Research › Search › Judgment

Gauhati High Court · body

2010 DIGILAW 295 (GAU)

Likha Saaya v. Nikh Kamin

2010-04-28

I.A.ANSARI

body2010
ORDER I.A. Ansari, J. 1. By filing an election petition, under Sections 80, read with Section 81 of the Representation of People Act, 1951 ('the ROP Act'), the opposite party herein has called, in question, the election of the present petitioner (who stands impleaded in the election petition as respondent No. 1) to the Legislative Assembly of Arunachal Pradesh from 16 Yachuli (ST) Constituency. This election petition has given rise to Election Petition No. 5/2009 and it is in this election petition that the present miscellaneous application, under Section 86 of the ROP Act, has been made by respondent No. 1 of the said election petition. With the help of this miscellaneous application, respondent No. 1 has sought for dismissal of the election petition alleging non-compliance of the provisions of Section 81of the ROP Act by the election petitioner. 2. The challenge to the maintainability of the election petition rests on several grounds. 3. The first challenge to the maintainability of the election petition is on the ground that in the first page of the Election, Petition the date of presentation has been mentioned by the election petitioner as 11.30.2009', whereas the election petitioner has mentioned, in other places of his election petition, namely, affidavit, verification, etc., the date of presentation as 30th day of November, 2009'. Respondent No. 1, therefore, contends that it is not possible to figure out as to when the election petition had, as a matter of fact, been filed. Thus, according to the respondent No. 1, the date of presentation of the election petition being not clear, the election petition needs to be held to have not been validly presented and is, therefore, liable to be dismissed by invoking the provisions of Section 86 read with Section 81 of the ROP Act. 4. While considering the above ground of challenge to the maintainability of the election petition, it needs to be pointed out that, in English language, there are several ways of mentioning a date. One and the same date may be mentioned in a variety of ways. Thus, 30th of November, 2009, can be mentioned as 30th day of November, 2009, or 30.11.2009, or 11.30.2009. This apart, the American style of writing of the said date is 11.30.2009. One and the same date may be mentioned in a variety of ways. Thus, 30th of November, 2009, can be mentioned as 30th day of November, 2009, or 30.11.2009, or 11.30.2009. This apart, the American style of writing of the said date is 11.30.2009. It is imperative to mention here that there is no provision, in the election laws, specifying the manner in which a date has to be mentioned in an election petition. 5. The question, therefore, which falls for determination, in this case, is this: whether the election petition, in question, can be dismissed on the mere ground of variation in the way of mentioning the date of presentation of the election petition and the dates, mentioned in the affidavit, verification, etc., inasmuch as the date of presentation of the election petition appears as 11.30.2009' whereas the dates, mentioned in the affidavit, verification, etc., appear as 30th day of November, 2009', particularly, when it has been clearly pointed out, on behalf of the election petitioner and has not been disputed by the respondent No. 1, that the office note of the registry as well as the Registry's official seal depict the date of filing of the election petition as the 30th day of November, 2009'? 6. Since the veracity or correctness of the report of the Registry and also of the 'date seal' are not disputed by the respondent No. 1, the objection, raised by the respondent No. 1, as to the actual date of filing of the election petition is not sustainable and cannot be acceded to. 7. Above all, when it could not be convincingly contended or shown, by the respondent No. 1, that the manner of mentioning the date, on the 1st page of the election petition and the Registry's notings and the 'date seal' have confused him and he is unable to ascertain as to when the election petition was actually presented, this election petition cannot be dismissed, particularly, when the respondent No. 1 has not been able to show that the manner of mentioning the date, as indicated hereinbefore, has caused prejudice to him. 8. 8. While considering the above aspect of the matter, it needs to be borne in mind that it is one thing to say that the correct date is difficult to figure out and it is quite another to say that the correct date of presentation of the election petition cannot be ascertained. It may be noted, in this regard, that it is not the case of the respondent No. 1 that he has not been able to figure out the date of presentation of the election petition and/or that he does not know, and has not been able to ascertain the date as to when the election petition was filed; rather, his ground of challenge rests on the mere fact that the date, mentioned on the 1st page of the election petition, is 11.30.2009', whereas the date, mentioned in the affidavit, verification, etc., is 30th day of November, 2009'. Thus, the ground of challenge is more technical in nature than substantial. On the mere technical ground, therefore, that on the 1st page of the election petition the date of presentation has been mentioned as 11.30.2009', but in the affidavit, verification, etc., the date of presentation has been mentioned as 30th day of November, 2009', the election petition cannot be held to be not maintainable and the same cannot be dismissed. 