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2010 DIGILAW 2945 (ALL)

VIJAI PAL v. STATE OF U. P.

2010-09-23

ASHOK BHUSHAN, D.K.ARORA, S.K.SINGH

body2010
JUDGMENT Hon’ble Ashok Bhushan, J.—This Full Bench has been constituted to answer following two questions referred by the Division Bench hearing this writ petition. (1) Whether the directions contained in Savitri Devi’s case in the nature of a general mandamus are in direct conflict with the ratio of Kanchchid’s case reported in 1999 (3) AWC 1978 (DB). (2) Whether the High Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India while interpreting Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act can confer the power on the Collector to refer a dispute under Section 18 even if it is barred by limitation. 2. We have heard Shri Y.D. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, Shri M.C. Chaturvedi, Chief Standing Counsel assisted by Shri Govind Saxena, Additional Chief Standing Counsel and Dr. Y.K. Srivastava, learned Standing Counsel for the respondents. 3. The facts as emerge from the pleadings in the writ petition may briefly be noted for appreciating the issues which have arisen for consideration by this Full Bench. 4. The land of the petitioner was subject to notification under Section 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, (hereinafter called the “Act, 1894”), which notifications were respectively issued on 26.9.1981 and 10.10.1981. An award by Special Land Acquisition Officer was announced on 26.7.1982. The petitioner’s case in the writ petition is that land of several farmers adjoining to the village was acquired for the same project and on filing the reference, the compensation had been enhanced by the District Judge, Bulandshahr. When the petitioner came to know about the enhancement of the compensation he filed an application under Section 18 of the Act, before the Collector on 11.2.2000. It was also stated in the application that when the petitioner came to know about the distribution of compensation, he obtained compensation under protest. The Special Land Acquisition Officer, vide order dated 2.7.2003, rejected the application for reference as barred by time. It was observed that reference application has been filed after 18 years, which does not deserve to be referred to the Court. The writ petition was filed by the petitioner challenging the aforesaid order dated 2.7.2003, and a writ of mandamus has also been prayed directing the respondents to make the reference under Section 18 of the Act to the District Judge, Bulandshahr. The writ petition was filed by the petitioner challenging the aforesaid order dated 2.7.2003, and a writ of mandamus has also been prayed directing the respondents to make the reference under Section 18 of the Act to the District Judge, Bulandshahr. A supplementary affidavit was filed in the writ petition stating that no notice was served on the petitioner under Section 12 (2) of the Act, and the award was not published in the well known newspapers. It was stated in the affidavit that the petitioner came to know about the award on 23.1. 2000, and the application for reference was filed on 11.2.2000. The writ petition was heard by the Division Bench before whom it was contended that the Collector ought not have rejected the reference application, and the reference should have been made to the Court who alone was competent to decide as to whether the reference was barred by time or not. It was contended before the Division Bench that the Collector had no jurisdiction to reject the application. Reliance was placed on the Division Bench judgment of this Court in Smt. Savitri Devi v. State of U.P. and others, Writ Petition No. 44080/2003, decided on 30.9.2003, where the Division Bench of this Court had issued a general mandamus directing that whenever there is a dispute regarding limitation, the Collector shall adjudicate the same and refer it to the Court as contemplated under Section 18 of the Act, even if such authority comes to the conclusion that it is time barred. The Division Bench after hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner and noticing an earlier Division Bench judgment in Kanchchid v. State of U.P. and others, 1999 (3) AWC 1978, where the Division Bench took the view that when the application for Reference has not been made within the prescribed time, then the Collector will not have power to make Reference, took the view that there is apparent conflict by the Division Bench in Kanchchid’s case (supra) and the subsequent Division Bench judgment in Smt. Savitri Devi’s case (supra). It was further noticed that Kanchchid’s case (supra) has not been noticed by the Division Bench deciding Smt. Savitri Devi’s case. The Division Bench further took the view that by issuing general mandamus issued in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court cannot create or enlarge the jurisdiction of the Collector. It was further noticed that Kanchchid’s case (supra) has not been noticed by the Division Bench deciding Smt. Savitri Devi’s case. The Division Bench further took the view that by issuing general mandamus issued in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court cannot create or enlarge the jurisdiction of the Collector. Expressing its disagreement with the view taken by the Division Bench in Smt. Savitri Devi’s case (supra) the Division Bench referred the above noted two questions to be answered by larger bench. 5. Before proceeding to answer the above two questions, it is necessary to refer to the facts and ratio of both the Division Bench cases i.e. Kanchchid’s case (supra) and Smt. Savitri Devi’s case (supra). In Kanchchid’s case (supra), the application filed under Section 18 (1) was rejected by the Collector as barred by limitation. Notice under Section 12 (2) of the Act, was served on the petitioner on 2.2.1992 and the award was issued on 25.10.1991. The application for reference was made on 18.8.1992, alleging that the petitioner came to know about the award on 7.8.1992. An application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, for condonation of delay was also filed. The reference application was rejected with the finding that notice having been served on 2.2. 