JUDGMENT S. J. MUKHOPADHAYA, C.J. 1. The petitioners original plaintiffs filed Regular Civil Suit No.279 of 2008 in the Court of the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Vadodara for a declaration and injunction with regard to the suit properties and mainly contended that in the suit properties, they have their undivided shares. Permanent injunction was also sought restraining the defendants from taking any action or causing any loss or damage to the shares of the plaintiffs in respect of the suit properties. 2. The aforesaid properties, in the meantime, were auction sold by original defendant No. 3, present respondent No. 3 Bank of Baroda in favour of the auction purchaser, who is the appellant in the connected Letters Patent Appeal. Said defendant No. 3 bank filed an application (Exh. 15) and requested the Court that the plaint be rejected as the suit is barred by Section 18 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993. The said application (Exh. 15) filed by the 3rd defendant bank was allowed by the learned 8th Addl. Senior Civil Judge, Vadodara by judgment and order dated 29.4.2008 observing that the suit was not maintainable. The said order was unsuccessfully challenged in appeal by the petitioners original plaintiffs. Thereafter, they preferred a writ petition before this Court in Special Civil Application No. 8452 of 2008. This Court by order dated 8/9/2008, while noticed that though the prayer made in the application (Exh. 15) was to frame a preliminary issue with respect to jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the suit, the Civil Court went a step further and also decided the issue against the plaintiffs without sufficient notice after framing the preliminary issue. Thus, the plaintiffs having not granted sufficient opportunity to represent their case, the orders dated 29/4/2008 and 30/5/2008 passed by the learned Civil Court were set aside and the Civil Court was requested to decide the question of jurisdiction as a preliminary issue after hearing both the sides afresh. Thus, the plaintiffs having not granted sufficient opportunity to represent their case, the orders dated 29/4/2008 and 30/5/2008 passed by the learned Civil Court were set aside and the Civil Court was requested to decide the question of jurisdiction as a preliminary issue after hearing both the sides afresh. Having noticed that the 3rd respondent Bank of Baroda had already proclaimed the auction for the properties in question and such auction was proposed to be held on 9/9/2008, the learned single Judge observed that though it would be open for the 3rd respondent bank to proceed further with receiving of bids and to hold the auction, no offer shall be accepted till the Civil Court decides the above question. Thereafter, the Court below heard the parties and decided the preliminary issue relating to jurisdiction of the Court to try and entertain the suit. Having noticed the rival submissions, the learned 7th Add1. Senior Civil Judge, Vadodara, observed that the suit can be decided and adjudicated by the Debts Recovery Tribunal and the plaintiffs have not challenged the order and they cannot challenge any order of the DRT and the Recovery Officer, as a third party can also file appeal against the order of the Recovery Officer and when the Recovery Certificate has been issued after completing all the procedures, it cannot be modified or effected by the suit of any third party and thereby by order dated 31.3.2009, the learned Civil Judge declared that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to try and entertain the suit and thereby ordered to return back the plaint to the plaintiffs for presentation before the proper forum. The appeal preferred against the said order in Civil Misc. Appeal No. 60 of 2009, having dismissed on 10.11.2009, the writ petition in question has been preferred by the petitioners original plaintiffs. 3. Before the learned single Judge, the auction purchaser intervened and was impleaded party respondent No. 10, who is the appellant in the connected Letters Patent Appeal. In the writ petition, the learned single Judge having observed that the petitioners have made out a prima facie case and by order dated 10.12.2009, while issuing Rule, has ordered to maintain status quo of the suit property, the auction purchaser preferred the appeal. 4. In the writ petition, the learned single Judge having observed that the petitioners have made out a prima facie case and by order dated 10.12.2009, while issuing Rule, has ordered to maintain status quo of the suit property, the auction purchaser preferred the appeal. 4. As the common issues were involved in both the writ petition and the appeal, both the cases were heard together and decided by this common judgment. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners original plaintiffs, referring to the relevant facts, would contend that the learned 7th Addl. Senior Civil Judge, Vadodara and the appellate Court erred in holding that the suit was barred under Section 18 of the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as "the RDBI Act" or "the Act"). According to him, Section 17 deals with jurisdiction of the Tribunal who shall exercise jurisdiction, powers and authority to entertain and decide applications only from banks and financial institutions, that too for recovery of debts due to such banks and financial institutions and not by third party. Section 17 further says that the Tribunal shall entertain the applications from banks and financial institutions only for recovery of debts. Therefore, a private party has no locus to initiate proceedings in the Debts Recovery Tribunal in view of Section 17. It was further contended that as the plaintiffs in the suit sought permanent relief with regard to a declaration of the properties in question and mainly prayed to declare that the properties in question are joint co-ownership of the plaintiffs, defendant Nos. 1 and 2 and 4 to 8; and further prayed that defendant Nos. 3 and 9 be restrained from disturbing the rights of the plaintiffs. Thus, the main relief is for a declaration of co-ownership and shares of the plaintiffs in the properties in question and consequential relief is against defendant No. 3 and defendant No. 9 and, therefore, the suit was maintainable. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioners original plaintiffs would further contend that return of the plaint for filing the same before the proper forum i.e. the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, amounts to transfer of a suit from a Civil Court to a Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, which is not permissible. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioners original plaintiffs would further contend that return of the plaint for filing the same before the proper forum i.e. the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, amounts to transfer of a suit from a Civil Court to a Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, which is not permissible. The plaintiffs being neither borrowers nor guarantors of the loan and the suit properties having not been mortgaged or given on security to defendant No. 3 bank, the Court below was competent to decide the claim as made in the suit. 6. Next it was contended that the suit filed against several parties is not maintainable against the 3rd defendant. In that case, the suit is definitely maintainable against the other defendants. Only consequential relief having prayed against defendant Nos. 3 and 9, the main relief in the suit is with regard to the declaration and share of the plaintiffs in the suit properties. The cause of action for filing the suit by the plaintiffs arose because the 3rd defendant started recovery proceedings qua the properties in question wherein the plaintiffs have their undivided shares. The appeal under Section 20 of the RDBI Act is not maintainable as the DRT cannot decide the question as raised in the appeal. Further, as the limitation period having been prescribed for preferring appeal, the plaintiffs cannot approach the DRT as their appeal would be time-barred. Even if it is assumed that the petitioners have a right to prefer appeal under Section 20 of the Act, the power of the appellate Court being limited, the total relief cannot be granted as sought for by the petitioners original plaintiffs. The counsel appearing on behalf of the auction purchaser (10th respondent in the writ petition) would submit that there being a remedy against the order made by the Recovery Officer before the Presiding Officer of the DRT, Ahmedabad, as per the scheme of RDBI Act, the learned single Judge ought not to have entertained the writ petition. The learned single Judge ought to have appreciated that the suit filed by the original petitioners is clearly barred under Section 18 of the RDBI Act and thereby there is no occasion to pass any interim order which amounts to stalling the proceedings under Section 19 of the RDBI Act. 7. The learned single Judge ought to have appreciated that the suit filed by the original petitioners is clearly barred under Section 18 of the RDBI Act and thereby there is no occasion to pass any interim order which amounts to stalling the proceedings under Section 19 of the RDBI Act. 7. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the 3rd defendant-bank, while supported the case of the auction purchaser, has accepted that the auction purchaser has already deposited the entire consideration amount of Rs.4.31 Crores with the Recovery Officer. The auction purchaser is a bona fide purchaser and, therefore, no order ought to have been made which would directly affect the interest of the auction purchaser. 