JUDGMENT By the Court.—Heard Sri M.A. Qadir, Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Shamim Ahmad, Advocate for the appellants, and Sri Ashok Khare, Senior Advocate assisted by Sri W.A. Siddiqui, for opposite party No. 4, Sri M.S. Pipersenia and Dr. Y.K. Srivastava, standing counsel, appearing for opposite party No. 1,2 and 3. 2. This special appeal is directed against the order and judgment dated 5.5.2010 passed by Hon’ble Single Judge in Civil Misc. W.P. No. 21478 of 2010. 3. The writ petition was filed by Jamia Rizviya Merajul-Uloom, Chilmapur, District Gorakhpur, hereinafter referred to as ‘the Society’ through its Secretary/ Manager Mohd. Fakhruddin Khan son of Farzand Ali, and Mohd. Fakhruddin Khan, claiming himself to be the Secretary/ Manager, for setting aside the order dated 27.3.2010 passed by the Assistant Registrar, Firms, Societies and Chits, Gorakhpur, herein after referred to as ‘the Assistant Registrar’. By this order, the Assistant Registrar did not approve the papers submitted by petitioner Mohd. Fakhruddin Khan and respondent No. 4 Karimullah Khan, regarding constitution of the Committee of Management of the Society and did direct that the election of the Committee of Management of the Society be held under Section 25(2) of the Societies Registration Act, 1860. From the list of forty five members of the general body of the Society after excluding Mohd. Fakhruddin Khan shown at serial No. 17 and has nominated District Minority Welfare Officer, Gorakhpur as the Election Officer for holding the election. 4. In nutshell the facts of the case are that the ‘society’ runs a Madarsa known as Jamia Razviya Merajul Uloom, Chilmapur, Distirct Gorakhpur, which is a duly recognized Madrsa and is also in the list of grant-in-aid of the State Government. The term of the office bearers of the society is five years and it is renewed from time to time. The last renewal was made on the application dated 8.11.2006 submitted by Farzand Ali, the father of the petitioner No. 2. Thus the certificate of renewal was granted on 15.11.2006 for a period of 5 years which is operative up to 7.8.2011. 5. According to the petitioner/ appellant after said election, certain developments, which had taken place, are; (i) member Mohd. Thus the certificate of renewal was granted on 15.11.2006 for a period of 5 years which is operative up to 7.8.2011. 5. According to the petitioner/ appellant after said election, certain developments, which had taken place, are; (i) member Mohd. Yusuf Khan @ Kanchhed was removed from the office of membership of the society for continued absence in three meetings as also held on 11.12.2006 and in his place the petitioner No. 2 was enrolled as member. (ii) Sri Karimullah Khan, the respondent No. 4 was the Assistant Secretary of Society, however he had resigned which was accepted and in his place vide resolution of the society dated 25.3.2007, Shri Zafar Ahmad was elected as Assistant Secretary. (iii) Subsequently, on 20.5.2007, Shri Farzand Ali, the Secretary had also resigned from the Office of Secretary, and in his place Shri Zafar Ahmad was elected as Secretary. (iv) On 7.3.2008, Shri Zafar Ahmad Khan had also resigned from the office of Secretary which was accepted in Resolution dated 9.3.2008 and the petitioner No. 2 Mohd. Fakhruddin Khan was elected as Manager/Secretary on 9.3.2008. (v) The petitioner No. 2 also sent a letter dated 18.3.2008 to the Assistant Registrar, Firms Societies and Chits communicating that he has been elected as Manager and for registration list of office bearers, on which the list of office bearers for the years 2007-08, 2008-09 was dully certified by the Assistant Registrar. Mohd. Fakhruddin Khan further sent papers to the District Minority Welfare Officer, who attested the signatures of Mohd. Fakhruddin Khan as Manager of Madarsa on 2.5.2008. Just after his becoming Manager, Karimullah Khan had been creating disturbance. Earlier Karimullah Khan got a complaint made by one temporary teacher Smt. Sharmila Begum before the District Magistrate and the District Magistrate had wrongly ceased the power of Mohd. Fakhruddin Khan by order dated 6.10.2008, the said order was stayed by this Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petition NO. 55257 of 2008 filed by Committee of Management. The said writ petition is still pending. 6. Fakhruddin Khan by order dated 6.10.2008, the said order was stayed by this Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petition NO. 55257 of 2008 filed by Committee of Management. The said writ petition is still pending. 6. One Shaukat Ali Noori was the Head Master of the Madarsa, however, vide resolution dated 14.8.2009, passed by the committee of management, the said Head Master was suspended on the basis of preliminary inquiry pending departmental proceedings which has been communicated to him by the manager of the said Madarsa, vide letter dated 22.9.2009, and the same has also been published in the news papers. On 14.8.2009, the Principal/Manager was suspended and Kabir Ahmad, Karimullah Khan, Farzand Ali were removed from the membership of the Society. The said resolution was accorded by the respondent No. 2 vide letter dated 22.9.2009. 7. It has further been alleged that on the other hand, Karimullah Khan, who had colluded with the suspended Head Master, filed an application with Assistant Registrar annexing therewith the resolution of alleged meeting dated 16.8.2009, on which the Assistant Registrar sent two notices dated 12.10.2009 and 14.10.2009 to the petitioners, to which Mohd. Fakhruddin Khan petitioner No. 1, had submitted detailed reply dated 26.10.2009. 8. Since Karimullah Khan had relied upon a Fatwa dated 6.7.2009 in its resolution dated 16.8.2009, issued by Mohd. Afzal Rizvi Marqazi Darul Ifta, 82, Saudagaran, Bareilly Sharif, after coming to know about said Fatwa, Mohd. Fakhruddin Khan had sent a letter dated 15.1.2010 to Mohd. Afzal Rizvi Marqazi Darul Ifta, 82, Saudagaran, Bareilly Sharif, who had given the Fatwa. On 4.11.2009, Mohd. Fakhruddin Khan had filed an application along with previous resolution and records. On 14.11.2009 and 15.12.2009, which was the date fixed, Fakhruddin Khan did not submit any reply on 15.12.2009. He submitted reply before the Respondent No. 2 which was served on the petitioners on 30.12.2009. On 30.12.2009, the matter was adjourned for 16.2.2010 whereas, on 16.2.2010, the Presiding Officer was out of station therefore, the case was adjourned for 5.3.2010. On 30.12.2009, the case was adjourned for 28.1.2010 and on that day the matter was fixed for 5.3.2010 as Presiding Officer was out of station. On 5.3.2010, it was Friday, the petitioner No. 2 remained present in the office of respondent No. 2 from 10 A.M. to 12 P.M. However, he had gone to offer Friday prayer asking his Counsel to obtain date. On 5.3.2010, it was Friday, the petitioner No. 2 remained present in the office of respondent No. 2 from 10 A.M. to 12 P.M. However, he had gone to offer Friday prayer asking his Counsel to obtain date. The counsel remained watching the case, but neither case was called out nor hearing had taken place on 5.3.2010, and the learned respondent No. 2 had reserved the orders without commencing the hearing ex parte. The findings contrary to these facts, in the impugned order are incorrect and are perverse. On 8.3.2010, the petitioners had submitted an application, to respondent No. 2. Without affording opportunity of hearing to the petitioners by order dated 27.3.2010, the respondent No. 2 had passed the impugned order. The respondent No. 2 has made incorrect observations in the impugned order dated 27.3.2010; that Mohd. Fakhruddin Khan had resigned on 9.4.2008, Karimullah Khan had submitted complaint on 7.5.2009 or on 8.9.2009 in fact, the complaint was made by Karimullah Khan was on 5.9.2008. The petitioners have not been supplied any copy of complaint dated 7.5.2008 and 8.9.2008 nor copy had ever been supplied to the petitioners nor they are aware; that hearing of case had taken place on 4.3.2010. 