T. Vaiphei,J.;- These revision petitions filed under Article 227 of the Constitution (wrongly registered as writ petitions) involving a common ques­tion of law and arising out of the common judgment and order dated 9.10.2003 passed by the learned District Judge, Shillong in Misc. Civil Appeal Nos. 3 and 4(H) of 1994 and the order dated 17.11.2003 passed by him in CRP No. 1(H) of 2003, were heard to­gether and are now being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. The facts common to both the revision petitions may be noticed at the outset. The petitioner No. 1 is the Chief Executive Of­ficer of the Meghalaya Wakf Board, which had come into existence in the year 1976 af­ter the State of Meghalaya was bifurcated from the State of Assam in the year 1972, but in the interregnum, the management and affairs of the Wakf properties in the State of Meghalaya continued to be controlled by the Assam Wakf Board. According to the peti­tioners, the Haji Elahi Buksh Wakf Estate of Shillong is one of the registered Wakf prop­erties under the Meghalaya Board of Wakf ("the Board" for short), and this Wakf estate has several valuable landed properties and both the disputed properties herein situate at GS. Road, Police Bazar, Shillong covered by Patta No. 62 issued by the Collector, East Khasi Hills are some of those properties. It is the further case of the petitioners that the dis­puted properties stand in the name of the pe­titioner No. 2, who is the sole mutawalli of the said wakf estate. He was appointed as the joint mutawalli on 4.3.1973 and 23.4.1975 with Haji Kanu mia by the Assam Board of Wakf in accordance with the Wakf Deed dated 9.11.1936 executed by the late Haji Elahi Buksh and after the death of the said Haji Kanu Mia in the year 1980, he be­came the sole mutawalli in terms of the order dated 7.2.1980 passed by the Meghalaya Board of Wakf. Both the respondents in the writ petitions through the said Haji Kanumia, according to the petitioner, had illegally oc­cupied the disputed properties and surrepti­tiously constructed multi-storeyed RCC build­ings thereon merely on the strength of unreg­istered tenancy agreements dated 12.4.1974 and dated 12.4.1974 respectively without obtaining permission from the competent authority and also contrary to the terms and conditions of the said agreements. Both the private respondents are engaged in multifari­ous businesses by renting out the buildings to a number of tenants, are earning a huge amount of money therefrom and are also fraudulently depriving both the mutawalli and the Board of the benefits to be used for char­ity as intended by the original wakf of the petitioner No. 2. 3. It is also the case of the petitioners that on getting information about such unautho­rized occupations, the Board in its meeting held on 17.2.1982 at Mahendraganj, decided to set up a Sub-Committee to enquire into the two disputed properties. Two separate enquiries under Section 36-Aof the Wakf Act, 1954 ("1954 Act") were initiated by the Board against each of the private respondents by issuing statutory notices requiring them to furnish all the documents and papers relevant for facilitating the enquiries. The common Sub-Committee after making spot enquiries and inspection and after giving adequate op­portunities to both the respondents concluded the enquiries and submitted their reports. On being satisfied with the enquiry reports, the Board resolved to recover the disputed prop­erties and requisitioned the Collector, East Khasi Hills District as provided for in Section 36-B of the 1954 Act for their recovery. On receipt of requisition orders from the Board, the Collector gave statutory notices to the two private respondents to vacate the disputed properties and their premises within thirty days vide separate orders but bearing the same date i.e. 18.7.1986. It is contended by the petitioners that the aforesaid orders for req­uisition operate as a decree of a Civil Court, and the notice of eviction so issued by the Collector under Section 36-B of the 1954 Act are in exercise of the power of an ex­ecuting Court under the 1983 Rules, which is appealable under Section 36-B(4) of the 1954 Act; the statutory period of limitation prescribed therefor being thirty days. Neither of the private respondents preferred an ap­peal against the order dated 18.7.1986 of the Collector but had chosen to file Civil Rule No. 176 (SH) of 1989 before this Court, which, however, by its order dated 27.9.1992 dis­missed the writ petition by directing them to first exhaust the alternative remedy provided under Section 36-B(4) of the 1954 Act. The respondents accordingly preferred Misc. Civil Appeal No. 3 and Misc. Civil Appeal No. 4 of 1994 respectively before the learned Dis­trict Judge, Shillongon 8.4.1994. The respondents accordingly preferred Misc. Civil Appeal No. 3 and Misc. Civil Appeal No. 4 of 1994 respectively before the learned Dis­trict Judge, Shillongon 8.4.1994. The appeals were finally disposed of in favour of the pri­vate respondents after nine long years by the impugned judgment and order. Both the peti­tioners, aggrieved thereby, sought for review of the said judgment and order before the learned District Judge by filing C.R.P. No. 1(H) of 2003 jointly, which was, how­ever, rejected by the second impugned order dated 17.11.2003. 