9. The other grounds of challenge, posed to the maintainability of the election petition, read as under: (a) That on the first page of the original election petition the opposite party No. 1/election petitioner has on top of the said page on the right had side written that - presented by...11.30.2009. But at the corresponding space of the first page of the copy of the election petitioner served on the applicant it is mentioned 30.11.2009 as the date of filing the election petition. Obviously, there is no similarity between 11.30.2009 and 30.11.2009. Consequently, the election petition served on the applicant is not the true copy of the election petition. (b) That under Section 81(3) of the Act the election petition petitioner is required to furnish a true copy of the election petition to the respondent. But the election petition served on the applicant being not a true copy of the original election petition there has been noncompliance of the said provisions of the Act which attracts Section 86 of the Act entailing dismissal of the election petition. But the election petition served on the applicant being not a true copy of the original election petition there has been noncompliance of the said provisions of the Act which attracts Section 86 of the Act entailing dismissal of the election petition. (c) That the endorsement on the copy of the election petition to the effect that - "attested to be true copy of the election petition" is available only on the first page of the copy of the election petition with a signature above the words 'election petitioner.' But no such endorsement is made by the election petitioner on other pages of the copy of the election petition. It would, therefore, mean that the copy of the election petition served on the applicant is not attested by the petitioner under his own signature to be a true copy of the election petition as required under Section 81(3) of the Act. (d) That while on all the pages of the copy of the election petition there is a signature on right hand side top of the petition in addition to the seal of the Commissioner of Affidavit of Gauhati High Court, there is no such seal of the Commissioner of Affidavit at page 16 of the copy of the election petition served on the applicant. It may be stated that in the original election petition filed by the opp. party No. 1 the seal of the Commissioner of Affidavit is available on all the pages. As such the copy of the election petition served on the applicant is not a true copy of the original election petition. (e) That at page 20 of the copy of the election petition appears the verification of the petitioner in support of the statements made in the election petition. But there is no signature at the bottom of the verification above the word 'signature'. However, at page 20 of the original election petition, he has put his signature at the corresponding space of the verification at page 20. As such the copy of the election petition served on the applicant is not a true copy of the election petition. 10. However, at page 20 of the original election petition, he has put his signature at the corresponding space of the verification at page 20. As such the copy of the election petition served on the applicant is not a true copy of the election petition. 10. From the ground of challenge, it can be easily discerned and gathered that what the respondent No. 1 contends, in effect, is that since the date of presentation of the election petition, as mentioned on the 1st page in the election petition, is 11.30.2009', whereas the corresponding space of the first page of the election petition, served on the respondent No. 1, mentions the date as 30.11.2009' as the date of filing of the election petition, there is no similarity between 11.30.2009' and 30.11.2009'. Pointing out to this dissimilarity in mentioning the dates, respondent No. 1 contends that the copy of the election petition, served on the respondent No. 1, is not a true copy of the election petition. This ground of challenge brings us to the question as to what the expression true copy, in the realm of an election petition, means and conveys. 11. While examining the meaning of the expression 'true copy', which appears in Section 81(3) of the ROP Act, the Supreme Court, in Murarka Radhe Shyam v. Roop Singh Rathore and Ors. AIR 1964 SC 1545 , which the respondent No. 1 relies upon, has observed and held as follows: 11. We agree with the High Court and the Election Tribunal that the first defect is not a defect at all. When every page of the copy served on the appellant was attested to be a true copy under the signature of the petitioner, a fresh signature below the word "petitioner" was not necessary. Sub-section (3) of Section 81 requires that the copy shall be attested by the petitioner under his own signature and this was done. As to the second defect, the question really turns on the true scope and effect of the word "copy" occurring in Sub-section (3) of Section 81. On behalf of the appellant the argument is that Sub-section (3) of Section 81 being mandatory in nature all the requirements of the Sub-section must be strictly complied with and the word "copy" must be taken to be an absolutely exact transcript of the original. On behalf of the appellant the argument is that Sub-section (3) of Section 81 being mandatory in nature all the requirements of the Sub-section must be strictly complied with and the word "copy" must be taken to be an absolutely exact transcript of the original. On behalf of the respondents the contention is that the word "copy" means that which comes so near to the original as to give to every person seeing it the idea created by the original. Alternatively, the argument is that the last part of Sub-section (3) dealing with a copy is merely directive, and for this reliance is placed on the decision of this Court in Kamaraja Nadar v. Kunju Thevar. We are of the view that the word "copy" in Sub-section (3) of Section 81 does not mean an absolutely exact copy, but means that the copy shall he so true that nobody can by any possibility misunderstand it (see Stroud's judicial Dictionary, 3rd edn., vol. 4, p. 3098). In this view of the matter it is unnecessary to go into the further question whether any part of Sub-section (3) of Section 81 is merely directory. Several English decisions were cited at the Bar. The earliest decision cited to us is the decision in Pocock v. Mason where it was held that the omission of the words "the" and "by" in the copy of the writ of capias prescribed by the Schedule 2 W. 4, c. 39 did not invalidate an arrest. The reason given was, thus, expressed: To ascertain whether or not an unfaithful copy produces any alteration in the meaning, supposes an exertion of intellect which it may be inconvenient to require at the hands of those who serve the copy. It was to obviate this inconvenience, that the Legislature has given a form, and required that it should be pursued. Nothing but ordinary care is necessary for taking the copy. In a later decision Sutton v. Mary and Burgess, the copy of the writ served on the defendant omitted the letter "s" in the word "she". It was held that the omission was immaterial as it could not mislead anybody. Nothing but ordinary care is necessary for taking the copy. In a later decision Sutton v. Mary and Burgess, the copy of the writ served on the defendant omitted the letter "s" in the word "she". It was held that the omission was immaterial as it could not mislead anybody. In Morris v. Smith there was a motion to set aside the service of the writ of summons for irregularity, on the ground that the defendant being an attorney, he was only described as of Paper Buildings in the Inner Temple, London and the addition of "gentleman" was not given. It was held that the form in the Statute 2 Will. 4, c. 39 Section 1 did not require the addition of the defendant to be inserted in the writ and it was sufficient to state his residence. The writ of summons was, therefore, valid. In another case in the same volume Cooke v. Vaughan it was held that where a writ of capias described the defendant by the addition of "gentleman", but that addition was omitted in the copy served, the copy was not a copy of the writ, in compliance with the Statute 2 Will. 4, c. 39, Section 4. On behalf of the respondents a number of decisions under the Bills of Sale Act, 1878 and the Amendment Act, 1882 (45 and 46 Vict. c. 43) were cited. The question in those cases was whether the bill was "in accordance with the form in the schedule to this Act annexed" as required by Section 9 of the Bills of Sale Act 1878, and Amendment Act 1882. In re Hewer. Ex parte Kahen it was held that a "true copy" of a bill of sale within the Bills of Sale Act 1878, Section 10, Sub-Section 2, must not necessarily be an exact copy, so long as any errors or omissions in the copy filed are merely clerical and of such a nature that no one would be thereby misled. The same view was expressed in several other decisions and it is unnecessary to refer to them all. Having regard to the provisions of Part VI of the Act, we are of the view that the word "cow" does not mean an absolutely exact copy. It means a copy so true that nobody can by any possibility misunderstand it. The same view was expressed in several other decisions and it is unnecessary to refer to them all. Having regard to the provisions of Part VI of the Act, we are of the view that the word "cow" does not mean an absolutely exact copy. It means a copy so true that nobody can by any possibility misunderstand it. The test whether the copy is a true one is whether any variation from the original is calculated to mislead an ordinary person. Applying that test we have come to the conclusion that the defects complained of with regard to election petition No. 269 of 1962 were not such as to mislead the appellant; therefore, there was no failure to comply with the last part of Sub-section (3) of Section 81. In that view of the matter Sub-section (3) of Section 90 was not attracted and there was no question of dismissing the election petition under that Sub-section by reason of any failure to comply with the provisions of Section 81. This disposes of the second preliminary objection raised before us. 12. What