9. The respondent No. 2 has no right or authority to pass the impugned order as he has not given any opportunity of hearing to the petitioners before passing the impugned order. Thus the order dated 27.3.2010, passed by respondent No. 2 is wholly without jurisdiction and is liable to be dismissed. He has wrongly directed the District Minority Welfare Officer to hold the election on the basis of list registered in 2006-07. 10. There are two main contentions of the learned counsel for the appellants Sri M.A. Qadir, firstly he argues that this was a case of election dispute and the Assistant Registrar should have referred the matter to the Prescribed Authority under Section 25 (2) of the Societies Registration Act, and secondly he argues that even if the Registrar had the power to decide the matter, he has decided it incorrectly and hence, the order of the Registrar as well as its part affirmation by Hon’ble Single Judge is also incorrect. For convenience Section 25 of the Societies Registration Act is being reproduced below : “25. For convenience Section 25 of the Societies Registration Act is being reproduced below : “25. Disputes regarding election of office-bearers.—(1) The prescribed authority may, on a reference made to it by the Registrar or by at least one-fourth of the members of a society registered in Uttar Pradesh, hear and decide in a summary manner any doubt or dispute in respect of the election or continuance in office of an office-bearer of such society, and may pass such orders in respect thereof as it deems fit. 11. Broken into its basic components, the Section has following ingredients: (a)There is a prescribed authority, which can summarily decide; (i) any doubt or dispute in respect of the election, (ii) continuance in office of an office- bearers of such society. THIS CAN BE DONE; (iii) on a reference made by the Registrar or (iv) on a reference made by one fourth of the members of a Society registered in U.P. 12. While stressing on point No. 1 learned counsel for the appellants has taken a ground in the appeal that four case laws were referred by him, which have not been looked into by the learned Single Judge at all. These judgments, he argues, lay down that the Registrar should refer the case of election dispute to the Prescribed Authority. In this regard the first case referred by the learned counsel for the appellants is Urwa Bazar Educational Society, Gorakhpur and another v. Assistant Registrar, Firms, societies and Units, Division, Gorakhpur and others, 1988 UPLBEC 515. On careful examination of the facts of aforesaid case, it appears that the rival claims of the parties were pending before the Assistant Registrar for renewal of the registration of the Society. The list with regard to the election held on 29.1.1986 had not got resolved. The District Inspector of Schools was not vested with the power either under the U.P. Intermediate Education Act or the Regulations framed thereunder, to pass any order recognizing the committee till dispute was legally settled. District Inspector of Schools, Gorakhpur having this fact in mind, and in view of the ameliorating the plight of the employees and teachers passed an order on 29.3.1986 purporting to be under Section 5(1) of the Payment of Salaries Act, 1971. Simultaneously, the District Inspector of Schools passed a fresh order on 17.4.1986 recognizing one committee with Narsingh Prasad Singh as Manager. Simultaneously, the District Inspector of Schools passed a fresh order on 17.4.1986 recognizing one committee with Narsingh Prasad Singh as Manager. This was the dispute in the writ petition. 13. It is very clear from the facts of the above mentioned case that the recognition of one of the rival committees could not have been decided by the Registrar. It involved the determination of the question as to which of the committee of which persons named above, have been duly elected. The Assistant Registrar proceeded to decide this dispute and renewed the registration of the society, of which Khirodhi Singh was the Manager. This was not within the domain or competence of the Assistant Registrar. It should have been referred to the Prescribed Authority and hence the order was quashed. Therefore, it is abundantly clear that the facts of the case are entirely different from the facts of the present dispute, hence this case law was definitely not a good authority to decide the controversy in the present writ petition, hence the learned Single Judge rightly ignored it. 14. The second case referred to by Mr. Qadir is of Vijai Narain Singh v. Registrars, Firms, Societies and Chits Registration, U.P. Lucknow and others, 1981 UPLBEC 308. This is again reiteration that the election dispute should be referred to prescribed authority. Nobody can dispute this law but the facts of the present case are otherwise, hence this case law is also not applicable. 15. The third case law is Committee of Management, Gramothan Shiksha Parishad Gramothan Junior High School Barwala District Muzaffarnagar and another v. Zila Basic Shiksha Adhikari, Muzaffarnagar and another, 1987 UPLBEC 989. Para-5 of the judgment is quoted below : “The dispute between the parties is which election is valid the one held on 10.2.1986 at which respondent Santosh Kumar has been elected as Manager or the one held on 23.2.1986, at which the petitioner was elected as Manager ? The provisions contained in Section 25 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), cover disputes regarding the election before the Assistant Registrar and in such circumstances it was incumbent upon the Assistant Registrar to refer the dispute between the parties to the Prescribed Authority under Section 25(1) of the Act. The provisions contained in Section 25 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), cover disputes regarding the election before the Assistant Registrar and in such circumstances it was incumbent upon the Assistant Registrar to refer the dispute between the parties to the Prescribed Authority under Section 25(1) of the Act. Instead of doing what he was required to do under the law, the Assistant Registrar has in his order dated 22/24.5.1986 observed that it was open to the petitioner to invoke the jurisdiction of the Prescribed Authority along with 1/4th member of the Society under Section 25(1) of the Act. This approach of the Assistant Registrar was obviously not proper and this is well proved by the series of litigations referred to above.” 