Judgment Rakesh Kumar Jain, J. 1. This is an application filed under Section 482 read with Section 31 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short Cr.P.C.) in a decided Criminal Revision with a prayer that the sentence awarded by the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Fatehabad (hereinafter referred to as the Magistrate) vide her order dated 05.04.2005 in the same trial for different offences, which has been upheld upto the High Court, may be ordered to run concurrently as the total sentence awarded would be more than 14 years which would be contrary to Section 31(2)(b) of the Cr.P.C. 2. In order to unfold the controversy, a few skeletal facts are required to be noticed. The applicant was tried for the offences committed under Sections 409/420/467/468/471 of the Indian Penal Code (for short the Code) in a case registered vide FIR No.292 dated 30.07.1996 at Police Station Ratia, District Fatehabad. The Magistrate vide her order dated 05.04.2005 held the applicant guilty for committing offences punishable under Sections 409/420/467/468/471 of the Code and by her separate order of the even date, the applicant was sentenced as under:- i) Under Section 409 IPC For 3 years with fine of Rs.2,000/- In default of payment of fine further R.1 of 6 months ii) Under Section 420 IPC For 3 years with fine of Rs.2,000/- In default of payment of fine further R.1. of 6 months iii) Under Section 467 IPC For 3 years with fine of Rs.2,000/- In default of payment of fine further R.1. of 6 months iv) Under Section 468 IPC For 3 years with fine of Rs.2,000/- In default of payment of fine further R.1. of 6 months v) Under Section 471 IPC For 3 years with fine of Rs.2,000/- In default of payment of fine further R.1. of 6 months 3. Admittedly, the Magistrate ordered the period already spent by the applicant in custody to set off against the sentence awarded but it was not ordered that the aforesaid sentence shall run concurrently which otherwise would mean that the sentence would run consecutively. The applicant challenged the order of the Magistrate dated 05.04.2005 by way of Criminal Appeal No.10 but admittedly, he did not make a prayer for making the sentence, awarded by the Magistrate under the various provisions of the Code to run concurrently nor it was argued before the Appellate Court. The applicant challenged the order of the Magistrate dated 05.04.2005 by way of Criminal Appeal No.10 but admittedly, he did not make a prayer for making the sentence, awarded by the Magistrate under the various provisions of the Code to run concurrently nor it was argued before the Appellate Court. Consequently, no order was passed in this regard when the appeal was dismissed. 4. Still aggrieved, the applicant filed Criminal Revision No.1157 of 2008 before this Court against the order of the Courts below and interestingly in the grounds of revision, the prayer for ordering the sentence to run concurrently was conspicuous by its absence nor any prayer in this regard was made even at the time of arguments. The said revision petition was dismissed by this Court in limine vide its order dated 10.07.2008, which has not been further challenged by the applicant and thus, had attained finality. On 12.7.2010, the present application has been filed in which, for the first time, prayer is made to order the sentence awarded by the Magistrate on 05.04.2005, which has been confirmed upto the High Court, to run concurrently. 5. Notice in the application was issued to the State of Haryana and after their appearance both the learned counsel for the parties have been heard. 6. Learned counsel for the applicant has very fairly conceded that upto the conclusion of the proceedings in Criminal Revision before this Court, no prayer was made by the applicant for ordering the sentence awarded by the Magistrate under various provisions of the Code, in the same trial, to run concurrently. However, it is argued that the applicant has been sentenced to undergo R.I. for 3 years each under five provisions of the Code which comes to 15 years. But the sentence, as per Section 31(2)(a) of the Cr.P.C. cannot be more than 14 years and according to Section 31(2)(b) of the Cr.P.C. the aggregate punishment could not exceed twice the amount of punishment which the Court is competent to inflict for a single offence. He further submits that as per Section 29(2) of the Cr.P.C, a Magistrate has the jurisdiction to award sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 years and in view thereof as per Section 31(2)(b), the sentence cannot be more than six years. He further submits that as per Section 29(2) of the Cr.P.C, a Magistrate has the jurisdiction to award sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 years and in view thereof as per Section 31(2)(b), the sentence cannot be more than six years. It is further submitted that the duty of the Court is to pass sentence in consonance with the mandatory provisions of law and as it is an error apparent on the face of record that the sentence of 3 years R.I. awarded by the Magistrate under five separate provisions of the Code is not made in her order to run concurrently, this Court has the jurisdiction to pass an appropriate order in its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to prevent the abuse of law and to secure the ends of justice. