JUDGMENT:- By this petition, the petitioners impugn judgment and order rendered by learned Member of Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, in Revision Application No.4/1989, confirming the judgment and order rendered by Sub-Divisional Officer, Ahmednagar in T.N.C. Appeal No.4/1988. 2. Original petitioners were real brothers in-terse. Their father, namely, Shripati Kanhu Bankar was the original tenant of two (2) parcels of lands viz. Survey No.125, admeasuring 11 hectares 89 Area and Survey No.124-B, admeasuring 00 Hectares 24 Ares, situated at Village Walunj under Ahmednagar district. The deceased respondent No.1 was original owner of the above referred lands. In the year 1959, Shripati Kanhu Bankar had filed proceedings for exercising right to purchase the lands in question. The proceedings were terminated against him for the reason that he was then in possession of land more than the permissible limits under the provisions of the Maharashtra Ceiling on Holdings Act, 1961 (for short, "the Ceiling Act"). The Tribunal directed thereafter that appropriate action under section 32-P of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (for short, "the BT &AL Act") may be taken. The deceased respondent No.1 (landlord) did not taken any action for a long-drawn period after the said decision which was rendered on 19th October, 1959. He, however, instituted tenancy case No.2/1987 under 32-P of the BT &AL Act for restoration of possession on the ground that he was entitled to get back the possession in as much as the tenant was having more land than permissible under the Ceiling Act. The application was resisted by the original petitioners on the ground that the Ceiling Act was amended and the standard area prescribed as on the date of such application filed by the deceased respondent No.1 was of 60 acres which was previously of 48 acres and as such, the tenant could not be regarded as holder of excess land more than the standard unit prescribed under the Ceiling Act. The original petitioners submitted that after 28 years of the previous direction to initiate proceedings under section 32-P of the BT &AL Act, such application filed by the deceased respondent No.1 (landlord) was not maintainable and was barred by limitation. The petitioners further contended that the landlord was not residing in the village and was not an agriculturist. The original petitioners submitted that after 28 years of the previous direction to initiate proceedings under section 32-P of the BT &AL Act, such application filed by the deceased respondent No.1 (landlord) was not maintainable and was barred by limitation. The petitioners further contended that the landlord was not residing in the village and was not an agriculturist. They submitted that the landlord was ineligible to claim restoration of the lands in question because he had changed the vocation and was employed as a servant at another place. Consequently, the original petitioners urged for dismissal of the proceedings which were initiated by the deceased respondent No.1 (landlord). 3. The Tahsildar carried out certain enquiry. The Tahsildar noticed that the original order issued in the previous tenancy proceedings No. 19/1959 initiated by deceased Shripati Kanhu Bankar was not placed on record and, therefore, it was difficult to execute such order. The Tahsildar further held that due to increase in the limit of standard holdings under the Ceiling Act, the tenants i.e. petitioners could not be regarded as surplus land holders and were not proved to be ineligible to continue their possession. The Tahsildar further took notice of the fact that the petitioners (tenants) had submitted the return under the Ceiling Act in Format No XII and the same was approved by the competent authority. Therefore, they were not held as holders of surplus lands and as such, as on the date of application, it was not proved that they were having the land in excess of the limit provided under the Ceiling Act and as such, the restoration under Section 32-P of the BT &AL Act was not legally permissible. The Tahsildar further held that the application under Section 32-P was barred by limitation because it was filed after 28 years of earlier proceedings. It was also held that the deceased respondent No.1 was not eligible to claim restoration because he had left the occupation as an agriculturist. In keeping with such findings, the learned Tahsildar dismissed the application of the deceased respondent No.1 and further directed to initiate proceedings under section 32-0 of the BT &AL Act vide order dated 3012-1987. The respondents No.1 and 2 challenged the said order of the learned Tahsildar by filing T.N.C. appeal NoA/1988. Their appeal was allowed. In keeping with such findings, the learned Tahsildar dismissed the application of the deceased respondent No.1 and further directed to initiate proceedings under section 32-0 of the BT &AL Act vide order dated 3012-1987. The respondents No.1 and 2 challenged the said order of the learned Tahsildar by filing T.N.C. appeal NoA/1988. Their appeal was allowed. The learned Sub-Divisional Officer held that the proceedings under section 32-P were initiated by way of execution of the previous order because the tenant was found ineligible to purchase the tenanted land under section 32-0 of the BT &AL Act. The learned Sub-Divisional Officer held that the purchase had become ineffective and, therefore, the land could be restored in favour of the landlord. The judgment and order rendered by the learned Sub-Divisional Officer was challenged by filing revision application NoA/1989 by the original petitioners. The Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal dismissed the revision application. Hence, the petition. 4. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 5. Question involved in this petition are as enumerated below. (i) Whether proceedings under Section 32P of the BT &AL Act could be entertained and allowed after lapse of more than 28 years because of the reason that it was to be treated as continuation of the previous proceedings and that it was by way of execution of the order rendered in the proceedings under section 32-0 of the BT &AL Act? (ii) Whether ineligibility of the tenant to purchase the tenanted land or to continue possession can be considered in the proceedings under section 32-P of the BT&AL Act, having regard to his holdings of land more than the standard area provided under the Maharashtra Ceiling on Holdings Act, with reference to the date on which his previous application under section 32-0 of the BT &AL Act was dismissed or that it has to be considered with reference to the juxtaposition as available on the commencement of the proceedings under section 32-P of the BT &AL Act? 6. Before I proceed to consider the rival submissions of the counsel, it is worthy to be noticed that section 32-0 of the BT &AL Act provides for the manner in which the competent Tribunal shall determine the price of the land which is required to be paid by the tenant for the purpose of effecting the statutory purchase. 6. Before I proceed to consider the rival submissions of the counsel, it is worthy to be noticed that section 32-0 of the BT &AL Act provides for the manner in which the competent Tribunal shall determine the price of the land which is required to be paid by the tenant for the purpose of effecting the statutory purchase. The Tenancy Tribunal is required to issue public notice in the prescribed form soon after the Tillers' Day. The Tillers' Day as contemplated under section 32(1) is the 1st day of April, 1957. The fact that the lands in question were in possession of Shripati Kanhu Bankar as a tenant from the Tillers' Day is not in dispute. Obviously, ordinarily, he was entitled to purchase the lands in question as provided under section 32-0. The fact that he was ready and willing to purchase the lands in question is explicit in view of his commencement of the proceeding under section 32-0 vide tenancy case no.19/1959. Sub-section (3) of Section 32-0 of the BT &AL Act reads as follows: "32-0. Tribunal to issue notice and determine price of land to be paid by tenants.- (1) ...... (2) ...... (3) Where any tenant fails to appear or makes a statement that he is not willing to purchase the land, the Tribunal shall by an order in writing declare that such tenant is not willing to purchase the land and that the purchase is ineffective; Provided that if such order is passed in default of the appearance such order to the parties and any party on whose default the order was passed may within 60 days from the date on which the order was communicated to him apply for the review of the same." The purport of section 32-0 is that immediately after the commencement of the BT &AL Act, protective action ought to be taken by the Tenancy Tribunal in order to examine whether the tenant's right to purchase the land can be exercised without any delay. In other words, section 32-G provides for scheme to accelerate realization of the statutory rights by the tenants. It does not intend to discontinue the tenancy rights in default of the tenant. 7. Mr. Mantri, holding for Mr. Garud, would submit that the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal failed to appreciate the legal implications of the non-declaration of the Tribunal that the purchase has become ineffective. It does not intend to discontinue the tenancy rights in default of the tenant. 7. Mr. Mantri, holding for Mr. Garud, would submit that the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal failed to appreciate the legal implications of the non-declaration of the Tribunal that the purchase has become ineffective. He would submit that the proceedings under Section 32-M of the BT&AL Act are distinct in nature and, therefore, mere fact that the previous application of the tenant Shripati Kanhu Bankar was dismissed, will not be of any material impact and the juxtaposition available as on the date of the application under section 32-P was-more relevant. He contended that the petitioners were not holders of surplus land and their Return filed under the Ceiling Act was approved by the competent authority. He would submit that even if it was found that they were holders of some excess land after the amalgamation of the lands in question, then also, they were entitled to retain possession of the land which would be up-to the limit provided under the Ceiling Act. He contends that the petitioners would be eligible to purchase the lands in question to the extent it is proportionate to the ceiling area after adding their own holdings. He submitted that the purchase could not have been determined to