JUDGMENT Hon'ble Rakesh Tiwari, J. - Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 2. This writ petition has been preferred by Smt. Radhamani Gupta and others challenging the validity and correctness of the judgment and order dated 26.2.2010, appended as Annexure-8 to the writ petition passed by the Additional District Judge, Court No.9, Agra as well as the judgment and order dated 28.11.2008, appended as Annexure-7 to the writ petition passed by the Judge Small Causes Court, Agra. 3. The petitioners have prayed for a writ of certiorari for quashing the aforesaid two orders and judgments of the courts below and also for a writ of mandamus for restraining the respondents from interfering or otherwise dispossessing the petitioners from Kothi/House No. 36/211 (new) 4838 (old) Hindustan Mutual Building New Agra, District Agra. 4. By order dated 28.11.2008 aforesaid, the trial Court decreed the suit of the landlord Life Insurance Corporation of India represented by its Divisional Manager and by order dated 26.2.2010 the Revisional Court dismissed SCC Revision No. 2 of 2009 filed by the petitioners challenging the order of the trial Court. 5. The facts as reflected from the record are that Prem Prasad Gupta, the husband of petitioner no.1 was a tenant of Life Insurance Corporation of India (hereinafter referred to as the 'LIC' ) in premises no. 4838 (old), 36/211 (new) Hindustan Mutual Building, New Agra on rent @ Rs.40/- per month. A notice to quit dated 12th July, 1971 was issued to the petitioners by the LIC of India through its Divisional Manager by which he was informed that as being tenant they had fell in arrears of rent and are liable for ejectment without permission of the District Magistrate. Original Suit No. 730 of 1971 was thereafter instituted by the LIC of India for arrears of rent from 1.2.1971 and eviction of the petitioners from the premises in suit. During their tenancy Act No. 13 of 1971 came into force in July, 1972. The suit aforesaid was dismissed by the trial Court vide its judgment and order dated 9.4.1976. Civil Appeal No. 113 of 1976 preferred by the LIC of India against the judgment and order dated 9.4.1976 aforesaid was allowed by the appellate Court vide its order and judgment dated 30.4.1984 holding that all the proceedings of the court after 20.9.1972 were illegal and without jurisdiction. 6. Civil Appeal No. 113 of 1976 preferred by the LIC of India against the judgment and order dated 9.4.1976 aforesaid was allowed by the appellate Court vide its order and judgment dated 30.4.1984 holding that all the proceedings of the court after 20.9.1972 were illegal and without jurisdiction. 6. The matter was then transferred to the Court of Judge Small Causes, Agra. The validity and correctness of the order of the appellate Court dated 30.4.1984 was challenged by the tenants in First Appeal From Order No. 678 of 1984, which was dismissed by the High Court vide order and judgment dated 26.4.2007.Consequently, the matter was registered as Case No. 90/4 of 2007 before the Judge Small Causes Court,Agra. The suit was then decreed by the Judge Small Causes Court, Agra vide its judgment and decree dated 28.11.2008. SCC Revision No. 2 of 2009 filed by the tenants petitioner was also dismissed by the Revisional Court vide judgment and order dated 26.2.2010. 7. The case of the tenants petitioners was that the tenancy in question was a "contractual tenancy" governed by the provisions of Sections 105 read with Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act; that as the U.P. (Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1947 did not prescribe the provisions of Transfer of Property Act it was not applicable even though its principles were applicable and as such in order to bring a suit for eviction a notice under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act was a must. This section provides for a notice by the lessor, which according to Section 105 of the Act is the person transferring a right to enjoy the property. 8. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioners is that it is not the case of the respondent that the tenancy was created by the Divisional Manager and therefore, in the facts and circumstances above, the following questions are involved. 8. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioners is that it is not the case of the respondent that the tenancy was created by the Divisional Manager and therefore, in the facts and circumstances above, the following questions are involved. (i) Divisional Manager of LIC of India was not competent to issue notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, hence the notice dated 12th July, 1971 was invalid and tenancy of the petitioners does not stand terminated; (ii) that the Divisional Manager was also not competent to institute the suit for arrears of rent and eviction of the petitioners on behalf of the LIC of India; and (iii) that as the power was not registered, hence the Divisional Manager was not vested with the power to file the suit. 9. It is lastly urged that the Courts below have not examined the power of the Divisional Manager with respect to the service of notice even though this point was specifically raised before them and they only confined themselves to the point that since Divisional Manager is empowered to sign the pleadings, the suit was validly instituted and in that context the Revisional Court has placed reliance upon paragraph 10 of the judgment rendered in AIR 1997 SC-3, Union Bank of India versus Naresh Kumar which was not a point in issue in the argument. It is stated that the Courts below thus have failed to consider the point raised before them and did not give any finding over it and that the challenge to the validity of notice and power to serve the notice can be raised by the tenant alone whose valuable right of tenancy is in jeopardy. 