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the applicant has relied upon decision of this Court in the case of "Rajwant Singh v. The State of Punjab and another", 1990(1) Recent Criminal Reports 540 (S.B.), "Rai Singh v. State of Haryana" 1974 Chandigarh Law Reporter 490 (S.B.), "Pargat Singh v. The State of Punjab", 1991(1) R.C.R. (Criminal) 199 (D.B.), "Bhima Shankar v. State of Karnataka", 2004(4) R.C.R. (Criminal) 284 (S.B.), "Mohd. Madar Saheb, Convict No.892 v. State of A.P. and another" 2003(3) R.C.R. Criminal 715 (S.B.), "Smt. Sooraj Devi v. Pyare Lal and another", A.I.R. 1981 Supreme Court 736. 7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State has filed an affidavit of Jaidev Bishnoi, Superintendent Central Jail, Hissar dated 14.10.2010 in order to apprise the actual sentence having been suffered by the applicant as on that date. The relevant part of the affidavit is reproduced as under:- That the period undergone by the petitioner as on 14.10.2010 as under:- Y M D (i) Undertrial period 30.08.1996 to 19.10.1996 28.07.2000 to 29.09.2000 & 07.10.2002 to 08.10.2002 00 03 22 (ii) Conviction period 05.04.2008 to 14.10.2010 02 06 09 Total 02 10 01 (iii) Details of overstay/absent from parole/furlough:- Nil (iv) Parole availed Nil (v) Actual sentence undergone 02 10 01 3. Detail of Parole/furlough Nil 4. Detail of other Criminal cases:- Nil 8. Detail of Parole/furlough Nil 4. Detail of other Criminal cases:- Nil 8. Learned counsel for the State has submitted that as per Section 31(1) of the Cr.P.C, if a Court has not made the sentence to run concurrently in its order, it would automatically mean to run consecutively and since the applicant did not challenge this part of the sentence before all the three Courts, namely, during trial, appeal and revision, he is not entitled to file application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. for passing of this order after this Court has become functus officio. He, however, submits that such an application could have been filed had the proceedings been continuing. In support of his submissions, he has relied upon Section 362 of the Cr.P.C and also a Full Bench judgment of this Court in the case of "Jang Singh v. State of Punjab", 2008(1) R.C.R. (Criminal) 323, a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of "M.R. Kudva v. State of Andhra Pradesh" 2007(1) R.C.R. (Criminal) 868, "Naresh and others v. State of U.P." A.I.R. 1981 Supreme Court 1385 and "Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa and others", A.I.R. 2001 Supreme Court 43. 9. Before referring to the respective submissions, it would be worthwhile to mention the relevant provisions of law which have been invoked by both the learned counsel for the parties: "29. Sentences which Magistrates may pass.- (1) The Court of a Chief Judicial Magistrate may pass any sentence authorised by law except a sentence of death or of imprisonment for life or of imprisonment for a term exceeding seven years. (2) The Court of a Magistrate of the first class may pass a sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years, or of fine not exceeding five thousand rupees, or of both. (3) The Court of a Magistrate of the second class may pass a sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year, or of fine not exceeding one thousand rupees, or of both. (4) The Court of a Chief Metropolitan Magistrate shall have the powers of the Court of a Chief Judicial Magistrate and that of a Metropolitan Magistrate, the powers of the Court of a Magistrate of the first class. 31. (4) The Court of a Chief Metropolitan Magistrate shall have the powers of the Court of a Chief Judicial Magistrate and that of a Metropolitan Magistrate, the powers of the Court of a Magistrate of the first class. 31. Sentence in cases of conviction of several offences at one trial.- (1) When a person is convicted at one trial of two or more offences, the Court may, subject to the provisions of section 71 of the Indian Penal Code, (45 of 1860) sentence him for such offences, to the several punishments prescribed therefor which such Court is competent to inflict; such punishments when consisting of imprisonment to commence the one after the expiration of the other in such order as the Court may direct, unless the Court directs that such punishments shall run concurrently. (2) In the case of consecutive sentences, it shall not be necessary for the Court by reason only of the aggregate punishment for the several offences being in excess of the punishment which it is competent to inflict on conviction of a single offence, to send the offender for trial before a higher Court: Provided that- (a) in no case shall such person be sentenced to imprisonment for a longer period than fourteen years; (b) the aggregate punishment shall not exceed twice the amount of punishment which the Court is competent to inflict for a single offence. (3) For the purpose of appeal by a convicted person, the aggregate of the consecutive sentences passed against him under this section shall be deemed to be a single sentence. 362. Court not to alter judgment:- Save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, no Court, when it has signed its judgment or order disposing of a case, shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error. 482. 