4. The findings of the learned District Judge are that the tenancy in question were created by the said Haji Kanumia in favour of the father of the private respondents; that their father was allowed to run the business in a temporary structure situated on the disputed properties, for which monthly rents were fixed, but the structures were devastated by fire; that the private respondents were evi­dently the tenants of the Haji Elahi Wakf Es­tate managed and run by the said Haji Kanumia and that the said Haji Kanumia sub­sequently issued the authorization letter allow­ing the private respondents to construct the RCC buildings thereon with their own costs and expenses. According to the learned Dis­trict Judge, the notice dated 15.2.1980 is­sued by Md. Taiyab, the respondent No. 4 in the appeals, disclosed that notice had been served upon the private respondents in his capacity as the new mutawalli as the previ­ous mutawalli had expired and that they had been paying rents to the said Md. Taiyab. On the basis of these findings, the learned Dis­trict Judge concluded that the private respon­dents could not be termed illegal occupants of the Haji Elahi Wakf Estate. The learned District Judge disagreed with the findings of the Enquiry Committee constituted by the Board accepting the case of the petitioners noticed earlier and questioned as to how the private respondents became unauthorized occupants of the disputed properties when they took the same on rents from the said Md. Kanumia, more so, when the RCC Buildings were subsequently constructed by them in terms of the authorization letter issued by the former; the enquiry report was also silent as to in what manner, the private respondents had tried to usurp the disputed properties. Kanumia, more so, when the RCC Buildings were subsequently constructed by them in terms of the authorization letter issued by the former; the enquiry report was also silent as to in what manner, the private respondents had tried to usurp the disputed properties. The learned District Judge also disputed the view taken by the Enquiry Committee that the pri­vate respondents were barred by Section 36 of the 1954 Act from occupying the disputed properties which were located in an urban area for more than one year under lease. Ac­cording to the learned District Judge, Section 36 did not say that Wakf property located in urban area could not be occupied for more than one year even under a lease; which is mainly concerned with the duties of mutawalli. Though the learned District Judge found from the said report that there was some internal dispute between Md. Suleiman and Md. Taiyab, he held that the private respondents could not be victimized for this so long as they regularly paid rents to the rightful owner or the authorized agent. The learned District Judge also recorded the findings that it is the duty of the Board to decide as to who is the authorized mutawalli; that the enquiry was held ex-parte and no copy of the report was fur­nished to the private respondents; that the file of the Collector disclosed that the parties were not given sufficient opportunity to place their grievances before issuing the notice under Section 36-B(2) of the Wakf Act, 1955 (sic) and that notices were issued without apply­ing his mind. According to the District Judge, as the transfer by way of lease is not included in Section 36-A(1) of the 1954 Act, the ten­ancy agreements in question are not hit by Section 36-B(1), and the notices under Sec­tion 36-B of the 1954 Act are, therefore, without jurisdiction. The notices were accord­ingly set aside by the learned District Judge. The correctness of the views taken by the appellate Court is called into question in these revision petitions. 5. Both the private respondents filed their respective affidavits-in-opposition. The com­mon stands taken by both of them is that both of them are the tenants of Md. The notices were accord­ingly set aside by the learned District Judge. The correctness of the views taken by the appellate Court is called into question in these revision petitions. 