have become ineffective as contemplated under Section 32M. He argued that after delay of more than 28 years, the application under section 32-P was liable to be rejected on the ground of latches and because it was barred by limitation. Per contra, Mr. Gaware would submit that the application under section 32-P of the BT &AL Act was not required to be filed because the Tribunal itself should have suo motu exercised such power when the sale had become ineffective in view of section 32-G. He contended that in absence of any provision of limitation, the application under section 32-P could not be regarded as barred by limitation. He argued that such proceedings ought to be treated as continuation of the previous proceedings in which the Tenancy Tribunal had directed the action under Section 32-P. He argued that inaction on the part of the Tenancy Tribunal for such period of about 28 years could not cause any legal impediment in realisation of the rights of the deceased respondent No.1 and the same could be translated into action without any difficulty. He would submit that the purchase of the lands in question had become ineffective under section 32-G in 1959 itself and the juxtaposition of the relevant year was material. It is argued that the provisions of section 32-G, 32-M and 32-P are integral parts of the scheme provided under same Chapter-II which is captioned as "purchase of land by tenant". Mr. Gaware would submit, therefore, that these provisions are required to be harmoniously construed and are interlinked. He, therefore, urged for dismissal of the petition. 8. As stated earlier, there is nothing on record to infer that the Tribunal by an order in writing had declared that Shripati Kanhu Ban kar (tenant) was not willing to purchase the land and, therefore, the purchase had become ineffective. The relevant declaration as contemplated under section 32-G(3) was not made by the Tribunal and, therefore, the sale could not be treated as ineffective under the provisions of section 32-G. As far as section 32-M is concerned, the sale would become ineffective only when the tenant-purchaser would fail to pay the purchase price determine by the Tribunal. The only impediment in the way of deceased tenant (Shripati Kanhu Ban kar) was that he was the surplus land holder at the time when he had applied for statutory sale under Section 32-G in the year 1959. 9. It appears that the embargo is put on the rights of tenants to purchase the land beyond the ceiling limit vide section 32-A. Section 32-A of the BT&AL Act reads as follows; "32-A. A tenant shall be deemed to have purchased land under Section 32 (1) in the case of a tenant who does not hold any land as owner but holds land as tenant in excess of the ceiling area, up-to the ceiling area; (2) in the case of a tenant who holds land as owner below the ceiling area, such part of the land only as will raise his holding to the extent of the ceiling area." On plain reading of section 32-A, it is manifestly clear that the tenant may not necessarily become owner of all the land in this possession on the Tillers' Day. He could become owner of the land below the ceiling area, such part of the land only as will raise his holding to the extent of one ceiling area. He could become owner of the land below the ceiling area, such part of the land only as will raise his holding to the extent of one ceiling area. In such a case, the excess of the land, which is more than the ceiling area was required to be surrendered by the tel1ant to the landlord. This is a case in which the deceased tenant (Shripati Kanhu Ban kar) did not surrender the tenanted land nor was called upon to surrender any portion of the tenanted land. The application filed by him for determination of the purchase price and issuance of certificate under section 32-G was, apparently, dismissed though the relevant order is not placed on record. The clinching question is whether the Tribunal was legally competent to invoke the remedy under section 32-P of the BT &AL Act only on basis of the finding that the tenant was holding the land in excess of the ceiling area and was not entitled to purchase the same by virtue of section 32-A of the BT &AL Act. 10. This takes me to analyse section 32-P of the BT &AL Act. The caption of section 32-P will make it clear that it deals with the power of the Tribunal to resume and dispose of the land not purchased by the tenant. Subsection (1) of section 32-P provides that the Tribunal may suo motu or on an application made by the concerned party, resume and dispose of the tenanted land where the purchase has become ineffective by reason of section 32-G or 32-M, after holding the preliminary enquiry in this behalf. Subsection (1) of section 32-P provides that the Tribunal may suo motu or on an application made by the concerned party, resume and dispose of the tenanted land where the purchase has become ineffective by reason of section 32-G or 32-M, after holding the preliminary enquiry in this behalf. Needless to say, it ought to be determined, as a condition precedent before invoking powers under section 32-P, that the purchase has become ineffective either due to the reason that the tenant was unwilling to purchase the land and, therefore, the declaration was made under section 32-G(3) in this context or due to failure of the tenant to