JUDGMENT : H.K. Rathod, J. This group of petitions is filed by petitioner - Gujarat Water Supply & Sewerage Board (for short 'petitioner Board') and on his behalf, learned advocate Mr. H.S. Munshaw is appearing. On behalf of respondents-workmen, learned advocate Mr. Bipin I. Mehta, learned advocate Mr. P.P. Majmudar and learned advocate Mr. Shakti Jadeja are appearing. 2. The Labour Court, Rajkot has passed separate independent individual award in respect to each respondents workmen, but, facts of each case are almost similar, therefore, this group of petitions are heard together and decided this Court by delivering common judgment. The question of facts and question of law raised by learned advocate Mr. Munshaw are same in respect to each petition. 3. The petitioner Board has challenged award passed by Labour Court, Rajkot, wherein, Labour Court has partly allowed Reference while set aside termination order granted reinstatement with continuity of service without back wages of interim period. The Labour Court has passed same award in favour of other respondents. Against which, separate petitions are filed by petitioner Board. 4. Learned advocate Mr. Munshaw made common submission in support of each petition on behalf of petitioner - Board. He submitted that respondents - workmen were appointed for scarcity work provided in Mechanic Sub Division at Rajkot w.e.f. 1990 onwards and normally, the work was alloted to respondent workman from January to June, because, at that relevant time, there was scarcity of water, therefore, temporary orders were issued in favour of respondents as a daily wagers. The working days of each respondent workman has been produced before Labour Court. This work was taken by petitioner Board having special grant on project from State Government when rainy season was started. Thereafter, service of each respondent has been terminated as per order of State Government. Initially, services were terminated by petitioner Board, against which, interim relief has been obtained, thereafter, approached this Court by petitioner Board and on 28th February 1997, order was passed by this Court. Accordingly, petitioner Board has terminated services of each respondent. 5. Learned advocate Mr. Munshaw also submitted that none of respondent has completed 240 days continuous service within preceding 12 months from the date of termination. The petitioner Board has produced certain documents on record along with petition i.e. working days of concerned respondent, last order of appointment and order of State Government dated 1st August 1996. 5. Learned advocate Mr. Munshaw also submitted that none of respondent has completed 240 days continuous service within preceding 12 months from the date of termination. The petitioner Board has produced certain documents on record along with petition i.e. working days of concerned respondent, last order of appointment and order of State Government dated 1st August 1996. He submitted that scarcity work has been carried out through Revenue Department of State Government and after 31st July 1996, such work has been stopped by State Government. The order of termination has been also produced on record by petitioner Board. He submitted that service has been terminated after paying notice pay and retrenchment compensation to concerned workman though he raised contention before this Court that it is not required to comply Section 25F of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short 'ID Act, 1947') by petitioner Board, because, workmen were appointed in scarcity work which was a sovereign function of State Government and therefore, not covered by definition of 'industry' under Section 2(j) of ID Act, 1947. He submitted that periodical appointment in a particular project or work is covered by exception of Sec.2(oo) (bb) of ID Act, 1947, therefore, such termination cannot consider to be a retrenchment within a meaning of Sec.2(oo) of ID Act, 1947. He also submitted before this Court that time bound appointments were given, therefore, Sec.2(oo)(bb) is applicable. He emphasizes that appointments were given in a particular scheme, therefore, Sec.25F, Sec.25G and Sec.25H of ID Act are not applicable. The similar work as per evidence of officer is given to Contractor i.e. in year of 2005, but, workmen were relieved from services in the year of 1996 i.e. after scarcity and time limit work is over. These are the facts which are on record, even though, Labour Court has not considered it and misread the records, therefore, according to him, Labour Court has committed gross error in passing such award. He submitted that petitioner Board has raised all contentions in written statement and also produced relevant record in support of that, one officer was examined to prove it, even though, Labour Court has not believed defence raised by petitioner and gave finding contrary to record. He submitted that petitioner Board has raised all contentions in written statement and also produced relevant record in support of that, one officer was examined to prove it, even though, Labour Court has not believed defence raised by petitioner and gave finding contrary to record. He submitted that a termination dated 30th June 1997, Reference was made in the year of 1998 and decided by Labour Court in the year of 2005, therefore, from date of termination, more than 13 years have been passed, therefore, in such circumstances, Labour Court should not have to grant relief of reinstatement in favour of respondents, but, instead of that, if there is a violation of mandatory provisions of ID Act, 1947, then, Labour Court can award reasonable compensation to concerned respondents. 6. In support of aforesaid submission, learned advocate Mr. Munshaw relied upon following decisions : (i) AIR 1997 SC 2663 - Executive Engineer (State of Karnataka) v. Somasetty and others. Head Note : Industrial Disputes Act (14 of 1947), Ss.2(j), 11 - Industry - State - Function of public welfare carried by State - Does not make it industry - State is under constitutional mandate to bring about welfare State - It is sovereign function of State - Daily Wager appointed on project undertaken by State - Discharged on closure of project - Order of labour court reinstating him with back wages is without jurisdiction - Even otherwise on closure of project the daily wager had no right to post. (ii) AIR 2001 SC 2401 - Sain Steel Products v. Singh and others. Head Note : Industrial Disputes Act (14 of 1947), S.25-F - Retrenchment compensation - Order of termination discloses that it is open to employee to collect dues before leaving - All that it stated is to ask the employee to collect whatever is due to him and it does not spell out whether it included the amount as contemplated under S.25-F or not - Offer of such type cannot be taken as an offer of payment in terms of S.25-F of Act - Termination of service is illegal - Employee not been in employment for well over quarter of century - Reinstatement, not proper - Reasonable compensation directed to be paid to him in lieu of back wages, and reinstatement. (iii) AIR 1996 SC 1001 - State of Rajasthan and others v. Rameshwar lal Gahlot. (iii) AIR 1996 SC 1001 - State of Rajasthan and others v. Rameshwar lal Gahlot. Head Note : Industrial Disputes Act (14 of 1947), Ss.2(oo)(bb), 25-F-Appointment for fixed period - Is covered by S.2(oo)(bb) - Termination is not retrenchment and not illegal unless it is malafide - Provisions of S.25-F do not apply. (iv) AIR 2006 SC 2427 - Haryana State Electricity Development Corporation Ltd. v. Mamni. Head Note : (A) Industrial Disputes Act (14 of 1947), S.2(oo)(bb) - Termination for nonrenewal of contract of employment - Respondent's service terminated on regular basis on expiry of 89 days followed by reappointment after one or two days - Not bona fide - Adopted to defeat object of Act - To such termination S.2(oo)(bb) would not be attracted. (B) Industrial Disputes Act (14 of 1947), Ss.10(1)(c), 25-F - Retrenchment violating S.25-F - Relief of reinstatement with full back wages - Not to be given automatically - Respondent appointed on ad hoc basis - Services terminated long back - Did not apply for post when advertised - Wholly unlikely that respondent was not gainfully employed - Even if reinstated on an ad hoc basis, her services cannot be regularized in view of 2006 AIR SCW 1991 - Reinstatement not proper - Lump sum compensation of Rs. 25,000/- awarded. (v) AIR 2007 SC 288 - Bhogpur Co-op. Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Harmesh Kumar. Head Note : (A) Industrial Disputes Act (14 of 1947), S.10 - Reference - Jurisdiction of Labour Court - Court has to operate within four corners of question referred - Question about legality of termination of services of seasonal worker - Only referred - Court cannot go into question as to whether employer was bound to take services of respondent in all subsequent seasons or not. (B) Industrial Disputes Act (14 of 1947), Ss.25-F, 2(oo)(bb), 25-G - Retrenchment - Seasonal workman - Not completing 240 days of service - Termination of services - Not retrenchment in view of S.2(oo)(bb) - To such cases provisions of Ss.25-G, 25-H do not apply - Order directing re-employment of workman on ground that in next season his juniors were appointed - Not sustainable. (vi) AIR 2006 SC 3613 - Kishore Chandra Samal v. Divisional Manager, Orissa State Sachew Development Corporation Ltd., Dhenkanal. (vi) AIR 2006 SC 3613 - Kishore Chandra Samal v. Divisional Manager, Orissa State Sachew Development Corporation Ltd., Dhenkanal. Head Note : Industrial Disputes Act (14 of 1947), Ss.2(oo)(bb), 25F - Retrenchment - Appellant engaged again and again on daily wage basis - Every order of engagement was for specific period - His disengagement after lapse of last order is not retrenchment. (vii) 1994(2) GLR 1002 - H.K. Makwana v. State of Gujarat & Ors. (Full Bench). Head Note : Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (XIV of 1947) - Sec.2(j) - Industry - Relief works undertaken by the State during draught famine etc., for providing employment to the needy is not 'industry' but is the performance of duty in exercise of sovereign functions - J.J. Shrimali v. District Development Officer, 1989 (1) GLR 396 was rightly decided. The Court entirely agree with the decision rendered by this Court in the case of J.J. Shrimali, ( 1989 (1) GLR 396 ) and it does not call for any reconsideration. The employment offered to the persons on the scarcity relief works as undertaken by the State cannot be said to be employ in 'Industry' as defined by Sec.2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 mainly because, (a) It is the primary and inalienable function of the State to provide livelihood to the persons who are affected by the natural calamities such as famine, earthquake, epidemic, flood, scarcity, etc., and (b) admittedly, the relief work is not a 'business' or 'trade' and with regard to the 'undertaking', the activity is not analogous to trade or business or that it is not a systematic activity but is carried out casually at different places depending on the calamities in a particular area. (Para 12) (viii) Letters Patent Appeal No.148 of 1997 in Special Civil Application No.7694 of 1996 with other allied matters - Arunsinhji Fatehsinhji Zala v. Gujarat Water Supply and Sewerage Board. (Coram : The Acting CJ R.A. Mehta and Mr. Justice C.K. Thakker) Date of Decision : 27th February 1997. (ix) Special Civil Application No.7519 of 1996 with other allied matters - Harpalsinh M. Jadeja v. Dy. Executive Engineer. (Coram : Mr. Justice J.N. Bhatt) Date of Decision : 7th February 1997. Learned advocate Mr. Munshaw relied upon aforesaid decisions as referred above by this Court and made submissions as discussed by this Court. Except that, learned advocate Mr. (ix) Special Civil Application No.7519 of 1996 with other allied matters - Harpalsinh M. Jadeja v. Dy. Executive Engineer. (Coram : Mr. Justice J.N. Bhatt) Date of Decision : 7th February 1997. Learned advocate Mr. Munshaw relied upon aforesaid decisions as referred above by this Court and made submissions as discussed by this Court. Except that, learned advocate Mr. Munshaw has not made any other submission before this Court and not relied upon any decision in support of his submission. Learned advocate Mr. B.I. Mehta, learned advocate Mr. P.P. Majmudar and learned advocate Mr. Shakti Jadeja appearing on behalf of concerned respondents workmen submitted that before Labour Court, no such contention was raised by petitioner Board which are raised before this Court being a first time, therefore, such contention should not be entertained by this Court. They submitted that nature of work performed by respondents was permanent in nature and they were working since 1990, remained in continuous service upto date of termination, no periodical appointment order was issued in favour of respondents. But, they remained continue in service with the petitioner Board. The nature of work which was performed by respondents remains still continue with the petitioner Board as per evidence of petitioner Board. There is no jurisdictional error committed by Labour Court, which requires interference by this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. They submitted that finding of fact recorded by Labour Court normally cannot be disturbed by this Court while exercising the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. They have also raised contention before this Court that petitioner Board is not an ‘industry' or scarcity work is not covered by definition of ‘industry' which has not been specifically raised by petitioner Board before Labour Court. They also submitted that merely contention raised in written statement is not enough but it requires to be proved by proper evidence before Labour Court by petitioner Board. But, petitioner Board has not proved any of the contention raised in written statement before Labour Court. They also raised contention before this Court that workmen were appointed in the year of 1990. But, petitioner Board has not proved any of the contention raised in written statement before Labour Court. They also raised contention before this Court that workmen were appointed in the year of 1990. At that occasion, question of scarcity was not at all there, but, it was arose in the year of 1995-96, therefore, appointment of respondent was not made only in scarcity work, but, they were remained continue with petitioner Board from 1990 and in the year of 1995- 96, work has been taken from respondents by petitioner Board against the programme given by State Government. Therefore, they submitted that respondents were not appointed only in work of scarcity, for that, initial order of appointment was not produced on record by petitioner Board. They also submitted that details of working days of workman produced on record by petitioner Board and in each year, workman has completed 240 days continue service and even last preceding 12 months from date of termination, 240 days even completed continuous service on the basis of record produced by petitioner. The retrenchment compensation and notice pay, which was paid, was for only limited period of one year and not for entire service period as per record of respondents, therefore, it was found to be insufficient by Labour Court and Labour Court has rightly come to conclusion that retrenchment compensation and notice pay which was paid to workmen by petitioner Board is insufficient. They also submitted that petitioner Board is an ‘industry' held by Apex Court in case of Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa and others reported in AIR 1978 SC 548 , therefore, according to learned advocates appearing on behalf of respondents workmen, question of ‘industry' is to be considered in light of work carried out by petitioner Board not by respondents workmen. So, their submission is that nature of work which has been performed by petitioner Board is to be considered for determination of issue whether petitioner Board is covered by definition of ‘industry' or not, but, not to consider only last working period of workmen in determining the question of ‘industry'. They also submitted that petitioner Board has not pointed out before Labour Court that now, there is no possibility of reinstatement of respondent workmen as work is not available. They also submitted that petitioner Board has not pointed out before Labour Court that now, there is no possibility of reinstatement of respondent workmen as work is not available. On the contrary, admission made by witness of petitioner Board that similar work has been continued having permanent nature, but, that has been done through engaging Contractor. Therefore, similar activities are still continue with petitioner Board, therefore, they submitted that whatever contentions raised by petitioner Board before this Court, the same were not raised before Labour Court by petitioner Board. Therefore, according to their submissions, Labour Court has rightly examined the matter based on evidence and it was a finding of fact examined by Labour Court which cannot be disturbed by this Court while exercising the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. They relied upon two decisions; (i) 2010 (1) SCALE 613 - Harjinder Singh v. Punjab State Warehousing Corporation (ii) 2010 (2) CLR 1 - Anup Sharma v. Executive Engineer, Public Health Division No.1, Panipat (Haryana). Except that, no other submission is made by learned advocate Mr. Mehta, learned advocate Mr. Majmudar and learned advocate Mr. Jadeja appearing on behalf of concerned respondents workmen before this Court. 