5. Both the private respondents filed their respective affidavits-in-opposition. The com­mon stands taken by both of them is that both of them are the tenants of Md. Taiyab, who is the sole mutawalli of the Wakf properties, and his appointment as mutawalli has not been cancelled and that the construction of the buildings on the disputed properties were done with the permission of the then mutawalli and the competent authority; that they never deprived the petitioner No. 2 of his rents nor have they sub-let/mortgaged/sold or trans­ferred any of the disputed properties to any­one; that they had not received any notice for furnishing all the relevant papers or docu­ments; that they are not aware of the enquiry report dated 28.2.1985; that the grounds taken by the petitioners in paragraphs 12 (B), 12(D), 12 (E) of the revision petitions are departures from their pleadings in the appeal and the same are after-thoughts. They also asserted that the grounds stated by the peti­tioners in paragraphs 12(A), (C), (F), (G), (H), (I), (J), (K), (L), (M), (N) and other grounds stated elsewhere are baseless and that as they are defaulters, the question of their delivering vacant possession of the tenanted premises to the Board does not arise. They also contended that the provisions of Section 36(B)(2) of the Wakf Act are not applicable to these cases and that the revision petitions are devoid of merits, which are liable to be dismissed. 6. Mr. T.T. Diengdoh, the learned counsel for the petitioner No. 1, and Mr. They also contended that the provisions of Section 36(B)(2) of the Wakf Act are not applicable to these cases and that the revision petitions are devoid of merits, which are liable to be dismissed. 6. Mr. T.T. Diengdoh, the learned counsel for the petitioner No. 1, and Mr. H. Ahmed, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner No. 2, assail the impugned judgment by ar­guing that the appellate Court has completely overlooked the glaring fact that Wakf (Amendment) Act, 1984, except for the pro­visions relating to the enhancement of the pe­riod of limitation for filing suits in respect of wakf properties in adverse possession from 12 years to 30 years and the application of the provisions of Wakf Act, 1954 to the evacuee properties, has never been enforced and that it is the 1954 Act as amended in 1964, which held the field till the Wakf Act, 1995 ("1995 Act" for short) came into force and that as the instant dispute arose on 2.2.1985, when the enquiry report was submitted. Sec­tion 36A of the 1954 Act did provide for obtaining the sanction of the Board for grant of the lease in question. It is the contention of both the learned counsel that the provision of 52 (2) of the Wakf Act, 1995 requiring the previous sanction of the Board to grant lease does not have retrospective effect so as to cover the lease transaction which took place prior to the coming into force thereof. So construed, contends the learned counsel, the learned District Judge has committed grave error of law in applying the abortive Sections 36-A and 36-B of the 1984 Amendment. They also contend that the enquiry conducted by the Sub-Committee appointed by the Board does not suffer from any procedural infirmity as all the requirements of law prescribed under the Meghalaya Wakf (Register of Wakf and Recovery of Wakf Property) Rules, 1983 have been fully complied with and that as the Collector has acted as the Executing Court under Section 36 B (2), he was not required to issue notice to the pri­vate respondents. On the contention of the intervener that the disputed properties are not wakf properties as they were never registered in accordance with Section 26 of the 1954 Act, the learned counsel maintain that the in­tervener, having not challenged the enquiry report of the Board or the order of the Col­lector, is not a person interested in the wakf and has, therefore, no locus standi to inter­vene in these revision petitions. Per contra, Ms. R. M. Kharsynthiew, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1, supports the impugned judgment and contends that no in­firmity could be pointed out by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners which will warrant the interference of this Court. The written submissions filed on behalf of the two petitioners and that of the intervener have been duly considered by me. 7. Before proceeding further, let me dis­pose of the contention raised by the intervener on the alleged non-registration of the disputed properties as wakf properties. It is his case that the disputed properties have not been registered in accordance with the provisions of the Wakf Act, 1995 and are, therefore, not wakf properties governed by the said Act. This is not the plea taken by the petitioners or by the private respondents. It is well settled that an intervener cannot raise a point not canvassed by the petitioner nor has he the right to reply. In Gammon India Ltd. Vs. Union of India, (1974) 1SCC 925, the con­stitutional validity of certain provisions of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 was challenged by the petitioners