1992, the application for reference was beyond time. A submission was made before the Division Bench that the Collector lacked jurisdiction in rejecting the application and it was for the District Judge to consider whether the reference application was barred by limitation or not. The above submission was refuted on behalf of the State stating that such reference was barred by limitation, Collector could not have referred the matter to the District Judge for adjudication. The Division Bench after referring to several judgments of the Apex Court held that if an application for Reference is not made within the prescribed time, then the Collector will have no jurisdiction to make reference. Following was laid down by the Division Bench in paragraph 7 which is quoted below: “7. The Division Bench after referring to several judgments of the Apex Court held that if an application for Reference is not made within the prescribed time, then the Collector will have no jurisdiction to make reference. Following was laid down by the Division Bench in paragraph 7 which is quoted below: “7. We are thus of the considered view that the law in this regard has been categorically laid down by the Supreme Court that if an application for Reference is not made within the prescribed time, then the Collector will have no jurisdiction to make Reference and in order to determine the limitation on his powers, the Collector will have to decide whether the application presented by the claimant is or is not within time.” 6. In Smt. Savitri Devis’ case (supra) award was made on 2.7.2001, and the petitioner claims that no notice under Section 12 (2) of the Act, was issued to him. The petitioner claims that for the first time he acquired knowledge of the award on 11.7.2002, and an application for reference was made on 18.7.2002, under Section 18 of the Act. The application was rejected by the Special Land Acquisition Officer on 2.6.2003, on the ground that it was time barred as it was filed beyond six months of the date of the award. The Division Bench took the view that the Special Land Acquisition Officer, did not advert to the question as to what is the meaning of the word “Date of award”. The Division Bench held that the date of the award would mean “ The date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by the party whether actually or constructively.” The Division Bench quashed the order of the Special Land Acquisition Officer dated 2.6.2003. After quashing the order of the Special Land Acquisition Officer dated 2.6.2003, the Division Bench noticed that against an order passed under Section 18 of the Act, rejecting an application for reference there is no right of appeal provided. The Division Bench made an observation that Section 18 of the Act, does not contemplate passing of an order by Special Land Acquisition Officer, on the reference petition or to decide it either way if the same is barred by time. The Division Bench made an observation that Section 18 of the Act, does not contemplate passing of an order by Special Land Acquisition Officer, on the reference petition or to decide it either way if the same is barred by time. The Division Bench expressed its opinion that the Special Land Acquisition Officer, while submitting a statement to the Court should also point out as to whether the award is within time or not. It is useful to refer to the relevant observation made by the Division Bench while issuing general mandamus. “The first issue required to be adjudicated is when the applicant acquired knowledge of the award and whether he acquired knowledge of the said award on a particular date. This will require supporting material/evidence and adjudication. Section 18 of the Act as such does not contemplate passing of an order by Special Land Acquisition Officer on the reference petition or to decide it either way. Over all scheme of the Act and Rules framed thereunder go to show that Special Land Acquisition Officer is not authorised/competent to adjudicate and finally decide the reference petition. District Magistrate/S.L.O. has to as the Act and Rules exists today, ensure that it contains requisite information and particulars and that it conforms to the requirement of Act and Rules before referring the matter to the Court under Section 18 of the Act. This may require concerned authority to determine the question whether reference petition is in order or not, place his note/comment or recommendation and then refer the reference petition to the Court to decide relevant issues, including the question whether reference petition is time barred or not. In our opinion if such question arise, the Special Land Acquisition Officer while submitting statement to the Court by recommending the reference should also point out the said question to the concerned Court which shall have jurisdiction and competence to determine, in case said finding of the Special Land Acquisition Officer is disputed by the aggrieved persons, to be adjudicated under Section 18 of the Act. The said contingency did not arise before the Supreme Court in the case of Raja Harish Chandra (supra). The above view taken by us is reasonable and logical as well as to advance public convenience. Aggrieved persons are unnecessarily harassed by compelling them to rush to this Court by filing writ petitions for redressal of their grievance. The said contingency did not arise before the Supreme Court in the case of Raja Harish Chandra (supra). The above view taken by us is reasonable and logical as well as to advance public convenience. Aggrieved persons are unnecessarily harassed by compelling them to rush to this Court by filing writ petitions for redressal of their grievance. In our considered opinion, the said question can be properly adjudicated by the Court if the matter is referred to it alongwith reference application by the Special Land Acquisition Officer who shall be in a position to have original record and other material before it. Had Section 18 of the Act been read in the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in case of Raja Harish Chandra (supra), the State Government ought to have come forward to make necessary amendment through Legislative Enactment for providing remedy against the order of Special Land Acquisition Officer rejecting reference application on the ground of limitation. In case of Sita Ram and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1979)2 SCC 656 , V.R. Krishna Iyer, P.N. Shinghal, P.S. Kailasam, D.A. Desai and A.D. Koshal, JJ of the Apex Court in para-31 observed thus: “.....A single right of appeal is more or less a universal requirement of the guarantee of life and liberty rooted in the conception that men are fallible, that Judges are men and that making assurance doubly sure before irrecoverable deprivation of life or liberty comes to pass, a full-scale re-examination of the facts and the law is made an integral part of fundamental fairness of