JUDGMENT : Aggrieved by the award dated 17-9-2008 made in M. A. C. T. O. P. No. 41 of 2006 on the file of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, (Subordinate Court), Ranipet, the appellant-Transport Cor­poration preferred this appeal. 2. Heard Mr. N. Anand, learned counsel appearing for the appellant and Mr. V. Jaggannathan, learned counsel for the respon­dents. 3. Brief facts of the case are as follows: On 24-12-2005 about 4.30 p.m., when the deceased after loading the gunny bags, was trying to get down from a bus bearing Reg­istration No. TN 32 N 0672, owned by the appellant-Transport Corporation, after load­ing the gunny bags, the driver of the bus sud­denly moved the bus and due to which, the deceased fell down, the back wheel ran over his hip and he was crushed to death. Legal representatives of the deceased have pre­ferred a claim for Rs. 4,00,000/-. 4. The Transport Corporation resisted the claim application They denied the negligence of the driver and disputed the entitlement of the claimants for compensation on the ground that they are not dependants. 5. Before the Tribunal, the wife of the deceased was examined as P. W. 1 and an eye-witness was examined as P. W. 2. Ex. P-1 - First Information Report, dated 24-12-2005, Ex. P-2 - Postmortem certificate, dated 24-12-2005, Ex. P-3 - Inspection report, 25-12-2005 and Ex. P-4 - Charge-sheet, dated 31-1-2006 filed against the driver of the bus and Ex. P-5 - Legal Heir Certificate were marked on the side of the respondents/claim­ants. Driver of the bus was examined asRW-1 and no documentary evidence was let in on behalf of the appellant-Transport Corpo­ration. 6. The Tribunal, on evaluation of plead­ings and evidence, found that the driver of the bus owned by the appellant-Transport Corporation was responsible for the accident and awarded Rs. 3,27,000/- as compensation with interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum from the date of claim till the date of realisation. 7. Assailing the correctness of the award, learned counsel for the appellant-Transport Corporation contended that the Tribunal has erred in relying on the evidence of the claim­ants and fixed the negligence on the driver of the Transport Corporation. He further sub­mitted that the Tribunal has failed to note down that when the deceased got down from the bus, he lost his balance, fell down and due to which, he sustained injuries. He further sub­mitted that the Tribunal has failed to note down that when the deceased got down from the bus, he lost his balance, fell down and due to which, he sustained injuries. He also submitted that the Tribunal ought to have given credence to the evidence of RW-1, driver. 8. On the quantum of compensation, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the Tribunal has erred in determing the monthly income of the deceased at Rs. 3,000/- and consequently, the computation of dependency compensation, is arbitrary. He further submitted that in the absence of any proof of dependency, the Tribunal ought not to have awarded compensation to the mar­ried sisters and other claimants. 9. Per contra, learned counsel for the re­spondents/claimants submitted that the de­ceased was engaged as a coolie at the time of accident and the Tribunal, after consider­ation of oral and documentary evidence, let in by both parties, has properly fixed the neg­ligence on the driver of the bus owned by the appellant-Transport Corporation and the said finding cannot be termed as perverse. 10. Learned counsel for the respondents/claimants submitted that there is no illegal­ity in determination of the monthly income of the deceased for computing the depen­dency compensation. According to him, there is no prohibition under the Motor Vehicles Act for the Legal Representatives to main­tain a claim petition and, therefore, the com­pensation awarded to the married sisters, does not require any interference. In this context, he relied on the decisions made in Vidya Dhar Dubey v. U. P. State Road Transport Corpn., Reported in 1997 ACJ 1388 : (1998 AIHC 344) and New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Ash win Vrajlal Rajgor reported in 2005 ACJ 1618 : (AIR 2005 (NOC) 483 (Guj). 11. To prove the manner of accident, P.W.-1, wife of the deceased has deposed that on the date of accident, while the deceased was loading the gunny bags was trying to get down from the bus, the driver of the bus, without noticing him, suddenly moved the bus, due to which, he fell down and the back wheel of the bus ran over his hip and that he was crushed to death. PW-2, who is said to be an eye-witness has confirmed the place of accident. PW-2, who is said to be an eye-witness has confirmed the place of accident. In addition to that, he has de­posed that when he was standing in a Tea shop near the bus stand, the driver of the ve­hicle has moved the bus, before the deceased could get down from the bus and that there was no negligence on the part of the de­ceased. Ex. PI - FIR has been lodged against the driver of the bus. The oral testimony of PW-1 is supported by PW-2, an eye-witness and corroborated by Ex. PI-FIR. 12. Per contra, it is the evidence of RW-1, driver of the bus that the deceased, with­out informing the crew of the bus, attempted to get down from the moving bus, fell down and sustained injuries. The accident has oc­curred in Kasam Bus Stop. Therefore, there is every possibility that in the bus stand, the deceased would have loaded the gunny bags in the bus and fallen down due to sudden movement. If the deceased had just fallen down from the top of the bus, he would have certainly sustained injuries, but unless the vehicle is on the move, he would have not been crushed to death. Perusal of the im­pugned award shows that on investigation, the police has laid a charge-sheet against the driver of the Transport Corporation. While arriving at a conclusion that the accident had occurred purely on the fault of the driver of the bus, RW-1, the Tribunal has observed that the version of the claimants is proved and except the oral testimony of RW-1, there is no corroboration. It is well settled in catena of decisions, that preponderance of probabil­ity is the test in matters relating to claim pe­titions. The finding recorded by the Tribu­nal, on the evaluation of the evidence let in by both parties, cannot be said to be perverse and, therefore, it is sustained. 