JUDGMENT Akil Kureshi, J. 1. These petitions have been referred to Division Bench by learned Single Judge by an order dated 19.3.10. The learned Single Judge framed the following question for consideration of the Division Bench. While the provisions of Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 57 of the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1993 empower the Competent Authority to adjudicate upon misconduct in the discharge of his duties or any disgraceful conduct or abuse of powers, or persistent default in the performance of duties and functions under the Act by any member, sarpanch or upa-sarpanch of the panchayat, for his removal or disqualification, can an appeal from the decision of such adjudication be preferred by the original complainant? ; and whether the words "any person aggrieved" occurring in Sub-section (3) of Section 57 of the Act would include the original complainant in the context of the purpose and relevant provisions of the Act ? Brief facts of the cases are as follows: Special Civil Application No. 12298/09 is filed by Deputy Sarpanch of Zarola Gram Panchayat. He had filed complaint dated 18.4.08 against the Sarpanch of the village Panchayat who is respondent No. 1 in the petition. In the said complaint made to the District Development Officer of Anand District, the petitioner had levelled allegations against the Sarpanch regarding misuse of her powers and irregularities in discharge of duties. 2. On the basis of allegations made by the petitioner, preliminary inquiry was conducted by a committee of three members, including the Taluka Development Officer and Director of Village Development Agency, Anand. The Committee submitted its report dated 29th July, 2008 and concluded that respondent No. 1 had committed serious financial irregularities. The District Development Officer thereupon issued show cause notice to respondent No. 1 on 22nd August, 2008 calling upon her why she should not be removed from the office of Sarpanch in exercise of powers under Section 57(2) of the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1993 (Act for short). Respondent No. 1 replied to the said show cause notice under communication dated 4.9.08 and denied the charges. The petitioner placed his representation on record before the District Development Officer under communication dated 22nd September, 2008 and contended that respondent No. 1 was involved in number of financial irregularities and had misappropriated public funds. Respondent No. 1 replied to the said show cause notice under communication dated 4.9.08 and denied the charges. The petitioner placed his representation on record before the District Development Officer under communication dated 22nd September, 2008 and contended that respondent No. 1 was involved in number of financial irregularities and had misappropriated public funds. Respondent No. 2, District Development Officer, however, by his order dated 26th February, 2009 dropped the charges and withdrew the show cause notice holding that irregularities were not of serious nature. It is the case of the petitioner that since the inquiry against respondent No. 1 was initiated at his instance, he would be a "person aggrieved" as referred to in Sub-section (3) of Section 57 of the Act and he could file an appeal against the decision of the District Development Officer. 3. In Special Civil Application No. 13812 of 2009 petitioner is Deputy Sarpanch of Limbara Gram Panchayat. The petitioner had complained against the alleged irregularities of the Sarpanch of village, respondent No. 3 herein to the District Development Officer, alleging, inter alia that Sarpanch had remained absent in the meeting of the Panchayat held in March, 2008 and failed to pass budget within time. The petitioner had also made further representation with respect to the commissions and omissions of respondent No. 3 in discharge of her duties. On 16th March, 2009, a show cause notice was issued to respondent No. 3 why she should not be removed as Sarpanch. However, by an order dated 5.6.09, the District Development Officer dropped the proceedings against respondent No. 3. The petitioner appealed against the decision of the District Development Officer before the Additional Development Commissioner who dismissed the appeal by an order dated 13.11.09 holding that the petitioner had no locus standi to maintain the appeal relying on a decision of the learned single Judge in the case of Ganpat Mohanbhai Vasava v. Additional Development Commissioner 2008(2) GLH 342 : AIR 2008 Guj 88 . The order passed by the District Development Officer and as well as by the Additional Development Commissioner are under challenge in the said petition. The order passed by the District Development Officer and as well as by the Additional Development Commissioner are under challenge in the said petition. In both the petitions, common question of law involved is whether in view of the provisions contained in the Act and in particular Section 57 thereof, the petitioners have locus standi to maintain appeal against the order of the District Development Officer dropping the proceedings against the elected Sarpanch of a Gram Panchayat. 4. As is apparent from the order of reference, the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Ganpat Mohanbhai Vasava (supra), after examining the provisions of Section 57 of the Act and the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Lalbhai Trading Company v. Union of India 2006(1) GLR 497 , held that appeal would not be maintainable. 