Judgment :- 1. The petitioner is an association of employees working in the Life Insurance Corporation of India, belonging to the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Buddhist fold. They have come up with the above writ petition, seeking the issue of a Writ of Declaration, to declare that the action of the respondent-Corporation in omitting to invite them for take in the proposed Information Sharing Meeting/Wage Revision Meeting was illegal and violation of Articles 14,16, and 17 of the Constitution and for a consequential direction to the respondents to invite them for such meetings. 2. I have heard Mr. Balan Haridas, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, Ms. S. Seethalakshmi, learned Senior Panel Central Government Standing Counsel appearing for the first respondent and Mr. P.S. Raman, learned Advocate General appearing for the second and third respondents. 3. As stated earlier, the petitioner is an association of employees working in the Life Insurance Corporation of India and espousing the cause of employees who belong to the Scheduled Castes, Schedules Tribes and Buddhist fold. It is registered not under the Trade Unions Act nor under the Societies Registration Act, but under the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, as a public trust. The Constitution of the petitioner-trust, filed in the typed set of papers shows that the aims and objectives of the petitioner are as follows: - “5.1. To secure effective organization of all Schedules Caste, Schedule Tribe and Buddhist Employees of Life Insurance Corporation of India and to foster a sprit of Cooperation and promote greater understanding among them; 5.2. To secure improvements and safeguard the interests of its members by all legitimate, peaceful and democratic means as the Association may from time to time decide; 5.3. To properly represent to the management of the Life Insurance Corporation of India or any other competent Authorities in matters relating to or affecting the interests of its members; 5.4. To remove all types of difficulties experienced by the members of the Association through representation to the Management of LICI and /or by all other legitimate, peaceful and democratic means as the Association may from time to time decide and try to get the demands fulfilled; 5.5. To federate and/or affiliate itself with the other Association with similar aims and objectives.” 4. To federate and/or affiliate itself with the other Association with similar aims and objectives.” 4. The grievance of the petitioner, in a nutshell, is – (a) that the Corporation calls the petitioner for liaison once in 3 months for redressing the grievances of Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe employee; (b) that the wage revision which takes place once in 5 years, took place last in 2002 and the same expired in 2007; (c) that the Corporation has no procedure for recognizing the collective bargaining agent, but invite unions/associations by picking and choosing in an arbitrary manner; (d) that though the petitioner represents 28,000 employees and happens to be the largest body, the Corporation does not invite them for talks deliberately; (e) that whenever decisions are arrived at, in Information Sharing Meeting, such decisions are forwarded by the Corporation to the first respondent and the same is notified by the first respondent with or without modification in the gazette; (f) that since the Corporation deliberately omitted to invite the petitioner for the meetings, one of the members of the petitioner applied under the Right to Information Act, seeking information (i) about the eligibility criteria of the unions/associations to be invited for such meetings(ii) about the meetings held in the past, upto 5.11.2009 and about the unions/associations who were invited to participate and (iii) about the reasons for not inviting the petitioner and about the guidelines, if any for extending invitations; (g) that a reply was given on 1.12.2009 by the Executive officer (CPIO) admitting to the fact (i) that there are no guidelines in respect of the eligibility criteria (ii) that 12 Information Sharing Sessions were held from March 2005 to November 2009, in which 10 unions/associations participated and (iii) that there are no guidelines issued by the Government of India; (h) that the applicant under the RTI Act, not satisfied with the response of the Public Information Officer, filed an appeal to the Appellate Authority viz., The Managing Director; (i) that the Appellate Authority passed an order on 27.1.2010, dismissing the appeal; (j) that the applicant filed a Second Appeal to the Central Information Commission and the same was disposed of by order dated 30.4.2009, directing the Public Information Officer to permit the applicant to inspect the file relating to his application under the RTI Act; (k) that thereafter, the applicant made a fresh request to the Central Public Information Officer on 4.2.2000, requesting him to provide the basis for recognizing or calling only 10 unions/associations for Information Sharing Sessions; (l) that the Information officer gave a reply stating that there are no recognized unions/associations and that those 10 unions/associations are being called for the meetings as per the practice in vogue; (m) that therefore, the petitioner made a representation on 8.5.2010 to invite them for the Information Sharing Sessions and that when the Corporation proposed to hold an Information Sharing Session on 14.5.2010, they approached this Court with the prayer detailed in paragraph 1 above. 