7. In light of aforesaid submissions made by all learned advocates, it is necessary to consider award passed by Labour Court, therefore, I perused award passed by Labour Court, Rajkot in respect to each respondents workmen. The relevant details in respect to each respondent workman are material, therefore, same are quoted as under : In respect to SCA No.3003 of 2006 - Reference No.340 of 1998, the name of respondent is Pravinsinh Jashubhai Zala, whose service was terminated on 30th June 1997. This workman was remained in service from 1990 to 1997 and relevant details produced by petitioner Board before Labour Court in statement where details of presence have been mentioned which has been considered by Labour Court that; in year of 1991 - 226 days working, in 1992 - 213 days working, in 1993 - 217 days working, in 1994 - 207 days working, in 1995 - 328 days working, in 1996 - 348 days working. No documents have been produced on record by petitioner Board that respondent was appointed initially for scarcity work. Not only that but no such order or circular has been produced by petitioner Board before Labour Court. No documents have been produced on record by petitioner Board that respondent was appointed initially for scarcity work. Not only that but no such order or circular has been produced by petitioner Board before Labour Court. No periodical appointment order is also produced on record from date of initial appointment to date of termination by petitioner Board before Labour Court. This award is passed on 31st August 2005. In respect to SCA No.3004 of 2006 - Reference No.332 of 1998, the name of respondent workman is Shivajibhai Gagajibhai Chauhan, who remained in service from 1986 and 1990 to 1996, each year has completed 240 days continuous service. In the year of 1990 - 306 days working, in 1991 - 238 days working, in 1992 - 205 days working, in 1993 - 289 days working, in 1994 - 220 days working, in 1995 - 363 days working and in 1996 - 344 days working. The workman has completed 286 days continuous service. The Labour Court has passed an award in August 2005. In respect to SCA No.3005 of 2006 - Reference [(old) No.4 of 1999] and (new) No.33 of 2005, the name of respondent workman is Sidhdharajsinh Bhojubha Jadeja, whose services was terminated on 30th June 1997 and he remained in service from 1993 to 1997 and completed 240 days continuous service in the year of 1996 and also completed 240 days continuous service preceding 12 months from the date of termination. The date of award is 23.08.1995. In respect to SCA 3006 of 2006 - Reference No.336 of 1998, the name of respondent workman is Jesani Habib Ismail, whose service was terminated on 30th June 1997 and workman remained in service from 1991 to 1996 and he has completed 240 days continuous service in each year, even in a last preceding 12 months from date of termination, workman has completed 332 days continuous service. The date of award is 22.08.2005. In respect to SCA 3007 of 2006 - Reference No.334 of 1998, the name of respondent workman is Jitendrasinh R. Zala, whose service was terminated on 30th June 1997 and workman remained in service from 1990 to 1997 and he has completed 240 days continuous service in each year, even in a last preceding 12 months from date of termination, workman has completed 272 days continuous service. The date of award is 22.08.2005. The date of award is 22.08.2005. In respect to SCA 3009 of 2006 - Reference No.65 of 1999, the name of respondent workman is Kasam Aman Theba, whose service was terminated on 30th June 1997 and workman remained in service from 1990 to 1997 and he has completed 240 days continuous service in each year, even in a last preceding 12 months from date of termination, workman has completed 328 days continuous service. The date of award is 23.08.2005. In respect to SCA 3010 of 2006 - Reference No.69 of 1999, the name of respondent workman is Bhikhubhai Jilubhai Jadeja, whose service was terminated on 30th June 1997 and workman remained in service from 1983 to 1997 and details have been produced on record by petitioner Board vide Ex.20 before Labour Court and during the period from 1991 to 1996, workman was remained in service and in year of 1994 and 1991 to 1996, respondent workman has completed more than 240 days continuous service, even in a last preceding 12 months from date of termination, workman has completed 355 days continuous service. The date of award is 23.08.2005. In respect to SCA 3011 of 2006 - Reference No.333 of 1998, the name of respondent workman is Jadeja Pruthvisinh Mahipatsinh, whose service was terminated on 30th June 1997 and vide Ex.9, he was in service from 1982 and completed 247 days continuous service in the year of 1996. He has completed 240 days continuous service in last preceding 12 months from date of termination. The date of award is 22.08.2005. In respect to SCA 3012 of 2006 - Reference No.137 of 1999, the name of respondent workman is Arunsinh Fatehsinh Zala, whose service was terminated on 30th June 1997 and he remained in service from 1992 to 1997. As per statement produced by petitioner Board, he has completed 240 days continuous service in the year of 1993, 1995 and 1996 and also completed continuous service of 282 days in a last preceding 12 months from date of termination. The date of award is 23.08.2005. In respect to SCA 3013 of 2006 - Reference No.335 of 1998, the name of respondent workman is Harishchandra Kanaksinh Zala, whose service was terminated on 30th June 1997 and he remained in service for the period from 1991 to 1997. The date of award is 23.08.2005. In respect to SCA 3013 of 2006 - Reference No.335 of 1998, the name of respondent workman is Harishchandra Kanaksinh Zala, whose service was terminated on 30th June 1997 and he remained in service for the period from 1991 to 1997. As per statement produced by petitioner Board and completed 240 days continuous service in each year and also completed 240 days continuous service in each year from 1990 to 1997 and he has completed 240 days continuous service in a last preceding 12 months from date of termination. The date of award is 22.08.2005. In respect to SCA 3014 of 2006 - Reference No.331 of 1998, the name of respondent workman is Jadeja Vanrajsinh Vajubhai, whose service was terminated on 30th June 1997 and he remained in service for the period from 1990 to 1996 and completed 240 days continuous service in each year vide Ex.27 and also completed 240 days continuous service in a last preceding 12 months from date of termination. The date of award is 31.08.2005. In respect to SCA 3015 of 2006 - Reference No.337 of 1998, the name of respondent workman is Jadeja Harpalsinh Manharsinh, whose service was terminated on 30th June 1997 and he remained in service as per statement produced on record by petitioner Ex.19 from 1988 to 1997. He completed 240 days continuous service from 1988 to 1996. In the year of 1991, he completed 231 days service, in year of 1992 - 213 days, in year of 1993 - 289 days, in year of 1994 - 220 days, in year of 1995 - 348 days, in year of 1996 - 333 days and also completed 332 days continuous service in a last preceding 12 months from date of termination. The date of award is 17.08.2005. In respect to SCA 3016 of 2006 - Reference No.338 of 1998, the name of respondent workman is Rajesh R. Chavda, whose service was terminated on 30th June 1997 and he remained in service for the period from 1986 and completed 240 days continuous service from 1991 to 1996. The date of award is 17.08.2005. In respect to SCA 3016 of 2006 - Reference No.338 of 1998, the name of respondent workman is Rajesh R. Chavda, whose service was terminated on 30th June 1997 and he remained in service for the period from 1986 and completed 240 days continuous service from 1991 to 1996. However, no specific documents have been produced on record by petitioner Board before Labour Court, no muster roll, pay register has been produced in respect to this respondent, but, Labour Court has considered evidence of workman at Ex.9 and Ex.12 - evidence of Kantilal Nanjibhai Purohit on behalf of petitioner Board and come to conclusion that in a last preceding 12 months from date of termination, workman has completed continuous service of 240 days. The date of award is 31.08.2005. The aforesaid facts are taken by this Court from award itself and Labour Court, Rajkot has taken these facts from the documents produced by petitioner Board. Therefore, working days of each respondent workman are being undisputed facts between parties. The compliance of Sec.25F of ID Act, 1947 is not made, because, whatever amount of retrenchment compensation has been worked out and notice pay, it was for only one year and not considering entire length of service, therefore, it was found to be insufficient by Labour Court, Rajkot. It is not the case of petitioner Board before Labour Court that retrenchment compensation and notice pay has been paid to each respondent workman considering entire length of service of respondent workman. Therefore, also, this being undisputed facts between the parties that Sec.25F is not fully complied by petitioner Board. 