10. According to Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, lease is a transfer of a right to enjoy such property and is a valuable right. Section 108(B) (j) gives power to the lessor to transfer absolutely or by way of mortgage or sub lease the whole or any part of his interest in the property. 10. According to Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, lease is a transfer of a right to enjoy such property and is a valuable right. Section 108(B) (j) gives power to the lessor to transfer absolutely or by way of mortgage or sub lease the whole or any part of his interest in the property. Under the circumstances, it is the right of the tenant to challenge the validity of notice and the point that the notice has not been given by the lessor or the landlord or is otherwise invalid is a question of law which is inferred from the evidence on record and can be raised at any time before any court in any proceeding and for this no specific plea is required to be raised, because inference from the documentary and oral evidence or from both can be argued and nobody can be expected to know as to what evidence will come in the proceedings and from them what legal questions may arise, hence under the circumstances, the power of Divisional Manager and the validity of notice sent by him being questions of law going to the root of the case can be raised in the writ petition and that in the circumstances, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned judgments and orders of the courts below are liable to be quashed. 11. Learned counsel for the respondent submits that question of validity of notice to quit is a mixed question of law and fact. It is stated that it has been settled by a catena of decisions of this Court as well as by the Hon'ble Apex Court. Findings to this effect have been returned against the petitioners by both the Courts below. It is stated that moreover, it is evident from the statement of the tenants recorded before the court below that acting upon the said notice the tenant had visited to the office of LIC of India to tender the rent, which was not accepted and that even in her statement she has not raised the issue that notice sent to her was issued by an incompetent person as such the said notice does not validly terminate her tenancy. 12. 12. Learned counsel for the respondent also submits that where ever the suit is instituted or defended by a public corporation, then the public interest should not be permitted to be defeated on a mere technicality. He has placed reliance upon paragraphs 9,10,11,and 12 of the judgment in this regard rendered in AIR 1997 Supreme Court-3, United Bank of India versus Naresh Kumar and others. Paragraphs 9,10,11 and 12 of the judgment are as under:- "9. In cases like the present where suits are instituted or defended on behalf of a public corporation, public interest should not be permitted to be defeated on a mere technicality. Procedural defects which do not go to the root of the matter should not be permitted to defeat a just cause. There is sufficient power in the Courts, under the Code of Civil Procedure,to ensure that injustice is not done to any party who has a just cause. As far as possible a substantive right should not be allowed to be defeated on account of procedural irregularity which is curable. 10. It cannot be disputed that a company like the appellant can sue and be sued in its own name. Under Order 6 Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure a pleading is required to be signed by the party and its pleader, if any. As a company is a juristic entity it is obvious that some person has to sign the pleadings on behalf of the company. Order 29 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure,therefore, provides that in a suit by or against a corporation the Secretary or any Director or other Principal Officer of the corporation who is able to depose to the facts of the case might sign and verify on behalf of the company. Reading Order 6, Rule 14 together with Order 29, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure it would appear that even in the absence of any formal letter of authority or power of attorney having been executed a person referred to in Rule 1 of Order 29 can, by virtue of the office which he holds, sign and verify the pleadings on behalf of the Corporation. In addition thereto and dehors Order 29, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as a company is a juristic entity, it can duly authorize any person to sign the plaint or the written statement on its behalf and this would be regarded as sufficient compliance with the provisions of Order 6, Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A person may be expressly authorized to sign the pleadings on behalf of the company, for example, by the Board of Directors passing a resolution to that effect or by a power of attorney being executed in favour any individual. In absence thereof and in cases where pleadings have been signed by one of its officers a Corporation can ratify the said action of its officer in signing the pleadings. Such ratification can be express or implied. The Court can on the basis of the evidence on record, and after taking all the circumstances of the case, specially with regard to the conduct of the trial, come to the conclusion that the corporation had ratified the act of signing of the pleading by its officer. 