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2010 DIGILAW 2847 (PNJ)

Lal Chand v. State Of Haryana

2010-10-06

AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH, JASBIR SINGH

body2010
Judgment Augustine George Masih, J. 1. Prayer in the present writ petition is for quashing of the notification dated 16.11.2005 (Annexure P-20) issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (in short the Act) and notification dated 14.11.2006 (Annexure P-21) issued under Section 6 of the. Act and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom. The said notifications have been challenged by the petitioners on the ground that the land which was sought to be acquired for the development and utilization is of "A Class" construction and is being used for commercial purposes i.e. transport company dealing in business of Tractor transport, for the last 30 years has been included in the acquisition whereas the adjoining land where various industries are being run have been left out of the acquisition. It has been pleaded that the objections preferred by the petitioners under Section 5-A of the Act have not been decided and, therefore, the issuance of notification under Section 6 of the Act is bad in law. It has been further contended that successive notifications have been issued by the respondents for acquisition of the land but the same have either been quashed by this High Court or have elapsed. Notification dated 16.11.2005 (Annexure P-20) issued under Section 4 of the Act has been issued for the purpose of developing of commercial, institutional, recreational and residential area in Sector 20-B, Faridabad. The petitioners are already using it for commercial purpose. The land of the petitioners is sandwiched between Faridabad Filling Station and B.B.Industries which have been left out of acquisition. He, on this basis, contends that discrimination has been meted out to the petitioners. While issuing notification under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act, the old khasra numbers have been mentioned whereas after the consolidation, new khasra numbers have come into existence and, therefore, the same should have been mentioned. By doing so, the petitioners have been deprived of identifying their land which is being sought to be acquired by the State. Counsel, on this basis, prays for the writ petition to be allowed. 2. A preliminary objection has been raised by the respondents that the Award of the land in dispute was announced on 10.7.2007. There is a delay on the part of the petitioners in challenging the notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act. Counsel, on this basis, prays for the writ petition to be allowed. 2. A preliminary objection has been raised by the respondents that the Award of the land in dispute was announced on 10.7.2007. There is a delay on the part of the petitioners in challenging the notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act. The contention with regard to the non-decision of the objections under Section 5-A of the Act preferred by the petitioners, has been denied rather it has been pleaded that the petitioners did not prefer any such objections. Since the petitioners did not prefer any objections under Section 5-A of the Act, therefore, they are not entitled to challenge the acquisition proceedings. The averment of the petitioners with regard to discrimination having been meted out to them, has also been denied. 3. It has been pleaded that the notification under challenge was issued by mentioning old khasra numbers for the reason that the Director Land Consolidation, Haryana vide his order dated 16.4.1992 had revoked the consolidation scheme for village Ajronda in which the land in dispute is situated. The scheme was neither approved nor given effect to by the competent Authority and, therefore, new Khasra numbers are not in use and only the old khasra numbers are prevailing. 4. The fact with regard to the land of the petitioners sandwiched between the Faridabad Filling Station and B.B. Industries has not been specifically denied; however, it has been stated that no discrimination has been meted out to the petitioners. As regards the construction made on the land in question, it has been stated that the construction is B-Class. Most of the land is vacant and there are only four rooms and a boundary wall in existence over the land in question. The rooms are made of Gartar, Tukri and Stone. It has been contended that the State Government has an absolute right to acquire the super structures or the land for the public purpose and an adequate compensation would be granted for the land and the structures existing thereon. The Government has a right to issue successive notifications under the Land Acquisition Act in case the earlier notifications issued have either elapsed or the same had been quashed by a Court. The Government has a right to issue successive notifications under the Land Acquisition Act in case the earlier notifications issued have either elapsed or the same had been quashed by a Court. In support of the stand of the State that issuance of successive notifications itself would not be a ground for holding the subsequent notification as bad, reliance has been placed by the counsel upon a Full Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Ghansham Das Goyal and others v. State of Haryana and another, (1986-1)89 PLR 513 (FB) : AS 1986 Punjab & Haryana 207. As regards the issuance of the notification mentioning the old khasra numbers, counsel for the petitioners submits that the consolidation proceedings had been dropped and revoked on 16.12.1987. The old khasra numbers were prevalent and accordingly, the notification had been issued. He further contends that with the filing of the objections by the petitioners, mentioning the khasra numbers, both old and new, no prejudice appears to have been caused to them. He has placed reliance on! judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Pratibha Nema and others v. State of M.P. and others, (2003) 10 SCC 626. 5. Counsel for the respondents has produced the site plan of the area and while referring thereto, he has submitted that the land of the petitioners falls on the road which is to be constructed from Delhi-Mathura road and thus,the land of the petitioners cannot be exempted from acquisition. On this basis, dismissal of the writ petition has been prayed for. 6. We have heard counsel for the parties. 7. It is by now settled proposition of law that the owners and persons interested in the acquisition, who had not filed objections under Section 5-A of the Act to the notification issued under Section 4 of the Act, have no locus standi to contend that Section 5-A enquiry was not concluded properly and that Section 6 declaration must be struck down and that Section 4 notification would elapse. In such cases, Section 6 declaration must be deemed to be in force so far as they are concerned. In such cases, Section 6 declaration must be deemed to be in force so far as they are concerned. Reference in this regard can be made to the judgments of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh Uban and others, (1999) 7 SCC 44 as also in the case of Talson Real Estate v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 13 SCC 186 wherein in para 19 it has been held as follows:- "19. The appellant-company, being the owner of the land, has not filed objection under Section 5A, in principle, must be accepted that it had no objection to Section 4 notification operating in respect of its property. Those claimants-owners of the lands who have not filed objection under Section 5-A could not be allowed to contend that Section 5-A inquiry was bad and that consequently Section 6 declaration must be struck down and that then the Section 4 notification would lapse." 8. In view of ratio laid down in these judgments, the present writ petition would not be maintainable. 9. The contention of the petitioners that since the notification has been issued under the old khasra numbers, their right has been prejudiced as they would not been able to ascertain the land which is sought to be acquired, is without any basis for the reason that the consolidation scheme was not finalized and as a matter of fact, the same had been revoked vide order dated 27.4.1992 (Annexure R-1) passed by the Director, Consolidation, Haryana, relating to village Ajronda, District Faridabad and thus rejected. 10. The petitioners plea that the successive notifications cannot be issued to acquire the same land and therefore, deserve to be quashed, cannot be sustained in the light of the Full Bench judgment of this Court in Ghanshyam Dass Goyals case (supra) wherein it has been held that issuance of successive notifications itself would not be a ground for holding the subsequent notifications to be bad and the successive notifications can be issued for acquisition of the land. There is no bar under the Statute for issur ance of successive notifications where the same have elapsed or have been quashed by the Court. 11. There is no bar under the Statute for issur ance of successive notifications where the same have elapsed or have been quashed by the Court. 11. As regards the contention of the petitioners that they have been discriminated against as their land has not been released while the adjacent land of the Faridabad Filling Station and B.B. Industries between which it is sandwiched, has been left out of acquisition, suffice it to say that as the petitioners did not prefer objections under Section 5-A of the Act, the said plea cannot be allowed to be raised by the petitioners after it has been stated by the respondents in reply to these pleadings that the said land was released on submission of objections under Section 5-A of the Act and in any case the land of the petitioners cannot be exempted from acquisition for the reason that the same falls on the road. This Court as well as the Honble Supreme Court in various judgments have held that where the land falls on the road or is earmarked for public utility services, the same cannot be exempted from acquisition on the ground of discrimination. 12. In view of the above, we do not find any merit in the present writ petition and the same stands dismissed.