8. The workman has filed Statement of Claim before Labour Court. Against which, reply was filed by petitioner Board and order passed by this Court dated 7th February, 1997 and Office Order dated 28th February, 1997 also produced on record. The workman was examined before Labour Court and on behalf of petitioner Board, one Shri Kantilal Nanjibhai Purohit was examined. Certain documents have been produced by petitioner Board before Labour Court giving details of working days of each year of each respondent workman as referred above. In light of this background and factual details which are on record, Labour Court has examined the matter. The contention of ‘industry', nowhere was raised by petitioner Board before Labour Court. Certain documents have been produced by petitioner Board before Labour Court giving details of working days of each year of each respondent workman as referred above. In light of this background and factual details which are on record, Labour Court has examined the matter. The contention of ‘industry', nowhere was raised by petitioner Board before Labour Court. The petitioner Board has raised contention that activities carried by petitioner Board is not an ‘industry' in written statement, but, same facts have not been pressed before Labour Court in arguments. There is no contention at all raised by advocate of petitioner Board before Labour Court that petitioner Board is not an ‘industry' within a meaning of Sec.2(j) of ID Act, 1947. It is necessary to understand the submissions made by learned advocate Mr. Munshaw whether activities carried out by petitioner Board is not covered by definition of ‘industry' under Sec.2(j) of ID Act, 1947 or nature of work which was lastly performed by workmen is not covered by definition of ‘industry' under Sec.2(j) of ID Act, 1947. For applicability of ID Act, Court has to consider the activities carried out by employer, not the work which has been performed by workmen. The definition of ‘industry' under Sec.2(j) of ID Act, 1947 is quoted as under : "Sec. 2(j) : "industry" means any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling of employers and includes any calling, service, employment, handicraft, or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen;" In light of aforesaid definition, a mechanism systematic activities carried out by Establishment with the help of employer and employees relationship satisfied human needs/mankind and rendered material service to mankind, then, it covers by definition of ‘industry'. The activities which has been carried out by petitioner Board is not a sovereign function. But, Revenue Department of State Government has allotted some work to be carried out by petitioner Board during scarcity period, that does not outset the petitioner Board from the definition of ‘industry'. The petitioner Board has not produced any record before Labour Court from date of initiate appointment of workmen which was made in scarcity work. But, Revenue Department of State Government has allotted some work to be carried out by petitioner Board during scarcity period, that does not outset the petitioner Board from the definition of ‘industry'. The petitioner Board has not produced any record before Labour Court from date of initiate appointment of workmen which was made in scarcity work. In fact, scarcity work is to be carried out by State Government not by petitioner Board, but, that work has been allotted by State Government, therefore, if scarcity work is carried out by department of State Government, then, decision of Full Bench of this Court which has been relied upon by learned advocate Mr. Munshaw as referred above, can be applicable. But, it is not the case of petitioner Board that petitioner Board is a part of Department of State Government means petitioner Board is not a department of State Government. It is an independent body corporate having separate entity and establishment from State Government. The employees of petitioner Board are not the employees of State Government. Therefore, entire question of scarcity work carried out by workmen for last one year as an employee of petitioner Board has been misunderstood by petitioner Board as well as his lawyer and distinction between both has not been understand properly which creates difficulties in making submissions. Therefore, decision of Full Bench of this Court which has been relied upon by learned advocate Mr. Munshaw that scarcity work is not covered by definition of ‘industry', but, provided that work must have been carried out by State Government not by petitioner Board, because, such work is carried out by State Government, then, it can be considered to be a sovereign function, but, same work has been allotted to petitioner Board by Revenue Department of State Government, then, entire activities of petitioner Board cannot be converted into scarcity work. But, entity of the Board is remained separate, independent as a corporate body and therefore, in deciding question whether Industrial Disputes Act is applicable or not and activities carried out by petitioner Board is covered within definition of ‘industry' or not, then, Court has to consider the activities carried out by petitioner Board not the work which has been allotted by Revenue Department of State Government. 9. 9. The Apex Court has held in similar case of Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board (supra), wherein, it is considered to be an ‘industry' within a meaning of Section 2(j) of ID Act, 1947. This decision is given by larger Bench of Apex Court. The Apex Court in case of Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa and othersr reported in AIR 1978 SC 548 : 1978 Lab.I.C. 467. The relevant para is quoted as under : "Industry as defined in S.2(j) has a wide import. Where there is (i) systematic activity, (ii) organized by co-operation between employer and employee (the direct and substantial element is chimerical), (iii) for the production and/or distribution of goods and services calculated to satisfy human wants and wishes (not spiritual or religious but inclusive or material things or services geared to celestial bliss e.g. making, on a large scale, prasad or food), prima facie, there is an "industry" in that enterprise. Absence of profit motive or gainful objective is irrelevant be the venture in the public, joint, private or other sector. The true focus is functional and the decisive test is the nature of the activity with special emphasis on the employeremployee relations." Therefore, contentions which has been raised by learned advocate Mr. Munshaw cannot be accepted as merely scarcity work cannot outset the entire activities of petitioner Board from the definition of ‘industry'. Therefore, petitioner Board is covered by definition of ‘industry' under Sec.2(j) of ID Act, 1947 and Full Bench decision of this Court as referred above is not applicable to the facts of present case and each respondent is covered by definition of workman under Sec.2(s) of ID Act, 1947. Apart from that, no specific contention has been raised by petitioner Board before Labour Court that petitioner Board is not covered by definition of ‘industry'. Merely raising contention in written statement is not enough, but, that must have to be pressed into service by advocate of petitioner Board before Labour Court. After perusing entire award, nowhere, such contention is raised which invites decision of Labour Court by petitioner Board. Therefore, in such circumstances, in written statement, number of contentions can be raised by party, but, if it is not pressed into service before particular Court, then, Court may not obliged to decide each and every contentions raised in written statement only. 10. Therefore, in such circumstances, in written statement, number of contentions can be raised by party, but, if it is not pressed into service before particular Court, then, Court may not obliged to decide each and every contentions raised in written statement only. 10. This aspect has been considered by Apex Court in case of State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak and another reported in AIR 1982 (SC) 1249 . The relevant discussion made in Para 4 to 8 are quoted as under : "4. When we drew the attention of the learned Attorney General to the concession made before the High Court, Shri A. K. Sen, who appeared for the State of Maharashtra before the High Court and led the arguments for the respondents there and who appeared for Shri Antulay before us intervened and protested that he never made any such concession and invited us to peruse the written submission made by him in the High Court. We are afraid that we cannot launch into an inquiry as to what transpired in the High Court. It is simply not done. Public Policy bars us Judicial decorum restrains us. Matters of Judicial record are unquestionable. They are not open to doubt. Judges cannot be dragged into the arena. "Judgments cannot be treated as mere counters in the game of litigation". (Per Lord Atkinson in Somasundaran v. Subramanian, AIR 1926 PC 136 We are bound to accept the statement of the Judges recorded in their judgment, as to what transpired in court. We cannot allow the statement of the Judges to be contradicted by statements at the Bar or by affidavit and other evidence. If the Judges say in their judgment that something was done, said or admitted before them, that has to be the last word on the subject. The principle is wellsettled that statements of fact as to what transpired at the hearing, recorded in the judgment of the court, are conclusive of the facts so stated and no one can contradict such statements by affidavit or other evidence. The principle is wellsettled that statements of fact as to what transpired at the hearing, recorded in the judgment of the court, are conclusive of the facts so stated and no one can contradict such statements by affidavit or other evidence. If a party thinks that the happenings in court have been wrongly recorded in a judgment, it is incumbent upon the party, while the matter is still, fresh in the minds of the Judges, to call the attention of the very Judges who have made the record to 'the fact that the statement made with regard to his conduct was a statement that had been made in error (Per Lord Buckmaster in Madhusudan v. Chandrabati, AIR 1917 PC 30 That is the only way to have the record corrected. If no such step is taken, the matter must necessarily end there. Of course a party may resile and an Appellate Court may permit him in rare and appropriate cases to resile from a concession on the ground that the concession was made on a wrong appreciation of the law and had led to gross injustice; but, he may not call in question the very fact of making the concession as recorded in the judgment. 