JUDGMENT R.R. Prasad, J. 1. This writ application has been filed on behalf of the petitioner for quashing the entire criminal proceeding of Patna Sadar Vigilance P.S. case No. 29 of 2000 registered under Suctions 420, 467, 468 469, 471, 477A, 109, 201 read with Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code and also u/s 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of he Prevention of Corruption Act. 2. The facts leading to this case are that in the year 1987, one R.M. Tigga and other being occupancy raiyats of the land filed an application u/s 49(2) of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') before the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi for according permission to them to transfer the lands, bearing plot Nos. 636, 637 and 638 pertaining to Khata No. 102, measuring in area of .71 acres situated at Mnuza Hinoo to Mahavir Sahkari Grih Nirman Samiti, Dhurwa, Ranchi, a registered Co operative Society. On the soil application, a case was registered as Land Permission Case No. 9 of 1987-88. Similarly, Hardugan Munda and 9 others also filed an application for according permission to transfer the lands, bearing plot No. 635, 647 and 650, appertaining to Khate "40.57 and also plot No. 648 appertaining to Khata No. 174, measuring local area of 1.67 acres to the said Co-operative Society. On that application, land Permission Case No. 10 of 1987-88 was registered. Upon hearing, the then Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi, Sri B.K.Sinha refused to grant permissioner to transfer the aforesaid lands to the Co-operative Society as according to him the purpose for which land has been sought to be transferred to Co-operative Society for constructing building, cannot be said to be reasonable and sufficient purpose. However, the said order was challenged before the Commissioner, Ranchi by way of appeal being Misc. Revenue Appeal No. 307 of 1987. While hearing the said appeal, the following question was formulated: Whether or no the sale of the land to the Housing Co-operative Society for purpose of building/houses, can be deemed to been reasonable cause. 3. While dealing with the issue, learned Commissioner did observe that though certain purposes have been specified in the Act under which permission can be granted for transfer but there could be other purposes also not mentioned in the Act under which Deputy Commissioner can grant permission provided he finds the purpose to be reasonable and sufficient. 3. While dealing with the issue, learned Commissioner did observe that though certain purposes have been specified in the Act under which permission can be granted for transfer but there could be other purposes also not mentioned in the Act under which Deputy Commissioner can grant permission provided he finds the purpose to be reasonable and sufficient. Therefore, the case was remanded, vide its order dated 14.12.1987 to the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi to consider the case afresh as to whether or not construction of the houses/building is a reasonable activity taking in to account that in the past there have been several instances of according permission of transferring the land to the Co-operative Societies for the construction of the building and that In the area, several colonies have come up and also the fact that whether sufficient land would be left with the transferors and that the rate negotiated is reasonable and also to ensure genuineness of the claim of the Co-operative Society of having land for the purpose of constructing building. Thereupon, the cases which had been remanded before the Deputy Commissioner for its consideration in the light of the observation made by the learned Commissioner, could not be taken up by the then Deputy Commissioner for couple of years. However, on 16.11.1990 raiyats, who were seeking permission filed an application before the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi on which date the petitioner was holding the office of the Deputy Commissioner, to the effect that the land for which permission has been sought to be transferred is not cultivable, rather it is a 'tarnd' land and as such they are not getting benefit out of it and, hence, they want to dispose it of so that money could be utilized for constructing/repairing of their houses. Therefore, the prayer was made to grant permission as in the past permissions have been accorded to the raiyats for transferring their lands to the Co-operative Societies. Thereupon the matter was taken up for hearing by the petitioner, being the then Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi. 4. Therefore, the prayer was made to grant permission as in the past permissions have been accorded to the raiyats for transferring their lands to the Co-operative Societies. Thereupon the matter was taken up for hearing by the petitioner, being the then Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi. 4. Having heard the petitioner, the then Deputy Commissioner, vide its order dated 2.2.1992 granted permission to the raiyats to transfer the land to the said Co-operative Society taking into account the fact that the land being a trend land is not cultivable and even after transfer of the land to the registered Co-operative Society, the raiyats would be left with the adequate agricultural land and that raiyats have also taken a considerable amount as on advance and that earlier permission has been granted in number of cases where lands were sought to be transferred to the Co-operative: Societies for the purposes of constructing