8. In the present case, the only question required for determination is whether the suit filed by the petitioners original plaintiffs is barred under Section 18 of the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993. Section 17 of the RDBI Act relates to jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Tribunals to entertain and decide applications from the banks and financial institutions for recovery of debts due to such banks and financial institutions. Under Section 18, there is a bar on jurisdiction of all other Courts except the Supreme Court and the High Courts exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution to exercise any jurisdiction, powers or authority in relation to the matters specified in Section 17. That means there is a bar on Civil Courts to entertain such applications on behalf of the banks and financial institutions for recovery of debts due to such banks and financial institutions. 9. The aforesaid question of exclusion of jurisdiction under Section 18 of the RDBI Act fell for consideration before the Supreme Court from time to time. Having noticed the earlier decision in Nahar Industrial Enterprises Ltd. v. Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, reported in 2009 (10) SCALE 360 : (2009) 8 SCC 646 : (AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 2474), the Supreme Court observed as follows : 121. The Civil Court indisputably has the jurisdiction to try a suit. If the suit is vexatious or otherwise not maintainable action can be taken in respect thereof in terms of the Code. The Civil Court indisputably has the jurisdiction to try a suit. If the suit is vexatious or otherwise not maintainable action can be taken in respect thereof in terms of the Code. But if all suits filed in the Civil Courts, whether inextricably connected with the application filed before the DRT by the banks and financial institutions are transferred, the same would amount to ousting the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts indirectly. Suits filed by the debtor may or may not be counter claims to the claims filed by banks or financial institutions but for that purpose consent of the plaintiff is necessary. It is furthermore difficult to accept the contentions of the respondents that the statutory provisions contained in Sections 17 and 18 of the DRT Act have ousted the jurisdiction of the civil court as the said provisions clearly state that the jurisdiction of the civil court is barred in relation only to applications from banks and financial institutions for recovery of debts due to such banks and financial institutions. 122. A civil court is entitled to decide the respective claims of the parties in a suit. It must come within the purview of the hierarchy of courts as indicated in Section 3 of the Code. It will have jurisdiction to determine all disputes of civil nature unless the same is barred expressly by a statute or by necessary implication. Although some arguments have been advanced before us whether having regard to the provisions of Sections 17 and 18 of the Act the civil court jurisdiction is completely ousted, we are of the view that the jurisdiction of the civil court would be ousted only in respect of the matters connected in Section 18 which has a direct co- relation with Section 17 thereof, that is to say that the matter must relate to a debt payable to a bank or a financial institution. The application before the Tribunal would lie only at the instance of the bank or the financial institution for the recovery of its debt. It must further be noted in this respect that had the jurisdiction of the civil courts been barred in respect of counterclaim also, the statute would have said so and Sections 17 and 18 would have been amended to introduce the provision of counterclaim. It must further be noted in this respect that had the jurisdiction of the civil courts been barred in respect of counterclaim also, the statute would have said so and Sections 17 and 18 would have been amended to introduce the provision of counterclaim. We may in this context place on record the following observations from Indian Bank v. ABS Marine Products Pvt. Ltd., AIR 2006 SC 1899 . 10. Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the courts shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature, excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. It is evident from Sections 17 and 18 of the Debts Recovery Act that civil courts jurisdiction is barred only in regard to applications by a bank or a financial institution for recovery of its debts. The jurisdiction of civil courts is not barred in regard to any suit filed by a borrower or any other person against a bank for any relief. 11. What is significant is that Sections 17 and 18 have not been amended. Jurisdiction has not been conferred on the Tribunal, even after amendment, to try independent suits or proceedings initiated by borrowers or others against banks/financial institutions, nor the jurisdiction of civil courts barred in regard to such suits or proceedings. 