4-A. In R. v. Mellor, (1858) 7 Cox CC 454 Martin B was reported to have said : "We must consider the statement of the learned judge as absolute verity and we ought to take. his statement precisely as a record and act on it in the same manner as on a record of Court which of itself implies an absolute verity." 5. In King. Emperor v. Barendra Kumar Ghose, (AIR 1924 Cal 257) (FB), Page, J. said. ".............these proceedings emphasise the importance of rigidly maintaining the rule that a statement by a learned Judge as to what took place during the course of a trial before him is final and decisive; it is not to be criticised or circumvented; much less is it to be exposed to animad version." 6. ".............these proceedings emphasise the importance of rigidly maintaining the rule that a statement by a learned Judge as to what took place during the course of a trial before him is final and decisive; it is not to be criticised or circumvented; much less is it to be exposed to animad version." 6. In Sarat Chandra v. Bibhabati Debi, AIR 1921 Cal 584, Sir Asutosh Mookherjee explained what had to be done : "It is plain that in cases of this character where a litigant feels aggrieved by the statement in a judgment that an admission has been made, the most convenient and satisfactory course to follow, wherever practicable, is to apply to the Judge, without delay and ask for rectification or review of the judgment". 7. So the Judges' record is conclusive. Neither lawyer nor litigant may claim to contradict it, except before the Judge, himself, but nowhere else. 8. On the On the invitation of Mr. Sen, we have also perused the written submissions made by him before the High Court. We have two comments to make : First, oral submissions do not always conform to written submissions. In the course of argument, counsel, often, wisely and fairly, make concessions which may not find a place in the written submissions. Discussion draws out many a concession. Second, there are some significant sentences in the written submissions which probabilise the concession. They are: "If in the existing case, the entire Council of Ministers becomes interested in the use of the statutory power one way or the other, the doctrine of necessity will fill up the gap by enabling the Governor by dispensing with the advice of His Council of Ministers and take a decision of his own on the merits of the case. Such a discretion of the Governor must be implied as inherent in his constitutional powers. The doctrine of necessity will supply the necessary power to the Governor to act without the advice of the Council of Ministers in such a case where the entire Council of Ministers is biased. In fact, it will be contrary to the Constitution and the principles of democratic Government which it enshrines if the Governor was obliged not to act and to decline to perform his statutory duties because his Ministers had become involved personally. In fact, it will be contrary to the Constitution and the principles of democratic Government which it enshrines if the Governor was obliged not to act and to decline to perform his statutory duties because his Ministers had become involved personally. For the interest of democratic Government and its functioning, the Governor must act in such a case on his own. Otherwise, he will become an instrument for serving the personal and selfish interest of his Ministers." We wish to say no more. As we said, we cannot and we will not embark upon an enquiry. We will go by the judges' record." The Apex Court has also considered same question in case of Daman Singh and others, etc., v. State of Pubjab and others, etc., reported in AIR 1985 SC 973 . The relevant is Para 13, therefore, the same is quoted as under : "13. The final submission of Shri Ramamurthi was that several other questions were raised in the writ petition before the High Court but they were not considered. We attach no significance to this submission. It is not unusual for parties and counsel to raise innumerable grounds in the petitions and memoranda of appeal etc., but, later, confine themselves, in the course of argument to a few only of those grounds, obviously because the rest of the grounds are considered even by them to be untenable. No party or counsel is thereafter entitled to make a grievance that the grounds not argued were not considered. If indeed any ground which was argued was not considered it should be open to the party aggrieved to draw the attention of the court making the order to it by filing a proper application for review or clarification. The time of the superior courts is not to be wasted in inquiring into the question whether, a certain ground to which no reference is found in the judgment of the subordinate court was argued before that court or not ?" The Apex Court has also considered the same in case of Shankar K. Mandal and Others v. State of Bihar and Others reported in (2003) 9 SCC 519 . The relevant is quoted as under : "Held : It is not open for the appellants to take such stand before the Supreme Court, as they are bound by the observations of the High Court. The relevant is quoted as under : "Held : It is not open for the appellants to take such stand before the Supreme Court, as they are bound by the observations of the High Court. If there was any wrong recording of the stands or a different stand was taken, the only course open to the appellant was to move the High Court. Statements of fact as to what transpired at the hearing, recorded in the judgment of the Court, are conclusive of the facts so stated and no one can contradict such statements by affidavit or other evidence. If a party thinks that the happenings in court have been wrongly recorded in a judgment, it is incumbent upon the party, while the matter is still fresh in the minds of the Judges, to call the attention of the very Judges who have made the record. That is the only way to have the record corrected. If no such step is taken, the matter must necessarily end there. It is not open to the appellant to contend before the Supreme Court to the contrary. It is also not open to contend that the plea raised was not considered. (Para 10, 11 and 12)" The Apex Court has considered the said question in case of Md. Rafique @ Chachu reported in (2008) 15 SCALE 15 . The relevant is Para 5, therefore, the same is quoted as under : "5. It would be logical to first deal with the plea relating to absence of concession. It is to be noted that the appellant conceded certain aspects before the High Court. After having done so, it is not open to the appellant to turn around or take a plea that no concession was given. This is clearly a case of sitting on the fence, and is not to be encouraged. It is to be noted that the appellant conceded certain aspects before the High Court. After having done so, it is not open to the appellant to turn around or take a plea that no concession was given. This is clearly a case of sitting on the fence, and is not to be encouraged. If really there was no concession, the only course open to the appellant was to move the High Court in line with what has been said in State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak, 1982 (2) SCC 463 In a decision Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd., 2003 (2) SCC 111 the view in the said case was reiterated by observing that statements of fact as to what transpired at the hearing, recorded in the judgment of the Court, are conclusive of the facts so stated and no one can contradict such statements by affidavit or other evidence. If a party thinks that the happenings in court have been wrongly recorded in a judgment, it is incumbent upon the party, while the matter is still fresh in the minds of the judges, to call the attention of the very judges who have made the record. That is the only way to have the record corrected. If no such step is taken, the matter must necessarily end there. It is not open to the appellant to contend before this Court to the contrary. The above position was highlighted in Roop Kumar v. Mohan Thedani (2003) 