building. Thus, the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi on finding that such transfer would be for reasonable and sufficient purpose granted permission to transfer the land subject to condition that the land would be sold at the rate of Rs. 5000/- per decimal Instead of Rs. 4000/- which had been suggested by the then Circle Officer and that transferee would be using the land only for the purpose for which permission has been given for transferring the land and that none of the members of the Co-operative Society will be having more than 7 decimals of the land and that if the building is not constructed over that land) within three years, raiyats would be entitled to have possession back of those lands and last not the least, that the payment be made by having NSS in the name of the raiyats and cash be deposited in the account of the raiyats. 5. Subsequently, that order was challenged by some of the aggrieved parties before the State Government in terms of the provision as contained In Section 49(5) of the Act. After hearing, the Presiding Officer did not find fault with the order of the Deputy Commissioner granting permission as according to him, the order has been passed after taking into consideration several factors mentioned in the outer and as such, it was confirmed by holding that transfer for which permission was accorded was for reasonable and sufficient purpose. After hearing, the Presiding Officer did not find fault with the order of the Deputy Commissioner granting permission as according to him, the order has been passed after taking into consideration several factors mentioned in the outer and as such, it was confirmed by holding that transfer for which permission was accorded was for reasonable and sufficient purpose. Therefore, the Presiding Officer did not find it fit to interfere with the order, However, rate fixed by the Deputy Commissioner for sale of the land was enhanced to Rs. 6000/- per decimal. 6. However, before the order was confirmed by the State Government, Vigilance Bureau, Bihar on getting some complaints regarding illegal transfer of the land belonging to the Scheduled Tribes, constituted a committee for holding enquiry relating to the complaint of illegal transfer. The complaint relating to permission granted by the petitioner was enquired into by the then Dy. S.P. Vigilance Bureau, Patna who did find that earlier the permission for transfer of the land to Mahabir Housing Co-operative Society had been refused when the occupancy raiyats had sought permission However, the order was set aside by the then Commissioner and remanded the matter to the Deputy Commissioner for consideration as to whether the purpose for which the land is sought to be transferred to the Co-operative Society would be reasonable and sufficient. That matter was not decided by the then Deputy Commissioners, who were posted at the relevant point of time but it is only the petitioner, who accorded permission to transfer the land, though no such permission could be granted for housing purposes in view of the bar put u/s 19 of the Act, still the petitioner in connivance with others granted permission for transferring the land. 7. On the basis of such enquiry report, Patna Sadar Vigilance P.S. case No. 29 of 2000 was instituted on 13.11.2000 under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 477A, 109, 201 read with Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code and also u/s 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. 8. After bifurcation of the state, the Vigilance Bureau, Ranchi took up the matter for investigation and ultimately submitted charge sheet on 18.11.2007. 9. Mr. 8. After bifurcation of the state, the Vigilance Bureau, Ranchi took up the matter for investigation and ultimately submitted charge sheet on 18.11.2007. 9. Mr. V.K. kanth, learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that though earlier the then Deputy Commissioner had refused to give permission to the occupancy raiyats to transfer the land to the Housing Co-operative Society but that order was set aside by the then Commissioner, South Chota Nagpur Division and the matter was remanded to the Deputy Commissioner for considering as to whether the purpose for which the land is sought to be transferred to the Housing Co-operative Society would be reasonable and sufficient keeping in view that in past such permissions for transfer of the land to the Housing Co-operative Societies have been granted and that several colonies have come up around the land in question and also the other factors to be taken into account as to whether the land holders would be left with sufficient agricultural land and whether the claim of the Housing Co-operative Society is genuine or not? When the land holders by filing an application pointed out to the petitioner that the matter is pending since long for years together and as such they are facing hardship, the petitioner took up the matter and granted permission to the land holders to transfer the land to the Housing Co-operative Societies after taking into consideration the fact that the land in question, being a Tarnd land, is not cultivable and the raiyats would be left with substantial agricultural land and that in past several such permission for sale in favour of the Housing Co-operative Societies have been granted and as such the petitioner was subjectly satisfied that purpose for which the land has teen sought to be transferred is reasonable and sufficient. Therefore, such order passed in exercise of the statutory power vested on him cannot be a subject matter for criminal prosecution even if in the opinion of the Investigating Officer such order granting permission to sell the land to the Housing Co-operative Society is not permissible. Therefore, the instant prosecution is nothing but gross abuse of the process of the court. Under the circumstances, criminal proceeding can be said to have been manifestly attended with mala fide and hence, entire proceeding Is fit to be set aside. 