the decision, in Murarka Radhe Shyam (supra), conveys is this: when every, page of the copy of an election petition, served on the returned candidate, stands attested to be a true copy under the signature of the election petitioner, a fresh signature, below the word 'petitioner', is not necessary. So long as the copy stands attested by an election petitioner under the petitioner's own signature, no further signature is required to be put on the copy of the election petition, which may be served on the returned candidate. The word 'copy', in Sub-Section 3 of Section 81, does not mean an absolutely exact copy; rather, what the word 'copy', in Section 81(3), means is that the copy shall be so true that nobody can, by any possibility, misunderstands it. Thus, the word 'copy', appearing in Section 81(3), does not mean an absolutely exact copy. The test, therefore, is whether any variation from the original is calculated to mislead an ordinary person. 13. The expression, 'true copy' has also come to be explained, as rightly pointed out on behalf of the respondent No. 1, in the case of Mithilesh Kumar Pandey v. Baidyanath Yadav AIR 1984 SC 305 , wherein the Supreme Court, in Para 15, observed and held as under: 15. 13. The expression, 'true copy' has also come to be explained, as rightly pointed out on behalf of the respondent No. 1, in the case of Mithilesh Kumar Pandey v. Baidyanath Yadav AIR 1984 SC 305 , wherein the Supreme Court, in Para 15, observed and held as under: 15. On a careful consideration and scrutiny of the law on the subject, the following principles are well established: (1) that where the copy of the election petition served on the returned candidate contains only clerical or typographical mistakes which are of no consequence, the petition cannot be dismissed straightaway under Section 86 of the Act, (2) a true copy means a copy which is wholly and substantially the same as the original and where there are insignificant or minimal mistakes, the court may not take notice thereof, (3) where the copy contains important omissions or discrepancies of a vital nature, which are likely to cause prejudice to the defence of the returned candidate, it cannot be said that there has been a substantial compliance with the provisions of Section 81(3) of the Act, (4) prima facie, the statute uses the words 'true copy' and the concept of substantial compliance cannot be extended too far to include serious or vital mistakes which shed the character of a true copy so that the copy furnished to the returned candidate cannot be said to be a true copy within the meaning of Section 81(3) of the Act, and (5) as Section 81(3) is meant to protect and safeguard the sacrosanct electoral process so as not to disturb the verdict of the voters, there is no room for giving a liberal or broad interpretation of the provisions of the said section. 14. From the decisions, in Murarka Radhe Shyam (supra), and Mithilesh Kumar Pandey (supra), it becomes more than abundantly clear that the Supreme Court has summarised the position of law as to what a true copy in an election petition means and requires to be complied with. The decision, in Mithilesh Kumar Pandey (supra), makes it clear that a mere clerical or typographical mistake, which is of no consequence, cannot be treated as a defect warranting dismissal of an election petition under Section 86. The decision, in Mithilesh Kumar Pandey (supra), makes it clear that a mere clerical or typographical mistake, which is of no consequence, cannot be treated as a defect warranting dismissal of an election petition under Section 86. A 'true copy' means a copy, which is wholly and substantially the same as the original one and even if there are insignificant or minimal mistakes, the court may not take notice thereof. However, the Supreme Court has made it clear, in Mithilesh Kumar Pandey (supra), that if the copy of an election petition contains important omissions or discrepancies of a vital nature, which are likely to cause prejudice to the defence of the returned candidate, it cannot be said that there has been a substantial compliance with the provisions of Section 81(3) of the Act. 15. In Mithilesh Kumar Pandey (supra), the Supreme Court has held that prima facie the stature uses the words 'true copy' and the concept of substantial compliance cannot be extended too far to include serious or vital mistakes, which shed the character of a true copy so that the copy, furnished to the returned candidate, cannot be said to be a true copy within the meaning of Section81(3) of the Act. Section 81(3) is intended to protect and safeguard the sanctity of an electoral process so as not to disturb the verdict of the voters and, hence, the question of giving a liberal or broad interpretation of the provisions of Section 81(3) does not arise at all. 16. Except the fact that on the top of the 1st page of the election petition, the date mentioned is 11.30.2009 and the corresponding space on the first page of the copy of the election petition, served on the respondent No. 1, mentions the date as 30.11.2009, respondent No. 1 has not even pleaded that there is any material variation between the original election petition filed in this Court and the copy served on the respondent No. 1. This apart, respondent No. 1 has not