6 SCC 595 . The Apex Court in case of Ex. Constable Ramvir Singh v. Union of India & Ors. reported in 2009 AIR SCW 163 considered the same question. The relevant are Paras 9 to 11, therefore, the same are quoted as under : "9. The question as to whether he was discriminated against vis-a-vis the aforementioned Kalipada Mandal having not been raised by him before the High Court, we are of the opinion that it is not possible for us to consider the said contention which has been raised for the first time. Mr. Pandey submitted that such a contention had been raised in the Writ Petition. It might have been raised but it does not appear from the impugned judgment that the same was pressed before the High Court. This Court is bound by the Judge's record. If the High Court, as contended by Mr. Mr. Pandey submitted that such a contention had been raised in the Writ Petition. It might have been raised but it does not appear from the impugned judgment that the same was pressed before the High Court. This Court is bound by the Judge's record. If the High Court, as contended by Mr. Pandey, despite raising a contention in that behalf did not deal therewith, the only remedy available to him was to move the High Court drawing its attention thereto. Apart from the fact that the said procedure was not adopted by appellant, even before us, neither the counsel appearing in the High Court nor the appellant, affirmed any affidavit that such a contention, in fact, had been raised before the High Court. It is, therefore, not possible for us to accept that the contention as regards the discrimination against the appellant vis-a-vis the said Kalipada Mandal was raised. 10. In State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak, (1982) 2 SCC 462, this Court held : "4. When we drew the attention of the learned Attorney-General to the concession made before the High Court, Shri A.K. Sen, who appeared for the State of Maharashtra before the High Court and led the arguments for the respondents there and who appeared for Shri Antulay before us intervened and protested that he never made any such concession and invited us to peruse the written submissions made by him in the High Court. We are afraid that we cannot launch into an inquiry as to what transpired in the High Court. It is simply not done. Public policy bars us. Judicial decorum restrains us. Matters of judicial record are unquestionable. They are not open to doubt. Judges cannot be dragged into the arena. ‘Judgments cannot be treated as mere counters in the game of litigation.' (Per Lord Atkinson in Somasundaram Chetty v. Subramanian Chetty We are bound to accept the statement of the Judges recorded in their judgment, as to what transpired in court. We cannot allow the statement of the Judges to be contradicted by statements at the Bar or by affidavit and other evidence. If the Judges say in their judgment that something was done, said or admitted before them, that has to be the last word on the subject. We cannot allow the statement of the Judges to be contradicted by statements at the Bar or by affidavit and other evidence. If the Judges say in their judgment that something was done, said or admitted before them, that has to be the last word on the subject. The principle is well settled that statements of fact as to what transpired at the hearing, recorded in the judgment of the court, are conclusive of the facts so stated and no one can contradict such statements by affidavit or other evidence. If a party thinks that the happenings in court have been wrongly recorded in a judgment, it is incumbent upon the party, while the matter is still fresh in the minds of the Judges, to call the attention of the very Judges who have made the record to the fact that the statement made with regard to his conduct was a statement that had been made in error (Per Lord Buckmaster in Madhu Sudan Chowdhri v. Chandrabati Chowdhrain That is the only way to have the record corrected. If no such step is taken, the matter must necessarily end there. Of course a party may resile and an appellate court may permit him in rare and appropriate cases to resile from a concession on the ground that the concession was made on a wrong appreciation of the law and had led to gross injustice; but, he may not call in question the very fact of making the concession as recorded in the judgment." [See also Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. (2003) 2 SCC 111 and Dhanabhai Khalasi v. State of Gujarat, (2007) 4 SCC 241 . 11. Appellant did not even raise any contention before the Summary Security Force Court that he intended to consult a lawyer or to select a friend of his choice as provided for in Rule 157 of the Rules. 11. Appellant did not even raise any contention before the Summary Security Force Court that he intended to consult a lawyer or to select a friend of his choice as provided for in Rule 157 of the Rules. The High Court, therefore, in our opinion, has rightly opined that such a contention cannot be permitted to be raised." In view of aforesaid observations made by Apex Court, in written statement, number of contentions have been raised by party, similarly, in memo of appeal, number of contentions have been raised, but, not argued and specifically point has not been raised, then, it is not open for petitioner Board to raise such contention first time before this Court as decided by Apex Court in case of Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti through its Secretary, Anand Nagar v. Arvind Chaubey and Another reported in 2003 (1) LLJ 507 . The relevant Para 2 is quoted as under : "2. Learned senor counsel for the appellant contended that the appellant Mandi Samiti is not an "industry" governed by the provisions of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The High Court has held against the appellant on the ground that such a contention was not canvassed before the Industrial Tribunal and also following an earlier decision of another Bench, the High Court dismissed the writ petition. Once the appellant did not raise such a contention before the Industrial Tribunal, it was not available to be canvassed higher up." The Labour Court, after considering submissions made by both learned advocates, framed the issues and examined each issue. On the basis of facts, Labour Court has come to conclusion that workmen have satisfied requirements of Sec.25B of ID Act, 1947. The relevant Sec.25B of ID Act, 1947 is quoted as under : "Sec.25B: Definition of continuous service. On the basis of facts, Labour Court has come to conclusion that workmen have satisfied requirements of Sec.25B of ID Act, 1947. The relevant Sec.25B of ID Act, 1947 is quoted as under : "Sec.25B: Definition of continuous service. - For the purposes of this Chapter, - (1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman; (2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer - (a) for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than - (i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and (ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case; (b) for a period of six months, if the workman, during a period of six calendar months preceding the date with reference to which calendar months preceding the date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not lee than - (i) ninety-five days, in the case of workman employed below ground in a mine; and (ii) one hundred and twenty days, in any other case. Explanation. Explanation. - For the purposes of clause (2), the number of days on which a workman has actually worked under an employer shall include the days on which- (i) he has been laid-off under an agreement or as permitted by standing orders made under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 (20 of 1946), or under the Act or under any other law applicable to the industrial establishment; (ii) he has been on leave with full wages, earned in the previous years; (iii) he has been absent due to temporary disablement caused by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment; and (iv) in the case of a female, she has been on maternity leave; so, however, that the total period of such maternity leave does not exceed twelve weeks.]" This Section is having two parts; in first part, if workman is remained in continue service for a period of one year having uninterrupted service and cessation of work not due to any fault on the part of employee, then, workman is entitled benefits of Sec.25F of ID Act, 1947 irrespective of completion of 240 days in a preceding 12 months as per decision of this Court in case of Moti Ceramic Industries v. Jivuben Rupabhai reported in 2000 (2) CLR 156 . Therefore, looking to evidence which are on record considering oral evidence of workman and documents produced by petitioner Board and details of presence produced by petitioner Board on record in respect to each respondent workman, Sec. 25B(1) and (2) of ID Act, 1947 both are satisfied by each respondent workman. Therefore, Sec.25F of ID Act, 1947 is required to be complied by petitioner Board which is undisputedly not fully complied because whatever retrenchment compensation