11. The Courts below could have held that Sh. L.K. Rohatgi must have been empowered to sign the plaint on behalf of the appellant. In the alternative it would have been legitimate to hold that the manner in which the suit was conducted showed that the appellant bank must have ratified the action of Sh. L.K. Rohatgi in signing the plaint. If, for any reason whatsoever, the Courts below were still unable to come to this conclusion, then either of the appellate Courts ought to have exercised their jurisdiction under Order 41, Rule 27(1)(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure and should have directed a proper power of attorney to be produced or they could have ordered Sh. L.K. Rohatgi or any other competent person to be examined as a witness in order to prove ratification or the authority of Sh. L.K. Rohatgi to sign the plaint. Such a power should be exercised by a Court in order to ensure that injustice is not done by rejection of a genuine claim. 12. L.K. Rohatgi or any other competent person to be examined as a witness in order to prove ratification or the authority of Sh. L.K. Rohatgi to sign the plaint. Such a power should be exercised by a Court in order to ensure that injustice is not done by rejection of a genuine claim. 12. The Courts below having come to a conclusion that money had been taken by respondent no.1 and that respondent no.2 and husband of respondent no.3 had stood as guarantors and that the claim of the appellant was justified it will be a travesty of justice if the appellant is to be non suited for a technical reason which does not go to the root of the matter. The suit did not suffer from any jurisdictional infirmity and the only defect which was alleged on behalf of the respondents was one which was curable." 13. Learned counsel for the petitioners has relied upon Annexure-5 which is a authority dated 1st August,1970 given to Sri G.K. Merchant, Divisional Manager, Agra Divisional Office of the Life Insurance Corporation of India to represent the Corporation in the proceedings in Court of law. It reads thus:- " CENTRAL ZONAL OFFICE Life Insurance Corporation Building 16/98, Mahatma Gandhi Road, Post Box No.181, Kanpur-1 Tel: 64322 (P.B.X.) Telegram: " BIMAPRADESH" Telex: KSHEMA-219 1st August,1970. AUTHORITY TO SHRI G.K. MERCHANT, DIVISIONAL MANAGER, AGRA, DIVISIONAL OFFICE OF THE LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA TO REPRESENT THE CORPORATION IN THE PROCEEDINGS IN COURT OF LAW. By virtue of the power vested in me under Regulation No. 41 of the Life Insurance Corporation Regulations, 1959 to delegate any of the authorities specified in the aforesaid Regulation No.41, I hereby delegate the following authorities to Sri G.K. Merchant, Divisional Manager, Agra Divisional Office of the Life Insurance Corporation of India and authorize him to perform any of the following functions on behalf of the Life Insurance Corporation of India:- 1. To institute, conduct, defend and represent the Corporation in all suits, appeals, applications and execution proceedings by or against the Corporation or to which the Corporation may be a party in all Courts within the jurisdiction of the Agra Divisional Office. 2. To sign and execute all appearances and vakalatnamas for engagement of Advocates and other legal professional persons. 3. To institute, conduct, defend and represent the Corporation in all suits, appeals, applications and execution proceedings by or against the Corporation or to which the Corporation may be a party in all Courts within the jurisdiction of the Agra Divisional Office. 2. To sign and execute all appearances and vakalatnamas for engagement of Advocates and other legal professional persons. 3. To sign and verify pleadings, memorandum of appeal, cross-objections, applications for execution, petitions, counter petitions,all legal documents of whatsoever nature and make affidavits for and on behalf of the Life Insurance Corporation of India. Sd. Illegible ( O.P. Gupta ) Zonal Manager Life Insurance Corporation of India, Central Zonal Office, Kanpur." 14. It is submitted on the basis of above that Sri G.K. Merchant, Divisional Manager has the power to sign all the legal documents of whatsoever nature and as such the notice dated 12th July, 1971 signed under his signatures cannot be said to be invalid and even otherwise if there is any procedural defects in issuing of the notice, it does not go to the root of the matter and should not be permitted to defeat a just cause. It is argued that admittedly the petitioners were tenants and the claim of the LIC of India for arrears of rent and eviction was justified, hence it should not have non-suited for a technical reasons that the notice was not signed by the Divisional Manager of LIC of India. It is stated that the power to sign and verify all the legal documents of whatsoever nature includes signing of notice to quit or terminate tenancy as it is a document of legal nature issued under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act which adversely affects legal rights of a tenant. 