5. Before us, learned advocates appearing for the petitioners vehemently submitted that inquiries against the Sarpanches were initiated on the basis of the complaints filed by the petitioners. The petitioners had produced voluminous materials before the District Development Officer to point out that the Sarpanch had committed serious irregularities including financial irregularities. They, therefore, were persons aggrieved for the purpose of Sub-section (3) of Section 57 of the Act. 6. Section 57 of the Act pertains to removal and disqualification of a Sarpanch, Upa-sarpanch or a Member of a Panchayat on certain grounds. Section 57 reads as follows: 57(1). The competent authority may remove from office any member of the Panchayat, the Sarpanch or, as the case may be, the Upa-Sarpanch, thereof, after giving him an opportunity of being heard and giving due notice in that behalf to the panchayat and after such inquiry as it deems necessary, if such member, Sarpanch or, as the case may be, Upa-Sarpanch has been guilty of misconduct in the discharge of his duties or of any disgraceful conduct or abuses his powers or makes persistent default in the performance of his duties and functions under this Act or has become incapable of performing his duties and functions under this Act. The Sarpanch or, as the case may be, the Upa-Sarpanch, so removed may at the discretion of the competent authority also be removed from the membership of the panchayat. The Sarpanch or, as the case may be, the Upa-Sarpanch, so removed may at the discretion of the competent authority also be removed from the membership of the panchayat. (2) The competent authority may, after following the procedure laid down in Sub-section (1) disqualify for a period not exceeding five years any person who has resigned his office as a member, Sarpanch or Upa-Sarpanch, or otherwise ceased to hold any such office and has been guilty of misconduct specified in Sub-section (1) or has been incapable of performing his duties and functions: Provided that an action under this sub-section shall be taken within six months from the date on which the person resigns or ceases to hold any such office. (3) Any person aggrieved by an order of the competent authority under Sub-section (1) or (2) may, within a period of thirty days from the date of communication of such order, appeal to the State Government. 7. Upon analysis of Section 57 of the Act, it can be seen that Sub-section (1) pertains to the power of the competent authority to remove any Member, Upa-Sarpanch or Sarpanch of a Panchayat after holding such inquiry as it deems necessary, if such member, Upa-Sarpanch or Sarpanch, as the case may be, has been guilty of misconduct in discharge of his duties or in disgraceful conduct or has abused his powers or made persistent defaults in the performance of his duties and functions under the Act or has become incapable of performing his duties and functions. The powers include removal of a Sarpanch or Upa-Sarpanch even from the membership of the Panchayat. 8. Sub-section (2) of Section 57 pertains to disqualification of a member, Upa-Sarpanch or Sarpanch of a Panchayat for a period not exceeding 5 years under certain circumstances. Sub-section (3) of Section 57 provides for an appeal to the State Government against an order passed by the Competent Authority either under Sub-section (1) or under Sub-section (2) of Section 57 of the Act at the hands of a person aggrieved by such an order. 9. It is in this context that we need to interpret the term "person aggrieved" as mentioned in Sub-section (3) of Section 57 of the Act. This term had come up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Lalbhai Trading Company (supra). 9. It is in this context that we need to interpret the term "person aggrieved" as mentioned in Sub-section (3) of Section 57 of the Act. This term had come up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Lalbhai Trading Company (supra). Therein the issue arose under the provisions of the Customs Act, 1962. The order in original was passed against importer alone demanding certain dues. However, pursuant to such an order, notice was served on the petitioner therein who was the Customs House Agent demanding customs duty. When the petitioner filed appeal against the order in original, the appeal was dismissed on the ground that he was not an aggrieved person. Reversing the decision of the authorities, the Division Bench held that the petitioner was being fastened with a pecuniary liability which would deprive him of his property. If the approach of the authority is that the order in original was passed against the importer and, that therefore, the petitioner was not a person aggrieved if accepted, would result in meting out unfair treatment to the petitioner. The petitioner is a person who is directly affected by the order in original upon defaults by the importer. 10. Such is not the situation in the present case. The petitioners have been instrumental in initiation of proceedings against the elected Sarpanches of the respective Gram Panchayats. They had through their complaints alerted the competent authority, viz., the District Development Officer. Proceedings, however, came to be dropped after considering the representations of the Sarpanches. It is in this background that we need to examine whether the petitioners could be called persons aggrieved. 11. In the case of Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M.V. Dabhokar and Ors. (1975) 2 SCC 702 : AIR 1975 SC 2092 , the Apex Court has observed as under: 27. The words 'person aggrieved' are found in several statutes. The meaning of the words 'person aggrieved' will have to be ascertained with reference to the purpose and the provisions of the statute. Sometimes, it is said that the words 'person aggrieved' correspond to the requirement of locus standi which arises in relation to judicial remedies. 28. Where a right of appeal to courts against an administrative or judicial decision is created by statute, the right is invariably confined to a person aggrieved or a person who claims to be aggrieved. Sometimes, it is said that the words 'person aggrieved' correspond to the requirement of locus standi which arises in relation to judicial remedies. 