in the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution. Section 28 conferred power on the Central Government to appoint 'as it thinks fit' to be the Inspectors and vested in them wide powers. The validity of that provi­sion was not challenged by the petitioners, but it was challenged by the interveners. Re­jecting the said contention, the Court ob­served: "This point was taken by the intervener. An intervener cannot raise points which are not canvassed by the petitioners in the pleadings". This decision was followed in Saraswati In­dustrial Syndicate Ltd. Vs. C1T, (1999) 3 SCC 141 , State of T. N. Vs. Board of Trust­ees of the Port of Madras, (1999) 4 SCC 630 and Ravi Rao Gaikwad Vs. Rajajinagar Youth Social Welfare Assn., (2006) 5 SCC 62 . This decision was followed in Saraswati In­dustrial Syndicate Ltd. Vs. C1T, (1999) 3 SCC 141 , State of T. N. Vs. Board of Trust­ees of the Port of Madras, (1999) 4 SCC 630 and Ravi Rao Gaikwad Vs. Rajajinagar Youth Social Welfare Assn., (2006) 5 SCC 62 . Consequently, this plea taken by the intervener is to be noted only to be summarily rejected. 8. On going through the pleadings of the parties as well as the various decisions cited at the bar and after giving my thoughtful con­sideration to the rival submissions made by the counsel, it is thus obvious that the first point for consideration is whether the learned Dis­trict Judge is correct in invoking the provisions of Wakf (Amendment) Act, 1984 or not? The legislative history of the Wakf Act, as in­dicated in the Statement of Objects and Rea­sons of the Wakf Act, 1995, will show that the many deficiencies found in the actual working of the Wakf Act, 1954 necessitated the amendment of this Act in 1959, in 1964 and 1969 i.e. within a span of 15 years. In the year 1984, a comprehensive amendment to the Act was sought to be done by enacting the Wakf (Amendment) Act, 1984. Because of strong objections from the Muslim Com­munity, only two provisions, namely, (i) in­creasing the period of limitation for filing suit as in respect of wakf properties in adverse possession from 12 years to 30 years and (ii) application of the provisions of Wakf Act, 1954, to the evacuee properties, came to be enforced. The provisions of Sections 36-A and 36-Bofthe 1954 Act as amended in 1964 are in the following terms: "36A. The provisions of Sections 36-A and 36-Bofthe 1954 Act as amended in 1964 are in the following terms: "36A. Transfer of immovable property of wakfs-Notwithstanding anything contained in the wakf deed, no transfer of any immovable property of a wakf by way of- (i) sale, gift, mortgage or exchange; or (ii) lease for a period exceeding three years in the case of agricultural land, or for a period exceeding one year in the case of non-agricultural land or building, shall be valid without the previous sanction of the Board." (Emphasis mine) "36-B. Recovery of wakf property trans­ferred in contravention of Section 36A-(1) If the Board is satisfied, after making an inquiry in such manner as may be prescribed, that any immovable property of a wakf entered as such in the register of Wakf maintained under Sec­tion 26, has been transferred without the previ­ous sanction of the Board in contravention of the provisions of Section 36-A, it may send a requisition to the Collector within whose juris­diction the property is situate to obtain and deliver possession of the property to it. (2) On receipt of a requisition under sub­section (1), the Collector shall pass an order directing the person in possession of the prop­erty to deliver the property to the Board within a period of thirty days from the date of the ser­vice of the order. (3) Every Order passed under sub-section (2) shall be served-- (a) by giving or tendering the order or by sending it by post to the person for whom it is intended; or (b) if such person cannot be found, by affixing the order on some conspicuous part of his last known place of abode or busi­ness, or by giving or tendering the order to some adult male member or servant of his family or by causing it to be affixed on some conspicuous part of the property to which it relates: Provided that where the person on whom the order is to be served is a minor, service upon his guardian or upon any adult male member or servant of his family shall be deemed to be ser­vice upon the minor. (4) Any person aggrieved by the order of the Collector under sub-section (2) may, within a period of thirty days from the date of service of the order, prefer an appeal to the District Court within whose jurisdiction the property is situ­ate and the decision of the District Court on such appeal shall be final. Explanation-In this sub-section, "District Court" means, in any area for which there is a city Civil Court, that, and, in any other area, the principal Civil Court of Original jurisdiction. (5) Where an order passed under sub-sec­tion (2) has not been complied with and the time for appealing against such order has ex­pired without an appeal having been preferred or the appeal, if any, preferred within that time has been dismissed, the Collector shall obtain possession of the property in respect of which the order has been made, using such force, if any, as may be necessary for the purpose and deliver it to the Board. (6) In exercising his functions under this section, the Collector shall be guided by such rules as may be made in this behalf by the State Government." 