13. Though the claimants have not pro­duced any document to prove the engage­ment of the deceased as a coolie, having re­gard to the age determined on the basis of an entry in Ex. P-2 - Post-mortem Certificate, the Tribunal has presumed that even if the deceased was engaged as a coolie, he would have earned at least Rs. 3,000/- per month and contributed 1/3rd of his income to the family members. P-2 - Post-mortem Certificate, the Tribunal has presumed that even if the deceased was engaged as a coolie, he would have earned at least Rs. 3,000/- per month and contributed 1/3rd of his income to the family members. The mere fact that the ac­cident had occurred when he was loading gunny bags, itself shows that he was a coo­lie. No further evidence is required to prove his avocation. It is well settled that persons, who are engaged in unskilled jobs or arti­sans, small traders, may not have any docu­mentary proof to prove their avocation or em­ployment. This Court also fails to understand as to how documentary proof can be expected from a coolie in a bus stop. There are no reg­istered coolies in bus stand unlike the por­ters in Railway Stations. Though it was claimed that the deceased earned Rs. 4,500/-per month, the Tribunal has fixed it as Rs. 3,000/- only and by applying a proper multi­plier, has arrived at the dependency compen­sation of Rs. 3,12,000/-. There is no mani­fest illegality in determining the monthly income. 14. In Gujarat State Road Transport Cor­poration, Ahmedabad v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai and another, reported in 1987 ACJ 561: ( AIR 1987 SC 1690 ), the Gujarat High Court held that all the Legal heirs and the Legal Representatives of the deceased could maintain a claim petition under Sec­tion 110-A (now under Section 166(1)) and awarded compensation to the nephews of the deceased. Considering the divergence of opinion expressed by various High Courts, as regards the maintainability of the claim petition under Section 110-A (now under Section 166(1)), by persons other than wife, husband, parents and child of a person, who dies on account of the Motor Vehicles Acci­dent, the Supreme Court at Paragraph 10, held as follows: "10. Clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 110-A of the Act provide that an application for compensation arising out of an accident may be made where death has resulted from the accident by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased or by any agent duly authorised by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased. The proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 110-A provides that where all the legal representa­tives of the deceased have not joined in any such application for compensation, the ap­plication shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased and the legal representatives who have not so jointed shall be impleaded as respondents to the application. The expres­sion "legal representative" has not been de­fined in the Act. Section 2(11) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 defines "legal rep­resentative" as a person who in law repre­sents the estate of a deceased person and in­cludes any person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased and where a party sues or is sued in a representative character the person on whom the estate devolves on the death of the party so suing or sued. The above definition, no doubt, in terms does not apply to a case before the Claims Tribunal but it has to be stated that even in ordinary par­lance the said expression is understood al­most in the same way in which it is defined in the Code of Civil Procedure. A legal rep­resentative ordinarily means a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased per­son or a person on whom the estate devolves on the death of an individual. Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 110-A of the Act authorises all or any of the legal representa­tives of the deceased to make an application for compensation before the Claims Tribu­nal for the death of the deceased on account of a motor vehicle accident and clause (c) of that sub-section authorises any agent duly authorised by all or any of the legal repre­sentatives of the deceased to make it. The proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 110-A of the Act appears to be of some significance. It provides that the application for compen­sation shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased. Section 110-A(1) of the Act thus expressly states that (i) an application for compensation may be made by the legal rep­resentatives of the deceased or their agent, and (ii) that such application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives. Section 110-A(1) of the Act thus expressly states that (i) an application for compensation may be made by the legal rep­resentatives of the deceased or their agent, and (ii) that such application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives. Both the person or persons who can make an application for compensa­tion and the persons for whose benefit such application can be made are thus indicated in Section 110-A of the Act." Interpreting Section 110-A (now amended as Section 166(1)), vis-a-vis, a corresponding provision in the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, the Apex Court further held that: "These provisions are not merely