procedure.” In an agrarian country, compulsory acquisition of land of citizens who have no other source of livelihood, is not an ordinary event in the life time of a peasant. In such circumstances before reference application is rejected on the ground of limitation, there must be at least one opportunity of remedy by way of appeal/revision for deciding the soundness of finding (both on fact and law) of conclusion arrived by District Magistrate/Special Land Acquisition Officer with regard to limitation or even otherwise. In such circumstances before reference application is rejected on the ground of limitation, there must be at least one opportunity of remedy by way of appeal/revision for deciding the soundness of finding (both on fact and law) of conclusion arrived by District Magistrate/Special Land Acquisition Officer with regard to limitation or even otherwise. In view of the above, we issue a general mandamus directing State of Uttar Pradesh through concerned Secretary and District Magistrate/Special Land Acquisition Officer and all concerned to comply with our order, direction, namely, whenever there is a dispute regarding limitation, such authority shall adjudicate the same and refer it to the Court as contemplated under Section 18 of the Act even if such authority comes to the conclusion that it is time barred and/or beyond six months’ limitation.” 7. The aforesaid view of the Division Bench in Smt. Savitri Devi’s case (supra) is clearly in conflict of the earlier Division Bench judgment in Kanchchid’s case (supra). It is to be noticed that the Division Bench in Smt. Savitri Devi’s case (supra) had not noticed the earlier Division Bench judgment of Kanchchid’s case which reason is sufficient to hold that the subsequent judgment in Smt.Savitri Devi’s case (supra) is not a binding precedence, but looking to the nature and importance of the issue and looking to the issuance of general mandamus by subsequent Division Bench, it is necessary to examine the issue on merit for settling the controversy. 8. The Act, 1894, is an Act which has held the entire field of land acquisition for more than 100 years. Various provisions of the Act, 1894, including Section 18 came up for consideration before different High Courts, Privy Council and the Apex Court. Section 3 of the Act is a definition clause. Section 3 (c) defines the Collector and Section 3(d) defines the Court. Section 3(c) and 3(d) are as follows: “3. Definitions.—(c) the expression “Collector” means the Collector of a district, and includes any officer specially appointed by the [appropriate Government] to perform the functions of a Collector under this Act; (d) the expression “Court” means a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction, unless, the [appropriate Government] has appointed (as it is hereby empowered to do) a special judicial officer within any specified local limits to perform functions of the Court under this Act.” 9. Part 2 of the Act, 1894, deals with acquisition. Part 2 of the Act, 1894, deals with acquisition. After declaration is issued under Section 6 of the Act, by the appropriate Government, a notice is issued by the Collector under Section 9 to the persons interested. Section 11 of the Act, 1894, provides for Enquiry and award by Collector. Section 12 (2) provides that the Collector shall give immediate notice of his award to such of the persons interested as are not present personally or by their representatives when the award is made. Section 12 of the Act is quoted below : “12. Award of Collector when to be final.—(1) Such award shall be filed in the Collector’s office and shall, except as hereinafter provided, be final and conclusive evidence, as between the Collector and the persons interested, whether they have respectively appeared before the Collector or not, of the true area and value of the land, and apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested. (2) The Collector shall give immediate notice of his award to such of the persons interested as are not present personally or by their representatives when the award is made.” 10. Part 3 of the Act, 1894, relates to REFERENCE TO COURT AND PROCEDURE THEREON. Section 18 (1) of the Act provides that any person interested who has not accepted the award may, by written application to the Collector require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court. Proviso to Section 18 of the Act, lays down the limitation for making the application. Section 18 of the Act is quoted below: “18. (1) Reference to Court. Any person interested who has not accepted the award may, by written application to the Collector require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court, whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the persons to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested. (2) the application shall state the grounds on which objection to the award is taken: Provided that every such application shall be made,- (a) if the person making it was present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award, within six weeks from the date of the Collector’s award; (b) in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under Section 12, sub-section (2), or within six months from the date of the Collector’s award, whichever period shall first expire.” 11. Section 19 of the Act, provides for Collector’s statement to the Court which requires that in making the reference the Collector shall state about the various factors as enumerated therein. For deciding the questions referred to this Larger Bench, it is necessary to find out the nature and extent of jurisdiction of the Collector given under Section 18 of the Act. 12. Sub-section (1) of Section 18 of the Act, gives a right to any interested person who has not accepted the award to make an application in writing to the Collector to make reference for the determination of the Court. Sub-section (2) of Section 18 of the Act, and the proviso thereunder enumerate certain conditions for making such application. The proviso begins with the word “ Provided that every such application shall be made”. The injunction as contained in the proviso uses the mandatory word shall. Proviso to Section 18, provides if the person making the application was present or represented before the Collector at the time when the award was made, within six weeks from the date of the Collector’s award. In other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under Section 12, sub-section (2), or within six months from the date of the Collector’s award, whichever period shall first expire. 