362. Court not to alter judgment:- Save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, no Court, when it has signed its judgment or order disposing of a case, shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error. 482. Saving of inherent powers of High Court:- Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice." 10 From the bare reading of Section 29(2) of the Cr.P.C, it is clear that Magistrate of First Class could pass a sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years. In the present case, the Judicial Magistrate 1st Class has awarded the sentence under five different provisions of the Code for a term not exceeding 3 years. Section 31(1) of the Cr.P.C. provides that if a person is convicted at one trial for two or more offences, the Court may sentence for such offences, which the Court has the competence to inflict and such punishments to commence one after the expiration of the other in such order as the Court may direct unless the Court directs that such punishment shall run concurrently. Section 31(1) of the Cr.P.C. means that punishment for more than one offence in one trial would run consecutively as a rule with an exception to be made to run concurrently by an order. In the present case, the applicant has been convicted in one trial for five offences under the Code and has been sentenced separately but the order of sentence is silent either with regard to the sentence to run consecutively or to run concurrently. The presumption is that the sentence would run consecutively because in order to run the sentence concurrently, the Court is required to pass a specific order which has not been apparently passed in the present case. Section 31(2)(a) of the Cr.P.C. provides that in no case the sentence of imprisonment could be for a period of more than 14 years. The presumption is that the sentence would run consecutively because in order to run the sentence concurrently, the Court is required to pass a specific order which has not been apparently passed in the present case. Section 31(2)(a) of the Cr.P.C. provides that in no case the sentence of imprisonment could be for a period of more than 14 years. In the present case, there is a clear violation of Section 31(2)(a) because the total sentence awarded to the applicant under five different provisions of the Code would come to 15 years in aggregate. Section 31(2)(b) of the Cr.P.C. provides that the aggregate punishment shall not exceed twice the amount of punishment which the Court is competent to inflict for a single offence. In the present case, the order of sentence is in violation of Section 31(2)(b) of the Cr.P.C. because as per Section 29(2) of the Cr.P.C, the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class is competent to award punishment upto 3 years and according to Section 31(2)(b) of the Cr.P.C. he can not award punishment twice the amount of punishment for which he is competent to inflict for a single offence. Meaning thereby, the aggregate punishment under Section 31(2)(b) could be 6 years and not beyond that. 11. Indubitably, there is a single transaction rule for concurrent sentence but the question is whether this Court has got the jurisdiction under Section 482 read with Section 31 of the Cr.P.C to pass this order after the order passed in Criminal Revision by this Court has attained finality or in other words whether this Court does not have the jurisdiction in view of Section 362 of the Cr.P.C. to review its order? 12. In order to maintain the application filed under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C, the first judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant is in the case of Rai Singh (supra). In the said case, the petitioner along with three other accused was convicted in a case under Section 61(1)(a) of the Punjab Excise Act. Their appeal was dismissed. The petitioner, filed Revision Petition namely, Criminal Revision No.376 of 1974 which was dismissed in limine. The other co-accused filed Revision Petitions bearing Nos.422 and 433 of 1974 which were admitted. In the said case, the petitioner along with three other accused was convicted in a case under Section 61(1)(a) of the Punjab Excise Act. Their appeal was dismissed. The petitioner, filed Revision Petition namely, Criminal Revision No.376 of 1974 which was dismissed in limine. The other co-accused filed Revision Petitions bearing Nos.422 and 433 of 1974 which were admitted. In this background an application was filed by the petitioner, whose Criminal Revision No.376 of 1974 was dismissed in limine for recalling of the said order and to hear the said revision petition along with other admitted petitions. This Court, allowed the said application filed under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. observing thus: "Section 362 of the Cr.P.C. does not in any manner limit the powers of the High Court to be exercised under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C." 13. In nutshell, the order passed earlier dismissing the revision petition in limine was recalled and the said revision petition was ordered to be heard with the admitted revision petitions filed by the co-accused. In the case of Rajwant Singh (supra) accused was convicted and sentenced under Sections 326 and 324 of the IPC but the sentence was not made to run concurrently. Later on, a miscellaneous application was filed under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. which was simply allowed by this Court without