Judgment :- 1. The second appeal, in S.A.No.487 of 2010, has been filed against the judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court, dated 30.4.2009, made in A.S.No.611 of 2006, on the file of the V Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai, confirming the judgment and decree, dated 27.6.2006, made in O.S.No.3286 of 2003, on the file of the XIV Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai. 2. The second appeal, in S.A.No.488 of 2010, has been filed against the judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court, dated 30.4.2009, made in A.S.No.612 of 2006, on the file of the V Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai, confirming the judgment and decree, dated 27.6.2006, made in O.S.No.3697 of 2003, on the file of the XIV Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai. 3. In the second appeal, in S.A.No.487 of 2010, the defendants 1 to 6 in the suit, in O.S.No.3286 of 2003, are the appellants. The first respondent in the second appeal was the plaintiff in the said suit. 4. The plaintiff had filed the suit, in O.S.No.3286 of 2003, on the file of the XIV Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai, praying for a decree of permanent injunction restraining the defendants 1 to 7 in the suit and their men from interfering with the plaintiff’s peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property, and for a permanent injunction restraining the said defendants from alienating the suit schedule property to any third party, pursuant to the agreement of sale, dated 6.3.2002, registered on the file of the Office of the Sub Registrar, VirugambakkaM, in Document No.2475/02. 5. In the second appeal, in S.A.No.488 of 2010, the appellants were the plaintiffs 1 to 6 in the suit, in O.S.No.3697 of 2003. The respondent was the defendant in the said suit. 6. The plaintiffs had filed the suit, in O.S.No.3697 of 2003, on the file of the XIV Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai, praying for a decree of declaration, declaring that the defendant has no right to interfere with the plaintiffs’ possession of the plaint schedule property, and for a permanent injunction restraining the defendant, her servants, men and agents from interfering with the plaintiffs’ possession of the plaint schedule property and for costs. 7. 7. Since, the facts and circumstances of the case, in both the second appeals, are the same and common issues have been raised for consideration of this Court in the second appeals, a common judgment is passed. 8. The plaintiff in the suit, in O.S.No.3286 of 2003, namely, K.Amudha, who is the first respondent in the second appeal, in S.A.No.487 of 2010, was the defendant in the suit, in O.S.No.3697 of 2003. She had been shown as the respondent in the second appeal, in S.A.No.488 of 2010. 9. K.Amudha, the plaintiff in the suit, in O.S.No.3286 of 2003, had stated that she is the adopted daughter of late M.Somasundara Mudaliar. In the year 1941, late M.Somasundara Mudaliar had purchased the suit schedule property from one Arunachala Naicker. The suit property purchased by M.Somasundara Mudaliar is situated at No.103, Nesapakkam Village, in S.No.97, New T.S.No.44, Block No.3, with an extent of 72 cents, in Saidapet Taluk, Chengalpet District, within the Sub Registration District of Kodambakkam and the Registration District of South Madras. 10. The sale deed had been registered, as Document No.1170/1941, at the office of the Sub Registrar, Saidapet, Chennai. After the registration of the sale deed, M.Somasundara Mudaliar had taken possession of the land and he had developed the dry land, by planting guava and mango trees. M.Somasundara Mudaliar and his wife Kuppammal had three children. However, as none of them had survived, he had decided to adopt his nephew Kandasamy’s son Mohanasundaram @ Dakshinamurthy, on 7.2.1973. Later, he had also adopted his daughter, Amudha. After their adoption, both of them had started living with M.Somasundara Mudaliar. 11. It had also been stated that M.Somasundara Mudaliar had purchased properties in many places. In the year, 1976, he had executed a Will and testament, dated 5.3.1976, at Chennai and had registered it, as Document No.10 of 1976, at the office of the Sub Registrar, T.Nagar, Chennai. In the Will, dated 5.3.1976, M.Somasundara Mudaliar had bequeathed all his properties to his brother-in-law’s son and his adopted son Mohanasundaram @ Dakshinamurthy, and his adopted daughter Amudha. By the said Will M.Somasundara Mudaliar had bequeathed Schedule–A land to Mohanasundaram @ Dakshinamurthy, and schedule-B land to Amudha. Kandsamy had been appointed as the executor of the Will. However, M.Somasundara Mudaliar had, specifically, wanted all his properties to be enjoyed by his wife Kuppammal, as life estate holder, without any right of alienation or mortgage. By the said Will M.Somasundara Mudaliar had bequeathed Schedule–A land to Mohanasundaram @ Dakshinamurthy, and schedule-B land to Amudha. Kandsamy had been appointed as the executor of the Will. However, M.Somasundara Mudaliar had, specifically, wanted all his properties to be enjoyed by his wife Kuppammal, as life estate holder, without any right of alienation or mortgage. 