13. The Collector exercises his jurisdiction on the conditions as laid down in the Section 18. The nature and jurisdiction of the Collector was considered in an early Bombay judgment reported in The Indian Law Reports (Bombay Series) Vol.XXX pg 275. 13. The Collector exercises his jurisdiction on the conditions as laid down in the Section 18. The nature and jurisdiction of the Collector was considered in an early Bombay judgment reported in The Indian Law Reports (Bombay Series) Vol.XXX pg 275. In the matter of Government and Nanu Kothare and others, a reference was made by the Collector to the Court in which a preliminary objection regarding jurisdiction of the Court was raised that the reference having been made beyond the period of limitation the Court has no jurisdiction to hear the reference on merit. Chandavarkar J, of the Bombay High Court after considering Section 18 of the Act, made following observations: “Now, Section 18 provides that any person interested, who, having not accepted the award, desires to have an adjudication of the claim by the Court, should, within the period of limitation prescribed in the proviso to the section, do certain things. First, he must make a written application to the Collector. Secondly, that written application should require the Collector to refer the matter for the determination of the Court, whether the objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the persons to whom it is payable or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested. Thirdly, such application shall state the grounds on which objection to the award is taken. These are the conditions prescribed by the Act for the right of the party to a reference by the Collector to come into existence. They are the conditions to which the power of the Collector to make the reference is subject. They are also the conditions which must be fulfilled before the Court can have jurisdiction to entertain the reference.” 14. Further at page 289 of the judgment following observations were made by the Court. “The Collector’s authority to make the reference as an agent of Government is restricted by the statutory conditions prescribed in Section 18. The claimants cannot plead ignorance of those conditions and the restricted nature of the Collector’s authority. He cannot bind Government by stepping outside the limits of the power given by Section 18. “The Collector’s authority to make the reference as an agent of Government is restricted by the statutory conditions prescribed in Section 18. The claimants cannot plead ignorance of those conditions and the restricted nature of the Collector’s authority. He cannot bind Government by stepping outside the limits of the power given by Section 18. If he does step outside then, his action is illegal: and no waiver on his part can atone for the failure of the claimant to fulfil the statutory conditions which the law required them to fulfil before their right to require the Collector to make a reference could come into existence.” 15. Section 18 of the Act, came up for consideration before the Apex Court in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. The Deputy Land Acquisition Officer and another, AIR 1961 SC 1500 . In the said judgment the Court interpreted the words “The date of the Collector’s award”. The Apex Court held that the date of the award used in the proviso must mean the date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructively. Following was laid down in paragraph 6 which is quoted below : “6.The knowledge of the party affected by the award, either actual or constructive, being an essential requirement of fairplay and natural justice the expression “the date of the award” used in the proviso must mean the date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructively. In our opinion, therefore, it would be unreasonable to construe the words “from the date of the Collector’s award” used in the proviso to Section 18 in a literal or mechanical way.” 16. The judgment of the Apex Court in Mohammed Hasnuddin v. The State of Maharashtra, AIR 1979 SC 404 , had considered the provisions of Section 14 of Hyderabad Land Acquisition Act, which was pari materia to the provisions of Section 18 of the Act, 1894. An award was given on 13.1.1962, which was communicated to the appellant on 20.1.1962. The appellant instead of making an application for reference filed an application for review on 5.2.1962. The Land Acquisition Officer made a recommendation, through the Collector, to the Secretary of the State Government that the award be reconsidered. But the Collector by his order dated 23.3.1962, declined to forward the same. The appellant instead of making an application for reference filed an application for review on 5.2.1962. The Land Acquisition Officer made a recommendation, through the Collector, to the Secretary of the State Government that the award be reconsidered. But the Collector by his order dated 23.3.1962, declined to forward the same. Eventually on 14.5.1962, appellant made an application for reference and prayed that the period spent in the proceedings for the review before the Land Acquisition Officer subsequent to the date of the award be excluded. A reference was made under Section 14(1) to the District Court. However, while making the reference no expression of opinion was made as to whether the application was time barred or not, evidently taking the view that the point should be left for the decision of the Court. An objection was raised by the Government that the reference was incompetent the application being time barred. The objection was accepted by the Civil Court and the Bombay High Court. The Bombay High Court held that the appellant was not entitled to the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, and the application was barred by time. The Civil Judge had framed an issue as to whether the application for reference has been barred by time which was answered in affirmative. The Apex Court held that the Collector’s jurisdiction is circumscribed by the condition laid down in Section 18 of the Act, and if the Collector makes a reference even though the application for reference was not in accordance with the provisions of Section 18, the Court acquires no jurisdiction to hear the reference. Following was laid down in paragraphs 9 and 18. “9.The short question that falls for determination in the appeal is whether the Court can go into a question that the application for reference was not made to the Collector within the time prescribed in Section 18, sub-section (2) of the Land Acquisition Act; and if