shown as to what prejudice has been caused to him by the manner in which the dates have been mentioned in the election petition and the copy of the election petition. This apart, respondent No. 1 has not shown as to what prejudice has been caused to him by the manner in which the dates have been mentioned in the election petition and the copy of the election petition. It is not the case of the respondent No. 1 that he has not been able to understand the date of presentation or filing of the election petition or that there is some confusion in his mind; rather, the grievance of the respondent No. 1 is entirely technical, whereas the decision, in Murarka Radhe Shyam (supra), shows that when there is no possibility of anyone misunderstanding the contents of a petition from the copy thereof, the copy cannot be said to be not a 'true copy'. The test, as pointed out in Murarka Radhe Shyam's case (supra), is as to whether any variation from the original is calculated to mislead an ordinary person. As already observed hereinbefore, it is not the case of the respondent No. 1 that he has been misled and has not been able to understand as to what the correct date of presentation of the election petition was and/or that the two different styles of mentioning of the dates in the election petition and in the copy thereof, furnished to the respondent No. 1, has caused confusion in his mind and he does not know as to what the correct date of presentation of the election petition was/Thus, the challenge of the respondent No. 1, being entirely based on technicalities, cannot justify dismissal of the election petition. 17. In the light of the decision in Mithilesh Kumar (supra), one can safely gather that when an election petition contains only clerical or typographical mistake, which are of no consequence, the election petition cannot be dismissed and that a true copy would mean a copy, which is wholly and substantially the same as the original, and, further, where there are insignificant or minimal mistake, the court may not take notice thereof. When the omissions or discrepancies are not of vital nature and/or when the omissions or discrepancies are such, which are not likely to cause prejudice to the defence of the returned candidate, it cannot be said that there has been non-compliance of the provisions of Section 81(3) of the ROP Act. 18. When the omissions or discrepancies are not of vital nature and/or when the omissions or discrepancies are such, which are not likely to cause prejudice to the defence of the returned candidate, it cannot be said that there has been non-compliance of the provisions of Section 81(3) of the ROP Act. 18. Turning to the respondent No. 1's grievance as regard the variations in the copy of the election petition, namely, absence of the seal of the Commissioner of Affidavit at pages 15 and 16 and place of putting of signature of the election petitioner at page 20 are insignificant and the mistake, if any, is minimal in nature and, hence, these variations cannot be said to have constituted an omission or discrepancy of vital nature, which can cause prejudice to the defence of the returned candidate or cause prejudice to the effective defence. of the respondent No. 1. In fact, it has not been even pointed out, on behalf of the respondent No. 1, that the variation between the original election petition filed in this Court and the copy thereof, served on the respondent No. 1, is of such an extent or of such a dimension that the variation has caused prejudice to the respondent No. 1 leading him to misunderstand the election petitioner's case. 19. While considering the above aspect of the challenge to the maintainability of the present election petition, a reference needs to be made to the decision of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, in T.M. Jacob v. C. Poulose (1999) 4 SCC 274 , wherein the Supreme Court has explained the word 'copy', appearing in Section 81(3) of the ROP Act, and also the object of serving true copy of an election petition on the winning candidate. The relevant observations, which appear in para 33, 34, 35 and 36 of T.M. Jacob (supra), read as under: 33, Does the word "copy" occurring in Section 81(3) of the Act mean an absolutely exact copy or does it mean a copy so true that nobody could by any possibility misunderstand it. This matter is no longer res integra. In Murarka Radhey Shyam Ram Kumar v. Roop Singh Rathore a Constitution Bench of this Court elaborately dealt with this question after referring to a catena of authorities. This matter is no longer res integra. In Murarka Radhey Shyam Ram Kumar v. Roop Singh Rathore a Constitution Bench of this Court elaborately dealt with this question after referring to a catena of authorities. It was held that the test to determine whether a copy was a true one or not was to find out whether any variation from the original was calculated to mislead a reasonable person. The Constitution Bench found as untenable the contention that since copies of the petition served on the returned candidate did not contain the signatures of the petitioner below the word "petitioner", on the copies of the petition served on the respondent, they had ceased to be true copies of the original petition, attracting the consequences of Section 86(1) of the