15. This plea has not been specifically taken that Sri G.K. Merchant was not competent to sign the notice as the powers were not delegated. It is stated that after receipt of notice the tenant went to the office of LIC of India to deposit the rent but he was not allowed to deposit the rent by the Divisional Manager. The petitioners cannot therefore, raise the aforesaid point for the first time before this Court. 16. It is stated that after receipt of notice the tenant went to the office of LIC of India to deposit the rent but he was not allowed to deposit the rent by the Divisional Manager. The petitioners cannot therefore, raise the aforesaid point for the first time before this Court. 16. In rebuttal, learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that according to Section 22 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 the Corporation may entrust the superintendence and direction of the affairs and business of a Zonal Office upon Zonal Manager with respect to the area within the jurisdiction of the Zonal office; that Section 49 of the Act prescribes that the Corporation may make regulations which is not inconsistent with the Act and for the powers which may be delegated to the Zonal Manager. It is stated that there is no evidence on record that Sri O.P. Gupta was the Zonal Manager and Sri G.K. Merchant was the Divisional Manager as such the power of attorney delegating the certain powers to Sri G.K. Merchant does not contain a power to serve a notice of termination of tenancy upon a tenant. It is argued that Sri G.K. Merchant could not realize the rent from the tenants as landlord and that the power of attorney, Annexure-5 quoted above in the judgment has not been duly proved in evidence as such is inadmissible in evidence in view of Section 35 of the Act for it is not on any stamp paper as required under Article 48 Schedule I-B of the Stamp Act. It is stated that the authority of the Divisional Manager was challenged in the written statement ( Annexure-2) paragraph 1 of which with respect to delegation of authority has been denied and it has also been averred therein that the Zonal Manager was not authorized to delegate and authorize the Divisional Manager. 17. Relying upon Rules 2 and 4 of Order VI of C.P.C. it is stated that if a plea is not specifically made, it is covered by an issue by implication and the parties knew that the said plea was involved in the trial then in that case mere fact that that the plea was not specifically taken in the pleadings would not necessarily disentitle a party from relying upon it if it is satisfactorily proved by evidence. It is further stated that Rule 13 of the said Order also provides that where there is presumption of law, the same need not be pleaded and that it is proved from the judgments impugned in the present writ petition that this point was argued before the Courts below. 18. Learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon the provisions of Section 2(1) 2 (12) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India Act, 1956 and submits that Section 2(1) of the Act provides that word and expression not defined in the said Act shall have the same meaning as assigned in the Insurance Act, 1938. 19. Learned counsel for the respondent has also placed reliance upon the following rulings in support of the aforesaid contention. Jute & Gunny Broker Ltd. versus Union of India A.K. Lahari versus LIC of India SBI versus Dr. Swaran Singh Calcutta-123, J.Mc. Gaffin versus LIC of India 20. He then placed section 2(12) of the Insurance Act, 1938, which defines Manager and Officer as follows:- " 2(12) "Manager" and "officer" have the meanings assigned to those expressions in clauses (9) and (11) respectively of Section 2 of the Indian Companies Act, 1913 ( 7 of 1913)." 21. It is submitted that the aforesaid clause came up for interpretation before the Apex Court in the case of Jute and Gunny Broker Ltd., which held the Managing Agent of the Corporation to be officer of the Corporation and service upon such person is sufficient service upon the Corporation. 22. He also submitted that as soon as the tenants received the notice to quit, they acquiesced to it and went to comply with it but the rent, according to the learned counsel for the petitioners was deliberately not accepted by the LIC office, hence it cannot be said that there was any default on the part of the petitioners tenants and as such the suit was itself not maintainable for the reliefs claimed. 23. 23. It is stated that this aspect has already been considered in detail by the Apex Court in the case of Jute & Gunny Broker Ltd. versus Union of India aforesaid, hence under the provisions of CPC, institution of proceedings by a responsible officer of the LIC and such proceedings in suit cannot be treated to be invalid particularly when the suit is in the name of the Corporation and has been instituted for and on behalf of the Corporation. 24. After hearing learned counsel for the parties it is apparent that in the notice ( Annexure-5) it is clearly stated that LIC of India is the owner of the building in dispute which therefore, constitutes notice on behalf of LIC of India. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioners that the Divisional Manager had no authority to serve notice by and on behalf of LIC of India cannot be accepted for the Corporation has to be represented by an officer of the Corporation. In my considered opinion, the Court should do substantial justice and procedural defects which can be cured or appear to have been ratified by the subsequent action and conduct of the officers of the Public Corporations may not be permitted to be defeated on mere techanilities which does not go to the root of the matter. It is sufficiently indicated by the notice signed by the Divisional Manager, who is a responsible officer of the Corporation that notice for termination of tenancy of the tenants is being given on behalf of LIC of India. He could have issued notice because he was authorized to act in legal matters and for the purpose of proceedings in court cases . Termination of tenancy under Section 106 of the Act adversely affects the legal rights of the tenant for giving rise to cause for approaching the court by a person who can file written notice, arguments, written statement and do all other legal acts for the purpose of cases and can also sign on behalf of the Corporation. 25. Termination of tenancy under Section 106 of the Act adversely affects the legal rights of the tenant for giving rise to cause for approaching the court by a person who can file written notice, arguments, written statement and do all other legal acts for the purpose of cases and can also sign on behalf of the Corporation. 25. Learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance upon Sections 3(2),4 and 22(1) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India Act, Regulations-40 and 41 of the Life Insurance Corporation Regulations Act,1959, Order, 29, Order 26(2), Order 3 CPC, Order 6 Rule 14 CPC , Section 2(c) and Section 3 of the U.P. (Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1947 along with Article 4 Schedule-II of Provincial Small Causes Courts Act (U.P. Amendment ). 26. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioners that the Divisional Manager of LIC of India was not competent to issue notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act,hence the notice was invalid and tenancy does not stand terminated has no force. The LIC being a juristic and statutory corporation is to be represented in legal matters by its officers who are able to the facts of the case sign and verify on behalf of the Corporation. As held in paragraph no.'s 10 and 11 of United Bank of India (supra) , in view of Order 6 Rule 14, r/w Order 29, Rule 1 CPC even in absence of any formal authority or power of attorney having been executed a person by virtue of his office which he hold may sign or verify the pleadings etc. The Divisional Manager was delegated these powers by the Zonal Managers, hence even in absence of power to issue notice to quit under Section 105 of Transfer of Property Act, Sri G.K. Merchant had power and authority to issue the said notice as the legal act which he could perform in reference of letter dated 1.8.1970, Annexure-5 quoted in the judgment and his act of issue of notice to the petitioners stood ratified by the Corporation expressly and impliedly as the acts of Sri G.K.Merchant of issuance of notice and subsequently the court proceedings in pursuance thereof were not disowned by the corporation. 27. In paragraph 4 of the plaint it has been specifically stated that the notice to quit was served upon the tenants on 14.7.1971. 27. In paragraph 4 of the plaint it has been specifically stated that the notice to quit was served upon the tenants on 14.7.1971. This has been replied to in paragraph 4 of the written statement and service of notice has not been disputed. The tenants have not questioned the authority of the Divisional Manager to issue the notice and no pleadings exist in the written statement to the effect that notice was not issued by a competent person. In the absence of pleading in the written statement, the tenants cannot be permitted to raise the said issue and hence the question so raised by the petitioners is ill founded and cannot be taken up in the present writ petition. 28. Perusal of authority ( Annexure-5 to the writ petition) shows that it confers the authority specifically on the Divisional Manager, Agra by the Zonal Manager Central Zone, Kanpur. Paragraph 3 of the aforesaid authority categorically confers authority upon the Divisional Manager to sign and verify all legal documents of whatsoever nature, hence there existed full authority in the Divisional Manager of LIC of India to issue the notice to the tenant and terminate his tenancy. A perusal of the notice to quite also discloses that it has been issued on the letter pad of LIC of India and bears a reference of letter number of LIC of India. It is addressed to the tenants giving correct address and it has been sent through the registered post AD and has been signed by the Divisional Manager, hence the notice to quit, therefore, is valid and relying upon the said notice to quit, suit has been instituted by the LIC of India. 