so, can it refuse to entertain the reference if it finds it to be barred by time. There was at one time a great divergence of judicial opinion on the question. But almost all the High Courts have now veered round to the view that the Court has the power to go into the question of limitation. There was at one time a great divergence of judicial opinion on the question. But almost all the High Courts have now veered round to the view that the Court has the power to go into the question of limitation. It not only has the power but also the duty to examine whether the application for reference was in accordance with law i.e., whether it was made within time prescribed under the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 18 of the Act or not. The view taken by them is that a Collector’s jurisdiction is circumscribed by the conditions laid down in Section18, sub-section (1), that if he makes a reference even though the application for reference was not in accordance with the provisions of Section 18, the Court acquires no jurisdiction to hear the reference and that it can refuse to hear it if it was made on a time-barred application. 18.While it is true that the Collector in making the award under Section 11 acts as an agent of the Government, he in making a reference to the Court under Section 18 acts as a statutory authority. Section 18, sub-section (1) of the Act entrusts to the Collector the statutory duty of making a reference on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down therein. The Collector, therefore, acting under Section 18, is nothing but a statutory authority exercising his own powers under the section.” 17. The Apex Court in the above case approved the view of the Bombay High Court. In the matter of Government and Nanu Kothare and others (supra) laid down that making an application for reference within the time prescribed under proviso to Section 18 (2) of the Act, is a sine qua non for a valid reference by the Collector. The Apex Court further held that if an application is not made within time, the Collector will not have the power to make the reference. Following was laid down in paragraphs 25 and 28. “25.The conditions laid down in Section 18 are ‘matters of substance and their observance is a condition precedent to the Collector’s power of reference’, as rightly observed by Chandavarkar J. in Re Land Acquisition Act (supra). We are inclined to the view that the fulfilment of the conditions, particularly the one regarding limitation, are the conditions subject to which the power of the Collector to make the reference exists. We are inclined to the view that the fulfilment of the conditions, particularly the one regarding limitation, are the conditions subject to which the power of the Collector to make the reference exists. It must accordingly be held that the making of an application for reference within the time prescribed by proviso to Section 18. Sub-section (2) is a sine qua non for a valid reference by the Collector. 28.If an application is made which is not within time, the Collector will not have the power to make a reference. In order to determine the limits of his own power, it is clear that the Collector will have to decide whether the application presented by the claimant is or is not within time, and satisfies the conditions laid down in Section 18. Even if a reference is wrongly made by the Collector the Court will still have to determine the validity of the reference because the very jurisdiction of the Court to hear a reference depends on a proper reference being made under Section 18, and if the reference is not proper, there is no jurisdiction in the Court to hear the reference. It follows that it is the duty of the Court to see that the statutory conditions laid down in Section 18 have been complied with, and it is not debarred from satisfying itself that the reference which it is called upon to hear is a valid reference It is only a valid reference which gives jurisdiction to the Court, and, therefore, the Court has to ask itself the question whether it has jurisdiction to entertain the reference.” 18. Reliance has also been placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in Officer on Special Duty (Land Acquisition) and another v. Shah Mani Lal Chandulal and others, 1996 (9) SCC 414 , which is relevant to be noticed. In the aforesaid case, application for reference was rejected as barred by time. In the writ petitions filed against the order of the Collector, the Gujarat High Court held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, applied to the proceedings before the Collector, therefore, the reasons given to condone the delay were valid. The High Court condoned the delay and directed the Land Acquisition Officer to make the reference which judgment was challenged in the appeal. The High Court condoned the delay and directed the Land Acquisition Officer to make the reference which judgment was challenged in the appeal. There was local amendment i.e. Land Acquisition (Maharashtra Extension and Amendment) Act, 38/64, which provides as under : “Any order made by the Collector, on an application under this section shall be subject to revision by the High Court, as if the Collector where a Court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Section 115 of the Cr.P.C., 1908.” 19. On the basis of the local amendment, the High Court took the view that Collector was the Court. The Apex Court took the view that the Collector is not a Court when he acts as a statutory authority under Section 18 (1) and Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be applied. Following was laid down in paragraphs 9 and 17. “9. It would thus be clear that one of the conditions precedent to make a valid reference to the Court is that the application under Section 18(1) shall be in writing and made within six weeks from the date of the award when the applicant was present either in person or through counsel, at the time of making of the award by the Collector under clause (a) of proviso to sub-section (2). The Collector, when he makes the reference, acts as a statutory authority. 