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2010 DIGILAW 288 (ORI)

MANAGING COMMITTEE OF HASANPUR URDU HIGH SCHOOL v. STATE OF ORISSA

2010-04-16

A.S.NAIDU, B.N.MAHAPATRA

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JUDGMENT : A.S. Naidu, J. - The facts and points of law involved in all these cases being one and the same, the same are taken up for hearing with consent of learned counsel for the parties. 2. The controversy is-with regard to teaching and non-teaching staff of Hasanpur Urdu High School, Hasanpur in the district of Sundargarh. Admittedly, the said School is a recognized unaided institution. The Managing Committee of the School was constituted in the year 1998 for a period of three years and was approved by the Director, Secondary Education by order dated 14.10.2008. After expiry of the term of the said Managing Committee no other Committee has been constituted in accordance with sub-section (2) of Section 7 of the Orissa Education (Amendment) Act, 1989 and read with Rules 26 of the Orissa Education (Management of Private Unaided Schools Management) Rules, 1991. The School is at present directly managed by the Inspector of Schools. 3. The dispute in the present case relates back to the year 1998. It is submitted that steps were taken to bring the School within the Grant-in-Aid fold, consequently the Headmaster of the School was required to submit application in prescribed format along with relevant documents for verification before the Inspector of Schools and for onward submission to the concerned authorities for consideration of payment of Grant-in-Aid. Some of the local inhabitants opposite the proposal to bring the School within the Grant-in-Aid fold. Consequently they did not permit the Headmaster to sign any document and/or to communicate any information with regard to the School to the Inspector of Schools. Such move was opposed by Headmaster as well as teaching and non-teaching staffs of the School. Being aggrieved the persons who claimed to be in Management, it is alleged, terminated the services of all the teaching and non-teaching staffs of the School by a blanket order. 4. The said order was assailed by opposite party nos. 5 to 11 of W.P.(C) No. 17542 of 2008 (same person being opposite party nos. 4 to 10 in W.P.(C) No. 10824 of 2008) who were the members of the teaching and non teaching staff of the Schools before this Court in W.P.(C) No. 2260 of 2002. After hearing learned counsel this Court disposed of the Writ Petition giving liberty to the said petitioners to file an appeal before the Director, Secondary Education. 4 to 10 in W.P.(C) No. 10824 of 2008) who were the members of the teaching and non teaching staff of the Schools before this Court in W.P.(C) No. 2260 of 2002. After hearing learned counsel this Court disposed of the Writ Petition giving liberty to the said petitioners to file an appeal before the Director, Secondary Education. In obedience to the said order, it is submitted opposite party nos. 5 to 11 (same person being opposite party nos. 4 to 10 in W.P.(C) No. 10824 of 2008) filed an appeal before the Director, Secondary Education which was registered as Appeal No. 14 of 2003. The persons in Management after terminating services of opposite party nos. 5 to 11 of W.P.(C) No. 17542 of 2008 (same person being opposite party nos. 4 to 10 in W.P.(C) No. 10824 of 2008) appointed petitioner nos. 1 to 3 of W.P.(C) No. 17542 of 2008 in their post. The Director, Secondary Education after receiving the Memorandum of Appeal issued notice to the so called persons in Management of School, called for the records and after perusal of the same was satisfied that the blanket order of termination, terminating the services of all the members, both teaching and non-teaching staff of the school was dehorse to any Rules. The order of termination passed by the Managing Committee were arbitrary and were contrary to law. The Director further held that the appointment of the petitioners was also illegal as no prior permission was taken. On the basis of such conclusions the Director by order dated 18.10.2006 allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned order of mass termination of services of opposite party nos. 5 to 11 of W.P.(C) Nos. 17542 of 2008 (same person being opposite party nos. 4 to 10 in W.P.(C) No. 10824 of 2008) and directed that they should be permitted to continue in the School with immediate effect. 5. While matter stood thus a petition was filed before the Director, Secondary Education by the so called persons in Management of the School and the Director kept the order dated 18.10.2006 in abeyance. Being aggrieved by the said action opposite party nos. 5 to 11 of W.P.(C) No. 17542 of 2008 (same person being opposite party nos. 4 to 10 in W.P.(C) No. 10824 of 2008) again approached this Court in W.P.