29. Sections 3(2),4 read with Section 22(1) of LIC of India Act read with Regulations 40 and 41 of the LIC Regulations Act, 1959 along with Orders 3, 26(2),29 and Order 6 Rule 14 C.P.C. , Sections 2(c) and 3 of the U.P. (Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1947 as well as article 4 Schedule-II of the Provincial Small Causes Court Act (U.P. Amendment) clearly establish that the petitioners are lessee of LIC of India. It is not in dispute that the LIC of India is lessor. It is not in dispute that the LIC of India is lessor. Hence, as observed earlier, the Divisional Manager is vested with sufficient authority to issue notice as he has power to do all other legal acts on behalf of the Corporation or sue in its behalf in courts of law. No provision has been placed before the court showing that there is any requirement for registration of the power of attorney for the purpose of instituting the suit and therefore, this plea of the petitioners lacks merit and has no force. 30. Taking into consideration the fact that the petitioners had acquiesced to the aforesaid notice to the authority of Sri G.K. Merchant, the Divisional Manager for depositing the rent, therefore, the validity of notice being a mixed question of law and facts and that the findings of facts have been recorded against the tenants by both the courts below the tenants cannot raise this point for the first time that the Divisional Manager has no power to issue notice or that the powers which delegated upon him did not show that he was delegated this power. It has been rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent that in her statement the petitioner has not even raised that notice sent to her was a person who was incompetent to do so and that the said notice does not validly terminate her tenancy. 31. For the reasons stated above, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed with heavy and deterrent cost. 32. The Arex Court in Salem Advocate Bar Association, Tamil Nadu v. Union of India, has held that-- "So far as awarding of costs at the time of judgment is concerned, awarding of costs must be treated generally as mandatory inasmuch as the liberal attitude of the Courts in directing the parties to bear their own costs had led the parties to file a number of frivolous cases in the Courts or to raise frivolous and unnecessary issues. Costs should invariably follow the event. Where a party succeeds ultimately on one issue or point but 1oses an number of other issues or points, which were unnecessarily raised Costs must be appropriately apportioned. Special reasons must be assigned if costs are not being awarded. Costs-should be assessed according to rule in force. Costs should invariably follow the event. Where a party succeeds ultimately on one issue or point but 1oses an number of other issues or points, which were unnecessarily raised Costs must be appropriately apportioned. Special reasons must be assigned if costs are not being awarded. Costs-should be assessed according to rule in force. If any of the parties has unreasonably- protracted the proceedings, the judge should consider exercising discretion to impose exemplary costs after taking into account the expense incurred for the purpose of attend on the adjourned dates." 33. Thus from the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the aforesaid case of Salem Advocate Bar Association (supra) it is apparent that non-payment of cost is an exception for which special reasons have to be given by the Court and that in normal circumstances cost has to be awarded on the party according to the issue decided in favour of the party which were unnecessarily, raised. The cost so imposed should be in accordance with rules and if the proceedings are unnecessarily protracted or adjournments have been sought upon the discretion of the Judge to impose exemplary cost taking also into count the circumstances etc. for the purpose of adjournment. 34. The aforesaid case has been followed in Civil Misc. Writ Petition 48752 of 2006 Nizamuddin v. Shakoor Ahmad in which judgment has been rendered on 5.9.2006 after considering the relevant High Court Rules, 1952 as, well as sections 34, 35, 35-A and 35-B of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the judgment it has been held that "From the aforesaid rule it is evident that the Court can make such order as to costs as it may consider just. It is discretionary power of the Court to impose cost, hence it cannot be said to be illegal or perverse. The Court should award cost for judicious approach taking into consideration the whole set of facts and circumstances and not award cost arbitrarily or cat capriciously. In my opinion while awarding interest on a party by non-payment of principal amount or any dues should also be considered by the Court and not only interest but penal interest may also be awarded." 35. Considering all the facts and circumstances of this case, cost is assessed at Rs. 10,000/-. In my opinion while awarding interest on a party by non-payment of principal amount or any dues should also be considered by the Court and not only interest but penal interest may also be awarded." 35. Considering all the facts and circumstances of this case, cost is assessed at Rs. 10,000/-. It shall be deposited by the petitioners before the author concerned and paid to the landlord within two months from today. In case of failure of the petitioners to deposit the cost before the Executing Court, the same shall be recovered as arrears of land revenue from them within a month thereafter and paid forthwith to the landlord. 36. The petition is accordingly, dismissed with cost as aforesaid. Petition Dismissed.