16. It is again obvious that there was clear election dispute in this case and hence should have been referred to prescribed authority by the Registrar but the facts of the case are not applicable in the present case. 17. So far case No. 4, Committee of Management, Kisan Shiksha Sadan, Banksahi, District Basti and another v. Assistant Registrar, Firms, Societies and Chits, Gorakhpur Region, Gorakhpur and another, (1995) 2 UPLBEC 1242, it has been laid down in para 3 of the judgment as follows : “Having regard to the provisions of the Act, we see force in the submission of the learned counsel for the Respondents. Section 4 of the Act provides that a list of members of the managing body of a society shall be filed with the Registrar. That list is maintained by the Registrar for the purpose of performing his administrative functions as a Registrar. Section 25 of the Act provides that whenever any doubt or dispute is raised regarding the election of members of a managing body of a Society, the Registrar may refer such doubt or dispute to the Prescribed Authority for his decision. But when one fourth members of the Society raise a doubt or dispute relating to the election of the members of managing body or Society, the matter automatically goes to the Prescribed Authority for decision and in such a case the Registrar does not come into the picture. But when one fourth members of the Society raise a doubt or dispute relating to the election of the members of managing body or Society, the matter automatically goes to the Prescribed Authority for decision and in such a case the Registrar does not come into the picture. In exercising this power whether to refer or not any doubt or dispute relating to the election of members of the managing body of a Society to the Prescribed Authority, the Registrar has to apply his mind to the facts of the case and take a decision. In taking such a decision, the Registrar will be quite justified to take into account all the relevant circumstances, as he has done in the present case. If an objection is raised about the membership of a person. In our view, it is the duty of the Registrar, for his own administrative purpose, to enquire into whether the person concerned is a member of the Society or not. If the Registrar comes to the conclusion that such a person is not a member of the Society then he under no obligation to refer the dispute or doubt relating to his election to the Prescribed Authority for decision. In the present case, the Registrar has applied his mind to the facts of the case to find out whether the second appellant herein or was not a member of the Shiksha Sadan. He found that he was not even a member of a Society. It is a pure question of facts. If any person feels aggrieved by such a decision, the proper course to him is to approach the Civil Court and seek appropriate relief. The Registrar is bound by the decision of the Civil Court and his decision will be subject to the decree passed by the Civil Court.” 18. The ratio of this judgment is that where there is a dispute of primary membership of a person for the Society or a complaint is received that a member is not a valid member of the Society, then the Registrar, who under Section 4 of the Act maintains the list of the members, can take cognizance and apply his mind to the facts and declare whether a person is the valid member or not. It appears that the present case is more likely to fall under Section 4 rather than 25 of the Act. It appears that the present case is more likely to fall under Section 4 rather than 25 of the Act. The Registrar has simply declared that Fakhruddin Khan is not a valid member of the Committee of Management, hence his appointment as the Secretary/ Manager of the Committee of Management, could also not be approved. The Registrar, in his order, has simply decided the membership issue and not the election dispute. Hence the first contention of the learned counsel for the appellants fails to the extent that the Registrar was under obligation to send the matter to the Prescribed Authority. The Registrar was fully competent to decide the membership issue which he has decided vide his order dated 27.3.2010. 19. The question, which remains to be decided now is whether the decision of the Registrar is valid or not and whether the Registrar has proceeded in accordance with law or not. There are two relevant dates; one is 14.8.2009 and the other 16.8.2009. The contention of the counsel for opposite party led by Karimullah Khan is that no meeting took place on 14.8.2009. The meeting has been shown only on papers and it has been back dated. The contention of the petitioners- appellants is that the meeting held on 16.8.2009 was not legally tenable as the members who are said to have voted in the meeting, were already ousted by the resolution dated 14.8. 2009. One important thing about the meeting held on 14.8.2009 is that it was sent to the Registrar office with unreasonable delay and it has reached the office on 4.11.2009 20. It is the petitioner/appellant case that on 14.8.2009, the Committee of Management of the Society passed a resolution removing Karimullah Khan, Kabir Ahmad and Farzand Ali, as members of the general body of the Society. The said resolution was approved by the Assistant Registrar on 22.9.2009. On the other hand, it has been alleged that the Committee of Management of the Society vide a resolution dated 16.8.2009 Mohd. Fhakhruddin Khan was removed from the membership of the general body as well as office bearer of the Committee of Management of the Society, since he had been enrolled in contravention of clause 12 of bylaws of the Society and Fatwa had been issued on 6.7.2009 to this effect by Mohd. Afzal Rizvi Marqazi Darul Ifta, 82, Saudagaran, Bareilly Sharif, Bareily. 21. Main argument of Mr. Afzal Rizvi Marqazi Darul Ifta, 82, Saudagaran, Bareilly Sharif, Bareily. 21. Main argument of Mr. Qadir, learned senior counsel for the petitioners/ appellants is that when Karimullah Khan had been removed as member of the general body of the Society, in the meeting held on 14.8.2009, he could not have participated in the meeting of the Committee of Management held on 16.8.2009, nor he could had been elected as Secretary/ Manager of the Committee of Management of the Society. The decision taken in this meeting, is of no consequence since quorum was not complete, if the member who had been removed on 4.8.2009 are excluded. His further argument is that Fhakhruddin Khan remains a loyal Sunni as required and his membership is not in contravention of the rule- 12 of the bylaws of the Society. He could not have been removed on that ground and the Registrar has committed manifest error, in excluding his name from its membership. Further, the Registrar should not have relied upon the Fatwa issued on 7.2.2010 without giving any opportunity to Mohd. Fhakhruddin, to file his reply that in fact he had never agreed to abide by Fatwa as has been mentioned in the impugned order. 22. Hon’ble Single Judge has dealt with each and every argument of learned Senior Advocate. Hon’ble Single Judge has given finding that the Registrar had not simply acted upon the Fatwa. Initially the Fatwa was issued on 6.7. 