and notice pay was paid to workmen, where it is not considered total length of service, but, only considered for a period of one year, therefore, Sec.25F of ID Act, 1947 has been violated. In such circumstances, order of termination is held to be ab initio void and workmen are deemed to be in service for all purposes. In such circumstances, order of termination is held to be ab initio void and workmen are deemed to be in service for all purposes. The nature of work which has been performed by workmen is not having a merely project work, because, as per evidence of witness of petitioner Board, this being a permanent work remained continue after termination of workmen and that work has been also continued when the evidence given by witness, but, that work has been carried out by petitioner Board after calling tender from respective Contractors. Therefore, workmen were not appointed against any project. For that, no documents produced on record by petitioner Board. From date of initial appointment onwards, there is no periodical appointment order produced on record to justify exception of Sec.2(oo)(bb) of ID Act, 1947. From initial appointment, it was not made for scarcity work, for that, no documents have been produced by petitioner Board on record. Therefore, Sec.2(oo)(bb) of ID Act, 1947 is not applicable to the facts of present case and in spite of the work was remained continue, service of respondents workmen has been illegally terminated which amounts to unfair labour practice and such termination is not justified by petitioner Board before Labour Court, Rajkot. The seniority list is maintained by petitioner Board in respect to daily wager, but, not produced on record, therefore, it has been violated Rule 81 and on that basis, Labour Court has come to conclusion that Sec.25F has been violated. There is no specific appointment on specific project. No duration has been mentioned in appointment order and no such document has been produced on record by petitioner Board before Labour Court to justify Sec.2(oo)(bb) of ID Act, 1947. The Labour Court has rightly appreciated oral evidence of workman as well as witness of petitioner Board and rightly come to conclusion that petitioner Board has not proved before Labour Court while producing oral evidence as well as documentary evidence that from day one, when workmen were appointed initially whether he was appointed in scarcity work or not. For that, no documentary evidence is produced by petitioner Board. No circular has been produced to justify that from date of initial appointment, workmen were appointed in scarcity work, Labour Court has considered evidence of workman and denied total back wages of interim period. The respondent workmen have not challenged present award for denial of back wages. For that, no documentary evidence is produced by petitioner Board. No circular has been produced to justify that from date of initial appointment, workmen were appointed in scarcity work, Labour Court has considered evidence of workman and denied total back wages of interim period. The respondent workmen have not challenged present award for denial of back wages. When Sec.25F of ID Act, 1947 has been violated by petitioner Board, then, order of termination becomes ab initio void, then, workmen are deemed to be in service for all purposes. This aspect has been considered by Allahabad High Court in case of Gyanandera Dutt Trivedi v. Labour Court, U.P., Lucknow and Another reported in 2009 (2) LLJ 620. The relevant Para 8 to 13 are quoted as under : "8. I have carefully considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. The provisions of Section 6 N of the Act are para materia with the provision of Section 25 F of the Industrial Disputes Act. 1947. The various decisions rendered with reference to Section 25 F shall be applicable to the present case which is governed by Section 6-N of the Act also. In Mohan Lal v. Management of Bharat Electronics Ltd., (1981) 3 SCC 225 , it was held that termination simpliciter of services of a temporary workman not falling within the excepted or excluded categories mentioned in Section 2(oo) would amount to 'retrenchment' and if immediately preceding the date of termination of service, such workman actually worked for not less than 240 days within a period of 12 months under employer, he will be deemed to be in 'continuous service' for one year and therefore would be entitled to retrenchment compensation under Section 25 F. The termination of service of workman without complying with the provisions of Section 25 F (6-N) would rendered the order of termination for continuation in service with full back wages. A reference was also made to L Roberi D' Souza v. Executive Engineer, Southern Railway and Another, AIR 1982 SC 854 , Raj Kumar College, Karmachari Union v. Principal, Rajkumar College, Raipur and Another, (1987) 55 FLR 93 : Makhan Singh v. Narainpura Co-operative Agricultural Service Society Ltd and Another, (1987) 3 SCC 571 , Lallan Roi v. Presiding Officer Labour Court, Gorakhpur and Another 1995 (2) LLJ 361 (All) and the decision of the Apex Court in Uptron India Ltd v. Shammi Bhan, AIR 1998 SC 1681 . 9. In the case of State of U. P. v. Putti Lal and Another, 2003 (4) LLJ (Suppl) 820 (All NOC) this Court held that the termination of services of a workman, who has worked for more than 240 days in the preceding/calender year, without complying with the provisions of Section 6-N of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act is illegal and unjustified. 10. This Court again/held in the case of State of U.P. v. Presiding Officer/Labour Court, U.P., Gorakhpur and Another (2007) 3 UPLBEC 2756 that non observance of Section 6 - N of the Act prior to retrenchment renders the retrenchment totally unsustainable at law. 11. The unreported judgment of this Court dated September 4, 1998 given in Writ Petition No. 3739/1984, Hira Lal v. Labour Court, U. P., Luchnow and Another, relied upon by the petitioner applies with full force to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 12. On the strength of the above decisions the learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the impugned order of termination of the service of the petitioner was illegal and void ab initio as it was against the mandatory provisions of Section 6-N of the Act and that the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court was not justified in awarding the amount of compensation even though he had recorded a clear finding that the termination order was bad in law on account of non compliance of the provisions of Section 6-N of the Act. The learned counsel vehemently argued that the compensation is to be paid at the time of retrenchment and not subsequently. In support of his contention he placed relied on the decision State Bank of India v. N. Sundra Money, (1976) 1 SCC 822 in which it has been held that retrenchment compensation must be paid at the time of retrenchment. 13. In support of his contention he placed relied on the decision State Bank of India v. N. Sundra Money, (1976) 1 SCC 822 in which it has been held that retrenchment compensation must be paid at the time of retrenchment. 13. Shri Masoodi, learned counsel appearing for the opposite party No. 2 has failed to cite any decision to the contrary which may give strength to his submissions. After considering the entire case law cited on behalf of the petitioner, I am of the view that the impugned order of termination of service of the petitioner dated July 19, 1979 is nothing/but an attempt to camouflage the order of retrenchment. The order of termination simpliciter in nature is virtually an order of retrenchment. A workman cannot be retrenched, unless the requirement as mentioned in Section 6 - N of the Act are complied with. Admittedly no compensation was paid to the petitioner at the time of his retrenchment i.e. termination of his service although at the time, the services of the petitioner were terminated, the petitioner had admittedly worked continuously for more than four years in the Establishment. The Presiding Officer of the Labour Court also found the order of termination to be illegal and yet he made an order for payment of compensation in lieu of termination. The course adopted by the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court can not be justified. It did not fall within his domain or jurisdiction to pass an order for payment of compensation in lieu of the retrenchment of the petitioner. In view of the decision referred to above, the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement in service." [See : (i) Ramesh Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2010 (1) SCALE 432 (ii) Harjinder Singh v. Punjab State Warehousing Corporation, 2010 (1) SCALE 613 (iii) Krishnan Singh v. Executive Engineer, Haryana State Agriculture Marketting Board, Rohtak, (Haryana), 2010 (2) SCALE 848 (iv) Anup Sharma v. Executive Engineer, Public Health Division No.1, Panipat (Haryana), 2010 (2) CLR 1 (v) Maharashtra State Power Gen. Co. Ltd., Koradi v. Suresh Shantaram Ghede, 2010 (2) CLR 196 (vi) Director, Fisheries Terminal Division v. Bhikhubhai Meghjibhai Chavda, 2010 AIR SCW 542. 