was sent by the registered post at the correct address. Its postal receipt was filed. The trial Court has rightly drawn the presumption of service from the registered document available on record. 8. Presumption of service of notice which is a registered document as provided under the Evidence Act, has also under the Post Office Act, was rightly drawn by the trial Court, there being no contrary evidence. Its postal receipt was filed. The trial Court has rightly drawn the presumption of service from the registered document available on record. 8. Presumption of service of notice which is a registered document as provided under the Evidence Act, has also under the Post Office Act, was rightly drawn by the trial Court, there being no contrary evidence. When the above fact was pointed out to the learned counsel for the tenant, he did not pursue the matter any further. Earlier he had placed reliance upon a judgment of this Court in the case of Dharampal Tyagi v. Anil Kumar, 1986 ALR 324. The said judgment is distinguishable on facts. The letter was not correctly addressed therein as it did not contain the full postal address, which is not so herein. It is neither pleaded nor proved that the registered letter containing the notice was not correctly addressed, or it was not sent on the correct address; being a registered document a presumption of service is available under law as well as in fact. 9. Much emphasis was laid by the learned Senior Counsel on the second point for determination i.e. with regard to the question relating to relief against forfeiture of lease as provided under Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act. At this juncture, it may be placed on record that the finding of the trial Court with regard to non applicability of the State Rent Control Act i.e. U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, was not disputed. 10. As a matter of fact, the argument proceeds on the footing that even if, the State Rent Control Act is not applicable, the tenant is entitled for relief against forfeiture for non payment of rent. It was submitted that the property in question was taken on rent under a rent agreement dated 25th February, 2000 for a period of 11 months commencing from March, 2000. Much after the expiry of the aforesaid period, the suit giving rise to the present revision was filed. On this facts situation, the question arises as to whether the tenant can avail the benefit as provided under Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act or not. The whole gamut of the submissions of the tenant is that he has deposited the entire rent/damages as claimed in the plaint and therefore, he may be relieved from eviction decree. 11. The whole gamut of the submissions of the tenant is that he has deposited the entire rent/damages as claimed in the plaint and therefore, he may be relieved from eviction decree. 11. The question posed above is simple, and free from any difficulty. Time and again the said point has been set at rest by this Court in its various judicial pronouncements. 12. It is a simple suit for recovery of arrears of rent and ejectment of the tenant whose tenancy was month to month herein on the ground that the lease was granted for a period of 11 months and the said period has expired. It is acknowledged legal position that after the expiry of the lease period, a tenant becomes tenant month by month and tenancy of said tenant can be determined by giving him a notice under Section 106 of T.P. Act, if the tenancy is not governed by any State Rent Control Laws, as here the provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 are not applicable and as such the tenant is liable for eviction. In such matters, Section 114 of the T.P. Act is not applicable. 13. It is interesting to note that the tenant himself in his pleading has come out with the case that there was month to month tenancy between the parties. He has denied the written lease agreement and has pleaded that the contract of tenancy was oral though for a limited duration. This being so, the question of extending, benefit of Section 114 of the T.P. Act does not arise. 14. In the case of Ram Bali Pandey (Since deceased) through his LRs’ v. IInd Additional Judge, Kanpur and others, 1998 (2) ARC 362 , it has been held as follows: “23. .... In any view of the matter Section 114 of the T.P. Act has no application to the facts of the present case as it was not a case of forfeiture of tenancy for non-payment of rent. The tenancy was terminated under Section 106 of the T.P. Act simpliciter. For the applicability of Section 114, existence of an agreement containing a stipulation empowering the landlord to re-enter in the demised premises in case of breach of a condition regarding payment of rent is essential. The tenancy was terminated under Section 106 of the T.P. Act simpliciter. For the applicability of Section 114, existence of an agreement containing a stipulation empowering the landlord to re-enter in the demised premises in case of breach of a condition regarding payment of rent is essential. In the present case there was no such agreement and as U.P. Act No. 3/47 was not applicable to the premises, there was simpliciter termination of tenancy under Section 106 of the T.P. Act serving a notice thereunder. The mere fact that the notice stated about non-payment of rent also besides termination of monthly tenancy and demand of vacant possession it would not be a case of forfeiture under clause (g) but one of determination of tenancy by exercising power under clause (h) of Section 111 of the T.P. Act. No authority is required for the proposition that where there is simpliciter termination of tenancy under Section 106 of the T.P. Act cannot be attracted.” 