referring to the provisions of Section 362 of the Cr.P.C. and it was ordered that the sentence awarded would run concurrently and not consecutively. In the case of Pargat Singh (supra) for the double murder of Hazara Singh and Rameshwar Singh and an attempt to murder of two other persons namely, Natha Singh and Jagdish Parshad, Pargat Singh and Jagraj Singh were convicted and sentenced to death. They were also sentenced to undergo 4 years R.I. under sections 307/34 of the IPC and Jagraj Singh was further sentenced to suffer R.I. of 2 years under Section 404 of the IPC. In appeal and reference made for confirmation of death sentence, death sentence against Pargat Singh was confirmed but death sentence of Jagraj Singh was converted into life imprisonment and the remaining sentence awarded by the trial Court was maintained. The Supreme Court, however, converted the death sentence of Pargat Singh also into life imprisonment. In appeal and reference made for confirmation of death sentence, death sentence against Pargat Singh was confirmed but death sentence of Jagraj Singh was converted into life imprisonment and the remaining sentence awarded by the trial Court was maintained. The Supreme Court, however, converted the death sentence of Pargat Singh also into life imprisonment. After the final decision of the Apex Court, an application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. was filed before this Court in which a prayer was made that sentence of imprisonment awarded on various accounts may be made to run concurrently. The Division Bench of this High Court observed that there is a divergence of opinion about the use of inherent powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. for altering the sentence in view of Section 362 of the Cr.P.C. after the disposal of the appeal by the Apex Court. However, the Division Bench had observed that the case in hand was covered by Section 427(2) of the Cr.P.C. as both the applicant/convict were awarded life imprisonment and according to Section 427(2) any other sentence would automatically run with the previous sentence as there cannot be any sentence more than life imprisonment. Thus, the Division Bench had termed its order to be a "clarification" in terms of Section 427(2) of the Cr.P.C. and not an alteration or review. In the case of Bhima Shankar (supra), the Karnataka High Court had held that though Section 362 of the Cr.P.C. preclude the Court from varying the earlier order but the Court cannot shut its eyes to the overriding considerations namely, the interests of justice and the fact that this would be an appropriate case where the inherent powers of the High Court can be invoked. Thus, it was clarified that since it is obligatory on the part of the Courts while imposing multiple sentences to specify as to whether the sentences should be concurrent or consecutive because in the absence of such a direction it shall be presumed that the Court intended the sentences to run consecutively. However, in the said case, the Court while invoking its inherent jurisdiction passed the orders de hors the provisions of Section 362 of the Cr.P.C. or law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Hari Singh Mann (supra). In the case of Mohd. However, in the said case, the Court while invoking its inherent jurisdiction passed the orders de hors the provisions of Section 362 of the Cr.P.C. or law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Hari Singh Mann (supra). In the case of Mohd. Madar Saheb, Convict No.892 (supra) an application was filed under Section 482 read with Section 427 of the Cr.P.C. for the purpose of making the sentences to run concurrently in different cases. The said application was allowed on the ground that it is the duty of the Court to see that order of sentence passed is not in violation of the mandatory provisions of the Cr.P.C. Lastly, in the case of Smt. Sooraj Devi (supra), the Supreme Court has defined the meaning of clerical and arithmetical error. It is held that clerical or arithmetical error is an error occasioned by the accidental slip or omission of the Court. The arithmetical error is a mistake of calculation and a clerical error is a mistake in writing or typing. 14. On the other hand, Full Bench of this Court in the case of Jang Singh (supra) was dealing with the case where the applicant was convicted in two different FIRs. He filed the application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. for ordering the sentence awarded in both the cases to run concurrently. The question arose as to whether after the conclusion of the proceedings the court has the jurisdiction to pass such an order. The Full Bench authoritatively held that "if the trial Court does not pass any such direction for making the sentences to run concurrently and appeal or revision against said decision is also decided, then it may not be open for a person to seek such direction for making the sentences to run concurrently by moving an application under Section 482/427 Cr.P.C." In the case of Naresh and others (supra), the High Court, after pronouncing its judgment in the Criminal Appeal, altered a conviction under Section 302 of the Code to Section 304 of the Code by ostensibly exercising its power to correct clerical errors but ignoring Section 362 of Cr.P.C. In this regard, the Supreme Court has observed that "we are afraid we have