deposit/pay the purchase price determined by the Tribunal as contemplated under section 32-M. The sale would become ineffective in default of the tenant to pay the purchase price, yet, the tenant may continue in possession and the sale cannot be deemed to be effective until the Tribunal fails to recover the amount of purchase price under sub-section (3) of section 32-K. In other words merely because the tenant was unable to pay the price, the sale cannot be ipso facto regarded as ineffective under Section 32-M. In the present case, it cannot be said that the sale had become ineffective under section 32-M because the price was not determined. Obviously, it only remains to be seen whether the sale had become ineffective as provided under section 32-G of the BT &AL Act. It need not be reiterated that the Tribunal had not declared under sub-section (3) of section 32-G that the sale had become ineffective. Nor any such order was placed on record to show that the sale had become ineffective due to unwillingness of the deceased tenant. Considering the plain language of section 32-P, it is difficult to assume that ineligibility of the tenant to exercise the right to purchase land due to legal disability contemplated under section 32-A of the BT &AL Act could be that ground to initiate action under section 32-P of the BT&AL Act. It is amply clear that section 32-A only provides for manner to exercise rights of a tenant to make him deemed purchaser to the extent of the cei ling area. The provision of section 32-A does' not denude the tenant from his right to continue with the possession for the reason that he is in possession of surplus land beyond the ceiling limits. The provision of section 32-A does' not denude the tenant from his right to continue with the possession for the reason that he is in possession of surplus land beyond the ceiling limits. The tenant in such a case may not be deemed to have purchase the tenanted land. The holding of the excessive land will only disallow him from purchasing the land in excess of the ceiling area. In may humble opinion, it would not automatically result in the action contemplated under section 32-P for the purpose of resumption of land not purchased by the tenant. The resumption of land which is not purchase by the tenant due to his voluntary act or due to default in payment of the price, is contemplated under section 32-P and it does not provide for remedy to effect surrender of such excessive land in favour of the landlord The remedy of the landlord seems to be elsewhere. 11. Mr. Gaware invited my attention to certain observations in "Yellawwabai Malkappa Mali and others Vs. Yesu Sada Dhane and another", 2005(1) Bom. C.R. 698 A Single Bench of this Court held that the right to purchase land by the tenant is limited and if the tenant is found to be in excess of holding provided in section 5, such right can be restricted. The relevant observations may be reproduced as follows: "6. After having referred to the relevant provisions and on conjoint reading of the same, the position that emerges is that the Tribunal is obliged to take action under section 32~P of the Act in respect of land where the purchase has become ineffective or on the finding that the tenant is ineligible to purchase any portion of the land on account of having exceeded the permissible holding in terms of section 5 of the Act. A priori, such a provision, to my mind, can be and ought to be invoked where, from the facts established on record, it is possible to take the view that the tenant is not eligible to purchase the land, as the same is being held in excess of the ceiling area provided under section 5 of the Act. To get over this position, the argument canvassed on behalf of the respondents is that on account of section 32-F of the Act, the tillers' day stood postponed. To get over this position, the argument canvassed on behalf of the respondents is that on account of section 32-F of the Act, the tillers' day stood postponed. This argument clearly overlooks the settled position that section 32-F of the Act is not a provisions of disabling the landlord to resume the land. Whereas, it is only a provisions entitled or empowering the tenant to purchase the land at a future date. The fact remains that the date on which the subject application was filed, the holding of the tenant has been established to be in excess of ceiling area and that finding has not been disturbed either by the Tribunal nor has been questioned before this Court at the instance of the respondents. Counsel for the respondents fairly submits that, that finding reached by the two authorities below cannot be taken exception to, but he has supported the reason recorded hereinbefore. However, there is no express provision in the Act, which would disentitled by Tribunal to invoke remedy under section 32-P of the Act respect of the finding reached that the tenant was holding land in excess of the ceiling area and was therefore, not eligible to purchase the same by virtue of section 32-A of the Act." 12. It may be mentioned that the application in the given case was filed by the landlady under section 29 read with section 32G, 33-P and 35-A of the BT &AL Act. There was concurrent findings of the Tribunals and the High Court held that there was no express provision in the BT&AL Act which would disentitle