10. Therefore, the instant prosecution is nothing but gross abuse of the process of the court. Under the circumstances, criminal proceeding can be said to have been manifestly attended with mala fide and hence, entire proceeding Is fit to be set aside. 10. It was also contended that otherwise also the Instant criminal proceeding is fit tobe quashed in view of the fact that allegations made in the first information report even if are accepted to be true on its face value, it do not constitute prima facie case either of the forgery or of the cheating under which cases have been instituted. 11. Learned Counsel further submits that even the allegations made in the first information report do not constitute any offence whatsoever u/s 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act as it is never the case of the prosecution that the petitioner had sold his judicial verdict for quid pro quo i.e. in lieu of any pecuniary benefit. 12. Further contention is that in any view of the matter the order which the petitioner did pass in exercise of power vested him under the Act, cannot be a subject matter of the criminal prosecution in view of the protection as enshrined u/s 3 of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985. Thus, the instant case is fit to be quashed even if the charge sheet has been submitted as allowing such proceeding to continue would be a gross abuse of the process of law and in that situation, the case, in view of the ratio laid down in the case of State of Karnataka Vs. L. Muniswamy and Others, (1977) 2 SCC 699 and R.S. Raghunath Vs. State of Karnataka and another, (1992) 1 SCC 335 is fit to be quashed. 13. As against that, Mr. L. Muniswamy and Others, (1977) 2 SCC 699 and R.S. Raghunath Vs. State of Karnataka and another, (1992) 1 SCC 335 is fit to be quashed. 13. As against that, Mr. A.K. Kashyap, learned Senior counsel appearing for the vigilance submits that the petitioner in utter violation of the provision as stipulated under the Act has granted permission to the occupancy raiyats to sell the land in favour of the Housing Co-operative Society and as such, he performed his duty dishonestly and hence, he is rightly being prosecuted for the offence under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 477A, 109, 201 read with Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code and also u/s 13(t)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and that when the informant having come to the conclusion that the Deputy Commissioner by granting permission illegally has committed the offences alleged submitted charge sheet, therefore, it would not be a proper for this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to go into the intricacy of the matter, rather it should be left for the trial court to decide the matter and hence, this application is fit to be dismissed. 14. Learned Counsel further submits that the Deputy Commissioner in exercise of power under the statute if passes order granting or refusing permission to sell the land that can never be said to be a judicial order, rather it would be an administrative order and, therefore, protection as contemplated under the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 is not available to him. In this respect following decisions were referred to. Lal Bihari Prasad and Anr. v. State of Bihar 1979 BLJ 451 , Sitaram Choubey and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors. 1993 (2) PLR 255 and Surendra Kumar Bhatia v. Kanhaiya Lal and Ors. 2009 (4) East Cr.C 179 (SC). 15. Having heard learned Counsel appearing for the parties, it does appear that the appellate court having set aside the order passed by the then Deputy Commissioner, under which permission to transfer the land had been refused, remanded the matter for its reconsideration. 2009 (4) East Cr.C 179 (SC). 15. Having heard learned Counsel appearing for the parties, it does appear that the appellate court having set aside the order passed by the then Deputy Commissioner, under which permission to transfer the land had been refused, remanded the matter for its reconsideration. The appellate court while remanding the matter left it open for the Deputy Commissioner to consider again as to whether the purpose fur which the land is being sought to be transferred can be reasonable and sufficient other than the purpose which has been stipulated under the Act. As per the order of the appellate court that question is to be decided after taking into consideration certain factors which have been enumerated in the appellate court's order. The petitioner after taking into consideration those factors, which were required to be taken, granted permission for transfer of the land to the Housing Co-operative Society after being satisfied that the purpose for which the land has been sough to be transferred is reasonable and sufficient. Subsequently, that order has been confirmed with slight modification on the point of rate on which the land was to be sold. In spite of that the Instant prosecution has been launched against the petitioner on the premise that permission for transfer cannot be granted for building purposes and that the reason on