2009 by Bareily Sharif, on the basis of which the Committee of Management on 16.8.2009 removed Mohd. Fhakhruddin Khan from the membership of the general body and consequently from the post of Secretary/ Manager. Later on 7.2.2010 a categorical Fatwa was given that Mohd. Fhakhruddin was not a loyal member of Sunnat Jamat, hence the Registrar has only acted on the basis of the resolution dated 16.8.2009, which was in fact supported by Fatwa. The action of the Registrar is based on the resolution of the the Committee of Management rather than the Fatwa. The Fatwa has been used by the Registrar in order to clarify his mind about requirement of clause 12 of the bylaws. In order to see whether resolution passed by the Committee of Management on 16.8.2009 was inconsonance with the spirit of clause 12, the Registrar has relied upon the Fatwa. The Fatwa has been used by the Registrar in order to clarify his mind about requirement of clause 12 of the bylaws. In order to see whether resolution passed by the Committee of Management on 16.8.2009 was inconsonance with the spirit of clause 12, the Registrar has relied upon the Fatwa. It is a religious matter, a Fatwa by the religious Institution only helped the Registrar to reach to the conclusion that the resolution dated 16.8.2009 removing the name of Mohd. Fhakhruddin Khan was actually in consonance with the spirit of the bylaws. Further the Assistant Registrar has issued notice to both the parties on 12.10.2009 to appear before him and file their evidence. It has also been observed by Hon’ble Single Judge, that the Fatwa dated 7.2.2010 was issued with the consent of both the parties. It appears that all the aspect has been considered by Hon’ble Single Judge while dealing with the matter. So far resolution dated 14.8.2009 is concerned, no satisfactory reply has been given by the petitioners- appellants about the delay in communicating the same to the Assistant Registrar. Moreover, it is also not clear as to what was the occasion for Mohd. Fhakhruddin Khan to pass resolution dated 14.8.2009 and expel the three members. The reasoning given by Hon’ble Single Judge that the resolution dated 14.8.2009 appears to be back-dated, although is not based on any factual evidence, but leads to a most satisfactory and logical conclusion that the resolution was forged and back-dated to nullify the effect of resolution dated 16.8.2009. 23. Thus, after hearing respective arguments of both the learned senior Advocates, going through the case laws cited and perusing the documents annexed, we come to a definite conclusion that there was no election dispute. The matter before the Registrar was simply a dispute of membership which could very well be decided by the Registrar on the basis of powers vested to him under the Act. There was no material before the Registrar to refer the case to the Prescribed Authority under Section 25 of the Act. The Registrar had decided that the appellant was not a valid member of the Society as he was granted membership in contravention of Rule 12 of the Bylaws. In reaching to this conclusion, he has given notice to the appellant. All the arguments have been dealt with satisfactorily by Hon’ble Single Judge. The Registrar had decided that the appellant was not a valid member of the Society as he was granted membership in contravention of Rule 12 of the Bylaws. In reaching to this conclusion, he has given notice to the appellant. All the arguments have been dealt with satisfactorily by Hon’ble Single Judge. We are in complete agreement with the view drawn by him. 24. The appeal is misconceived and devoid of merit. It is accordingly dismissed. However, without imposing any costs. ————— [2010(9) ADJ 91 (DB)] ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT BEFORE : RAJES KUMAR AND BHARATI SAPRU, JJ. M/s. DHAMPUR SUGAR MILLS LTD. DHAMPUR, BIJNOR ...Petitioner Versus ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, NAJIBABAD, BIJNOR AND OTHERS .....Respondents (Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 2991 (Tax) of 2002, decided on 9th September, 2010) Income Tax Act, 1961—Sections 147 and 149—Notice—Issuance of—Re-Assessment of—Proceedings against Assessment year 1995-96—Escaped income—Notice could be issued beyond the period of four years and within period of six years if escaped income rupees one lac or more for that year—Since in present case impugned notice issued under Section 148 of the Act barred by limitation issued beyond the period of limitation, as no case of failure on part of the assessee to disclose fully and trully material fact necessary for assessment for the assessment year made out—Notice issued under Section 148 of the Act liable to be quashed. [Paras 15, 16, 17 and 18] Result; Petition Allowed. Cases cited : 247 ITR 436; 262 ITR 605; 272 ITR 154; (2009) 308 ITR 190 (Bom); 2007 UPTC 419; 226 ITR 156; 320 ITR 561 (SC); (2000) 10 SCC 241 ; 256 ITR 721; (2008) 299 ITR 321 (Para 6); 2003 SC 456; 248 ITR 493; 221 ITR 538 (Para 7); (2010) 323 ITR 564 (Bom); (2010) 324 ITR 48 (Bom); (2001) 251 ITR 416; (2010) 323 ITR 323 (Bom); (2000) 242 ITR 173; (2009) 319 ITR 282 (Guj.); (2010) 320 ITR 458 (Guj) (Para 17). Counsel : R.R. Agrawal for the Petitioner; C.S.C. for the Respondents. JUDGMENT Hon’ble Rajes Kumar, J.—In the present writ petition, the petitioner is seeking the following reliefs: (a) “issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the notice dated 5.3.2002 (Annexure-6) issued by the Assistant Commissioner of Income-Tax, Najibabad, District Bijnor, respondent No. 1. Counsel : R.R. Agrawal for the Petitioner; C.S.C. for the Respondents. JUDGMENT Hon’ble Rajes Kumar, J.—In the present writ petition, the petitioner is seeking the following reliefs: (a) “issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the notice dated 5.3.2002 (Annexure-6) issued by the Assistant Commissioner of Income-Tax, Najibabad, District Bijnor, respondent No. 1. (b) issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the notice dated 27.9.2002 (Annexure-14) issued by the Assistant Commissioner of Income-Tax, Najibabad, District Bijnor, respondent No. 1. (c) issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of prohibition restraining respondent No. 1 from proceeding with reassessment proceeding under Section 148 of the Income-Tax Act for the assessment year 1995-96. (d) issue any other writ, order or direction which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case. (e) award cost to the petitioner.” 2. The brief facts of the case giving rise to the present writ petition are that the petitioner is a Company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 and carried on the business of manufacture and sales of Sugar and Chemical, etc. The petitioner had two Sugar Units in the State of U.P. The first Sugar Unit was situated at Dhampur, District Bijnor and other Unit was situated at Rouzagaon, District Barabanki. 3. For the assessment year 1995-96, the petitioner filed return on 30.11.1995 disclosing a loss of Rs. 20,61,04,870/-, which included the loss suffered in the assessment year 1995-96 to the extent of Rs. 69,80,314/-. Initially the return of the petitioner was processed under Section 143 (1) (a) of the Income-Tax Act (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”). Subsequently, the case of the petitioner was selected for scrutiny and a notice under Section 143 (2) of the Act was issued and the assessment under Section 143 (3) of the Act had been completed on 3.3.1998. The Assessing Authority made an addition of Rs. 6,51,75,548/- (Rs.4,22,93,200/- for Dhampur Unit and Rs. 2,28,82,348/- for Rouzagaon Unit) on account of under valuation of closing stock. 4. Being aggrieved by the assessment order, the petitioner filed appeal before the Commissioner of Income-Tax (Appeals) (in short CIT (Appeals). The CIT (Appeals) vide order dated 1.2.1999 allowed the appeal in so far as addition was made on account of valuation of closing stock and deleted the addition. 4. Being aggrieved by the assessment order, the petitioner filed appeal before the Commissioner of Income-Tax (Appeals) (in short CIT (Appeals). The CIT (Appeals) vide order dated 1.2.1999 allowed the appeal in so far as addition was made on account of valuation of closing stock and deleted the addition. Later on, respondent No. 1 has issued a notice dated 5.3.2002 under Section 148 read with Section 147 of the Act to reopen the assessment for the assessment year 1995-96. The petitioner sought the reasons on the basis of which notice has been issued. Respondent No. 1, vide letter dated 26.7.2002 supplied the reasons. The reasons for the issuing the notice are reproduced herein below: “Office of the Assistant Commissioner of Income-Tax, Najibabad F. N0. D-10 The 26th July, 2002 To, MS Dhampur Sugar Mills Ltd. Khampur. Sub-Reassessment proceeding U/s 147 of the I.T. Act 1961 AY 95-96 Reasons regarding. With reference to your letter dated 15-03-02 on the subject stated above, the reasons recorded for assessment are being supplied here under : 1. Perused of P & L A/c reveals that you have debited a sum of Rs. 7,50,24,520/- on account of excise duty has not been taken into consideration while valuing the closing stock. There was an increase of Rs. 1,91,838 Qhs in closing stock, so, at the prevailing rate of excise duty i.e. @ Rs. 85/- quintals, value of closing stock should have been increased by Rs. 1,63,06,230/-. 