to voice our grave concern and express our serious displeasure at the course of events in the High Court in the present case. We consider it our duty to do. We are not a little disturbed by what has been done in the High Court". In the case of Hari Singh Mann (supra), the Supreme Court was very critical of the orders having been passed by the High Court on an application filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C for passing fresh orders in a case which was already decided. The relevant portion of the observation of the Supreme Court are as under:- "We have noted with disgust that the impugned orders were passed completely ignoring the basic principles of criminal law. No review of an order is contemplated under the Code of Criminal Procedure. After the disposal of the main petition on 7.1.1999, there was no lis pending in the High Court wherein the respondent could have filed any miscellaneous petition." "The practice of filing miscellaneous petitions after the disposal of the main case and issuance of fresh directions in such miscellaneous petitions by the High Court are unwarranted, not referable to any statutory provision and in substance the abuse of the process of the court." "There is no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure authorising the High Court to review the judgment passed either in exercise of its appellate or revisional or original criminal jurisdiction. Such a power cannot be exercised with the aid or under the cloak of Section 482 of the Code." "Section 362 of the Code mandates that no Court, when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a case shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error. The Section is based on an acknowledged principle of law that once a matter is finally disposed of by a Court, the said Court in the absence of a specific statutory provision becomes functus officio and disentitled to entertain a fresh prayer for the same relief unless the former order of final disposal is set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction in a manner prescribed by law." 15. Finally, in the case of MR Kucha (supra), the Supreme Court had observed as under:- "However, in this case the provision of Section 427 of the Code was not invoked in the original cases or in the appeals. A separate application was filed before the High Court after the special leave petitions were dismissed. Finally, in the case of MR Kucha (supra), the Supreme Court had observed as under:- "However, in this case the provision of Section 427 of the Code was not invoked in the original cases or in the appeals. A separate application was filed before the High Court after the special leave petitions were dismissed. Such an application, in our opinion, was not maintainable. The High Court could not have exercised its inherent jurisdiction in a case of this nature as it had not exercised such jurisdiction while passing the judgments in appeal. Section 482 of the Code was, therefore, not an appropriate remedy having regard to the fact that neither the Trial Judge, nor the High Court while passing the judgments of conviction and sentence indicated that the sentences passed against the appellant in both the cases shall run concurrently or Section 427 would be attracted. The said provision, therefore, could not be applied in a separate and independent proceeding by the High Court." 16. It is clear from the resume of the facts of this case, provisions of law and also various judgments relied upon by both the counsel for the parties that at no point of time i.e. at the time of sentence by the Magistrate, in appeal or in revision the question of sentence to run concurrently was raked up by the appellant. It is also no doubt true that the Magistrate, 1 st Class cannot inflict sentence more than double the amount of his competence as per section 31(2)(b) of the Cr.P.C. and also the sentence which has been awarded cannot be more than 14 years in view of section 31(2)(a) of the Cr.P.C. but It is equally true that as per Section 362 of the Cr.P.C the Court, after passing of the order which has been signed by it cannot alter or review the same except for correcting clerical or arithmetical error. In the present case, prayer made by way of miscellaneous application under Section 482 of the Cr.PC for passing of an order to make the sentence run concurrently does not fall in the exception of Section 362 of the Cr.P.C as it would be a substantive order. In the present case, prayer made by way of miscellaneous application under Section 482 of the Cr.PC for passing of an order to make the sentence run concurrently does not fall in the exception of Section 362 of the Cr.P.C as it would be a substantive order. The Supreme Court has very strongly observed in the case of Hari Singh Mann (supra) about the jurisdiction of the Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C to review or alter the judgment or final order which has been signed by the concerned Court. 17. In view of the above discussion, I am of the view that the application filed under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. before this Court in the decided Revision Petition for passing an order which was not passed earlier is not maintainable. As a matter of fact, the remedy lies elsewhere. In view thereof, the present application is dismissed, however, without any order as to costs.