17. It is to be remembered that the Land Acquisition [Amendment] Act [68 of 1984] was enacted prescribing the limitation to exercise the power under Sections 4, 6 and 11 and also excluded the time occupied due to stay granted by the Courts. Taking cognizance of the limitation prescribed in proviso to sub-Section (2) of Section 18, the provisions of the Limitation Act were not expressly extended. Though Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act is available, and the limitation in proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 18 may be treated to be special law, in the absence of such an application by Land Acquisition [Amendment] Act [68 of 1984], the Act specifically maintains distinction between the Collector and the Court and the Collector/LAO performs only statutory duties under the Act, including one while making reference under Section 18. It is difficult to construe that the Collector/LAO while making reference under Section 18, as statutory authority still acts as a Court for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.” 20. The Apex Court in a very recent judgment had an occasion to again consider the provisions of Section 18 of the Act after noticing the earlier decisions of the Apex Court in Bhagwan Das and others v. State of U.P. and others, (2010) 3 SCC 545 . In the aforesaid case, award was made by the Land Acquisition Officer on 14.3. 2007, and notice was served on the appellants on 25.10.2007. Appellants claim that they came to know about the award on 16.11.2007, and thereafter they made an application for reference. The Collector rejected the application for reference vide order dated 19.12.2007, on the ground that it was made beyond the period of 6 months from the date of award. The writ petition was dismissed by the High Court vide order dated 17.1. 2008 as not maintainable. While dismissing the writ petition the High Court observed that the appellants had a remedy by way of filing an appeal under Section 54 of the Act. 21. The review application was filed which too was rejected vide order dated 5.5.2008, with the observation that the appellants ought to have filed an application for condonation of delay with the application for reference. The order of the High Court was challenged in the appeals. The Apex Court noticed the issues which arose for consideration in paragraph 6 which is quoted below: “6. The following questions arise for consideration, on the contentions urged: (a) Whether an appeal would lie under Section 54 of the Act against the order of the Collector refusing to make a reference? (b) Whether the Collector can condone the delay in filing an application seeking reference, if sufficient cause is shown? (c) Whether the period of six months under clause (b) of the proviso to Section 18 of the Act should be reckoned from the date of knowledge of the award of the Collector or from the date of award itself? (d) Whether the appellants were entitled to relief?” 22. While considering the question (b) the Apex Court laid down that the Collector is not a Court and the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, have no application. (d) Whether the appellants were entitled to relief?” 22. While considering the question (b) the Apex Court laid down that the Collector is not a Court and the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, have no application. Following was laid down in paragraphs 14, 15 and 16 which are quoted below: “14. The proviso to Section 18 requires that an application by a person interested, to the Collector, seeking reference of his claim for higher compensation for determination by the Court, shall be made within six weeks from the date of the Collector’s award, if such person was present or represented before the Collector, at the time when the award was made. If not, the application for reference shall have to be made within six weeks of the receipt of the notice of the Collector under Section 12(2) or within six months from the date of the Collector’s award, whichever period shall first expire. 15. In Officer on Special Duty (Land Acquisition) and another v. Shah Manilal Chandulal and others, 1996 (9) SCC 414 , this Court held that in view of the special limitation provided under the proviso to Section 18 of the Act, Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, cannot be applied to the proviso to Section 18 of the Act; and therefore, the benefit of Sections 4 to 24 of Limitation Act 1963, will not be available in regard to applications under Section 18(1) of the Act. It was also held that as the Collector is not a Court when he discharges his functions as a statutory authority under Section 18(1) of the Act, Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1963 cannot be invoked for extension of the period of limitation prescribed under the proviso to Section 18(2) of the Act. 16. As the Collector is not a Civil Court and as the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 have not been made applicable to proceedings before the Collector under the Act, and as there is no provision in the Act enabling the Land Acquisition Collector to extend the time for making an application for reference, the Collector cannot entertain any application for extension, nor extend the time for seeking reference, even if there are genuine and bona fide grounds for condoning delay. This view was reiterated in Steel Authority of India Ltd. v. S.U.T.N.I. Sangam and others, 2009 (16) SCC 1 . Therefore, the observation of the High Court that an application for condonation of delay could have been made by the person interested, is incorrect.” 23. The Apex Court in the said judgment also laid down that if the person interested was not present when the award is made and did not receive notice under Section 12 (2) of the Act, he has to make an application within six months of the date on which he actually and constructively came to know about the conditions of the award. 24. From the judgments as noticed above following ratio is deducible : (1) The Collector while considering an application filed under Section 18 (1) of the Act for making reference acts as a statutory authority and the said application is to be dealt by him subject to the statutory conditions as laid down in Section 18 (2) of the Act. (2) The jurisdiction to make reference under Section 18 arises only when the application satisfies the statutory conditions enumerated in Section 18 (2). (3) The Collector is not a Court, Section 5 of the Limitation Act, is not applicable in the proceedings of reference under Section 18 of the Act. 25. The general mandamus issued by the Division Bench in Smt. Savitri Devi’s case (supra) as extracted above provides that whenever there is a dispute regarding limitation, the Collector shall adjudicate the same and refer it to the Court as contemplated under Section 18 of the Act, even if such authority comes to the conclusion that it is time barred. The Collector acts as a statutory authority. This jurisdiction given under Section 18 of the Act, is circumscribed by the conditions laid down in Section 18. 