130. The Act, although, was enacted for a specific purpose but having regard to the exclusion of jurisdiction expressly provided for in Sections 17 and 18 of the Act, it is difficult to hold that a civil courts jurisdiction is completely ousted. Indisputably the banks and financial institutions for the purpose of enforcement of their claim for a sum below Rs.10 lakhs would have to file civil suits before the civil courts. It is only for the claims of the banks and the financial institutions above the aforementioned sum that they have to approach the Debt Recovery Tribunal. 131. It is also without any cavil that the banks and financial institutions, keeping in view the provisions of Sections 17 and 18 of the Act, are necessarily required to file their claim petitions before the Tribunal. The converse is not true. 132. Debtors can file their claims of set off or counter-claims only when a claim application is filed and not otherwise. The converse is not true. 132. Debtors can file their claims of set off or counter-claims only when a claim application is filed and not otherwise. Even in a given situation the banks and/or the financial institutions can ask the Tribunal to pass an appropriate order for getting the claims of set-off or the counter claims, determined by a civil court. The Tribunal is not a high powered tribunal. It is a one man Tribunal. Unlike some Special Acts, as for example Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 it does not contain a deeming provision that the Tribunal would be deemed to be a civil court. 133. The liabilities and rights of the parties have not been created under the Act. Only a new forum has been created. The banks and the financial institutions cannot approach the Tribunal unless the debt has become due. In such a contingency, indisputably a civil suit would lie. 134. There is a possibility that the debtor may file preemptive suits and obtain orders of injunction, but the same alone, in our opinion, by itself cannot be held to be a ground to completely oust the jurisdiction of the civil court in the teeth of Section 9 of the Code. Recourse to the other provisions of the Code will have to be resorted to for redressal of his individual grievances. 135. It is also difficult to accept the contention of learned counsel for the banks that the civil courts jurisdiction is not in consonance with the Act. We do not find the same to be correct. 136. On the ground of inconsistency in the procedures contained in the two Acts alone, the jurisdiction of the civil court cannot be said to have been ousted. In the present case, the plaintiffs have prayed for reliefs, English version of which are quoted hereunder : 12(A). Your Honour may be pleased to declare that 3 immovable properties namely (1) 48, Alkapuri, Lock No. 19, Ward No. 10, Vadodara, (2) 38, Nutan Bharat Society, Wadi, Vadodara and (3) Narsinh Bhuvan, Chittekhani Gully, Gendi Gate Road, Mandvi, Vadodara as well as the movable properties lying in the said properties, are ancestral joint properties of the plaintiffs and defendant Nos. 1, 2 and 4 to 8, and also declare that in the said properties there is a share, right and title of the plaintiffs and declare that defendant Nos. 1, 2 and 4 to 8, and also declare that in the said properties there is a share, right and title of the plaintiffs and declare that defendant Nos. 3 and 9 have no right to disturb the right of the plaintiffs in the abovementioned properties. 12(B). By passing a permanent injunction the defendants may kindly be restrained from taking any action causing any loss or damage to the share of the plaintiffs in respect of the suit properties. The first portion of the prayer made in para 12(A) aforesaid, relates to a declaration that the plaintiffs and the concerned defendant Nos. 1, 2 and 4 to 8 have shares, right and title on the suit properties in question. The bank cannot file any application under Section 17 for such declaration nor the DRT can entertain or decide such application under Section 17 of the RDBI Act. In view of such prayer made in the first portion of para 12(A) of the plaint with regard to declaration of share, right and title, in view of Section 17 of the Act and the decision of the Supreme Court in Nahar Industrial Enterprises Ltd. v. Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 2474) and referred to above, we hold that the Debts Recovery Tribunal has no jurisdiction, power and authority to entertain and decide the aforesaid issue either at the instance of the bank or the petitioners original plaintiffs. The learned 7th Addl. Senior Civil Judge, Vadodara and the Appellate Court in Civil Misc. Appeal No. 60 of 2009, erred in holding that the total suit including the relief sought for in the first portion of para 12(A) relating to declaration of share, title and interest in the suit properties in question, is barred under Section 18 of the Act. So far as the declaration that defendant Nos. 3 and 9 have no right to disturb the right of the plaintiffs in the aforesaid properties and the prayer for permanent injunction as sought for in para 12(B) of the plaint are concerned, whether the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to decide the same, one should notice the relevant provisions under the RDBI Act, 1993. 