2. The details of interest transferees that in same case flat rate of interest has been applied, while in some other case product basis, has been applied, resulting in short computation. (i) M.S U.P. Stand & Agro Products Ltd. Agwanpori Rs. 8.49 lacs (ii) VLS Finance Ltd. New Delhi Rs. 15.41 (iii) Kotak Mahindra Finance, Bombay Rs. 7.15 Total [Rs. 31.05] Further as per schedule ‘8’ of balance sheet, Rs. 11.5 lacs interest receivable and Rs. 5 lacs interest recoverable were to be included in taxable income. The above amounts have escaped amount. S/d 26-7-2002" 5. Heard Sri R.R. Agrawal, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Shambhu Chopra, learned Standing Counsel. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that notice under Section 148 read with Section 147 of the Act has been admittedly issued on 5.3.2002 beyond the period of four years. The above amounts have escaped amount. S/d 26-7-2002" 5. Heard Sri R.R. Agrawal, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Shambhu Chopra, learned Standing Counsel. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that notice under Section 148 read with Section 147 of the Act has been admittedly issued on 5.3.2002 beyond the period of four years. For the assessment year 1995-96, the period of four years expired on 31.3.2000 while it was issued on 5.3.2002. He submitted that the proceeding under Section 147 of the Act can only be taken beyond the period of four years in case where there is failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment, for that assessment year. He submitted that the petitioner has disclosed fully and truly all material facts necessary for the assessment along with return and during the course of the assessment proceeding and on consideration of such materials, the assessment order under Section 143 (3) of the Act was passed. He submitted that in the reasons recorded, there is no whisper that the petitioner failed to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for the assessment and, therefore, the initiation of the proceeding is patently barred by limitation. He further submitted that so far as ground No. 1 is concerned, the petitioner has already furnished complete details relating to the valuation of closing stock for the Units Dhampur and Rouzagaon Sugar Mills vide letter dated 23.12.1997. He submitted that as per the accounting policy schedule 17 the excise duty has not been included in the stock as on 31.3.1995, inasmuch as the excise duty was payable at the time of removal of goods. He submitted that on a consideration of the complete details, which were available at the time of assessment proceeding, the Assessing Authority has enhanced the valuation of closing stock in the assessment order which has been deleted in appeal by the CIT (Appeals). Therefore, it is not open to the Assessing Authority to raise the issue relating to the valuation of closing stock and to reopen the proceeding on this ground. So far as second ground is concerned, it is stated that vide letter dated 15.9.1997 the petitioner has filed the details of the interest received and receivable during the course of the assessment proceeding and the reconciliation chart reveals that an amount of Rs. So far as second ground is concerned, it is stated that vide letter dated 15.9.1997 the petitioner has filed the details of the interest received and receivable during the course of the assessment proceeding and the reconciliation chart reveals that an amount of Rs. 11,49,978/- has already been charged to income tax. The interest was calculated on product basis. It was duly considered during the course of the assessment proceeding and in the assessment order and has been charged to tax. So far as ground No. 3 is concerned, it is submitted that the figure of Rupees 5 lac interest recoverable is taken by mistake as there is no such amount in the balance sheet as on 31.3.1995. He submitted that notice under Section 148 of the Act has been issued merely on the basis of the audit objection and merely on account of change of opinion and without any material of escaped assessment. In support of the contention that the proceeding is barred by limitation inasmuch as it has been initiated beyond the period of four years, he relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of Former v. Commissioner of Income-Tax and another, 247 ITR 436, the decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of (1) Simplex Concrete Piles (INDIA) Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Income-Tax and others, 262 ITR 605, the decision of the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Banswara Syntex Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Income-Tax, 272 ITR 154; a decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Asteroids Trading and investments P. Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Income-Tax, (2009) 308 ITR 190 (Bom); the decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of M/s. Universal Subscription Agency Pvt. Ltd., Kanpur v. Joint Commissioner of Income Tax, Kanpur, 2007 UPTC 419; the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of 226 ITR 156 and the latest decision of this Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 1057 of 2006, Smt. Raj Rani Gulati, Kanpur Nagar v. Union of India and another, decided on 3.5.2010. Writ Petition No. 1057 of 2006, Smt. Raj Rani Gulati, Kanpur Nagar v. Union of India and another, decided on 3.5.2010. On the issue that the proceeding under Section 148 read with Section 147 of the Act cannot be initiated on account of change of opinion, he relied upon the latest decision of the Supreme Court of India in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax v. (1) Kelvenator of India Ltd., (2010), 320 ITR 561 (SC). He submitted that it is a settled principle of law that excise duty is not part of the closing stock. Reliance is placed on the decision of the Supreme Court of India in the case of Collector of Central Excise v. Polyset Corporation, (2000) 10 SCC 241 , the decision of Bombay High Court in the case of Caprihans India Ltd. v. Prakash Chandra and others, 256 ITR 721 and the decision of Madras High Court in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax v. Parry Confectionary Ltd., (2008) 299 ITR 321. He further submitted that the Assessing Authority had sought permission from the Joint Commissioner of Income Tax, Bijnor Range, Bijnor only on the first ground and no sanction had been sought on ground Nos. 2 & 3. 