which the earlier Deputy Commissioner had refused to grant permission has not been taken into consideration by the petitioner. But these materials cannot be a ground for launching prosecution against the petitioner in absence of any material to the effect that the petitioner by corrupt or illegal means by abusing his position as a public servant put himself or any other person to pecuniary advantage by passing that order. Such allegation of adopting corrupt practices for pecuniary advantage is neither there in the first information report nor it is in the charge sheet nor it has come in course of investigation as such material even on being asked could not be placed before the court 16. It be reminded that the petitioner in exercise of power vested under the statute did pass order which has been made subject matter of the instant prosecution and therefore, submission was advanced that the petitioner being a quasi judicial authority does have protection u/s 3 of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 and as such he can not be prosecuted. It be reminded that the petitioner in exercise of power vested under the statute did pass order which has been made subject matter of the instant prosecution and therefore, submission was advanced that the petitioner being a quasi judicial authority does have protection u/s 3 of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 and as such he can not be prosecuted. However, this submission was countered by learned Counsel appearing for the Vigilance by taking stand that the Deputy Commissioner while granting or refusing permission never acts as quasi judicial authority rather it acts as Administrative Officer and as such, protection as contemplated under the Act is not available to the petitioner. 17. Thus, the question (alls for consideration is as to whether or not the petitioner in the circumstances stated above will have protection u/s 3 of the Judges (Protection) Act? 18. In order to decide this issue, may refer to Sections 2 and 3(1) of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 which reads as follows 2. Definition In this Act, "Judge" means not only every person who is officially designated as a Judge, but also every person (a) who is empowered by law to give in any legal proceeding a definitive judgment, or a judgment which, If not appealed against, would be definitive, or a judgment which, if confirmed by some other authority, would be definitive; or (b) who is one of a body of persons which body of persons is empowered by law to give such a judgment as is referred to in Clause (a). 3. Additional protection to Judges (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force and subject to the provisions of Sub-section (2), no Court shall entertain or continue any civil or criminal proceeding against any person who is or was a Judge for any act, tiling or word committed, done or spoken by him when, or in the course of, acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official or judicial duty or function. 19. From perusal of the definition as contained in Section 2, it does appear that immunity from civil or criminal proceeding is available not only to a person who if. 19. From perusal of the definition as contained in Section 2, it does appear that immunity from civil or criminal proceeding is available not only to a person who if. officially designated as a Judge but also to every person who under the law gives definitive judgment in a legal proceeding and that judgment attains finality, if no appeal is preferred or confirmed by some other authority. 20. Then obviously the question does arise as to which kind of order does have characteristics or definitive judgment By adding adjective 'definitive' "legislature" must have in its wisdom thought something different from the order which is being passed by the court or the quasi judicial authority. On several occasions the question came before the court as to whether a particular authority exercising quasi judicial power is a court or nor? In recent years, apart from regular courts civil, revenue and criminal many authorities have been vested under different enactments with the power to decide disputes affecting the rights of the citizen. While doing so, they are expected to act judicially, although they are not full-fledged court in the sense of the term. Some times, they exercise power which is being exercised by a regular court, still the order passed by such quasi judicial authority cannot be considered to be definitive judgment as only such pronouncement of such body would partake the characteristic of definitive judgment if it is. binding in nature. 21. In a case of Cooper v. Wilson (1937) 2 KB 309 the question arose as to whether the Administrative Tribunal or the authorities constituted under different acts can be held to be a court if they fulfillcertain requirements. binding in nature. 