12. The plaintiff had stated that by a Codicil, dated 4.3.1983, M.Somasundara Mudaliar had taken away some of the properties in schedule-B, without disturbing the disputed suit schedule property. Thereafter, Kandasamy, Administrator and Executor of the Will had moved the High Court of Judicature at Madras for the probation of the will, dated 5.3.1976 and the Codicil, dated 4.3.1983. By an order, dated 23.7.1986, the High Court had ordered the Will, as probated. Consequently, the plaintiff had got the property subject to the life estate given to Kuppammal. The plaintiff had further stated that Kuppammal, wife of late M.Somasundara Mudaliar, the testator had passed away, on 28.2.1994. Thereafter, the plaintiff has been in possession and enjoyment of the suit property, after the probation of the Will. Since, she was not in a position to maintain the property she had appointed one Loganathan, as the power agent to act on her behalf. 13. The plaintiff has further stated that the defendants 1 to 6, without showing the sale deed, date 14.7.1941, executed by Arunachala Naicker, in favour of M.Somasundara Mudaliar, and without mentioning about the probation of the Will, by an order of the High Court, dated 23.7.1986, had entered into an agreement to sell the property of the plaintiff, with one Duraisamy, Son of Vembuli Naicker, the 7th defendant. The said document, dated 6.5.2002, bearing Document No.2475/2002, had been registered at the office of the Sub Registrar, Virugambakkam, with the mala fide intention of grabbing the property in question. On coming to know about the said agreement, the plaintiff had instructed her power of attorney to issue a public notice in the newspaper, dated 23.6.2002, declaring that the plaintiff is the owner of the property and that the agreement entered into by the defendants is illegal and void. 14. In the written statement filed on behalf of the defendants, it had been stated that the averments and allegations made in the plaint filed in the suit, in O.S.No.3286 of 2003, are false and incorrect. 14. In the written statement filed on behalf of the defendants, it had been stated that the averments and allegations made in the plaint filed in the suit, in O.S.No.3286 of 2003, are false and incorrect. It had been submitted that it is correct to state that the suit property had been purchased by late M.Somasundara Mudaliar in the year, 1941. Further, the said sale is only a sham and nominal one, as it had not been intended to be acted upon. The said sale had been made, as there was some threat from third party purchasers and only with the intention of saving the property, the sale deed had been executed. The sale deed was never acted upon, and the possession of the property had not been handed over by late Arunachala Naicker. As such, the claims of the plaintiff that late M.Somasundara Mudaliar had taken possession of the suit land, and that he had developed the land by planting guava and mango trees are incorrect. In fact, the possession of the suit property continued to be with Arunachala Naicker, and after his death it has been with the defendants. The defendants have been in exclusive possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property, for a long time. 15. The agreement of sale entered into by the defendants 1 to 6, in favour of the 7th defendant, is a valid agreement. The said position is confirmed by the fact that the writ petition filed by the defendants, in the suit before the High Court of Judicature at Madras, in W.P.No.13982 of 1985, challenging the land acquisition proceedings for the Ramapuram Neighbourhood Scheme of the Tamil Nadu Housing Board, had been allowed by the High Court, by its order, dated 7.11.1991. Even otherwise, the defendants had acquired title in respect of the suit property, by adverse possession. Hence, the suit filed by the plaintiff is devoid of merits and therefore, it is liable to be dismissed. 16. Similar averments and allegations have been made by the parties in the plaint and in the written statement filed in the suit, in O.S.No.3697 of 2003, on the file of the XIV Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai, by the parties therein. 16. 16. Similar averments and allegations have been made by the parties in the plaint and in the written statement filed in the suit, in O.S.No.3697 of 2003, on the file of the XIV Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai, by the parties therein. 16. Based on the averments made on behalf of the opposing parties, the trial Court had framed the following points for consideration, with regard to the suit, in O.S.No.3286 of 2003: “1) Whether the suit property is in the enjoyment of the plaintiff? 2) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of permanent injunction, as prayed for by her? 3) What relief the plaintiff is entitled to?” 17. With regard to the suit, in O.S.No.3697 of 2003, the trial Court had framed the following issues for consideration: “1) Whether the plaintiffs are in possession and enjoyment of the suit property? 2) Whether the suit is maintainable without a prayer for the relief of declaration of title. 3) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief of permanent injunction, as prayed for in the suit? 4) What relief the plaintiffs are entitled to?” 18. During the trial of both the suits taken up together by the trial Court, the power of attorney of the plaintiff, Amudha, in O.S.No.3286 of 2003, had been examined as P.W.1 and one Rajaram Pandiyan had been examined as P.W.2. Exhibits A-1 to A-23 had been marked on her side. 19. On the side of the defendants, in O.S.No.3286 of 2003, the 6th defendant Pattabiraman had been examined as D.W.1 and the adjacent land owners of the disputed suit property had been examined as D.W.2 to D.W.7. Exs.B-1 to B-25 had been marked on the side of the defendants. 20. In view of the submissions made on behalf of the parties concerned and on analyzing the evidence available, the trial Court had found that the defendants in the suit, in O.S.No.3286 of 2003, had not objected to the plaintiff in the said suit being represented by her power agent. The trial Court had further found that the property described in Ex.A-1, sale deed, dated 19.4.1938, and the suit property are one and the same. It was seen that the property had been purchased by Arunachala Naicker from one Sriramulu Reddiar, by way of a registered sale deed. 21. The trial Court had further found that the property described in Ex.A-1, sale deed, dated 19.4.1938, and the suit property are one and the same. It was seen that the property had been purchased by Arunachala Naicker from one Sriramulu Reddiar, by way of a registered sale deed. 21. It was found from Ex.A-2, dated 4.6.1940, that it was a mortgage deed, which had been executed by Arunachala Naicker, in favour of Sivaram Naicker and Natesa Naicker. The trial Court had noted the recitals in Ex.A-2 and Ex.B-2, mortgage deed, dated 4.6.1940. It had also taken note of the fact that, by way of Ex.A-1 sale deed, Arunachala Naicker, had sold the property to M.Somasundara Mudaliar, by way of a registered sale deed, dated 14.7.1941, on the same day when the mortgage had been released. 22. From the recitals in the sale deed, dated 14.7.1941, the trial Court had found that the sale was not a sham and nominal one, as alleged by the defendants. It was found that the sale of the suit property was a valid transaction, for a valid consideration. The trial Court had found that no documents had been filed on behalf of the defendants to support their claim that the sale was a sham and nominal one. 23. The trial Court had also found that no steps had been taken to cancel the sale, dated 14.7.1941, either by Arunachala Naicker, or by his legal heirs, who are the defendants in the suit, even after the lapse of a number of years. Before the trial Court, Ex.A-4 will, dated 5.3.1976, had been marked on behalf of the plaintiffs. The said Will had been executed by M.Somasundara Mudaliar in favour of the adopted daughter, the plaintiff in the suit, in O.S.No.3286 of 2003, and his adopted son Mohanasundaram @ Dakshinamurthy. Thereafter, on 4.3.1983, Ex.A-5 codicil had also been executed by M.Somasundara Mudaliar. Both the Will, dated 5.3.1976, as well as the Codicil, dated 4.3.1983, has been probated by an order of the High Court of Judicature at Madras, dated 23.4.1986, marked as Ex.A-7. 24. The trial Court had found that even after the execution of the Will and the Codicil by M.Somasundara Mudaliar, Arunachala Naicker, and his legal heirs had not raised any objection. 24. The trial Court had found that even after the execution of the Will and the Codicil by M.Somasundara Mudaliar, Arunachala Naicker, and his legal heirs had not raised any objection. In such circumstances, the trial Court had come to the conclusion that Ex.A-3 sale deed, dated 14.7.1941, is a valid document, as it was not a sham and nominal sale deed, as alleged by the defendants. 25. It had also been found that Pattabiraman, examined as D.W.1, had accepted that objections had not been raised, either by Arunachala Naicker, or by his legal heirs, who are the defendants in the suit, against the Ex.A-4 Will, dated 5.3.1976, and Ex.A-5 Codicil, dated 4.3.1983, executed by M.Somasundara Mudaliar. He had also accepted that the documents like tax receipts, patta, chitta and other revenue records had not been filed to substantiate their claims made on behalf of the defendants. 26. It had also been accepted that the persons, whose names were found in Exs.B-11 to B-14 were not connected with the suit. The trial Court had also found that, even though the defendants had claimed that they have been in possession and enjoyment of the suit properties, for a period of nearly 65 years, no documents had been filed to support their claims. Witnesses D.W.2 to D.W.5 and D.W.7 and D.W.8, examined on behalf of the defendants, had stated that they had not known about the sale deed in question, and that they had no knowledge about the possession of the suit property, by the defendants. 27. Further, the trial Court had found that the claims made on behalf of the plaintiff had been substantiated by sufficient evidence, both oral, as well as documentary. In such circumstances, the trial Court had decreed the suit, in O.S.No.3286 of 2003, in favour of the plaintiff in the said suit, by its judgment and decree, dated 27.6.2006, and dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiffs therein, who were the defendants in the suit, in O.S.No.3286 of 2003. 28. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the trial Court, dated 27.6.2006, the defendants in the suit, in O.S.No.3286 of 2003, had filed an appeal, on the file of the V Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai, in A.S.No.611 of 2006. 29. 28. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the trial Court, dated 27.6.2006, the defendants in the suit, in O.S.No.3286 of 2003, had filed an appeal, on the file of the V Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai, in A.S.No.611 of 2006. 29. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the trial Court, dated 27.6.2006, the plaintiffs in the suit, in O.S.No.3697 of 2003, had filed an appeal, on the file of the V Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai, in A.S.No.612 of 2006. 30. The trial Court had passed a common judgment, dated 27.6.2006. However, two decrees, dated 27.6.2006, had been passed. By the decree, dated 27.6.2006, made in O.S.No.3286 of 2003, the suit had been allowed and by the decree, dated 27.6.2006, made in O.S.No.3697 of 2003, the suit had been dismissed. 31. During the hearing of the appeal, in A.S.No.611 of 2006, the appellants had filed a petition, under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, in C.M.P.No.889 of 2008, to permit them to mark certain additional documents. The First Appellate Court had allowed the petition, based on which the appellants had marked Exs.B-26 to Ex.B-30, in support of their contentions. 32. The First Appellate Court had framed the following points for consideration: “1. Whether the appellants in both the appeals are entitled for the relief of injunction, as prayed for in O.S.No.3697 of 2003? 2. Whether the suit filed by the plaintiff in O.S.No.3286 of 2003 is liable to be dismissed? 3. Whether both the appeals are allowable or not?” 33. The First Appellate Court had noted that the appellants had claimed that the property of Arunachala Naicker was in their possession, as it had been mentioned, by the witnesses D.W.2 to D.W.7, that the property was located adjacent to their properties, and that Arunachala Naicker and his legal heirs, were in possession of the property in question. However, the First Appellate Court had found that the said claim had not been substantiated by sufficient evidence. It had also been noted that the appellants had claimed that, in view of Exs.B-10 to B-16, it was clear that Arunachala Naicker was in actual possession and enjoyment of the suit property, and after his death the appellants were continuing in possession and enjoyment of the said property. It had also been noted that the appellants had claimed that, in view of Exs.B-10 to B-16, it was clear that Arunachala Naicker was in actual possession and enjoyment of the suit property, and after his death the appellants were continuing in possession and enjoyment of the said property. However, the First Appellate Court had come to the conclusion that the appellants had not been in a position to show that they are in actual possession and enjoyment of the suit property, after the death of Arunachala Naicker, in the year, 1980. 34. It had also been noted that the respondent in the first appeal had got the title to the suit property through her grand father, M.Somasundara Mudaliar, who had purchased the property from Arunachala Naicker, in the year, 1941 and subsequently, bequeathed the said property, by way of a Will, marked as Ex.A-4 and the Codicil, marked as Ex.A-5, which had been duly probated, as seen from Ex.A-7. 35. The claim of the appellants that the sale deed, by which M.Somasundara Mudaliar had purchased the suit properties from Arunachala Naicker, had not been acted upon and that the possession and enjoyment of the property had always been with Arunachala Naicker, and after his death with the appellants had not been sufficiently substantiated, by acceptable evidence. 36. The First Appellate Court had also found, from the evidence available on record, that certain writ petitions had been filed before the High Court of Judicature at Madras, challenging the land acquisition proceedings and that the writ petitions had been allowed. However, due to the non-appearance of the land owners the title in respect of the lands in question, could not be determined. The First appellate Court had held that even though the appellants had claimed that the document executed by Aruanchala Naicker, in favour of M.Somasundara Mudaliar, was a sham and nominal document, it was clear that no steps had been taken, either by Aruanchala Naicker, or by the appellants in the first appeal, to set aside the said sale. It had also been noted that the documents, marked as Ex.A-1 to A-3, were more than 30 years old and that as per Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the said documents were presumed to be genuine in nature. It had also been noted that the documents, marked as Ex.A-1 to A-3, were more than 30 years old and that as per Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the said documents were presumed to be genuine in nature. It had also been found that the appellants were not in a position to show that they were in possession and enjoyment of the suit property. 37. In such circumstances, the First Appellate Court had confirmed the findings of the trial Court, by its judgment and decrees, dated 30.4.2009, made in A.S.Nos.611 and 612 of 2006. Two separate decrees, dated 30.4.2009, had been passed, in A.S.Nos.611 of 2006 and A.S.No.612 of 2006, dismissing the appeals filed by the appellants. 