5. The writ petition was moved for orders as to admission on 12.5.2010 in the Vacation Court. The learned Senior Panel Counsel for Central Government took notice for the first respondent and the learned Vacation Judge directed notices to be served on the Standing Counsel for the second respondent. Thereafter, on 13.5.2010, the learned Judge passed an order, directing the Corporation to permit the representatives of the petitioner to participate in the meeting scheduled to be held on 14.5.2010 or on any other date. But the Corporation filed a counter affidavit and an additional counter affidavit and the petitioner also filed a reply affidavit and an additional reply affidavit. Therefore, the writ petition itself was taken up disposal by consent of parties. 6. Mr. Balan Haridas, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner took exception to the action of the Corporation in refusing to invite the petitioner for participation in the Information Sharing Sessions, on the following grounds:- (a) that admittedly, there are no rules or guidelines prescribing the criteria for inviting a union/association for participating in such meetings; (b) that in the absence of any criteria, the exclusion of the petitioner would amount to an arbitrary exercise of power offending Articles 14 and 19 (1) (c) of the Constitution; (c) that the exclusion of an association representing majority of the employees of the Corporation, even while inviting 10 unions/associations whose membership is lower than that of the petitioner, amounted to hostile discrimination; 7. The Corporation first filed a counter affidavit contending inter alia (i) that in exercise of the power conferred by Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation of /India Act, 1956, the Central Government had issued a set of guidelines on 23.10.1989 instructing Banks and Financial Institutions to conduct meetings with SC/ST associations to sort out matters relating to reservation policies; (ii) that the petitioner has a right to participate only in such meetings and they have also been invited for such meetings held quarterly (iii) that since the petitioner is not a trade union, they have no right to be invited for Information Sharing Meetings; (iv) that the members of the petitioner could also be members of other trade unions/associations;(v) that though there is no recognized union in the Corporation and consequently, there is no collective bargaining agent, all trade unions are invited for discussions; and (vi) that since the petitioner is not a trade union, they have no right to be invited. 8. In the course of hearing of the writ petition, Mr. P.S. Raman learned Advocate General appearing for the Corporation, raised a preliminary issue with regard to the jurisdiction, contending that since the petitioner is registered in Mumbai and also since all Information Sharing Sessions are held at Mumbai and part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of his Court. The learned Advocate General also submitted that all the 10 unions/associations invited for the Information Sharing Sessions are either officers’ associations or registered trade unions. According to the learned Advocate General, each one of those 10 unions/associations espouses the cause of one or two categories of employees and that therefore, they are invited for talks on matters relating to general terms and conditions of service. On the contrary, the petitioner, according to the learned Advocate General, represents the interests of only SC/ST employees, irrespective of the categories to which they belong, such as from the level of sub staff to the level of Executive Director. Therefore, the learned Advocate General contended that they could not be invited to participate in Information Sharing Sessions. 9. The above submissions of the learned Advocate General appearing for the Corporation were objected to by Mr. Balan Haridas, learned counsel for the petitioner on the ground that they were not supported by pleadings in the counter affidavit filed. Therefore, the learned Advocate General contended that they could not be invited to participate in Information Sharing Sessions. 9. The above submissions of the learned Advocate General appearing for the Corporation were objected to by Mr. Balan Haridas, learned counsel for the petitioner on the ground that they were not supported by pleadings in the counter affidavit filed. Therefore, the Corporation came up with an additional counter affidavit containing more particulars and the petitioner filed a reply to the original counter and a reply to the additional counter affidavit. 10. From the respective pleading made and the contentions raised, two issues arise for consideration viz., (i) whether this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition and (ii) whether the refusal of the Corporation to invite petitioner for talks, offends any of their rights, fundamental or otherwise. JURISDICTION: 11. Though on the question of jurisdiction, my attention was drawn by the learned counsel on both sides to the pleadings as well as to several decisions of this Court and the Supreme Court, I do not think that the said issue should detain me for long. This is in view of the fact that in the course of arguments, Mr. P.S. Raman, learned Advocate General for the Corporation, contended that the Corporation has a three tier system of Information Sharing viz., (i) Central Information Sharing Sessions (ii) Zonal Level Information Sharing Sessions and (iii) Divisional Level Information Sharing Sessions and that the petitioner is invited for the zonal Level and divisional level sessions. These sessions are concerned with administrative matters and all operational matters respectively. But the Central Information Sharing System deals with only two issues viz., (i) wage revision and (ii) framing of national policy. In view of