21. In a case of Cooper v. Wilson (1937) 2 KB 309 the question arose as to whether the Administrative Tribunal or the authorities constituted under different acts can be held to be a court if they fulfillcertain requirements. In that connection it was observed as follows : A true judicial decision presupposes on existing dispute between two or more parties and then involves four requisites : (1) the presentation (not necessarily orally) of their case by the parties to, the dispute; (2) if the dispute between them is a question of fact, the ascertainment of the fact by means of evidence adduced by the parties to the dispute that often with the assistance of argument by or on behalf of the parties on the evidence; (3) if the dispute between them is a question of law, the submission of legal argument by the parties; and (4) a decision which disputes of the whole matter by a finding upon the facts in dispute and an application of the law of the land to the facts so found, including where required a ruling upon any disputed question of law 22. In a case of Brajnandan Sinha Vs. Jyoti Narain, AIR 1956 SC 66 reference was made to the aforesaid case of Cooper v. Wilson (supra) with the approval and it was pointed out that one of the tests for holding such quasi Judicial authority to be a court is as to whether the pronouncement of such body binding in nature. Keeping in view such principle, the Patna High Court in a cast of Bhola Singh and Ors. v. Chandrabansh Choubey and Ors. 1966 BUR 759 held that mutation proceeding is a quasi judicial proceeding and the orders passed by them are not binding in nature. The same view was reiterated in a case of Lal Bihari Prasad and Anr. v. State of Bihar (supra). 23. Recently in a case of Surendra Kumar Bhatia v. Kanhaiya Lal and Ors. (supra) the question arose as to whether the Land Acquisition Officer passing an award u/s 11(2) of the Act does function as a judge as defined in Section 19 of the Indian Penal Code and will have protection of Section 77 of the Indian Penal Code? 23. Recently in a case of Surendra Kumar Bhatia v. Kanhaiya Lal and Ors. (supra) the question arose as to whether the Land Acquisition Officer passing an award u/s 11(2) of the Act does function as a judge as defined in Section 19 of the Indian Penal Code and will have protection of Section 77 of the Indian Penal Code? Before recording the conclusion arrived at by the court, I may point it out that the definition of the Judge given in Section 19 of the Indian Penal Code is couched with similar expression to that of the definition of a judge given in Judges (Protection) Act, 1985. The Hon'ble Supreme Court after taking into consideration the prevision under the Act did find that the Collector in making an award or making a reference or serving a notice neither acts in judicial nor quasi judicial capacity but purely in a administrative capacity exercising statutory power as an agent and representative of the Government/acquiring authority and ultimately it was held that only Judges (as defined in Section 19 of the Indian Penal Code) acting judicially are entitled to the protection u/s 77 of the Indian Penal Code. 24. It has been further held that the Collector is neither a Judge as defined in Section 19 nor does he act judicially when discharging any of the functions under the Act. Therefore, he is not entitled to the protection u/s 77 of the Indian Penal Code. 25. Thus, I do find that only those authorities empowered by law to pass definitive judgment in any legal proceeding will have protection under the Act and the definitive judgments are those judgments which are rendered by the authorities when the dispute exists between the two or more parties and the decision rendered in a case will be binding upon the parties. 26. Here in the instant case, the Deputy Commissioner in exercise of power u/s 49 never decides any dispute between the parties, rather it has only to record order granting permission to transfer the land or refusing the permission to transfer the land after taking into consideration evidences necessary for recording such order. 26. Here in the instant case, the Deputy Commissioner in exercise of power u/s 49 never decides any dispute between the parties, rather it has only to record order granting permission to transfer the land or refusing the permission to transfer the land after taking into consideration evidences necessary for recording such order. Therefore, that kind of order can never be said to be a definitive judgment as it never decides any dispute between the parties, That being so, any order passed by the Deputy Commissioner in exercise of power u/s 49 of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 would not be a definitive judgment and hence, he cannot enjoy the protection as contemplated under the Judges (Protection) Act. 27. Now coming to the merit of the case, one would be certainly faced with the question in the facts and circumstances stated above as to whether the petitioner would be liable to be prosecuted under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 471, 109, 201 read with Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code, even if it is assumed that the petitioner did pass order against the statute. In other words, the question would be as to whether the act done by the petitioner constitutes offences of forgery or cheating as contemplated under the Indian Penal Code. 28. The condition precedent for constituting offence under Sections 467, 468, 471 and 472 is forgery which gets attracted when one makes a false document (or false electronic record or part thereof) in terms of Section 464 of the Indian Penal Code. 29. An analysis of Section 464 of the Indian Penal Code shows that it divides false documents into three categories. 1. The first is where a person dishonestly or fraudulently makes or executes a document with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document was made or executed by some other person, or by the authority of some other person, by whom or by whose authority he knows It was not made or executed. 2. The second is where a person dishonestly or fraudulently, by cancellation or otherwise, alters a document in any material part, without lawful authority, after It has been made or executed by either himself of any other person. 