15. In the case of Phool Badan Verma v. Ram Badhaee and others, 2009 (3) ARC 567, it has been held as follows: 10. Section 114 of the T.P. Act provides for relief against forfeiture for non payment of rent. It provides that where a lease of immovable property has been determined by forfeiture for non payment of rent and the lessor chooses to elect the lessee, if at the hearing of the suit, the lessee pays or tenders to the lessor the rent in arrears, together with interest thereon and his full cost of suit or gives such security as the Court thinks sufficient for making such payment within 15 days, the Court may in lieu of a decree for ejectment, pass an order relieving the lessee against forfeiture; and thereupon the lessee shall hold the property leased as its forfeiture has not occurred. In the said section a rule of equity is enshrined. Covenant of forfeiture of tenancy for non payment of rent is regarded by the Courts as merely a clause for securing the payment of rent. On a plain reading of Section 114 of the T.P. Act, it would be clear that the said Section applies where a suit for eviction of a tenant is instituted on the basis of forfeiture of lease under the T.P. Act. On a plain reading of Section 114 of the T.P. Act, it would be clear that the said Section applies where a suit for eviction of a tenant is instituted on the basis of forfeiture of lease under the T.P. Act. In other words it will not be applicable where the suit has been filed for the eviction of a tenant on the basis of statutory provision dealing specifically with the rights and obligations of a landlord and tenant, such as Section 20(2)(a) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. Section 20 of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 provides the grounds for eviction of a statutory tenant. As soon as a ground for eviction of a tenant is made out in the terms of provisions of Section 20 of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, the tenant is liable for eviction and he cannot fall back upon Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act.” 16. The above view has been reiterated in the case of Mohammad Nasir v. District Judge, Nainital and others, 1999 (1) ARC 202, wherein it has been held that a notice under Section 106 of the T.P. Act by no means could be treated as one under Section 111(g) of the T.P. Act. Section 114 applies to those cases where the landlord invokes his rights under what is known as forfeiture clause and determines the lease by forfeiture and sues for the ejectment of the tenant by way of illustration given therein. It has been explained that where there is tenancy for a fixed term of five years containing a clause that the landlord will be entitled to determine the lease and to re-enter upon the demised premises even during the period of five years if the tenant does not pay rent for more than three months. But for this clause, the lease must run for the entire period of five years and the landlord during the said period will have no right to eject the tenant before the expiry of the fixed period of five years. If the tenant fails to pay rent for more than three months, forfeiture clause enables the landlord to determine the lease before its expiration. If the tenant fails to pay rent for more than three months, forfeiture clause enables the landlord to determine the lease before its expiration. In such a case, the subsisting tenancy cannot be determined by serving a notice simpliciter under Section 106 of the T.P. Act and it can only be determined where the landlord forfeits the tenancy by serving a notice under Section 111 (g). In such an event Section 114 can be pressed into service but where the tenancy runs from month to month and the same has been determined by a valid notice under Section 106 T.P. Act, Section 114 T.P. Act shall have no application. 