the Tribunal to invoke power under section 32-P of the said Act ins-pite of the finding reached that the tenant was holding land in excess of the ceiling area and was not eligible to purchase the same by virtue of section 32-A of the said Act. The learned Single Judge (Khanwillkar, J.) had no occasion, however, to consider the import of section 32-P in relation to section 32-G of the BT &AL Act. The question whether the juxtaposition regarding holding of the tenant as on the day of commencement of the proceedings under section 32-P was required to be seen or that his holding of land as on the Tillers' Day was important, was not subject matter for consideration before the learned Single Judge. The question whether the juxtaposition regarding holding of the tenant as on the day of commencement of the proceedings under section 32-P was required to be seen or that his holding of land as on the Tillers' Day was important, was not subject matter for consideration before the learned Single Judge. In the present case, however, the legal disability under section 32-A of the BT &AL Act as was available in 1959 but it was removed fully or partly due to the amendment in the Ceiling Act because the original permissible limit of 48 acres was enhanced to 60 acres. It was, therefore, necessary to examine whether as on date of such application, the tenants were ineligible to purchase the tenanted land in view of section 32-A of the BT &AL Act. That was not done by the learned Sub-Divisional Officer and the learned Member of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. 13. Mr. Gaware further seeks to rely on observations in "V. S. Charati Vs. Hussein Nhanu Jamadar (Dead) by L. Rs.", 1999(3) Bom. C.R.131. The ratio of the given authority is that protection against eviction under section 43-lB would be available to the tenants whose rights had been crystallized and not to deemed purchaser. In that case, the proceedings under section 32-0 were dropped by the Tribunal on the ground that the landlord was minor. The fact situation of the given case and the present case stands on different footings. Reliance is also placed on "Rarnchandra Harsha Dalvi (Deceased) through L. Rs. Vs. D. Patwardhan (Deceased) through L. Rs.1999(1) Bom. C.R. 763 (SC). In the given case, the tenant had declined to purchase the land and due to concurrent findings of the Tribunals, the High Court had dismissed the petition of the tenant which was upheld by the Apex Court. 14. Mr. Gaware further invited my attention to certain observations in "Uttam Narndeo Mahale Vs. Vithal Deo and others" AIR 1997 SC 2695 :[1997(4) ALL MR 447 (S.C.)]. The Apex Court held that there is no specific limitation provided under section 21 of the Bombay Mamlatdar's Court Act, 1906. It is held that the eviction order could have been executed at any time. This authority is hardly of any relevance in the context of present case. The Apex Court held that there is no specific limitation provided under section 21 of the Bombay Mamlatdar's Court Act, 1906. It is held that the eviction order could have been executed at any time. This authority is hardly of any relevance in the context of present case. The rejection of the previous application under section 32-0 could not be treated as an executable order for the purpose of section 32P and as such, it could not be assumed that the any time, the Tribunal may take the action required under section 32-P because there was no limitation provided for such kind of execution. Reliance is also placed on certain observations in "Madhukar Darnodar Pawar, deceased through his heirs and legal representatives & others Vs. Madan Purshottam Pandkar and another", 2003(3) Born.C.R. 291 :[2003(1) ALL MR 695]. A learned Single Judge of this Court held that the limitation was not provided for execution of eviction order under section 21 of the Mamlatdar's Courts Act, 1906 in relation to orders under sections 31, 73 and 73-A of the BT & AL Act. The argument of Mr. Oaware is that the proceedings under section 32-P are in the form of the execution of the order because, previously, such direction was given while dropping proceedings under section 32-0 of the BT &AL Act. It is unfortunate that the copy of the order rendered by the Mamlatdar is not on record and moreover only because of disposal of the proceedings under section 320, the power under section 32-P could not have been invoked on assumption that it was to be exercised by way of execution of the order rendered under section 32-0 of the BT &AL Act. Both the sections operate in different fields. If such interpretation is not adopted, it is probable that in a given case, the proceedings under section 32-G may be dropped on the premise that the tenant was unwilling to purchase the land. Yet, the right to purchase the land may not become ineffective if he lateron shows willingness to deposit the determined price under section 32-M. The basic requirement of Section 32-P is to clearly determine the issue whether the right of the tenant has become ineffective and frustrated due to his apathy to go ahead with the proposal to purchase the tenanted land or due to his default in making payment of the determined price. The rights of tenants, who were found in possession on the Tillers' Day, cannot be lightly taken away. 15. Coming to the question of