the said contention, I do not think that the issue of territorial jurisdiction should be pressed hard by the Corporation. If for divisional level and zonal level information sharing sessions, the petitioner is being invited, the refusal to invite them for the national level session, is certainly a part of the cause of action. That part of the cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court, since the elected President of the petitioner is working in Chennai. If for divisional level and zonal level information sharing sessions, the petitioner is being invited, the refusal to invite them for the national level session, is certainly a part of the cause of action. That part of the cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court, since the elected President of the petitioner is working in Chennai. If the Corporation had actually issued guidelines and if those guidelines had prescribed that the invitations for such sessions would be served only at the registered offices of the respective unions/associations, then it may not be open to the elected office bearers to claim that the cause of action would keep floating and circulating throughout the country depending upon wherefrom the office bearers got elected. In other words, if either the Corporation or the Central Government had framed a policy for extending invitations to such Information Sharing Sessions, stipulating therein that such invitations would be served only at the addresses of the registered offices of the unions, the entire cause of action would always arise only at the place where the invitations emanate or at the places where the region from which the offices of the unions are located, irrespective of the region from which the office bearers were elected. But no such policy is admittedly in force as on date. Therefore, in the light of the fact that such invitations for participation at the divisional and zonal level could be served only upon the office bearers, I cannot totally rule out the possibility of the cause of action arising within the jurisdiction of this Court. Though it may not be like the Chancellor’s Foot, it cannot outright be rejected as without jurisdiction. MERITS: 12. Coming to the second issue arising for consideration, it is seen from the rival contentions that in essence, the complaint of the petitioner is one of arbitrary exercise of power by the respondents and hostile discrimination of the petitioner by the respondents. The response of the Corporation is that at the outset, the petitioner has no right to be invited for talks and that in any case, the action of the respondents falls within the ambit of reasonable classification. Therefore, the second issue has to be tested on two parameters viz., (i) as to whether the petitioner has a right to be invited for talks and (ii) as to whether classification is reasonable. Therefore, the second issue has to be tested on two parameters viz., (i) as to whether the petitioner has a right to be invited for talks and (ii) as to whether classification is reasonable. RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE: 13. The right to represent the workmen in any industry, arising out of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is primarily confined only to “trade unions”. A trade union is defined in section 2(qq) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, to mean a trade union registered under the Trade Unions Act, 1926. Under Section 36(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the right to represent a workman who is a party to an industrial dispute, is conferred only upon (i) an office bearer of a registered trade union (ii) an office bearer of a federation of trade unions and (iii) an office bearer of any trade union connected with the industry. Chapter VC of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, deals with unfair labour practices. An unfair practices is defined. Under Section 2(ra) to mean any of the practices specified in the fifth Schedule. Item No. 15 of the Fifth Schedule makes “the refusal to bargain collectively in good faith with the recognised trade unions” alone as an unfair labour practice. Therefore, if the issue raised in this writ petition had been raised actually in the context of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the petitioner would have had no legs to stand at all in view of the admitted position that it is not a trade union registered under the Trade Unions Act, 1926. This is perhaps the reason why the petitioner has chosen to peg their claim in terms of Article 14 of the Constitution. 14. In B. Srinivas Reddy vs. Karnataka Urban Water Supply and Drainage Board Employees’ Association { 2006 (11) SCC 731 }, the Supreme Court held, after referring to Section 2(qq) and Section 36 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, in paragraph 38 as follows:- “Chapter III of the Trade Unions Act, 1926 sets out rights and liabilities of the registered trade unions. Under the said enactment, an unregistered trade union or a trade union whose registration has been cancelled has no manner of right whatsoever, even the rights available under the ID Act have been limited only to those trade unions which are registered under the Trade Unions Act, 1926 by insertion of clause 2(qq) in the ID Act, w.e.f. 21.8.1984 defining a trade union to mean a trade union registered under the Trade Unions Act, 1926.” 