17. The aforesaid interpretation of law has been followed and reiterated in the case of Vinod Kumar Rastogi v. VIIth Additional District and Sessions Judge, Allahabad and others, 2003 (2) ARC 377. In this case, the High Court has also looked the problem with a different angle vide para-6 thereof, which is reproduced below for the sake of inconvenience: “6. The matter may be looked from another angle. If a Rent Control Act does not apply then suit for ejectment may be filed and decreed. After termination of tenancy under Section 106 of T.P. Act even though tenant may not be defaulter and no relief regarding payment of rent may have been claimed in the suit. However, in case the tenant is also defaulter then the relief for recovery of arrears of rent may also be included in the suit. This relief will be in the nature of additional relief having got absolutely no concern with other relief of ejectment. In such situation relief for recovery of arrears of rent will not at all be dependent upon relief of ejectment. It does not appeal to reason as to why a non defaulter tenant of buildings not covered by Rent Control Act must be liable to ejectment after termination of tenancy while a defaulter tenant of such building in such situation shall not be liable to ejectment if he deposits the rent on the first date of hearing of the suit. Taking analogy from Section 20(4) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 it may be observed that only when the suit is filed on the ground of default the tenant is entitled to avoid the ejectment by depositing rent etc. on the first date of hearing. Taking analogy from Section 20(4) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 it may be observed that only when the suit is filed on the ground of default the tenant is entitled to avoid the ejectment by depositing rent etc. on the first date of hearing. However, if the suit is filed on other grounds mentioned under Section 20(2) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 alongwith or without ground of default then tenant cannot avoid eviction by depositing rent etc. on the first date of hearing.” 18. The decision given in the case of Mohammad Nasir (supra) has been followed in the case of Sunil Kumar Modi v. Munna Lal Gupta, 2008 (73) ALR 205. In this very case, the Court has noticed that the earlier judgment of this Court in the case of Tikkam Ram v. Prakash Chandra, 1966 ALJ 1016, and has reproduced the following paragraph therefrom. The said paragraph is also reproduced here: “Mr. Chaturvedi then argued that this Court should exercise its power to grant relief against the landlord’s forfeiture of the lease for non-payment of rent. He contends that the Court’s power to grant such relief is not confined to the cases falling within Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act, and he relied on a number of decisions. Jabab Vellalhi v. Smt. Kaderved Thayammatl; Sri Kishan Lal v. Ramnath Janaki Prasad and Malappa Venkatesh Shatti v. Janardan Govinda Mahab. In all these cases, the Court exercised its equitable power to grant relief against forfeiture, though the case did not fall within Section 114. But the power to grant relief against forfeiture, whether equitable or under Section 114, can be exercised by the Court only if there has been a forfeiture on the ground of non-payment of rent. But where there is no forfeiture and the landlord has terminated the lease under his right under Section 106, the question of granting relief against forfeiture does not arise. A suit for ejectment by the landlord after determining the lease under Section 106 is not based on forfeiture of the lease, but on the landlord’s ordinary right to terminate the lease and eject the tenant. A suit for ejectment by the landlord after determining the lease under Section 106 is not based on forfeiture of the lease, but on the landlord’s ordinary right to terminate the lease and eject the tenant. This right is restricted by Section 3 (1) (a) of the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act, but as soon as the tenant loses the protection of this Section, the landlord’s right to determine his lease and eject him is freed of all restrictions. The tenant cannot in such a case ask the Court to exercise its equitable power against a forfeiture, for the simple reason that there is no forfeiture to give relief against.” 19. It may be noted that so far as this Court is concerned the consistent view has been, exept in a solitary judgment which will be considered later on, that a tenant in respect of a disputed accommodation to which the provisions of State Rent Control Act are not applicable, cannot ask the Court to extend the benefit of Section 114 of the T.P. Act. 20. Surjeet Singh v. A.D.J. Haridwar and others, 1993 (22) ALR 482, is a solitary judgment wherein apparently a different view has been taken by this Court. The said decision was strongly relied by the learned Senior Counsel for the tenant to buttress his argument that the tenant is entitled to get relief against forfeiture for the non-payment of rent under Section 114 of the T.P. Act. 21. A close reading of the said decision would show that it does not contain any ratio or reason in support of the said conclusion. With great respect to the Hon’ble Judge, it may be noted that it referred a judgment of the Apex Court reported in 1989 SCFBRC 500, Arjun Khiama Makhijani v. Jamandas C. Tuliani, (1989) 4 SCC 