7. Sri Shambhu Chopra, learned Standing Counsel submitted that Section 149 of the Act provides limitation for issue of notice. He submitted that the notice under Section 148 can be issued beyond the period of four years and within the period of six years in case if the escaped income exceeds rupees one lac or more for that year. In the present case, the escaped income admittedly exceeds more than rupees one lac, therefore, the notice issued even beyond the period of four years and within a period of six years in case where there is no failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for the assessment is justified. Therefore, the notice issued on 5.3.2002 which was within the period of six years was within limitation. He submitted that there was sufficient material on record to show that there was escaped income and, therefore, the notice has been legally issued under Section 148 of the Act. Therefore, the notice issued on 5.3.2002 which was within the period of six years was within limitation. He submitted that there was sufficient material on record to show that there was escaped income and, therefore, the notice has been legally issued under Section 148 of the Act. He further submitted that mere production of books of account during the course of assessment proceeding does not amount to disclosure of all material facts in view of Explanation (1) to Section 147 of the Act. He placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Phool Chand Bajrang Lal and another v. Income-Tax Officer and another, 2003 SC 456, the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Grover Nursing Home v. Income-Tax Officer and others, 248 ITR 493 and the decision in the case of Sri Krishna Pvt. Ltd., Etc. v. Income Tax Officer and others, 221 ITR 538. 8. We have considered the rival submissions and gone through the records. 9. It would be useful to refer relevant provisions of the Act. “Section 147. v. Income Tax Officer and others, 221 ITR 538. 8. We have considered the rival submissions and gone through the records. 9. It would be useful to refer relevant provisions of the Act. “Section 147. If the Assessing Officer has reason to believe that any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for any assessment year, he may, subject to the provisions of Sections 148 to 153, assess or reassess such income and also any other income chargeable to tax which has escaped assessment and which comes to his notice subsequently in the course of the proceedings, under this section, or recompute the loss or the depreciation allowance or any other allowance, as the case may be, for the assessment year concerned (hereinafter in this section and in Sections 148 to 153 referred to as the relevant assessment years): Provided that where an assessment under sub-section (3) of Section 143 or this section has been made for the relevant assessment year, no action shall be taken under this section after the expiry of four years from the end of the relevant assessment year, unless any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for such assessment year by reason of the failure on the part of the assessee to make a return under Section 139 or in response to a notice issued under sub-section (1) of Section 142 or Section 148 or to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment, for that assessment year: Provided further that the Assessing Officer may assess or reassess such income, other than the income involving matters which are the subject matters of any appeal, reference or revision, which is chargeable to tax and has escaped assessment. Explanation 1.—Production before the Assessing Officer of account books or other evidence from which material evidence could with due diligence have been discovered by the Assessing Officer will not necessarily amount to disclosure within the meaning of the foregoing proviso. Explanation 1.—Production before the Assessing Officer of account books or other evidence from which material evidence could with due diligence have been discovered by the Assessing Officer will not necessarily amount to disclosure within the meaning of the foregoing proviso. Explanation 2.—For the purpose of this section, the following shall also be deemed to be cases where income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment, namely : (a) where no return of income has been furnished by the assessee although his total income or the total income of any other person in respect of which he is assessable under this Act during the previous year exceeded the maximum amount which is not chargeable to income-tax; (b) where a return of income has been furnished by the assessee but no assessment has been made and it is noticed by the Assessing Officer that the assessee has understated the income or has claimed excessive loss, deduction, allowance or relied in the return; (c) where an assessment has been made, but—— (i) income chargeable to tax has been underassessed; or (ii) such income has been assessed at too low a rate; or (iii) such income has been made the subject of excessive relief under this Act; or (iv) excessive loss or depreciation allowance or any other allowance under this Act has been computed. Explanation 3.—For the purpose of assessment or reassessment under this section, the Assessing Officer may assess or reassess the income in respect of any issue, which has escaped assessment, and such issue comes to his notice subsequently in the course of the proceedings under this section, notwithstanding that the reasons for such issue have not been included in the reasons recorded under sub-section (2) of Section 148.” Issue of notice where income has escaped assessment. Section 148 (1) Before making the assessment, reassessment or recomputation under Section 147, the Assessing Officer shall serve on the assessee a notice requiring him to furnish within such period, as may be specified in the notice, a return of his income or the income of any other person in respect of which he is assessable under this Act during the previous year corresponding to the relevant assessment year, in the prescribed form and verified in the prescribed manner and setting forth such other particulars as may be prescribed; and the provisions of this Act shall, so far as may be, apply accordingly as if such return were a return required to be furnished under Section 139:) Provided that in a case— (a) where a return has been furnished during the period commencing on the 1st day of October, 1991 and ending on the 30th day of September, 2005 in response to a notice served under this section, and (b) subsequently a notice has been served under sub-section (2) of Section 143 after the expiry of twelve months specified in the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 143, as it stood immediately before the amendment of said sub-section by the Finance Act, 2002 (20 of 2002) but before the expiry of the time limit for making the assessment, reassessment or recomputation as specified in sub-section (2) of Section 153, every such notice referred to in this clause shall be deemed to be a valid notice. Provided further that in a case—— (a) where a return has been furnished during the period commencing on the 1st day of October, 1991 and ending on the 30th day of September, 2005, in response to a notice served under this section, and (b) subsequently a notice has been served under clause (ii) of sub-section (2) of Section 143 after the expiry of twelve months specified in the proviso to clause (ii) of sub-section (2) of Section 143, but before the expiry of the time limit for making the assessment, reassessment or recomputation as specified in sub-section (2) of Section 153, every such notice referred to in this clause shall be deemed to be a valid notice. [Explanation—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that nothing contained in the first proviso or the second proviso shall apply to any return which has been furnished on or after the 1st day of October, 2005 in response to a notice served under this section.] [(2) The Assessing Officer shall, before issuing any notice under this section, record his reasons for doing so.] Time limit for notice. Section 149. [(1) No notice under Section 148 shall be issued for the relevant assessment year— [(a) if four years have elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year, unless the case falls under clause (b); b) if four years, but not more than six years, have elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year unless the income chargeable to tax which has escaped assessment amounts to or is likely to amount to one lakh rupees or more for that year.] Explanation.