(C) No. 16493 of 2006. Being aggrieved by the said action opposite party nos. 5 to 11 of W.P.(C) No. 17542 of 2008 (same person being opposite party nos. 4 to 10 in W.P.(C) No. 10824 of 2008) again approached this Court in W.P.(C) No. 16493 of 2006. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, a Division Bench of this Court, on being satisfied that the order passed by the Director on 09.11.2006 keeping the order dated 18.10.2006 in abeyance is an act without jurisdiction, more so because after disposal of the appeal the Director became functus officio and had no right to pass any orders. The said order is sought to be reviewed in RVWPET No. 221 of 2008. 6. The Managing Committee of the School represented through its so called Secretary has filed W.P.(C) No. 10824 of 2008 inter alia praying to declare that the School in question having been established by Muslim minority, the Director had no locus standi to entertain the appeal filed by opposite party nos. 5 to 11 (same person being opposite party nos. 4 to 10 in W.P.(C) No. 10824 of 2008) and the impugned order dated 18.10.2006 should be set aside on that ground alone. 7. Mr. Das, learned counsel for opposite parties on the other hand disputed the said submission and submitted that the School in question is not a minority institution and was all along governed by the provisions of Orissa Education Act and the Rules framed there under. 8. Before entering into the arena of controversy, it would be just and proper to deal with the submission as to whether the School in question is a minority community School or not? According to Mr. Swain, learned counsel for the Management, u/s 2 of the Orissa Education Act, the Legislature kept the administration of educational institutions established by minorities out of the purview of the Education Act. The said Section reads as follows: Act not to apply to certain Institutions : Nothing contained in this Act shall apply to educational institutions of their choice established and administered by minorities having the right under Clause (1) of Article 30 of the Constitution. Provided that the State Government may, by Notification apply or adopt to an educational institution established and administered by minorities such of the provisions of the Act, so however that the rights under Article 30 of the Constitution are not infringed. Provided that the State Government may, by Notification apply or adopt to an educational institution established and administered by minorities such of the provisions of the Act, so however that the rights under Article 30 of the Constitution are not infringed. In the case of S. Azeez Basha and Another Vs. Union of India (UOI), it was held : The words 'established' and 'administered' under Article 30 (1) must be read conjointly and so read, it clearly shows that the minority will have the right to administer educational institutions of their choice provided they have established them, but not otherwise. The Article cannot be read to mean that even if the educational institution has been established by some body else, any religious minority will have the right to administer it because for some reason or other it might have been administering it before the Constitution came into force. In the case of Frank Anthony Public School Employees' Association Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others it was observed that the regulatory measures are designed towards achievement of the goal of making the Minority Educational Institutions effective. Instructions for imparting education cannot be considered to impinge upon the right guaranteed under Article 30 (1) of the Constitution. Fundamental rights guaranteed by Article 30 (1) cannot be surrendered fully or partly and the authorities in the garb of receipt of allegations cannot take away the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 30. 9. Thus to substantiate a plea that an educational institution is a minority community institution, the person claiming so, have to establish that the agency which established the School belong to minority community and that the institution in question was all along treated as minority institution. In the case at hand not a single document has been produced except a copy of writing pad to specify that the School was a Minority Community School. 10. Now coming to the facts, one Mr. Md. Samim Akhtar claims to be the Secretary of the Managing Committee of the School. Mr. Swain, relied upon a resolution said to have been passed constituting the Managing Committee and appointing Md. Samim Akhtar as the Secretary. Copy of the resolution is available on record and marked as Annexure-7 to W.P.