612 and jumped to the conclusion that according to it Section 114 of Transfer of Property Act applies to that case where a lease of immovable property has been determined by forfeiture for non-payment of rent. The relevant paragraph Nos. 6 and 7 are reproduced below: “6. Sri Rajesh Tandon, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that once the revisional Court has upheld the finding that the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 is not applicable then the provisions of Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act becomes applicable automatically. The relevant paragraph Nos. 6 and 7 are reproduced below: “6. Sri Rajesh Tandon, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that once the revisional Court has upheld the finding that the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 is not applicable then the provisions of Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act becomes applicable automatically. In support of his contention he has relied upon a decision reported in 1989 SCFBRC 500, Arjun Khiama Makhijani v. Jamandas C. Tuliani. According to it Section 114 of Transfer of Property Act applies to that case where a lease of immovable property has been determined by forfeiture for non-payment of rent. 7. Applying the same principle in the instant case I am of the view that since the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 is not applicable the petitioner was entitled for the relief as contemplated under Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act.” 22. As seen above in the case of Surjeet Singh (supra) the Hon’ble Judge has not given any independent reasoning and has simply followed the judgment of the Apex Court delivered in the case of Arjun Khiama Makhijani (supra). On an examination of the aforesaid judgment of the Apex Court, it would be evident that no such proposition of law has been laid down therein. As a matter of fact, on a careful reading of the judgment of the Apex Court in the above case, would show that the Apex Court has disagreed with the said plea of the tenant. It dismissed the tenant’s appeal. While doing so, it in no uncertain terms has laid vide paragraph-13, that Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act cannot be applied to a case where the suit for eviction of a tenant has been instituted not on the basis of forfeiture of lease under the Transfer of Property Act but on the basis of statutory provision dealing specifically with the rights and obligation of the landlords and tenants. In a case where a tenant renders himself liable to be evicted on the ground of being defaulter in the payment of rent as contemplated by the State Law, bar from the way of the landlord in instituting a suit for ejectment of a tenant is removed and he gets in right to have a decree for eviction. In a case where a tenant renders himself liable to be evicted on the ground of being defaulter in the payment of rent as contemplated by the State Law, bar from the way of the landlord in instituting a suit for ejectment of a tenant is removed and he gets in right to have a decree for eviction. Such removal of bar is not in any sence forfeiture of any rights under lease which the tenant held. The relevant portion of paragraph-13 is reproduced below: “....Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act which provides relief against forfeiture for non-payment of rent applies to a case where a lease of immovable property has determined by forfeiture for non-payment of rent. Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act deals with various contingencies whereunder a lease of an immovable property determines. Clause (g) contains one of such contingencies being by forfeiture inter alia in case the lessee breaks an express condition which provides that on breach thereof the lessor may re-enter. In a case where forfeiture of lease is claimed for non-payment of rent, it would, therefore, have to be established that one of the express conditions of the lease provided that on breach of that condition namely on non-payment of rent the lessor was entitled to re-enter. Is is only in those cases where such an express condition is contained in the lease and the lessee breaks the said condition and the lessor on his part gives notice in writing to the lessee of his intention to determine the lease that a lease of immovable property determines by forfeiture for non-payment of rent...” 23. Applying the aforesaid ratio on facts of the present case, it would be clear that Section 114 of the T.P. Act cannot be made applicable herein. According to the tenant’s own showing, there is no lease deed or the rent note in writing for a period of 11 months. The lease deed relied upon by the landlords was disputed by the tenant and he came out with the case that no such rent note was ever executed and the tenancy was oral. 24. Period of 11 months has expired before the filing of the suit. The lease deed relied upon by the landlords was disputed by the tenant and he came out with the case that no such rent note was ever executed and the tenancy was oral. 24. Period of 11 months has expired before the filing of the suit. It is a case of month to month tenancy and in view of Section 111 clause (g), it cannot be said that the present one is a case forfeiture of lease for non-payment of rent, there being no lease deed in existence. 