—In determining income chargeable to tax which has escaped assessment for the purposes of this sub-section, the provisions of Explanation 2 of Section 147 shall apply as they apply for the purposes of that section.) (2) The provisions of sub-section (1) as to the issue of notice shall be subject to the provisions of Section 151. (3) If the person on whom a notice under Section 148 is to be served is a person treated as the agent of a non-resident under Section 163 and the assessment, reassessment or recomputation to be made in pursuance of the notice is to be made on him as the agent of such non-resident, the notice shall not be issued after the expiry of a period of two years from the end of the relevant assessment year.” 10. Admittedly, the notice under Section 148 issued on 5.3.2002 was beyond the period of four years. There is no whisper in the reason recorded that there was failure on the part of the assessee to disclose the material fact for the purposes of assessment. We have perused the assessment order which reveal that the petitioner had furnished the complete details of closing stock and on consideration of such details, the value of the closing stock was enhanced and an addition was made towards closing stock, which has been subsequently deleted in appeal. The issue relating to under valuation has been considered in the assessment order in paragraph-11. The issue relating to under valuation has been considered in the assessment order in paragraph-11. So far as ground No. 2 relating to interest is concerned, the Assessing Authority has considered in paragraph-23 of the assessment order in details. In paragraph-23, the Assessing Authority has assessed the interest and dividend income as income from other sources which included the interest received from inter corporate loans at Rs. 1,07,39,953/-. The details of Rs. 1, 73,00,000/- is Annexure-B to the balance sheet wherein under the head the “Details of interest” the interest received on inter corporate loans of Rs. 1,07,39,953/- is shown. The details include the interest received for Rs. 7,08,904/- and Rs. 12,329/- from VLS Finance Limited, New Delhi on product basis, interest of Rs. 8,01,279/- from M/s U.P. Straw Board Agro Product Limited on product basis, and a sum of Rs. 9,18,357/- from M/s Kotak Mahindra Finance Limited, Bombay on product basis. Therefore, it cannot be said that the complete details of interest along with return and during the course of assessment proceeding were not filed. Such interest has also been considered in assessment order and has been assessed to tax. So far as third objection is concerned, namely, “as per schedule 8 of the balance sheet 11.5 lacs interest receivable and Rs. 5,00,000/- interest recoverable were to be included in the taxable income” is concerned, as per the Assessing Authority own observation, such details had been obtained from the balance sheet which was furnished by the Assessing Authority. Moreover in para 23 of the writ petition, it is stated, that the figure of Rs. 5,00,000/- towards interest recoverable, appears to have been mistakenly mentioned. There is no such amount for that head in the balance sheet as on 31.3.1995 of the petitioner. This paragraph has been replied by paragraph-12 of the counter affidavit filed by Shri Rama Kant Shukla, Income-Tax Inspector, wherein it is stated that the contents of paragraph-23 of the writ petition are not admitted as stated and it is submitted that the figure of Rs. 5,00,000/- has been inadvertently mentioned as interest receivable in letter dated dated 26.7.2002. This is actually “claims recoverable” amounting to Rs. 27,35,365/-. In this view of the matter so far as ground No. 3 is concerned, the amount has been inadvertently mentioned. 5,00,000/- has been inadvertently mentioned as interest receivable in letter dated dated 26.7.2002. This is actually “claims recoverable” amounting to Rs. 27,35,365/-. In this view of the matter so far as ground No. 3 is concerned, the amount has been inadvertently mentioned. Therefore, it is not the case of failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for the assessment. 11. It is also pertinent to refer some paragraphs of the writ petition, which have not been specifically denied in the counter affidavit. Para-23. “That regarding third objection, figure of Rs. 5 lacs of interest recoverable, it appears that they have mistakenly mentioned it as there is no such amount or head in the balance sheet as on 31.3.1995, of the petitioner. Para-26. That the petitioner had disclosed the matter fully and truly at the time of regular assessment proceedings. It had also furnished the details regarding closing stock specifically asserting that no provision of Excise Duty/liability in respect of goods manufactured and held in stock as on 31.3.1995 was made and valuation of the closing stock of both the units were furnished. Para-27. That the petitioner also furnished details of interest received in case of U.P. Staw Board and Agro Product Ltd., M/s V.L.S. Finance Ltd. and Kotek Mahindra Finance Ltd. and the list of interest charged showing the basis of charging interest, whereas at the time of proceeding it imposed interest on year end basis. Para-28. That the third objection was also dealt with as per Schedule 8 of the Balance Sheet, which was furnished by the assessing authority. Thus, the petitioner had disclosed the matter fully and truly and the material facts necessary for assessment in course of the regular assessment proceeding under Section 143 (3) of the Income Tax Act. Therefore, Explanation I of the proviso to Section 147 of the Act is not applicable, and accordingly, issuance of notice under Section 148 of the Act is wholly illegal, without jurisdiction and liable to be quashed.” 12. In view of the above, we are of the view that the present is not the case of failure on the part of the assessee to disclose the material facts. In view of the above, we are of the view that the present is not the case of failure on the part of the assessee to disclose the material facts. All the material facts relating to the valuation of closing stock and interest had been disclosed along with the return and during the course of the assessment proceeding which have been duly examined by the Assessing Authority while passing the assessment order. Further it is not the case of failure on the part of the assessee to make a return under Section 139, issued under sub-section (1) of Section 142 or Section 148. 