Judgment M.M.Kumar, J. 1. The instant appeal under Clause X of the Letters Patent is directed against judgment dated 25.3.2010 rendered by the learned Single Judge upholding the award of the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Panipat (for brevity, the Tribunal), dated 1.12.2005. It may be appropriate to mention that the Tribunal had ordered reinstatement of the workman-respondent No. 1 with continuity of service with full back wages from the date of issuance of demand notice dated 10.10.2000. The Tribunal has also concluded that the workman-respondent No. 1 had continuously worked on the post of Typist on Deputy Commissioners rates from April 1997 to April 2000 and there was complete violation of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for brevity, the Act) while refusing his engagement. The findings of the Tribunal are discernible from the following extracts of para 9, which reads thus: "9.......Hence it clearly shows that he has worked continuously as Typist with the respondent Xen, HSAMB, Karnal as Typist on DC rate and from April, 1997 to April, 2000 when his service have been terminated wrongly by the respondent in violation of the provision of section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and even they have with-held the best evidence in their possession and had also not come to the court with clean hands by suppressing the material facts from this court while a co-official WW-1 has proved their record in favour of the workman. Even juniors to him are admittedly working with the respondent as admitted by MW-1 and admittedly, neither any notice, pay in lieu of notice and retrenchment compensation was paid to him at the time of termination. Hence there is a violation of the provision of mandatory provision of section 25-F of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 in fact, the respondent is using unfair labour practice by appointing and terminating the (Services of its several employees like Santosh Kumari, Archana and Sachin etc. who are fighting for their rights in the court. Hence the workman is entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full back wages at the rate of last drawn salary fixed by DC on April,2000 from the date of demand notice i.e. 10.10.2000......." 2. who are fighting for their rights in the court. Hence the workman is entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full back wages at the rate of last drawn salary fixed by DC on April,2000 from the date of demand notice i.e. 10.10.2000......." 2. The appellant Board challenged the award of the Tribunal before the learned Single Judge by urging that the appointment of the workman respondent No. 1 as Typist was against the statutory rules and in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. It was contended that the award of the Tribunal was not sustainable. Another ground in support of the petition raised before the learned Single Judge was that the workman-respondent No. 1 was not an employee of the Management and the Tribunal has committed an error in law by recording a finding that he worked continuously as Typist with the appellant Board. Both the arguments have been repeated before us. 3. The learned Single Judge rejected the first contention by holding that no such plea was raised in the written statement filed to the statement of claim nor any evidence was led in support of the contention. There is no argument raised before the Tribunal nor any finding could have been recorded. The learned Single Judge held that such a plea could not be raised for the first time in the writ jurisdiction. 4. A similar issued came up before Honbie the Supreme Court in the case of Harjinder Singh v. Punjab State Warehousing Corporation, 1 (2010) 3 SCC 192. In para 7 of the judgment their Lordships of Honble the Supreme Court has noticed that the learned Single Judge did not approve the award of reinstatement on the premise that initial appointment of the workman was not in consonance with the statutory rules and Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and consequently substituting the award with reinstatement with 50% back wages. The aforesaid view of the learned Single Judge did not find approval of Honbie the Supreme Court as is evident from the following extracts from para 14 of the judgment: "14.......the learned Single Judge substituted the award of reinstatement of the appellant with compensation of Rs. 87,582/- by assuming that appellant was initially appointed without complying with the equality clause enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India and the relevant regulations. 87,582/- by assuming that appellant was initially appointed without complying with the equality clause enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India and the relevant regulations. While doing so, the learned Single Judge failed to notice that in the reply filed on behalf of the corporation before the Labour Court, the appellants claim for reinstatement with back wages was not resisted on the ground that his initial appointment was illegal or unconstitutional and that neither any evidence was produced nor any argument was advanced in that regard. Therefore, the Labour Court did not get any opportunity to consider the issue whether reinstatement should be denied to the appellant by applying the new jurisprudence developed by the superior courts in recent years that the court should not pass an award which may result in perpetuation of illegality. This being the position, the learned Single Judge was not at all justified in entertaining the new plea raised on behalf of the corporation for the first time during the course of arguments and over turn an otherwise well reasoned award passed by the Labour Court and deprive the appellant of what may be the only source of his own sustenance and that of his family." 5. When the facts of the present case are examined in the light of the aforesaid principle, it could not be disputed by the learned counsel for the appellant Board that no plea with regard to violation of statutory rules or Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution was raised before the Tribunal. His only explanation is that in cross-examination the workman-respondent No. 1 was asked question with regard to his appointment which according to him are sufficient. We are unable to accept such a contention because without pleadings no evidence could built up the case as the pleadings are considered to be foundation on which case is built by adducing evidence. In the absence of foundation it is not possible to conceive the building. Therefore, the argument is wholly misconceived and is rejected. We are unable to accept such a contention because without pleadings no evidence could built up the case as the pleadings are considered to be foundation on which case is built by adducing evidence. In the absence of foundation it is not possible to conceive the building. Therefore, the argument is wholly misconceived and is rejected. The other argument does not require any detailed consideration because the workman-respondent No. 1 has produced on record sufficient evidence showing that not only he has rendered service as a Typist from April 1997 to April 2000 but he has also produced as evidence a large number of documents showing the work done by him which was initialed by the Executive Engineer of the appellant Board. There is, thus, no substance in the argument that the workman-respondent No. 1 did not prove that he had completed 240 days preceding the date of his termination. 6. As a sequel to the aforesaid discussion this appeal fails and the same is dismissed.