25. It appears that the attention of the Court was in the case of Surjeet Singh (supra) not drawn to the earlier judgment on the point of this Court in the case of Tikkam Ram (supra). The attention of the Court was also not drawn towards Section 114 T.P. Act, which in no uncertain terms states that it will apply where a lease of immovable property has been determined “by forfeiture for non payment of rent”. The word forfeiture has not been defined in the Act. Section 111 of the Act enumerated clauses (a) to (h) where the ground for determination of lease are given in Clauses (a) to (h). Its Clauses (g) and (h) are reproduced below: “(g) by forfeiture; that is to say, (1) in case the lessee breaks an express condition which provides that, on breach thereof, the lessor may re-enter; or (2) in case the lessee renounces his character as such by setting up a title in a third person or by claiming title in himself; or (3) the lessee is adjudicated an insolvent and the lease provides that the lessor may re-enter on the happening of such event; and in any of these cases the lessor of his transferee gives notice in writing to the lessee of his intention to determine the lease; (h) on the expiration of a notice to determine the lease, or to quit, or of intention to quit, the property leased, duly given by one party to the other.” 26. Having noticed the legal provisions, it may be noted that the distinction in between the determination of lease by giving a notice to quit and determination of lease due to forfeiture clause i.e. of Clauses (g) and (h) of Section 114 of the T.P. Act, was not pointed out to the learned Judge in the case of Surjeet Singh (supra). Having noticed the legal provisions, it may be noted that the distinction in between the determination of lease by giving a notice to quit and determination of lease due to forfeiture clause i.e. of Clauses (g) and (h) of Section 114 of the T.P. Act, was not pointed out to the learned Judge in the case of Surjeet Singh (supra). The judgment in the case of Surjeet Singh is based upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Arjun Khiama Makhijani (supra). 27. The judgment of Surjeet Singh case has not been followed by this Court in the case of Mohammad Nasir (supra) and has been distinguished as is clear from para-19 of the judgment therein. This Court has gone to the extent of saying in the case of Vinod Kumar Rastogi (supra) that the Surjeet Singh (supra) does not lay down correct law and is per incuriam. Therefore, reliance placed by the learned Senior Counsel on the case of Surjeet Singh is misplaced one. 28. Lastly, it was urged that the tenant could not pay the rent inspite of his best efforts. It was further stated that the landlords were confined to jail for certain period. Elaborating the argument, it was submitted that there is no fault on the part of the tenant in not timely making the payment of monthly rent. Be that as it may, the ejectment has not been sought for on the ground of non-payment of rent but on the ground that the tenancy has been determined and the provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 are not applicable. 29. Now I take up the third point for determination. The argument of the tenant is that in the plaint it has been claimed that the tenant is in arrears of rent since August, 2003 while the plaintiff’s witness P.W.-1 in his deposition has stated that the tenant is in arrears of rent since August, 2004. The contention of the learned Senior Counsel is that in view of the above statement of P.W.-1, the trial judge was not justified in decreeing the suit for recovery of arrears of rent since August, 2003. I have given careful consideration to the aforesaid submission of the tenant and also examined the original record. The contention of the learned Senior Counsel is that in view of the above statement of P.W.-1, the trial judge was not justified in decreeing the suit for recovery of arrears of rent since August, 2003. I have given careful consideration to the aforesaid submission of the tenant and also examined the original record. A plain reading to the plaint would show that a simple suit for recovery of arrears of rent, damages and ejectment was instituted wherein it has been pleaded specifically in para-8 that the defendant tenant is in arrears of rent since August, 2003. The defendant in his written statement has not denied the contents of the said paragraph specifically. He has not come out with the case in the written statement that he was in arrears of rent for a different period. The written statement contains 27 paragraphs but in none of these paragraphs the defendant pleaded that he was not in arrears of rent or has paid the rent up to date to the plaintiff. On the contrary, he has come out with the case that he was given an understanding by the plaintiff not to pay the rent as some dispute with the Income Tax Department was going on and that is the reason, he kept quite. Thus, it follows that there is no specific denial in the written statement that the defendant is not in arrears of rent since August, 2003. After noticing the pleadings of the parties, the evidence led by them in this regard may be considered. 