11. One contention is raised by learned advocate Mr. Co. Ltd., Koradi v. Suresh Shantaram Ghede, 2010 (2) CLR 196 (vi) Director, Fisheries Terminal Division v. Bhikhubhai Meghjibhai Chavda, 2010 AIR SCW 542. 11. One contention is raised by learned advocate Mr. Munshaw that considering date of termination 30th June 1997 and matter remained pending before Labour Court from 1998 to 31st August 2005 and thereafter, present petitions are filed in the year of 2006 and remained pending before this Court for about four years. So, in all, 13 years have passed. Therefore, in such circumstances, because of delay in deciding dispute, reinstatement cannot be granted to respondents workmen, but, instead of that, some reasonable compensation can be awarded. 12. This contention raised by learned advocate Mr. Munshaw cannot be accepted, because, long pendency of litigation in Courts is no ground to deny relief otherwise, employee who suffers double jeopardy of loosing back wages and also delay in getting reinstatement for no fault of his. It is also necessary to note that in facts of this case, date of termination is 30th June 1997 and immediately, workmen have approached the Conciliation Officer against termination by raising industrial dispute under the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Conciliation Officer, Rajkot has referred the industrial dispute for adjudication to Labour Court, Rajkot on 14th September 1998. So, workmen have immediately approached the Labour Court which can consider to be 'within reasonable time'. This aspect is considered by Apex Court in case of M/s. P.V.K. Distillery Ltd. v. Mahendra Ram reported in 2009 AIR SCW 2904. The relevant Para 20 is quoted as under : "20. In the instant case, the notice had been issued limiting the question to the payment of 50% of the total back wages. This does not mean that the respondent is not entitled to further relief. The point that his services were terminated in the year 1985 and since then the case is pending for the last two decades in different courts also has no relevance, since he had approached the court within a reasonable time. It is not his fault that the case is still pending before the court. These grounds could not be held against him for denying the relief of back wages otherwise he would suffer double jeopardy of losing back wages and delay in getting the reinstatement for no fault of his. It is not his fault that the case is still pending before the court. These grounds could not be held against him for denying the relief of back wages otherwise he would suffer double jeopardy of losing back wages and delay in getting the reinstatement for no fault of his. Therefore, it would have been more enlightening, had the High Court reasoned out as to why the appellant should reinstate the respondent with full employment benefits and should pay full back wages to him for nothing in return from him in terms of work, production etc." 13. I have considered reasoning and observations made by Labour Court, Rajkot. Almost reasoning is based on record which was produced by petitioner Board. The finding which has been given by Labour Court is a finding of fact and in support of reasoning is given. The finding of fact when examined by Labour Court being a First Court, then, this Court, which is not an Appellate Court, cannot reappreciate such finding of fact as an Appellate Court having limited jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution of India upon Subordinate Courts. This aspect has been considered by Apex Court in case of State of Haryana & Ors. v. Manoj Kumar reported in 2010 AIR SCW 1990. The relevant Para 22 to 29 are quoted as under : "22. The appellants urged that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 is very limited and the High Court, while exercising the jurisdiction under Article 227, has to ensure that the courts below work within the bounds of their authority. 23. More than half a century ago, the Constitution Bench of this court in Nagendra Nath Bora and Another v. Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam & Others AIR 1958 SC 398 settled that power under Article 227 is limited to seeing that the courts below function within the limit of its authority or jurisdiction. 24. This court placed reliance on Nagendra Nath's case in a subsequent judgment in Nibaran Chandra Bag v. Mahendra Nath Ghughu AIR 1963 SC 1895 . The court observed that jurisdiction conferred under Article 227 is not by any means appellate in its nature for correcting errors in the decisions of subordinate courts or tribunals but is merely a power of superintendence to be used to keep them within the bounds of their authority. 25. The court observed that jurisdiction conferred under Article 227 is not by any means appellate in its nature for correcting errors in the decisions of subordinate courts or tribunals but is merely a power of superintendence to be used to keep them within the bounds of their authority. 25. This court had an occasion to examine this aspect of the matter in the case of Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaqim & Others (1983) 4 SCC 566 . The court observed as under:- "The supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution is limited "to seeing that an inferior Court or Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority," and not to correct an error apparent on the face of the record, much less an error of law. for this case there was, in our opinion, no error of law much less an error apparent on the face of the record. There was no failure on the part of the learned Subordinate Judge to exercise jurisdiction nor did he act in disregard of principles of natural justice. Nor was the procedure adopted by him not in consonance with the procedure established by law. In exercising the supervisory power under Article 227, the High Court does not act as an Appellate Court or Tribunal. It will not review or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior court or tribunal purports to be based or to correct errors of law in the decision." 26. This court again clearly reiterated the legal position in Laxmikant Revchand Bhojwani & Another v. Pratapsing Mohansingh Pardeshi, (1995) 6 SCC 576 . The court again cautioned that the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution cannot assume unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decisions. It must be restricted to cases of grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice, where grave injustice would be done unless the High Court interferes. 27. A three-Judge Bench of this court in Rena Drego (Mrs.) v. Lalchand Soni & Others (1998) 3 SCC 341 again abundantly made it clear that the High Court cannot interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the subordinate court or the tribunal while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227. 27. A three-Judge Bench of this court in Rena Drego (Mrs.) v. Lalchand Soni & Others (1998) 3 SCC 341 again abundantly made it clear that the High Court cannot interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the subordinate court or the tribunal while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227. Its function is limited to seeing that the subordinate court or the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority. It cannot correct mere errors of fact by examining the evidence and re-appreciating it. 28. In Virendra Kashinath Ravat & Another v. Vinayak N. Joshi & Others (1999) 1 SCC 47 this court held that the limited power under Article 227 cannot be invoked except for ensuring that the subordinate courts function within its limits. 29. This court over 50 years has been consistently observing that limited jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 cannot be exercised by interfering with the findings of fact and set aside the judgments of the courts below on merit." In view of aforesaid discussion made by this Court after examining contentions raised by all learned advocates appearing on behalf of respective parties and after perusing entire award passed by Labour Court in each petition, according to my opinion, Labour Court has rightly decided the matters based on record and finding which has been given by Labour Court cannot consider to be a perverse or baseless, because, it based on legal evidence which are on record, therefore, according to my opinion, contentions which are raised by learned advocate Mr. Munshaw cannot be accepted. The Labour Court has rightly decided the matters and no error is committee which requires interference by this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 14. Therefore, there is no substance in each petitions, accordingly, this group of petitions are dismissed. No order as to costs. Rule is discharged in each petition. Interim relief, if any, shall stand vacated. 15. This being an old matters and workmen are out of job since more than 13 years, so, let petitioner Board may implement it as early as possible within a period of two months from the date of receiving copy of present order. Petition dismissed.