28. Where a right of appeal to courts against an administrative or judicial decision is created by statute, the right is invariably confined to a person aggrieved or a person who claims to be aggrieved. The meaning of the words 'a person aggrieved' may vary according to the context of the statute. One of the meanings is that a person will be held to be aggrieved by a decision if that decision is materially adverse to him. Normally, one is required to establish that one has been denied or deprived of something to which one is legally entitled in order to make one 'a person aggrieved'. Again a person is aggrieved if a legal burden is imposed on him. The meaning of the words 'a person aggrieved' is sometimes given a restricted meaning in certain statutes which provide remedies for the protection of private legal rights. The restricted meaning requires denial or deprivation of legal rights. A more liberal approach is required in the background of statutes which do not deal with property rights but deal with professional conduct and morality... 12. In the present case, it cannot be stated that the decision rendered by the District Development Officers are materially adverse to the petitioners. The petitioners are not deprived of any vested rights or anything which was legally due to them. None of the legal rights of the petitioners are violated or breached. The term "person aggrieved" must be understood in the context in which the provisions of the statute under consideration have been made. Section 57 of the Act, as already noted, empowers removal or disqualification of an elected member, Upa-Sarpanch or Sarpanch. It is held that such removal should not be lightly resorted to. The Competent authority must consider all relevant aspects of the matter before taking a final decision on the basis of the available material on record. The role of the complainant in such a case is to bring to the notice of the competent authority the alleged irregularities. It is thereafter a matter between the elected members, Upa-Sarpanch or Sarpanch as the case may be and the competent authority. The role of the complainant in such a case is to bring to the notice of the competent authority the alleged irregularities. It is thereafter a matter between the elected members, Upa-Sarpanch or Sarpanch as the case may be and the competent authority. As a complainant, a person who brings such irregularities to the notice of the Competent Authority may participate in the proceedings and bring on record material at his command. He, however, cannot claim to be a "person aggrieved" if ultimately on the basis of the evidence on record, the proceedings are dropped by the competent authority. We must remember that issue involves question of removal of a member, Upa-Sarpanch or Sarpanch of a Gram Panchayat who are elected by people. Question of removal of such an elected member through administrative order must be confined between the competent authority and the member concerned. Any member of public claiming interest in the lis cannot be entrusted with the right to appeal if the competent authority on the basis of evidence on record holds that the proceedings need to be dropped. 13. It is by now well settled that right to appeal is a statutory right and cannot be claimed as an inherent right by any person unless it is statutorily provided. 14. In case of Shin-Etsu Chemical Co. Ltd. v. M/s. Aksh Optifibre Ltd. and Anr. reported in AIR 2005 SC 3766 , it was observed that it is well settled in law that an appeal is a creature of statute and a right to appeal inheres in no one. 15. In case of National Insurance Co. Ltd., Chandigarh v. Nicolletta Rohtagi and Ors. reported in AIR 2002 SC 3350 , it was observed that the right of appeal is not an inherent right or common law right, but it is a statutory right. If the law provides that an appeal can be filed on limited grounds, the grounds of challenge cannot be enlarged on the premise that the insured or the persons against whom a claim has been made has not filed any appeal. If the law provides that an appeal can be filed on limited grounds, the grounds of challenge cannot be enlarged on the premise that the insured or the persons against whom a claim has been made has not filed any appeal. It was further observed that the view that a right to contest would also include the right to file an appeal is contrary to well established law that creation of a right to appeal is an act which requires legislative authority and no court or tribunal can confer such right, it being one of limitation or extension of jurisdiction. 16. In case of Superintending Engineer and Ors. v. B. Subba Reddy reported in AIR 1999 SC 1747 , it was observed that appeal is a substantive right. It is a creation of statute. Right to appeal does not exist unless it is specifically conferred. 