12. Section 19 relates to application to the Tribunal preferred by a bank or a financial institution for recovery of any debt from any person. 12. Section 19 relates to application to the Tribunal preferred by a bank or a financial institution for recovery of any debt from any person. On receipt of such application, the Tribunal is required to issue summons to the defendant to show cause and after hearing, including counter claim, if any, filed by the defendant or the claim to set off against the applicants demand, the Tribunal may make an interim order, whether by way of injunction or stay or attachment against the defendant to debar him from transferring, alienating or otherwise dealing with, or disposing of, any property and assets belonging to him without prior permission on the Tribunal and finally decide the claim and the counter claim. After final order is passed by the Tribunal, the Presiding Officer issues a certificate under his signature on the basis of the order of the Tribunal to the Recovery Officer for recovery of the amount of debt specified in the certificate. Chapter V of the RDBI Act deals with recovery of debt determined by the Tribunal. Under Section 25, the Recovery Officer on receipt of the copy of the certificate under sub-section (7) of Section 19 is required to proceed to recover the amount of debt specified in the certificate by one or more modes, namely (a) attachment and sale of the movable or immovable property of the defendant, (b) arrest of the defendant and his detention in prison and (c) appointing a receiver for the management of the movable or immovable properties of the defendant. Any person aggrieved by an order made by the Recovery Officer under the Act has a right to prefer appeal under Section 30 of the RDBI Act. Similarly, any person aggrieved against the order made or deemed to have been made by the Tribunal under the Act can prefer an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal having jurisdiction in the matter under Section 20 of the RDBI Act. As the Recovery Officer passes order on behalf of the DRT for attachment and sale of movable and immovable properties of the defendant under Section 25, the said order is deemed to have been passed by the DRT under Section 19 of the RDBI Act. Under Section 18, no Court or other authority have or is entitled to exercise any jurisdiction, power or authority in relation to the matters specified in Section 17. Under Section 18, no Court or other authority have or is entitled to exercise any jurisdiction, power or authority in relation to the matters specified in Section 17. As the attachment and sale of the property for recovery of the amount of debt is made by the Tribunal, in view of the power delegated under Section 17 of the Act, we hold that against such action of the DRT or the order passed by the Recovery Officer at the instance of the DRT, no suit is maintainable before a Civil Court in view of the bar of jurisdiction under Section 18. For the said reason, we hold that in the present case the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to declare that the 3rd respondent had no right to disturb the right of the plaintiffs in the aforesaid properties nor could have passed a permanent injunction on the 3rd respondent restraining it from taking any action causing loss or damage to the share of the plaintiffs in respect of the suit properties as sought for para 12(B) of the plaint. 13. However, it is open to the Civil Court to pass appropriate injunction on other defendant Nos. 1, 2 and 4 to 8 including the prayer as sought for in para 12(B) of the plaint. 14. The learned 7th Addl. Senior Civil Judge, Vadodara in Regular Civil Suit No. 279 of 2008 and the Appellate Court in Civil Misc. Appeal No. 60 of 2009, having failed to notice the aforesaid facts and erred in coming to the conclusion that the total suit was barred under Section 18 of the RDBI Act, we have no other option but to set aside the impugned orders dated 31/3/2009 and 10/11/2009 and direct the Court below to decide the suit, vis-a-vis defendant Nos. 1, 2 and 4 to 8, we having held the suit not maintainable against defendant No. 3 so far as the relief sought for in the suit. The order of status quo passed by the learned single Judge stands vacated. This order shall not stand in the way of the petitioners original plaintiffs to prefer appeal under Section 20 against the order of auction, if any, passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal or to prefer any case challenging the auction sale under Rule 60 of the Second Schedule of the Income-tax Act, 1961 read with Section 29 of the RDBI Act, 1993. The writ petition, Letters Patent Appeal, Civil Application and the Misc. Civil Application stand disposed of, but in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs. Order accordingly.