26. One of the question which has also arisen for consideration in this reference is as to whether this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, can direct statutory authority to exercise its jurisdiction in a manner not contemplated on a plain reading of statute. 27. 26. One of the question which has also arisen for consideration in this reference is as to whether this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, can direct statutory authority to exercise its jurisdiction in a manner not contemplated on a plain reading of statute. 27. The Privy Council in a celebrated judgment of Nusserwanjee Pestonjee v. Meer Mynoodeen Khan, 6 Moo Ind App 134, has laid down following: “Wherever jurisdiction is given to a Court by an Act of Parliament or by Regulation in India (which has the same effect as an Act of Parliament), and such jurisdiction is only given upon certain specified terms contained in the Regulation itself it is a universal principle that these terms must be complied with in order to create and raise the jurisdiction, for if they be not complied with, the jurisdiction does not arise.” 28. The Apex Court in A.P. Christians Medical Educational Society v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1986 SC 1490 , had laid down that no direction can be issued by the Supreme Court to disobey the statute to which it owes its existence. No direction to the Court or to a statutory authority to act contrary to the statute has been strongly disapproved by the Apex Court. Following observation was made by the Apex Court in paragraph 10 which is quoted below: “Any direction of the nature sought by Shri Venugopal would be in clear transgression of the provisions of the University Act and the regulations of the University. We cannot by our fiat direct the University to disobey the statute to which it owes its existence and the regulations made by the University itself. We cannot imagine anything more destructive of the rule of law than a direction by the Court to disobey the laws.” 29. Again the Apex Court in K.S. Bhoir v. State of Maharashtra and others, (2001) 10 SCC 264, again laid down that the Court cannot issue any direction to waive the mandatory requirement of law. Following was laid down in paragraph 11. “The High Court has rightly declined to issue any direction to the Central Government to grant one time increase in the admission capacity in the medical colleges, otherwise it would not have been proper exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Following was laid down in paragraph 11. “The High Court has rightly declined to issue any direction to the Central Government to grant one time increase in the admission capacity in the medical colleges, otherwise it would not have been proper exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Adjusting equities in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 is one thing, and the High Court assuming the role of the Central Government and the Medical Council under Section 10A of the Act is a different thing. The Court cannot direct to waive the mandatory requirement of law in exercise of its extraordinary power under Article 226. It is not permissible for the High Court to direct an authority under the Act to act contrary to the statutory provisions. The power conferred on the High Court by virtue of Article 226 is to enforce the rule of law and ensure that the State and other statutory authorities act in accordance with law.” 30. A Three Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee and another v. C.K. Rajan and others, (2003) 7 SCC 546 , laid down that the High Court and Supreme Court could not ordinarily issue a writ of mandamus directing the State to carry out its statutory functions in a particular manner. Following was laid down in para 76: “The High Courts and the Supreme Court would not ordinarily issue a writ of mandamus directing the State to carry out its statutory functions in a particular manner. Normally, the Courts would ask the State to perform its statutory functions, if necessary within a time frame and undoubtedly as and when an order is passed by the State in exercise of its power under the Statute, it will examine the correctness or legality thereof by way of judicial review.” 31. The general mandamus issued by the Division Bench in Smt Savitri Devi’s case (supra) is a mandamus to exercise jurisdiction by the Collector which is not contemplated by Section 18 of the Act. The general mandamus issued by the Division Bench in Smt Savitri Devi’s case (supra) is a mandamus to exercise jurisdiction by the Collector which is not contemplated by Section 18 of the Act. The statutory authority itself has to exercise its jurisdiction given by the statute and making a reference to the Court, even when the statutory authority is satisfied that the application is not within the time as provided under Section 18 (2) shall nothing, but command to a statutory authority not to exercise jurisdiction conferred by Section 18, but to abdicate its jurisdiction to the Court where reference is made. It is another thing that Court while deciding a reference referred to it by Collector under Section 18 of the Act, may also examine as to whether the reference is valid and it is within the four corners of Section 18, but to direct the Collector that even though he is satisfied that the reference is beyond time the application be not rejected, rather reference be made to the Court, cannot be approved. 32. Section 18 (2) of the Act, which provides limitation for making application for reference under Section 18 (1) of the Act is with a purpose and object. As observed above Section 5 of the Limitation Act, is not attracted in the proceedings before the Collector under Section 18. He has no power to condone the delay in filing the application under Section 18 (1) and the only option left to the Collector when an application is barred by time is to reject the same. The question may be posed that supposing an application is rejected under Section 18 of the Act, by the Collector without properly applying the limitation as prescribed under Section 18 of the Act, or without adverting to the question as to when the award came into the knowledge of the claimant actually or constructively, what is the remedy available to such claimant. It is true that when the application is rejected as barred by time the matter closes at the end of Collector. We are of the view that in such circumstances when an order by Collector has been passed not in conformity with Section 18, the claimant is not