proce­dural provisions. They substantively affect the rights of the parties. As the right of ac­tion created by the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 was "new in its pecies, new in its quality, new in its principles, in every way new" the right given to the legal representatives un­der the Act to file an application for com­pensation for death due to a motor vehicle accident is equally new and an enlarged one. This new right cannot be hedged in by all the limitations of an action under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. New situations and new dangers require new strategies and new rem­edies. While confirming the decision of Gujarat High Court in Megjibhai Khimji's case ( AIR 1977 Guj 195 ), the Supreme Court at Para­graph 12, held that: "We feel that the view taken by the Gujarat High Court is in consonance with the prin­ciples of justice, equity and good conscience having regard to the conditions of the Indian society. Every legal representative who suf­fers on account of the death of a person due to a motor vehicle accident should have a remedy for realisation of compensation and that is provided by Sections 110-A to 110-F of the Act. These provisions are in consonance with the principles of law of torts that every injury must have a remedy. It is for the Motor Vehicles Accidents Claims Tribunal to determine the compensation which appears to it to be just as provided in Section 110-B of the Act and to specify the person or per­sons to whom compensation shall be paid. These provisions are in consonance with the principles of law of torts that every injury must have a remedy. It is for the Motor Vehicles Accidents Claims Tribunal to determine the compensation which appears to it to be just as provided in Section 110-B of the Act and to specify the person or per­sons to whom compensation shall be paid. The determination of the compensation pay­able and its apportionment as required by Section 110-B of the Act amongst the legal representatives for whose benefit an appli­cation may be filed under Section 110-A of the Act have to be done in accordance with well known principles of law. We should re­member that in an Indian family brothers, sisters and brothers' children and sometimes foster children live together and they are de­pendent upon the bread winner of the family and if the bread winner is killed on account of a motor vehicle accident, there is no justi­fication to deny them compensation relying upon the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 which as we have already held has been substantially modified by the provisions contained in the Act in relation to cases aris­ing out of motor vehicles accidents." 15. In Vidya Dhar Dubey and others v. U.P. State Road Transport Corporation, re­ported in 1997 ACJ 1388 : (1998 AIHC 344), the Allahabad High Court considered a case as to whether the claim for compensation for the death in motor accidents filed by the claimants, who are dependants, but not the legal heirs of the deceased, such as parents, wife and son, could be entertained- Follow­ing the decision reported in Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai, reported in 1987 ACJ 561: (AIR 1989 SC 1690) (SC), the Allahabad High Court held that the emphasis under the Motor Vehicles Act is dependency and that near and dear, including the brother's chil­dren can be dependants. 16. In Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. v. Naresh, Chandra Agarwal and others, re­ported in 2000 ACJ 931 : (20dl All LJ 25), the parents of the deceased were not alive and, therefore, the brother of the deceased in the capacity of legal representative, preferred a claim. 16. In Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. v. Naresh, Chandra Agarwal and others, re­ported in 2000 ACJ 931 : (20dl All LJ 25), the parents of the deceased were not alive and, therefore, the brother of the deceased in the capacity of legal representative, preferred a claim. The award passed by the Tribunal, following the Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation's case ( AIR 1987 SC 1690 ), was confirmed by the Allahabad High Court, holding that the Legal Representatives in­cluding the brother of the deceased is entitled to get compensation. 17. In Govindasamy v. Ravi and others, reported in 2003 (1) MLJ 253 : (AIR 2003 (NOC) 199), a Division Bench of this Court held that the deceased father's younger brother is entitled to compensation, as he was also a legal representative as per the Hindu Succession Act. 18. In Kishan lal v. Bharosi lal, reported in II (2003) ACC 225, the deceased was the elder brother of claimant appellant Nos. 1 and 4 and was the brother-in-law of appellant Nos. 2 and 5 and father of appellant No. 3 before the High Court. The deceased was unmarried and he had adopted a son, appel­lant No. 3. The maintainability of the claim petition, on behalf of brothers, adopted son and other relatives, was one of the issues before the Tribunal. Without giving any op­portunity to the parties, the Tribunal held that inasmuch as the deceased was an unmarried person, the applicant Nos. 1,2,4 and 5 were not entitled to maintain the claim petition and that they were not the dependants. As no document was filed to prove adoption, the claim of the appellant No. 3 was also rejected. Thus, in toto, the Tribunal dismissed the claim petition. After referring to Section 166(1)(c) of the Motor Vehicles Act, which provides that an application for compensa­tion arising out of the accident of the nature specified in sub-section (1) of Section 165, can be made by Hon'ble Mr. Justice J. S. Verma (as he than was), has opined as fol­lows: "5. Thus, in toto, the Tribunal dismissed the claim petition. After referring to Section 166(1)(c) of the Motor Vehicles Act, which provides that an application for compensa­tion arising out of the accident of the nature specified in