9. From the provisions extracted above, it is plainly shown that Section 36A of the Amended Act in 1964 requires the previous sanction of the Board for transfer of any im­movable property of a wakf by way of sale, gift, mortgage or exchange or a lease for a period not exceeding three years in the case of agricultural land, or for a period exceeding one year in the case of non-agricultural land or building; this is notwithstanding anything contained in the wakf deed. The question whether this provision is mandatory or not is answered by the subsequent provisions, namely, Section 36-B, which categorically states, among others, that the Board may send a requisition to the Collector having the terri­torial jurisdiction to obtain and deliver pos­session of the wakf property which has been transferred in contravention of Section 36-A. In Sharif-ud-din Vs. Abdul Gani Lone, (1980) 1 SCC 403 at page 407, it has been observed that whenever a statute prescribes that a particular act is to be done in a particu­lar manner and also lays down that failure to comply with the said requirement leads to a specific consequence, it would be difficult to hold that the requirement is not mandatory and the specified consequence should not follow. It is obvious that in the 1984 amend­ment, upon which heavy reliance is placed by the learned District Judge, the term "lease" was nowhere found and the transaction for which the previous sanction of the Board is required are confined to "gift", "sale", "ex­change" and "hypothecation". Interestingly, under Section 56 of the Wakf Act, 1995, it is provided that a lease or sub-lease for any period exceeding three years of any immov­able wakf property shall be void while a lease or sublease for a period exceeding one year and not exceeding three years of such property shall also be void unless it is made with the approval of the Board. Anyway, I am not concerned with this new Act as the same is not applicable to this case. In the instant case, the cause of action arose sometime in the year 1985. Therefore, the question to be consid­ered is whether the Wakf (Amendment), 1984 can be invoked? The answer must be in the negative. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Wakf Act, 1995, as already noticed, confirms that the Wakf (Amendment) 1984 was never enforced except for the pro­visions indicated earlier, which has no rela­tion with the controversy involved here. It must have escaped the attention of the learned Dis­trict Judge that the 1984 amendment was never in force in so far as the provisions of Sections 36 A and 36 B of the 1954 Act as amended in 1964 was concerned and has in the process proceeded on the erroneous as­sumption that the Wakf (Amendment) Act, 1984 had been enforced all along. He, there­fore, acted with material irregularity in invok­ing the provisions of an Act which are still­born or, at any rate, are never enforced. This amounts to improper exercise of jurisdiction. Once it is found that Sections 36 A and 36 B of the 1954 Act as amended in 1964 were then applicable, there is no difficulty in hold­ing that the tenancy agreements in question executed in favour of the two private respon­dents without the previous sanction of the Board shall have to be declared invalid and could never have been acted upon. There­fore, the Board was right in sending requisi­tions to the Collector for recover' of the dis­puted wakf properties. 10. The next question to be determined is whether the Collector acted illegally in not is­suing notice to the private respondents ? There­fore, the Board was right in sending requisi­tions to the Collector for recover' of the dis­puted wakf properties. 