remedy less. The claimant can invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. We are of the view that in such circumstances when an order by Collector has been passed not in conformity with Section 18, the claimant is not remedy less. The claimant can invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. There is also nothing in the Act, 1894, which may prohibit a claimant to challenge a decision of the Collector rejecting the application under Section 18 before a competent Civil Court. There is neither express nor any implied bar in filing a suit by an aggrieved person, rather Section 52 of the Act, which provides for notice in case of suits for anything done in pursuance of the Act, indicates a suit is contemplated against any action done in pursuance of the Act. 33. The Division Bench in Smt. Savitri Devi’s case (supra) observed that the State Government ought to have come forward to make necessary amendment through Legislative Enactment for providing remedy against the order of Special Land Acquisition Officer rejecting the reference application on the ground of limitation. It is for the Legislature to consider bringing an amendment in the legislation or provide remedy against such order. Probably the Division Bench in Smt. Savitri Devi’s case (supra) after making above observation issued general mandamus after noticing that no appeal or revision is provided against the order passed under Section 18 of the Act. It is for the legislature to provide for appeal or revision, this Court exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution shall not invest jurisdiction to a Court which is never contemplated by the statute. 34. Submission of Shri Y.D. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner that the view taken in Smt. Savitri Devi’s case (supra) is a correct view cannot be accepted in view of what has been said above. 35. Shri Y.D. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on another Division Bench judgment in Writ Petition No. 10846 of 2001, Rajju and others v. Collector/Special Land Acquisition Officer, decided on 22.10.2002. In Rajju’s case (supra) the application for making reference was rejected on 23.8.2000. The notice under Section 12 (2) of the Act, was served on the petitioners on 30.3. 1999, and an award was given on 31.3. 1999, whereas the application under Section 18 of the Act, was moved on 24.6.1999. In Rajju’s case (supra) the application for making reference was rejected on 23.8.2000. The notice under Section 12 (2) of the Act, was served on the petitioners on 30.3. 1999, and an award was given on 31.3. 1999, whereas the application under Section 18 of the Act, was moved on 24.6.1999. The Division Bench took the view that notice under Section 12 (2) of the Act could not be sent prior to making of the award, therefore, the reason given in the order of Special Land Acquisition that the notice under sub-section 2 of Section 12 served on 30.3. 1999, was not approved. In view of the aforesaid, the writ petition was allowed and the order of the Special Land Acquisition Officer was set-aside. The said case does not support the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Collector ought not have rejected the application as barred by time and ought not to have referred the matter to the Court for deciding as to whether the application was barred by time or not. 36. We may also notice a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Parasu Ram v. State of U.P. and others, 2004 (4) AWC 3422 . The Division Bench in the said case had occasion to consider the Division Bench judgment in Smt. Savitri Devi’s case (supra). The Division Bench observed that Smt. Savitri Devi’s case (supra) has not noticed the Supreme Court judgment in Officer on Special Duty (Land Acquisition) and another v. Shah Mani Lal Chandulal and others, (supra), hence the said judgment of the Division Bench in Smt. Savitri Devi’s case (supra) is not a good law. Following was laid down in paragraph 8 which is quoted below: “8.This Division Bench has not noticed the decision of the Supreme Court in Officer on Special Duty (Land Acquisition) v. Shah Manilal Chandulal (supra) wherein it has clearly been held in paragraph 8 that if the application under Section 18 has not been made within time the Collector has no power to make a reference. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court the observation made in the decision of the Division Bench in Savitri Devi’s case (supra) to the contrary is not good law. 37. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court the observation made in the decision of the Division Bench in Savitri Devi’s case (supra) to the contrary is not good law. 37. From the discussions as made above, we arrive on following conclusion with regard to scope and extent of jurisdiction of Collector under Section 18 of the Act: (1) The Collector while considering an application filed under Section 18 (1) of the Act for making reference acts as a statutory authority and the said application is to be dealt by him subject to the statutory conditions as laid down in Section 18 (2) of the Act. (2) The jurisdiction to make reference under Section 18 arises only when the application satisfies the statutory conditions enumerated in Section 18 (2). (3) The Collector is not a Court, Section 5 of the Limitation Act, is not applicable in the proceedings of reference under Section 18 of the Act. (4) The High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot issue any general mandamus to a statutory authority to act in a manner which is not contemplated by statutory power given to such authority. (5) The Collector while considering an application under Section 18 of the Act, if comes to the conclusion that the application is barred by time which having not been made in accordance with Section 18 (2) the Collector has no option, but to reject the said application. 38. In view of the foregoing discussion our answer to the above two questions is as follows: (1) The directions contained in Smt. Savitri Devi’s case (supra) in the nature of general mandamus are in direct conflict with the ratio of Division Bench judgment in Kanchchid’s case reported in 1999 (3) AWC 1978, which directions are not approved. (2) The High Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution while interpreting Section 18 of the Act, cannot confer jurisdiction to the Collector to refer a dispute under Section 18 of the Act, to the Court even if the application is barred by limitation 39. Let our answers be placed before the appropriate Bench hearing the writ petition. —————