(C) No. 10824 of 2008. Md. Samim Akhtar claims to be the Secretary of the Managing Committee of the School. Mr. Swain, relied upon a resolution said to have been passed constituting the Managing Committee and appointing Md. Samim Akhtar as the Secretary. Copy of the resolution is available on record and marked as Annexure-7 to W.P.(C) No. 10824 of 2008. The said document reveals that a meeting of the guardians was held on 21.8.2005 and in the said meeting it was decided that Mr. Md. Samim Akhtar would act as the Secretary of the School. But then law is well settled that guardians of a School have no right to constitute the Managing Committee of the School. That apart no document has been annexed to reveal that the signatories were the guardians. 11. The second contention of Mr. Swain is that the principles of natural justice and equity were followed before terminating the services of opposite party nos. 5 to 11 of W.P.(C) No. 17542 of 2008 (same person being opposite party nos. 4 to 10 in W.P.(C) No. 10824 of 2008). It is stated that registered notice were issued, publications were made in newspapers and as the aforesaid opposite parties did not show cause or appear before the managing Committee, termination orders were passed. 12. This submission is repudiated by Mr. Das, learned counsel appearing for opposite party nos. 5 to 11 in W.P.(C) No. 17542 of 2008. According to him the so-called Secretary namely Mr. Md. Samim Akhtar having not been appointed validly had no right to issue any show cause notice. Even otherwise no show cause notice issued by him was served upon any of the members of the staff of the School. 13. Be that as it may, fact remains, opposite party nos. 5 to 11 of W.P.(C) No. 17542 of 2008 (same person being opposite party nos. 4 to 10 in W.P.(C) No. 10824 of 2008) were validly appointed teaching and non-teaching Staff of the School.? They were working in the School for quite some time. By a blanket order their services have been terminated. Being aggrieved they have approached this Court. But then, as number of disputed questions of fact were involved this Court directed them to approach the Director, Secondary Education so that the factual controversy can be put to rest Accordingly they preferred an appeal before the Director. Thus the submission made by Mr. Being aggrieved they have approached this Court. But then, as number of disputed questions of fact were involved this Court directed them to approach the Director, Secondary Education so that the factual controversy can be put to rest Accordingly they preferred an appeal before the Director. Thus the submission made by Mr. Swain that the Director had no power, cannot be accepted. In fact the Director was called upon by this Court to decide the controversy. After receipt of the petition filed by opposite party nos. 5 to 11 of W.P.(C) No. 17542 of 2008 (same person being opposite party nos. 4 to 10 in W.P.(C) No. 10824 of 2008) the Director called for the records, gave opportunity to all parties and on being satisfied that the order of mass termination was dehorse of any rules, set aside the orders of termination. The impugned order thus suffers from no infirmity. 14. It appears that another petition was filed before the Director after disposal of the appeal and the Director for the reasons best known entertained the petition and kept his order in abeyance. The said order was assailed before this Court in W.P.(C) No. 16493 of 2006. This Court after coming to the conclusion that the Director and become functus officio and review being a creature under the Act, he lacked the initial jurisdiction to entertain the petition, by order dated 18.2.2008 allowed the Writ Petition and set aside the order passed by the Director. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, this Court finds that there is no ground to review the order dated 18.2.2008 passed in W.P.(C) No. 16493 of 2006. 15. In view of the discussions made above, this Court finds that the order of termination of the members of the staff of Hasanpur Urdu High School in mass was not only an act without jurisdiction but also otherwise contrary to law. The Director, Secondary Education has taken into consideration all facts and has rightly set aside the order of termination and directed that opposite party nos. 5 to 11 of W.P.(C) No. 17542 of 2008 (same person being opposite party nos. 4 to 10 in W.P.(C) No. 10824 of 2008) should be permitted to continue. This Court finds no infirmity or illegality in the order and therefore declines to interfere with the same. 16. Consequently all the three cases are disposed of. B.N. Mahapatra, J. 17. 5 to 11 of W.P.(C) No. 17542 of 2008 (same person being opposite party nos. 4 to 10 in W.P.(C) No. 10824 of 2008) should be permitted to continue. This Court finds no infirmity or illegality in the order and therefore declines to interfere with the same. 16. Consequently all the three cases are disposed of. B.N. Mahapatra, J. 17. I agree.