Act. The Bench opined: Having regard to the provisions of Part VI of the Act, we are of the view that the word 'copy' does not mean an absolutely exact copy. It means a copy so true that nobody can by any possibility misunderstand it. The test whether the copy is a true one is whether any variation from the original is calculated to mislead an ordinary person. Applying that test we have come to the conclusion that the defects complained of with regard to Election Petition No. 269 of 1962 were not such as to mislead the appellant; therefore, there was no failure to comply with the last part of Sub-section (3) of Section 81. In that view of the matter Sub-section (3) of Section 90 was not attracted and there was no question of dismissing the election petition under that Sub-section by reason of any failure to comply with the provisions of Section 81. The Bench also opined: When every page of the copy served on the appellant was attested to be a true copy under the signature of the petitioner, a fresh signature below the word 'petitioner' was not necessary. Sub-section (3) of Section 81 requires that the copy shall be attested by the petitioner under his own signature and this was done. As to the second defect the question really turns on the true scope and effect of the word 'copy' occurring in Sub-section (3) of Section 81. Sub-section (3) of Section 81 requires that the copy shall be attested by the petitioner under his own signature and this was done. As to the second defect the question really turns on the true scope and effect of the word 'copy' occurring in Sub-section (3) of Section 81. On behalf of the appellant the argument is that Sub-section (3) of Section81 being mandatory in nature all the requirements of the Sub-section must be strictly complied with and the word 'copy' must be taken to be an absolutely exact transcript of the original. On behalf of the respondents the contention is that the word 'copy' means that which comes so near to the original as to give to every person seeing it the idea created by the original. Alternatively, the argument is that the last part of Sub-section (3) dealing with a copy is merely directive, and for this reliance is placed on the decision of this Court in K. Kamaraja Nadar v. Kunju Thevar. We are of the view that the word 'copy' in Sub-section (3) of Section 81does not mean an absolutely exact copy, but means that the copy shall be so true that nobody can by any possibility misunderstand it (see Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 3rd edn., vol. 4, p. 3098). In this view of the matter it is unnecessary to go into the further question whether any part of Sub-section (3) of Section 81 is merely directory. (emphasis ours) 34. Similar view was reiterated by another Constitution Bench in Ch. Subbarao v. Member, Election Tribunal, Hyderabad wherein it was held that the expression "copy" occurring in Section 81(3) of the Act did not moan an exact copy but only one so true that no reasonable person could by any possibility misunderstand it as not being the same as the original. Agreeing with the view of the Constitution Bench in Murarka Radhey Shyam Ram Kumar case the Constitution Bench in Ch. Subbarao case ruled that substantial compliance with Section 81(3) was sufficient and the petition could not be dismissed where there had been substantial compliance with the requirements of Section 81(3) of the Act, in limine, under Section 81(1)of the Act. We are in respectful agreement with the view expressed by the Constitution Bench in Murarka Radhey Shyam Ram Kumar case as well as in Ch. Subbarao case. 35. We are in respectful agreement with the view expressed by the Constitution Bench in Murarka Radhey Shyam Ram Kumar case as well as in Ch. Subbarao case. 35. The object of serving a "true copy" of an election petition and the affidavit filed in support of the allegations of corrupt practice on the respondent in the election petition is to enable the respondent to understand the charge against him. so that he can effectively meet the same in the written statement and prepare his defence. The requirement is, thus, of substance and not of form. 36. The expression "copy" in Section 81(3) of the Act, in our opinion, means a copy which is substantially so and which does not contain any material or substantial variation of a vital nature as could possible mislead a reasonable person to understand and meet the charges/allegations made against him in the election petition. Indeed a copy which differs in material particulars from the original cannot be treated as a true copy of the original within the meaning of Section 81(3) of the Act and the vital defect cannot be permitted to be cured after the expiry of the period of limitation. 20. From the observations made and the position of law, explained by the Supreme Court, in T.M. Jacob (supra), as to what the word 'copy', appearing in Section 81(3) of the ROP Act, shall be taken to mean, it becomes clear that the word 'copy' means a copy, which is substantially a copy of the original and which does not contain any material or substantial variation of a vital nature as could possibly mislead a reasonable person to understand and meet the charges/allegations, made against him, in the election petition. A copy, which differs in material particulars from the original, cannot, therefore, be treated as a 'true copy' of the original within the meaning of Section 81(3) of ROP Act and that the vital defect cannot be permitted to be cured after the expiry of the period of limitation. 