3. 2. The second is where a person dishonestly or fraudulently, by cancellation or otherwise, alters a document in any material part, without lawful authority, after It has been made or executed by either himself of any other person. 3. The third is where a person dishonestly or fraudulently causes any person to sign, execute or alter a document knowing that such person could not by reason of (a) unsoundness of mind (b) intoxication; or (c) deception practiced upon him, know the contents of the document or the nature the alteration. In short, a person is said to have made a "false document" If (i) he made or executed a document claiming to be someone else or authorized by someone else; or (ii) he altered or tampered a document; Or (HI) he obtained a document by practicing deception, or from a person not In control, of his senses. 30. Therefore, even if the order passed by the petitioner, as per the prosecution, is erroneous/illegal on account of being against the statute, it does not constitute any offence whatsoever under Sections 467, 468, 469, 471 and 477A of the Indian Penal Code as passing of any order even an Illegal order never assumes any characteristics of making a false document. 31. So far the offence of cheating is concerned, I failed to understand as to how the alleged act constitute offence under Sections 419 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code as the petitioner has never been alleged to have deceived anyone either by making a false or misleading representation or by any other action or omission, nor it is the case that the petitioner did offer any fraudulent or dishonest inducement to deliver any property or to consent to the retention thereof by any person or to intentionally induce him to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived. Therefore, no offence of cheating is made out either u/s 420 or 419 of the Indian Penal Code. At the same time act which has been alleged to have been committed never attracts any offence u/s 201 of the Indian Penal Code. Therefore, no offence of cheating is made out either u/s 420 or 419 of the Indian Penal Code. At the same time act which has been alleged to have been committed never attracts any offence u/s 201 of the Indian Penal Code. So far offences relating to abetment and conspiracy are concerned, one wonders how it get attracted in absence of allegation by the land holders that they were cheated by the act of the petitioner who did pass order in connivance of the other accused rather it were the land holder who came forward to have permission for transfer of the land. 32. So far the offence u/s 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act is concerned, the petitioner though has been alleged to have passed erroneous order being contrary to the provision of the statute but he has never been alleged to have passed the order by adopting corrupt practices or illegal means for having pecuniary advantage/valuable thing for himself or for any other person. The aforesaid essential ingrecients constituting offence u/s 13(1)(d) is completely lacking as nothing could be placed to show even an iota of evidence/material of receiving pecuniary advantage and as such, one cannot be prosecuted u/s 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, if one passes wrong order in exercise of power vested in him. 33. Thus, I do find that the instant case falls within category (1) and (3) enunciated in a case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal where High Court can exercise its power either under Article 226 or under its inherent power u/s 82 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. For reference, I may quote aforesaid two categories placed at serial 1 and 3. (1) Where the allegations made in the fist information report Or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) ... ... (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. 34. (2) ... ... (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. 34. In this connection, I may also refer to a decision rendered in a case of State of Karnataka v. L. Munni Swami and Ors. (supra) where it has been observed as follows: In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Courts Inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or prosecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice. We ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. The compelling necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realization of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice between the State and its subjects, it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of, that salient jurisdiction. 35. Thus, in the facts and circumstances it would be gross abuse of the process of law if the criminal proceeding is allowed to continue and the petitioner is asked to face rig our of trial when I did find that allegation made In first information report even if are taken at their face value and are accepted to be true do not constitute any offence against the petitioner and further uncontroverted allegation made in first information report and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence against the petitoner. 36. 36. Accordingly, entire criminal proceeding of Patna Sadar Vigilance P.S. case No. 29 of 2000 registered under Sections 420, 467, 468, 469, 471, 477A, 109, 201 wad with Section 120B of the Indian Penal and also u/s 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act is hereby quashed so far the petitioner Is concerned. 37. In the result, this application is allowed. Application allowed.