limitation, certain observations in "Mohamad Kavi Mohamad Amin Vs. Fatmabai Ibrahim" in Civil Appeal No.5023/1985, may be usefully quoted. The Apex Court observed: "Although Mr. Bhasme, learned counsel appearing for the appellant took a stand that under Section 63 of the Act aforesaid, there should not be any discrimination amongst the agriculturists with reference to the State to which such agriculturist belongs. But according to him even without going into that question the impugned order can be set aside on the ground that suo motu power has not been exercised within a reasonable time. Section 84-C of the Act does not prescribe any time for initiation of the proceeding. But in view of the settled position by several judgments of this court that wherever a power is vested in a statutory authority without prescribing any time-limit, such power should be exercised within a reasonable time. In the present case the transfer took place as early as in the year 1972 and suo motu enquiry was started by the Mamlatdar in September, 1973. If sale deeds are declared to be invalid the appellant is likely to suffer irreparable injury, because he has made investments after the aforesaid purchase. In this connection, on behalf of the appellant reliance was placed on a judgment of Justice S. B. Majmudar (as he then was in the High Court of Gujarat) in State of Gujarat Vs. Jethmal Bhagwandas Shah disposed of on 1-3-1990, where in connection with Section 84-C itself it was said that the power under the aforesaid section should be exercised within a reasonable time. This court in connection with other statutory provisions, in the case of State of Gujarat Vs. Patil Raghav Natha and in the case of Ram Chand V s. Union of India has impressed that where no time-limit is prescribed for exercise of a power under a statute it does not mean that it can be exercised at any time; such power has to be exercised within a reasonable time. We are satisfied that in the facts and circumstances. of the present case, the suo motu power under Section 84-C of the Act was not exercised by the Mamlatdar within a reasonable time. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The impugned orders are set aside. We are satisfied that in the facts and circumstances. of the present case, the suo motu power under Section 84-C of the Act was not exercised by the Mamlatdar within a reasonable time. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The impugned orders are set aside. No costs." 16. In "Radhu Gokul Gawali and others Vs. Mohan Kishan Gawali and others" 2007(6) Mh.L.J.117 : {2007(4) ALL MR 339], a Single Bench of this Court held that application under section 98 of the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 (for short, "HT &AL Act"), could not have been entertained after lapse of 18/19 years even though no limitation is provided under the relevant section. The learned Single Judge considered the Judgment in "Eknath Raghoba Vs. Somla Lalu Lamani", 1992(1) M h. L.J. 541 wherein observations of the Division Bench in Special Civil Application No.764 of 1955 were referred to by the learned Single Judge. Taking stock of the relevant case-law, the learned Single Judge observed: "The judgment of the Apex Court in the matter of Mohamad Kavi (Supra) is in relation to section 84-C and suo motu action by the authority concerned. In my view, the Apex Court judgment in Mohamad Kavi (supra) as well as Division Bench-judgment of the year 1998 has to be preferred to the of the Division Bench Judgment in Special Civil Application No.764 of 1955." It goes without saying that the learned Single Judge categorically held that even though no limitation is provided under section 98 of the HT &AL Act, yet, the action ought to be taken within a reasonable time by the authority initiating suo motu action or the party concerned resorting to such provision. 17. By analogy, the same view can be taken in the context of the action provided under section 32-P of the BT &AL Act. This Court in Gulabrao Bhaurao Kaka-de since deceased by L.Rs. and others Vs. Nivrutti Krishna Bhilare and other" 2001(4) M h. L.J. 31 :[2001(2) ALL MR 518], held that the powers under section 32(1) of the Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1947 are required to be exercised within reasonable period though no specific limitation is provided for. The absence of specific period of limitation will not give a licence to the competent authority to initiate action at any point of time though it has become too stale. The absence of specific period of limitation will not give a licence to the competent authority to initiate action at any point of time though it has become too stale. The law does not expect keeping Damocles’' sword hanging on head of any litigant for perennial period. For all these reasons, I have no hesitation in holding that institution of such proceedings under section 32-P after about 28 years was improper and barred by limitation. 18. For the reasons stated hereinabove, I am of the opinion that the impugned judgments of the learned Member of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal and the Sub Divisional Officer are patently erroneous. Hence, the petition is allowed. The impugned judgments are set aside and that of the Tahsildar is restored. Rule made absolute accordingly. No costs. Petition allowed.