30. In the examination-in-chief filed on affidavit, it is mentioned categorically that the defendant tenant is in arrears of rent since August, 2003. In the cross-examination he stated that the defendant is in arrears of rent since, 2004. On a bare perusal of the original record would show that there is overwriting on the year 2004. The learned Senior Counsel for the tenant has laid much emphasis on the said portion of the statement of the plaintiff. In my considered view, if the said portion is read in the context of the case, it is established beyond pale of doubt that the plaintiff is in arrears of rent since August, 2003. Noticeably, it is admitted case of the parties that the tenancy was terminated by the notice dated 8th December, 2003 which was received by the tenant on 10th December, 2003. Noticeably, it is admitted case of the parties that the tenancy was terminated by the notice dated 8th December, 2003 which was received by the tenant on 10th December, 2003. The suit giving rise to the present revision was instituted on 23rd February, 2004 as per report of the Sadar Munsrim on the plaint. The notice which was given in the month of December, 2003 and the plaint which was instituted on 23rd February, 2004, it is unthinkable and unimaginable that the plaintiff will plead that the tenant is in arrears of rent since, August 2004, the date which had not yet arrived at that time. The above conclusion also finds support from the statement of the defendant tenant, who has not disputed that he was not in arrears of rent since August, 2003. 31. Interestingly the tenant who has examined himself as D.W.-1 has in his cross-examination stated that he was in the arrears of rent since August when the suit was instituted. The relevant portion is reproduced below: “nkok nk;j gqvk mlesa vxLr 2003 dk fdjk;k okftc FkkA” This clinches the issue and it is held that the defendant was in arrears of rent since August, 2003 as held by the Court below. 32. Before parting with the case, it may be noted that in this case, the interim stay order was obtained on 28th June, 2005 staying the eviction from the premises in question provided the tenant deposits the decreetal amount and goes on depositing the monthly rent as and when it falls due. The tenant has enjoyed the stay order for the last five years by depositing damages at the rate of Rs. 3000/- per month. It has been held by the Apex Court in the case of Atma Ram Properties (P) Ltd. v. Fedral Motors (P) Ltd., (2005) 1 SCC 705 , that there is every justification for the appellate court to put the appellant tenant on terms and direct him to compensate the landlord by payment of a reasonable amount which is not necessarily the same as the contractual rate of rent. The tenant has enjoyed the premises for all these five years. 33. It is, therefore, provided that the tenant shall be liable to pay the damages for the period from July, 2005 till delivery of the judgment at the rate of Rs. 4000/-. 34. The tenant has enjoyed the premises for all these five years. 33. It is, therefore, provided that the tenant shall be liable to pay the damages for the period from July, 2005 till delivery of the judgment at the rate of Rs. 4000/-. 34. In view of the above, I do not find any merit in the above submissions of the learned counsel for the applicant. No other point was pressed. The present revision lacks merit and is dismissed accordingly with costs throughout. The applicant is granted time to vacate the disputed accommodation on or before 31st December, 2010 subject to the following conditions: (1) The applicant shall deposit the entire arrears of rents and damages as indicated above after adjusting the amount, if any, already deposited for the period upto 31 December, 2010 within a period of one month from today before trial Court. (2) Within the aforesaid period, the applicant shall file an undertaking on affidavit before the trial Court that he will vacate the disputed accommodation on or before 31st December, 2010 and shall hand over its peaceful vacant possession to the plaintiff landlord without creating any third party interest. 35. In case of default in compliance of the conditions stipulated above, the time granted shall stand vacated automatically. If the applicant fails to vacate the disputed accommodation on or before 31.12.2010, he shall be liable to pay the damages @ Rs. 5000/- per month w.e.f. 1.1.2011 till the date of actual delivery of possession. —————