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2010 DIGILAW 2858 (MAD)

N. R. Sundaresan v. Varun Bedi

2010-07-14

T.S.SIVAGNANAM

body2010
Judgment :- 1. The prayer in the writ petition is for issuance of a writ of certiorari to quash the FIR No.154 of 2002, dated 23.06.2002 on the file of the second respondent, based on the complaint lodged by the first respondent, before the learned Judicial Magistrate No.I, Nawan Shahr, Punjab. 2. The petitioner was working as a Manager in the Marketing Office in the first respondent company at Chennai. The Marketing Office of the first respondent company was functioning at No.19, 5th Street, Krishna Nagar, Virugambakkam, Chennai – 92. The first respondent company was engaged in the imports of the consumer goods from the International Market and distributed the same to various places throughout the country. The goods which were handled by the Chennai Office were imported through the Chennai Port and were stocked in the office functioning at Virugambakkam. The Director of the first respondent company, Mr.Varun Bedi, used to visit Chennai Office frequently for the purpose of managing the affairs of the business of the company. According to the petitioner, in December 1999, he expressed his unwillingness to continue in the employment of the first respondent company and thereafter the Director of the first respondent company came to Chennai in the last week of January 2000. They verified all the accounts of the Company and took details of the remaining stock and thereafter, the Chennai Office was closed on 04.03.2000 and vacant possession of the premises was handed over to the landlord of the building. According to the petitioner, the company was due and payable to him arrears of salary and other adjustments and he had been repeatedly representing to the first respondent for settlement of his dues. The petitioner was requested to come over to Delhi during December 2000 and the first respondent promised to settle the dues payable to the petitioner. While so, on 22.08.2002, the Assistant Sub Inspector of Police from the second respondent Police Station, came to the petitioners residence stating that warrant has been issued by the Court of Judicial Magistrate No.I, Nawan Shahr, Punjab, based on the complaint given by the first respondent. At that stage, the petitioner filed the present writ petition and this Court, while admitting the writ petition, by order dated 07.01.2003, granted interim stay of all further proceedings pursuant to the registration of the FIR. 3. At that stage, the petitioner filed the present writ petition and this Court, while admitting the writ petition, by order dated 07.01.2003, granted interim stay of all further proceedings pursuant to the registration of the FIR. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that no part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the second respondent as the entire transaction relating to the business of the first respondent company were carried on at Chennai in the premises which was leased out by the Company situated at No.19, 5th Street, Krishna Nagar, Virugambakkam, Chennai – 92 and therefore the second respondent would have no jurisdiction to register a case. Further, it is contended that even going by the allegation as contained in the FIR, the alleged offences under Sections 406, 420, 467, 471 and 120-B IPC are not made out and the first respondent did not furnish any materials to substantiate the alleged offences and therefore, the FIR itself is liable to be quashed. 4. The order of interim stay granted by this Court on 07.01.2003, continues to remain in force till date. The first respondent has entered appearance through the counsel. The learned counsel for the first respondent submits that despite intimation given to the first respondent, there is no instruction from his client. The second respondent Police have been served, but they have not chosen to enter appearance, but, their name is printed in the cause list. Therefore, this Court is inclined to dispose of the writ petition, based on the available materials and law laid down by the Honourable Apex Court. Though the learned counsel for the petitioner strenuously urged that a bare reading of the FIR does not disclose the commission of the alleged offence, I am not inclined to entertain the prayer for quashing the FIR, as the Honourable Supreme Court has held that the power to quash FIR to be exercised in rarest of the rare case that too in a case where there is no remedy available in the code of Criminal Procedure and this is not one such rare case where such power should be exercised. Accordingly, the prayer to quash the FIR is rejected. 5. The other contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is as regards the territorial jurisdiction. Accordingly, the prayer to quash the FIR is rejected. 5. The other contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is as regards the territorial jurisdiction. In support of his contention, the learned counsel relied on the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court reported in (2000) 7 SCC 640 (Navinchandra N. Majithia vs. State of Maharashtra and others). The Honourable Supreme Court was considering the correctness of the decision of the Bombay High Court which summarily dismissed a writ petition for want of jurisdiction. The prayer in the said writ petition was to quash the complaint lodged by one J.B.Holdings Ltd. or in the alternative to direct the State of Meghalaya to transfer the investigation being conducted by the officers of CID at Shillong to the Economic Offences Wing, General Branch of CID, Mumbai or any other investigating agency of the Mumbai Police. The Honourable Supreme Court after considering the entire factual materials, held as follows as regards the jurisdiction issue and relating to the interpretation of the expression "cause of action, wholly or in part" and the following paragraphs of the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court would be relevant. "41. Even in the context of Article 226(2) of the Constitution this Court adopted the same interpretation to the expression "cause of action, wholly or in part, arises" vide State of Rajasthan v. Swaika Properties. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu observed that it is well settled that the expression "cause of action" means that bundle of facts which the petitioner must prove, if traversed to entitle him to a judgment in his favour. Having given such a wide interpretation to the expression Ahmadi, J. (as the learned Chief Justice then was) speaking for M.N.Venkatachaliah, C.J. and B.P.Jeevan Reddy, J., utilised the opportunity to caution the High Courts against transgressing into the jurisdiction of the other High Courts merely on the ground of some insignificant event connected with the cause of action taking place within the territorial limits of the High Court to which the litigant approaches at his own choice or convenience. The following are such observations. (SCC p.722, para 12). The following are such observations. (SCC p.722, para 12). "If an impression gains ground that even in cases which fall outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court, certain members of the court would be willing to exercise jurisdiction on the plea that some event, however trivial and unconnected with the cause of action had occurred within the jurisdiction of the said court, litigants would seek to abuse the process by carrying the cause before such members giving rise to avoidable suspicion. That would lower the dignity of the institution and put the entire system to ridicule. We are greatly pained to say so but if we do not strongly deprecate the growing tendency we will, we are afraid, be failing in our duty to the institution and the system of administration of justice. We do hope that we will not have another occasion to deal with such a situation." 42. The above observations are sufficient to take care of the apprehension expressed by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in the impugned judgment that "if that be so, then no investigation by any police officer in India can be successfully carried out because any absconding accused can go to any corner of India and challenge the prosecution where he has staying". 43. We make it clear that the mere fact that FIR was registered in a particular State is not the sole criterion to decide that no cause of action has arisen even partly within the territorial limits of jurisdiction of another State. Nor are we to be understood that any person can create a fake cause of action or even concoct one by simply jutting into the territorial limits of another State or by making a sojourn or even a permanent residence therein. The place of residence of the person moving a High Court is not the criterion to determine the contours of the cause of action in that particular writ petition. The High Court before which the writ petition is filed must ascertain whether any part of the cause of action has arisen within the territorial limits of its jurisdiction. It depends upon the facts in each case. 44. In the present case, a large number of events have taken place at Bombay in respect of the allegations contained in the FIR registered at Shillong. It depends upon the facts in each case. 44. In the present case, a large number of events have taken place at Bombay in respect of the allegations contained in the FIR registered at Shillong. If the averments in the writ petition are correct then the major portion of the facts which led to the registering of the FIR have taken place at Bombay. It is unnecessary to repeat those events over again as Mohapatra, J. has adverted to them with precision and the needed details. 45. In the aforesaid situation it is almost impossible to hold that not even a part of the cause of action has arisen at Bombay so as to deprive the High Court of Bombay of total jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition filed by the petitioner. Even the very fact that a major portion of the investigation of the case under the FIR has to be conducted at Bombay itself, shows that the cause of action cannot escape from the territorial limits of the Bombay High Court." 6. In the instant case, perusal of the FIR reveals that the Registered Office of the first respondent company was located at Banga and it is the case of the first respondent that the company was sending all the papers, negotiable instruments to their office at Chennai. The complainant has admitted that the petitioner was appointed as Branch Manager of the Company and there was a Branch Office at Chennai. Further allegation in the complaint is that the petitioner, who was arrayed as the first accused, had created a document as if he was supplying goods to accused Nos.2 and 3, who are his close relatives. According to the complainant, it is false and a fabricated document. Admittedly, all the three accused are residing at Chennai and the allegation pertains to creation of fabrication of documents at Chennai. 7. Further, in the FIR, it is admitted that the complainant company deputed one of its Marketing Manager to visit Chennai and such Manager came to Chennai Office and found the same to be locked. Thus, the entire business dealings arose at Chennai even as per the complaint. 7. Further, in the FIR, it is admitted that the complainant company deputed one of its Marketing Manager to visit Chennai and such Manager came to Chennai Office and found the same to be locked. Thus, the entire business dealings arose at Chennai even as per the complaint. Thus, by applying the law laid down by the Honourable Apex Court referred supra, the mere fact that the FIR was registered in the State of Punjab, because the Registered Office of the company situated is not the sole criteria to decide that no cause of action has arisen even partly within the territorial limits of jurisdiction of another State. Even as per the complaint, there was an office at Chennai and the petitioner was its Branch Manager. The complainant has stated that the petitioner created certain false and fabricated documents at Chennai in the names of the second and third accused, who are also at Chennai. It is not in dispute that the first respondent had deputed its Marketing Manager to come over to Chennai and it is that point of time, they came to know about the facts which are alleged in the complaint. Thus, substantial part of cause of action arose within Tamilnadu and merely because the first respondent company is registered at Punjab cannot be a ground for proceeding with the case within the territorial limits of the State of Punjab. Perusal of the complaint shows that major portion of the facts which led to the registering of the FIR have taken place at Chennai and major portion of the investigation of the case under the FIR has to be conducted at Chennai only. 8. In the present case, since all the events which have been mentioned in the complaint had taken place at Chennai, based on which the FIR has been registered at Banga, it would be appropriate that the case is transferred to Chennai. Accordingly, the writ petition is disposed of with a direction to the second respondent to transfer the FIR No.154 of 2002 dated 23.06.2002 to the Chennai City Police, Economic Offences Wing, Chennai for further investigation and to file a final report. It is made clear that this Court has not gone into the merits of the allegations contained in the complaint. It is made clear that this Court has not gone into the merits of the allegations contained in the complaint. It is left open to the petitioner to avail all other statutory remedies which may be available under law and it is open to him to raise all defence which are available. Accordingly, the writ petition is disposed of. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.