21. Yet another ground, on which the maintainability of the election petition has been challenged, is with regard to non-attestation of every page of the copy of the election petition, served on the respondent No. 1, to be 'true copy' of the Election petition by the petitioner. 21. Yet another ground, on which the maintainability of the election petition has been challenged, is with regard to non-attestation of every page of the copy of the election petition, served on the respondent No. 1, to be 'true copy' of the Election petition by the petitioner. While considering this aspect of the objection, raised by the respondent No. 1, it needs to be carefully noted that the fact, that in the copy of the Election, served upon the respondent No. 1, the election petitioner has put his attestation, in his own handwriting, with signature, at the front page of the copy of the election petition, mentioning therein as the 'true copy' of the election petition, is not in dispute. It is also not in dispute that each and every page of the copy of the election petition, served upon the respondent No. 1, does contain the signature of the election petitioner. 22. I may pause here to point out that a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court, in Dr. Anup Singh v. Abdul Ghani AIR 1965 SC 815 , followed the view taken by another Constitution Bench of the Apex Court, in Subba Rao v. Member, Election TribunalAIR (1964) SC 1027, and reiterated the principle that even in the absence of attestation to be 'true copy' by the election petitioner, when there is signature of the election petitioner, in original, in the copy, served upon the respondent, "the presence of such original signature in the copy was sufficient to Indicate that the copy was attested, even though the words 'true copy' were not written above the signature in the copies". Based on the observations, so made, the Supreme Court has held that even if an election petitioner does not scribe the words, 'true copy', in each page of the copy of an election petition, it would still be treated as substantial compliance of Section 81(3) of the ROP Act if the election petitioner has put his signature on the copy of the election petition served on the respondent. 23. In the case of M. Kamalam v. Dr. 23. In the case of M. Kamalam v. Dr. V.A. Syed Mohammad AIR 1978 SC 840 , the Supreme Court has held that although no signature is appended by the election petitioner on the copy of the election petition and the election petitioner puts his signature only at the bottom of the copy of the Affidavit, it can be held as sufficient compliance with the requirement of Section 81(3) of the ROP Act. It was also held, in M. Kamalam (supra), thus, "The law does not require that the authenticating signature must he made by the petitioner at any particular place of the copy of the election petition. It may be made at the top of the copy or in the middle, or at the end. The place of the signature is immaterial so long as it appears that it is intended to authenticate the copy". 24. From the observations, appearing above, in the case of M. Kamalam (supra), it clearly follows that the law does not require that the authenticating signature of the election petitioner must appear at any particular place of the copy of the election petition and, hence, the signature may be put by the election petitioner at the top of the copy, or in the middle, or at the end. The Supreme Court has further clarified, in M. Kamalam (supra), that the place of signature is immaterial so long as it appears that it is intended to authenticate the copy. 25. In the present case, the signature of the election petitioner does not appear at the bottom of the application made by him. This, by it self, would not make the election petition so vague as to hold that the election petition has boon rendered thereby not maintainable in law, particularly, when each page of the election petition does contain the signature of the election petitioner signifying thereby that what has been furnished to the respondent is a true copy of the election petition. 26. Because of what have been discussed and pointed out above, this Court does no find that the election petition and/or copy thereof, served on the respondent No. 1, suffers from such omission, defect or variation, which shall be taken to have rendered the election petition not maintainable in law. 27. 26. Because of what have been discussed and pointed out above, this Court does no find that the election petition and/or copy thereof, served on the respondent No. 1, suffers from such omission, defect or variation, which shall be taken to have rendered the election petition not maintainable in law. 27. Situated, thus, I hold that there is no merit in the objections, raised by the respondent No. 1, to the maintainability of the present election petition. Consequently, this application fails and the same shall accordingly stand dismissed. 28. With the above observations and directions, this Miscellaneous Case shall stand disposed of. 29. No order as to costs.