15. Therefore, even the rights flowing under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 are available only to a registered trade union and not to others. But neither the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 nor the Trade Unions Act, 1926 contains any provisions for recognition of a union. In respect of the employee of the Central Government and the employees of some public sector undertakings, there are departmental instructions and circulars. A Division Bench of this court took note of this fact, albeit in a different context, in K.V. Sridharan and another vs. S. Sundaramurthy and another { 2009 (3) MLJ 1320 }. The relevant portion in paragraphs 3 of the said decision is extracted as follows:- “The said Act does not make any provision for recognition of such a union. Any recognition of union, even if it is a union relating to the employees of the Central Government, is governed by some departmental circulars. Those circulars are administrative in nature and not statutory. Therefore, those circulars also cannot be enforced in a writ petition.” 16. In so far as the Life Insurance corporation of India is concerned, it is the Central Government to which power is reserved under Section 48(2) (cc) of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, to make rules relating to the terms and conditions of service of the employees and agents of the Corporation, including those who became employees on the appointed day under the Act. Clause (cc) was inserted in section 48(2), with effect from 20.6.1979 under the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981. Similarly, sub-section (2-A) of Section 48, inserted by the very same Amendment Act, declared that the Regulations in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, with respect to the terms and conditions of services of the employees and agents of the Corporation, shall be deemed to have been issued under Clause (cc) of sub-section (2). Similarly, sub-section (2-A) of Section 48, inserted by the very same Amendment Act, declared that the Regulations in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, with respect to the terms and conditions of services of the employees and agents of the Corporation, shall be deemed to have been issued under Clause (cc) of sub-section (2). The constitutional validity of the Amendment Act, 1981, as well as the validity of the rules issued by the Central Government is terms of Section 48(2) (cc) were challenged before the Supreme Court in a batch of writ petitions. While upholding the Amendment Act as well as L.I.C. of India Class III and IV Employees (Bonus and Dearness Allowance) Rules, 1981, the Supreme Court held in A.V. Nachane vs. Union of India ( 1982 (1) SCC 205 ) that though the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 stood excluded to the extent of any rule framed by the Central Government in terms of Section 48 (2) (cc) of the L.I.C. Act, 1956, the Amendment Act, 1981 cannot be held to be violation of Article 14. Following the said decision, it was pointed out in M. Venugopal vs. the Divisional Manager { AIR 1994 (SC) 1343 } that after the amendment to Section 48, the employees of the Corporation were not entitled to protections to which they were entitled before the coming into force of the amendment and that the amendment cannot be said to be violation of Article 14 merely on the ground that a section of the employees were deprived of the protection under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, to which they were earlier entitled. 17. Therefore, after the amendment to section 48, the role of trade unions as collective bargaining agents has been actually reduced, since the issued in terms of Section 48(2) (cc) would override even the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Once it is found that there is no procedure in the respondent – Corporation for recognition of a trade union and once it is also found that as a result of section 48 (2) (cc) and the rules issued thereunder, the role of unions as bargaining agents is reduced, there is very little space for any union of employees to reach a negotiated settlement. The talks that take place under the tag of “Information Sharing Sessions”, are really intended only for providing basic material to the Central Government to revise the terms and conditions of service of the employees of the Corporation. If viewed in this background, it will be clear that the right claimed by the petitioner to participate in the Information Sharing Sessions, is neither borne out of statute nor out of custom. It is a right that they seek to establish only under Article 14 of the Constitution. RIGHT UNDER ARTICLE 14: 18. As seen from the very prayer of the petitioner; their claim is pitched on Articles 14, 16 and 17 of the Constitution. But before examining such a claim, it must be remembered at the outset that in All India Bank Employees’ Association vs. National Industrial Tribunal { AIR 1962 SC 171 }, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that the right to form a union or association guaranteed under Article 19(1) (c) of the Constitution, does not carry with it a “concomitant right to collective bargaining”. Keeping in mind this essential principle, the question raised by the petitioner on the foundation of Article 14 has to be examined. 19. It is well settled that right to equality of treatment can be successfully defended if the classification is shown to be reasonable. The respondent –Corporation claims that they invite only the trade unions and that unlike the petitioner, the unions invited for talks, represent only one or two categories of employees. Therefore, what is to be seen is whether this classification is a reasonable classification or not. 20. It is admitted by both the petitioner and the respondent – Corporation that 10 unions are invited for the Information Sharing Sessions. In Annexure-A to the additional counter affidavit filed by the respondent-corporation, they have furnished the details such as (i) abbreviation of the union (ii) expansion of the abbreviations (iii|) the categories of employees represented by such unions and (iv) the registration number of those unions. 