13. The proviso to Section 147 clearly provides that where an assessment under sub-section (3) of Section 143 or this section has been made for the relevant assessment year, no action shall be taken under this Section after the expiry of four years from the end of of the relevant assessment year, unless any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for such assessment year by reason of the failure on the part of the assessee to make a return under Section 139 issued under sub-section (1) of Section 142 or Section 148 or to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment, for that assessment year. Therefore, in a case where the assessment has been made under Section 143 (3) of the Act, the limitation is only four years, unless the case falls under the exceptions mentioned in the proviso itself. No case has been made out that the case falls under the exception. In the reason recorded also there is no mention that there was a failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment and it could not be because, as stated above, the assessee has furnished complete details relating to valuation of closing stock and interest, which have been duly examined in details by the Assessing Authority in the assessment order. The Assessing Authority has made an addition on account of under valuation of stock, which has been deleted in the appeal on the ground that the assessee has followed the same method of valuing the stock, which had been followed in the earlier years. The Assessing Authority has made an addition on account of under valuation of stock, which has been deleted in the appeal on the ground that the assessee has followed the same method of valuing the stock, which had been followed in the earlier years. Moreover, the Apex Court has held that excise duty is payable at the time of removal of goods and, therefore, the excise duty cannot be included in the closing stock. 14. We do not find any substance in the argument of learned Standing Counsel that where the escaped income exceeds rupees one lac the limitation to issue notice is six years under Section 149 of the Act, whether the case falls under the exception of the proviso to Section 147, or not. 15. In our view both Sections 147 and 149 of the Act are to be read together. The proviso to Section 147 of the Act specifically provides the limitation for taking action under the said Section within four years and only in the exceptional case mentioned therein, namely, where there is failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for assessment for the assessment year, the proceeding can be initiated beyond the period of four years. Thus the proviso to Section 147 completely prohibits to take action beyond four years unless the case is covered under the exception mentioned in the proviso itself. Section 149 provides limitation for the issue of notice under Section 148. Section 149(1)(a) provide general limitation for issue of notice four years. Section 149 (1)(b) provides six years limitation for issue of notice in case escaped income exceeds one lac. Section 149 provides limitation for the issue of notice under Section 148. Section 149(1)(a) provide general limitation for issue of notice four years. Section 149 (1)(b) provides six years limitation for issue of notice in case escaped income exceeds one lac. Section 149 (1)(a) and (b) read with proviso to Section 147 of the Act clearly provides that where the case falls under the exception mentioned in the proviso to Section 147 of the Act the proceeding can be taken beyond the period of four years, but within six years if the escaped income exceeds rupees one lac and in for all other cases, the limitation for issue of notice remains four years meaning thereby that if the income chargeable the tax which has escaped assessment is less than rupees one lac, the limitation to issue notice under Section 148 of the Act is only four years even if case falls under the exception mentioned in proviso to Section 147 and six years limitation is applicable only in case where escaped income chargeable to tax exceeds rupees one lac and the case falls under exception, namely there is a failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly material fact. Therefore, where there is a case of failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts on the part of the assessee, the action can be taken beyond the period of four years but if the escaped income chargeable the tax is less than rupees one lac, the period of limitation for the issue of notice is only four years and where the escaped income exceeds rupees one lac the limitation to issue the notice under Section 148 is up to six years. The object fixing such limitation appears to be that where the escaped income is less than one lac, the tax incidence may be small the action under Section 147 should not be taken beyond the period of four years in any case. 16. The object fixing such limitation appears to be that where the escaped income is less than one lac, the tax incidence may be small the action under Section 147 should not be taken beyond the period of four years in any case. 16. Thus, on the plain reading of Section 147 and Section 149 legal position in respect of limitation emerges as follows: (i) In view of proviso to Section 147 no action can be taken under Section 147 beyond the period of four years if there is no case of failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts which are necessary for assessment for the year of assessment. (ii) If the case falls under the exception mentioned in the proviso to Section 147, namely there is failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts which are necessary for assessment for the year of assessment then action can be taken beyond four years subject to the issue of notice under Section 148 within the period of limitation provided under Section 149 of the Act. (iii) Where case falls under the exception to proviso to Section 147 and escaped income exceed rupees one lac the notice under Section 148 can be issued beyond the period of 4 years but within 6 years under Section 149 (1) (b). (iv) In case when the escaped income is less than rupees one lac the limitation to issue the notice under Section 148 is only four years, even if, the case falls under the exception of proviso to Section 147. 17. (iv) In case when the escaped income is less than rupees one lac the limitation to issue the notice under Section 148 is only four years, even if, the case falls under the exception of proviso to Section 147. 17. It may be mentioned here that our above view is supported by the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Anil Radhakrishna Wani v. Income-tax Officer and others, (2010) 323 ITR 564 (Bom), in the case of Multiscreen Media P. Ltd. v. Union of India and another (No. 1), (2010) 324 ITR 48 (Bom), in the case of IPCA Laboratories Ltd. v. Gajanand Meena, Deputy Commissioner of Income-Tax and others (No. 2), (2001) 251 ITR 416, and in the case of Supreme Treves Pvt. Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Income-Tax and others, (2010) 323 ITR 323 (Bom) and the decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Arvind Mills Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Income-Tax (Assessment), (2000) 242 ITR 173, in the case of Gujarat Fluorochemicals Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax, (2009) 319 ITR 282 (Guj.) and in the case of Inducto Ispat Alloys Limited v. Assistant Commissioner of Income-Tax (OSD), (2010) 320 ITR 458 (Guj). 18. In view of the above, we are of the view that the impugned notice issued under Section 148 of the Act is barred by limitation being issued beyond the period of limitation inasmuch as no case of failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly material fact necessary for assessment for the assessment year is made out. 19. In view of above, it is not necessary to deal with the other submissions of learned counsel for the petitioner. 20. In the result, the writ petition is allowed and notice dated 5.3.2002 issued under Section 148 of the Act for the assessment year 1995-96 is hereby quashed. —————