17. In case of Gujarat Agro Industries Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad and Ors. reported in (1999) 4 SCC 468 : AIR 1999 SC 1818 , it was observed that: Right of appeal which is statutory right can be conditional or qualified. It cannot be said that such a law would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. If the statute does not create any right of appeal, no appeal can be filed. There is a clear distinction between a suit and an appeal. While every person has an inherent right to bring a suit of a civil nature unless the suit is barred by statute. However, in regard to an appeal, position is quite opposite. The right to appeal inheres in no one and, therefore, for maintainability of an appeal there must be authority of law. When such a law authorises filing of appeal, it can impose conditions as well. 18. In case of M/s. Ramnarain Private Limited and Anr. v. State Trading Corporation of India Limited reported in (1983) 3 SCC 75 : AIR 1983 SC 786 , it was observed that: 16. The right to prefer an appeal is a right created by Statute. No party can file an appeal against any judgment, decree or order as a matter of course in the absence of a suitable provisions of some law conferring on the party concerned the right to file an appeal against any judgment, decree or order. The right to prefer an appeal is a right created by Statute. No party can file an appeal against any judgment, decree or order as a matter of course in the absence of a suitable provisions of some law conferring on the party concerned the right to file an appeal against any judgment, decree or order. The right of appeal so conferred on any party may be lost to the party in appropriate cases by the provisions of some law and also by the conduct of the party. The law of limitation may deprive a party of the right he may enjoy to prefer an appeal by virtue of any statutory provisions. Also, in appropriate cases a party may be held to have become disentitled from enforcing the right of appeal which he may otherwise have. 19. We may refer to judgment dated 8.12.2005 passed in Special Civil Application No. 17427 of 2005 by learned Single Judge of this Court. In the said case, the petitioner had complained against irregularities committed by Sarpanch of village Gaviar. District Development Officer after issuing show cause notice and holding inquiry ordered removal of the Sarpanch. The Sarpanch aggrieved by the order of the District Development Officer preferred an appeal before the Additional Development Commissioner who allowed the appeal and set aside removal of the Sarpanch. The complainant approached this Court by filing writ petition contending inter alia that in the appeal filed by the Sarpanch he was a necessary party despite which without joining him appeal was entertained and allowed. In the judgment, the Court observed that in the proceedings conducted by the District Development Officer, the petitioner had made no attempt to join himself as party nor did he participate in the proceedings in any other manner. Before the Additional Development Officer also no attempt was made by the petitioner to join in the appeal. It was, therefore, held that the petitioner had no right to insist that the order passed by the Additional Development Commissioner should be set aside since he was not given an opportunity of being heard before allowing the appeal. It was further observed as follows: Primarily the question of removal of a member, Sarpanch or Upa-sarpanch is a matter between the competent authority and the elected member. It was further observed as follows: Primarily the question of removal of a member, Sarpanch or Upa-sarpanch is a matter between the competent authority and the elected member. Especially in the present case where only one out of nine charges levelled against respondent No. 3 could be related to any complaint made by the petitioner and especially when the petitioner took no active steps to participate in the proceedings before the District Development Officer initially and the Additional Development Commissioner thereafter, I do not see how the petitioner can maintain the petition for want of locus standi. 20. Considering all these aspects of the matter, we find that the petitioners cannot be stated to be "persons aggrieved". They, therefore, could not have maintained appeals against the orders passed by the District Development Officer. 21. Coming to the facts of the case, in Special Civil Application No. 13812 of 2009, we have perused the orders under challenge. Even on facts, we see no possibility of interference. Main allegation against respondent No. 3 Sarpanch was that she had failed to ensure passing of budget before 31st March of the financial year. The Competent Authority exercising discretionary powers condoned such a lapse warning the Sarpanch to be careful in future. We do not find any reason to exercise extra-ordinary jurisdiction to upset such an order. Irrespective of the appeal having been dismissed on the ground of locus standi, we find no merit in the petition also. 22. With respect to Special Civil Application No. 12298 of 2009, we prima facie find that the allegations against the Sarpanch were extremely serious. In the preliminary inquiry, the Committee of three officers found sufficient material to proceed further against the Sarpanch. A detailed report was submitted. Such report was though placed before the District Development Officer, he closed the proceedings observing that the Sarpanch did not commit any serious irregularities. We are of the opinion that the issue requires proper consideration. The entire proceedings shall be placed before the State Government who enjoys revisional powers under Section 259 of the Act to consider whether any further orders are necessary with respect to the order passed by the District Development Officer dropping the proceedings against respondent No. 1. 23. With above observations and directions, both the petitions are disposed of. The entire proceedings shall be placed before the State Government who enjoys revisional powers under Section 259 of the Act to consider whether any further orders are necessary with respect to the order passed by the District Development Officer dropping the proceedings against respondent No. 1. 23. With above observations and directions, both the petitions are disposed of. We answer the reference in following manner: Against an order that the District Development Officer may pass under Sub-section (1) or (2) of Section 57 of the Act, the original complainant cannot be said to be a person aggrieved for the purpose of maintaining appeal under Sub-section (3) of Section 57 of the Act.