10. The next question to be determined is whether the Collector acted illegally in not is­suing notice to the private respondents ? Section 36-B merely says that on receipt of the requisition, the Collector shall pass an order directing the person in possession of the property to deliver the property to the Board within a period of thirty days from the date of service of the order. This sub-section does not speak of anything about the require­ment to issue notice to the person in posses­sion of the wakf property. The subsequent sub-sections already reproduced also are si­lent on the need to issue such notice. Sub­section 6 says that in exercising his functions under this Section, the Collector shall be guided by such rules as may be made in this behalf by the State Government. In exercise of this power, the State of Meghalaya framed the Meghalaya Wakf (Register of Wakf and Recovery of Wakf Property) Rules, 1983. Rules 5,6 and 7 of this Rule is important for our purpose, which are reproduced below: "5. Requisition to the Collector. [Section 36-B(1)]. The requisition to the Collector shall then be drawn up by the Secretary and sent to the Collector of the District in which the property is situate or may be made over to him personally. 6. Procedure to be followed by the Collector on receipt of requisition [Section 36 B (6)]. On receipt of the requisition under Rule 4 (sub-sec­tion (1) of Section 36 B of the Act), the Collector shall pass an order directing the person/per­sons in possession of the property to deliver it to the Board within a period of thirty days from the date of service of the order and it shall be served on the person/persons in possession of the property in the manner laid down in sub­section (3) of Section 36 B. 7. Recovery of possession of property [Section 36 B (6)1 -(1) If the order passed by the Collector under Rule 5 has not been complied with and the time of appeal against such order as provided under sub-section (4) of Section 36B has expired without any appeal having been preferred or the appeal has been dismissed the Collector shall issue direction to any Gazetted Officer subordinate to him within his jurisdic­tion of which the said property is situate to obtain possession of property in respect of which the order has been made and to deliver it to the Board. (2) The Officer to whom the Collector is­sued direction to obtain possession of the prop­erty in respect of which the order has been made and to deliver it to the Board shall, on receipt of the direction under sub-rule (1), cause posses­sion to be taken and delivered it to the Board and in so doing he shall follow the procedure laid down for ejectment of persons from immov­able property in execution of a decree of a Civil Court." 11. Even a cursory look at the aforesaid provisions does not in anyway indicate that the Collector, before passing an order direct­ing the person in possession of the wakf prop­erty to deliver the property to the Board, is mandated by law to issue such notice to him. In my opinion, the reason is not far to seek. The Collector in exercising his functions un­der Section 36-B is acting as an executing Court. In my opinion, the reason is not far to seek. The Collector in exercising his functions un­der Section 36-B is acting as an executing Court. Even under the Code of Civil Proce­dure, the law does not require any notice to be issued to the party against whim the ex­ecution is applied for, except in the following cases: (a) where the application for execution is made more than two years after the date of the decree or more than two years after the date of the last order made on any previous application for execution (Order 22, Rule 1) (b) where the execution is applied for against the legal representative of the judgment-debtor; (c) where an application is made for the execution a decree filed under Section 44A (Rule 22); (d) where the application is made against the assignee or receiver in insolvency, where the party to the decree has been adjudged to be an insolvent; (e) where the decree is for money and execution is sought against the person of the judgment-debtor unless the proviso applies (Rule 37). In these cases, the Code provides that 'the Court executing the decree shall issue a no­tice'. The exceptions carved out under the Code are not applicable to the case in hand. Resultantly, the Collector does not err in law in not issuing notice to the private respondents before issuing the eviction orders. I have also gone through the proceedings of the Sub-Committee constituted by the Board upon which the requisition was sent to the Collec­tor and am unable to find any infirmity of grave nature vitiating the requisition so sent. In this view of the matter, the learned District Judge has apparently acted illegally and with mate­rial irregularity in interfering with the notices issued by the Collector. 12. The result of the foregoing discussion is that these revisions succeed. The common judgment and order dated 9.10.2003 and dated 17.11.2003 passed by the learned Dis­trict Judge, Shillong in Misc. Appeal Nos. 3(H) and 4(H) of 1994 and C. R. P. No. 1 (H) of 2003 are hereby set aside. The Collector shall now proceed with and complete the re­covery proceedings in accordance with law as expeditiously as possible, more so, when the cases have been pending since 1994. The parties are, however, directed to bear their respective costs.