21. A careful perusal of the chart furnished by the respondent-Corporation in Annexure-A to the additional counter affidavit shows that some of them are Federations and some of them are unions and one of them is an Association. The chart contains the details of all the member unions with their respective registration numbers, wherever they from part of a Federation. 21. A careful perusal of the chart furnished by the respondent-Corporation in Annexure-A to the additional counter affidavit shows that some of them are Federations and some of them are unions and one of them is an Association. The chart contains the details of all the member unions with their respective registration numbers, wherever they from part of a Federation. It is only in respect of Class I employees that their body corporate is an association and not a trade union. 22. In response to the said chart filed by the respondent- Corporation, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted (i) that since an association of Class I employees, which is not a registered trade union is invited for talks, another association cannot be discriminated against and (ii) that the stand of the respondent is falsified by the fact that no invitation is extended to a trade union by name Aayul Kaapeettu Kazhaga Munnaal Ranuvathinar Thozhilalar sangam. In other words, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that if invitation is restricted only to trade unions, the association of Class I employee could not have been invited and a trade union ought not to have been omitted to be invited. 23. In so far as the first objection of the learned counsel for the petitioner is concerned, it is the stand taken by the Corporation that since Class I employees are officers who do not come under the category of workmen, the management did not expect them to have a trade union. In so far as the second objection is concerned, the trade union said to have been not invited for talks, has not taken up the matter. 24. A careful consideration of the pleadings and rival contentions show that the Corporation seeks to deprive the petitioner of the benefit of participation in the Information Sharing Sessions, on the basis of a classification. The classification made between (i) trade unions and federation of trade unions on the one hand and (ii) associations like the petitioner, appear to be a reasonable classification. Though federations by themselves may not be registered bodies, there is recognition for federations even under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The classification made between (i) trade unions and federation of trade unions on the one hand and (ii) associations like the petitioner, appear to be a reasonable classification. Though federations by themselves may not be registered bodies, there is recognition for federations even under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Therefore, in the absence of any specific rule framed in terms of Section 48 (2) of the LIC Act, 1956, there is nothing wrong in the Corporation drawing analogy from the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and inviting only trade unions and federations of trade unions. 25. Similarly, the invitation extended to the association of Class I officers, cannot be treated as a deviation, since Class I officers do not come under the category of workmen. The very definition of Trade Union under Section 2(h) of the Trade unions Act, 1926 is that it is a combination formed primarily for the purpose of regulating the relations between workmen and employers or between workmen and workmen or between employers and employers or for imposing restrictive conditions on the conduct of any trade or business and includes any federation of tow or more trade unions. Therefore, the stand taken by the Corporation that the Class I officers were not expected to have a trade union and that therefore, their association was invited, cannot be said to be an arbitrary or unreasonable attitude. The definition under Section 2(h), it is relevant to note, includes even federations. Therefore, the classification made by the respondent cannot be said to be arbitrary, unfair or unreasonable violating Article 14 of the Constitution. 26. The omission to invite one of the trade unions, indicated by the petitioners, cannot really improve the case of the petitioner. If perhaps that trade union comes up with a demand, the same may require consideration. But the fact that one of the trade unions which fall under the category entitled to be invited for talks, was not actually invited, is no ground to assail the classification itself. 27. Thus I find that the attack of the petitioner to the action of the respondent cannot be sustained even on the ground of Article 14. As pointed out earlier, there is no collective bargaining agent in the Corporation and after the amendment to Section 48, it is the Central Government which has assumed a significant role. 27. Thus I find that the attack of the petitioner to the action of the respondent cannot be sustained even on the ground of Article 14. As pointed out earlier, there is no collective bargaining agent in the Corporation and after the amendment to Section 48, it is the Central Government which has assumed a significant role. Therefore, the refusal of the Corporation to invite the petitioner for talks cannot to be held to be discriminatory. Hence, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly it is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Consequently connected miscellaneous petition is also dismissed.