sub-section (1) of Section 165, can be made by Hon'ble Mr. Justice J. S. Verma (as he than was), has opined as fol­lows: "5. I find merit in the submission of the learned Counsel for the appellants that if the contrary view is taken, in the event of death of a person in accident who happens to be an unmarried or whose parents, are not living, it shall amount to as if no compensation can be claimed in regard to the death of such persons and such compensation will lead to such an unpleasant situation that the default­ing negligent driver will escape the liability for any such accident for the purpose of com­pensation, I fully agree with learned Coun­sel for the appellants in the regard and sped ally when in the present case, application for compensation had also been filed includ­ing an adopted son, adoption of which could only be proved by leading evidence as per law." So saying, the order of the Tribunal, dismiss­ing the claim petition, was set aside and that the matter was remitted back to the Tribu­nal, to proceed with the claim petition on merits. 19. In Managing Director, K. S. R. T. C. v. Venkataramappa K. S., reported in III (2003) ACC 457: (2002 AIR - Kant HCR 298), (DB), the deceased was an agricultural labourer and there were no Class-I heirs. The claim for compensation was made by the married sisters and brother, who, according to the respondents, were not dependents, but living together. Before the Tribunal, an ob­jection was raised by the Transport Corpo­ration that the claimants were not dependants on the deceased and, therefore, they are not entitled to compensation. However, the Tri­bunal, computed the dependency compensa­tion, in addition to the compensation awarded under the conventional damages. Aggrieved by the same, the State Transport Corpora­tion preferred an appeal to the High Court, reiterating the said averment. The High Court has framed the following questions for con­sideration: "(1) Whether the brothers and sisters of the deceased can maintain a claim petition even though they were not depending upon the income of the deceased for their mainte­nance? Aggrieved by the same, the State Transport Corpora­tion preferred an appeal to the High Court, reiterating the said averment. The High Court has framed the following questions for con­sideration: "(1) Whether the brothers and sisters of the deceased can maintain a claim petition even though they were not depending upon the income of the deceased for their mainte­nance? (2) Whether the compensation awarded by the Tribunal is on the excessive side?" 20. Following the judgment in Supreme Court in Gujarat State Transport Corporation's case, ( AIR 1987 SC 1690 ), (cited supra) and taking note of Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, which states that when a male Hindu dies intestate, his prop­erty has to be devolved according to the pro­vision of Section 8: i.e., (a) firstly, upon the heirs, being the relatives specified in Class-I of the Schedule; and (b) secondly, if there is no heir of Class I then upon the heirs, being the relatives specified in Class-II of the Schedule, the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court, held that the claim­ants, viz., brothers and sisters, who had fallen under Class-II heirs, as per Hindu Succes­sion Act, would be entitled to maintain a claim. 21. In New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Ashwin Vrajlal Rajgor, reported in 2005 ACJ 1618 : (AIR 2005 (NOC) 483) a Division Bench of Gujarat High Court considered the entitlement of the brother's son and brother's wife (sister-in-law) of the deceased, similar to that of the present case, for compensation. Following the judgment in Megjibhai Khimji Vira v. Chaturbhai Taljabhai, reported in 1977 ACJ 253 (Guj): ( AIR 1977 Guj 195 ), wherein, a Division Bench has held that the claim for compensation arising out of use of motor vehicle can be maintained by brothers and nephews, who are the legal heirs and also of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai, reported in 1987 ACJ 561: ( AIR 1987 SC 1690 ), another Di­vision Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Ashwin Vrajlal Rajgor's case: (AIR 2005 (NOC) 483) held that in the absence of Class-I legal representatives to represent the estate of the deceased, a brother's son, a Class-II heir and the brother's wife are en­titled to claim compensation for the death of the deceased. The Division Bench has also taken note of the line of succession, as pro­vided under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and held that the appellants therein were en­titled to compensation. 22. Insofar as the contention that the claimants are not dependents of the deceased, this Court is of the considered view of this Court that when a claim petition is made by a married son or daughter, or in the absence of any other Class-I heir and if the claimants adduce evidence that they are the legal rep­resentatives and that the deceased during his lifetime, had contributed a portion of his in­come to them and if the said contention is disputed, it is the burden of the objector to lead strong rebuttal evidence to dislodge the claim of dependency. If the contention of contribution by the deceased to the legal rep­resentatives is not rebutted by any acceptable evidence, the inevitable conclusion of the Tribunal should be in favour of the claim­ants. In view of the judgments and for the reasons stated supra, the award made in favour of the married sisters and others, can­not be said to be without any legal principles and this Court is not inclined to interfere with the decision of the Tribunal. 23. For the reasons stated supra, this Court is of the view that no valid grounds have been made out, to interfere with the award of the Tribunal. Accordingly, the award is con­firmed and in the result, the Civil Miscella­neous Appeal is dismissed. No costs. Appeal dismissed.