38. Aggrieved by the judgment and decrees of the First Appellate Court, dated 30.4.2009, made in A.S.Nos.611 and 612 of 2006, two second appeals have been filed before this Court, in S.A.Nos.487 and 488 of 2010, raising the following questions, as substantial questions of law: 39. The appellants, in S.A.No.487 of 2010, had raised the following questions, as substantial questions of law: “1) Whether the Courts below are right in rejecting the claim of the appellant that Exhibit A1 Sale Deed is sham and nominal document and it was never acted upon. 2) Whether the Courts below are right in holding that the plaintiff is in possession in the suit property admittedly no oral and documentary evidences were filed by the plaintiff to prove her possession? 3) Whether the Courts below are right in considering the Exhibit A12 is a valid document, while the NJ Stamp paper sold stands in the name of Sivakami, but in the stamp paper, the plaintiff’s name is mentioned as Purchaser of the stamp which obviously cooked up for the purpose of this case. 4) Whether the Courts below erred right in rejecting Exhibit B10 to B16 in all which the boundaries makes it very clear, the existence of Arunahcala Naicker’s land as one of the boundary. 5) Whether the Courts below are right in holding that the exhibits A20 and A21 the Corporation Tax Assessment is not a manipulated one while admittedly the cancellation was made after the 6th defendant Pattabiraman filed Writ Petition to cancel the document in question before this Hon’ble Court.” 40. 5) Whether the Courts below are right in holding that the exhibits A20 and A21 the Corporation Tax Assessment is not a manipulated one while admittedly the cancellation was made after the 6th defendant Pattabiraman filed Writ Petition to cancel the document in question before this Hon’ble Court.” 40. The appellants, in S.A.No.488 of 2010, had raised the following questions, as substantial questions of law: “1) Whether the Courts below are right in rejecting the claim of the appellant that Exhibit A1 Sale Deed is sham and nominal document and it was never acted upon. 2) Whether the Courts below are right in holding that the defendant is in possession in the suit property admittedly no oral and documentary evidences were filed by the defendant to prove her possession? 3) Whether the Courts below are right in considering the Exhibit A12 is a valid document, while the NJ Stamp paper sold stands in the name of Sivakami, but in the stamp paper, the defendant’s name is mentioned as Purchaser of the stamp which obviously cooked up for the purpose of this case. 4) Whether the Courts below erred right in rejecting Exhibit B10 to B16 in all which the boundaries makes it very clear, the existence of Arunahcala Naicker’s land as one of the boundary. 5) Whether the Courts below are right in holding that the exhibits A20 and A21 the Corporation Tax Assessment is not a manipulated one while admittedly the cancellation was made after the 2nd plaintiff Pattabiraman filed Writ Petition to cancel the document in question before this Hon’ble Court.” 41. The learned counsel for the appellants had submitted that the judgment and decrees of the Courts below are contrary to law, weight of evidence and the probabilities of the case. The Courts below had failed to appreciate the oral, as well as the documentary evidence available on record, in its proper perspective. The learned counsel had further submitted that the Courts below had erred in coming to the conclusion that no sufficient evidence had been shown to substantiate the claim of the appellants that Arunachala Naicker and his legal heirs had been in possession, as claimed by the appellants. 42. It had also been stated that the respondent Amudha, had not filed any documents like patta, kist receipts, chitta extracts and adangals to prove her possession, in respect of the suit properties. 42. It had also been stated that the respondent Amudha, had not filed any documents like patta, kist receipts, chitta extracts and adangals to prove her possession, in respect of the suit properties. It had also been submitted that the Courts below had erred in relying upon the Will, dated 5.3.1976, said to have been executed by M.Somasundara Mudaliar, marked as Ex.A-4 and the Codicil, dated 4.3.1983, marked as Ex.A-5, to come to the conclusion that she is in possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule properties. 43. The Courts below ought to have held that the sale deed, dated 14.7.1941, marked as Ex.A-3, is only a sham and nominal document and that it had not been acted upon by the parties concerned. The Courts below ought to have seen that the respondent had not examined herself as a witness and that no independent witness had deposed in favour of the respondent, with regard to her possession and enjoyment of the suit properties. The Courts below ought to have noted that Arunachala Naicker could not raise any objection when the Will and the Codicil, dated 5.3.1976 and 4.3.1983, respectively, had been probated before the High Court of Judicature at Madras, as he was not a party to the said proceedings. 44. The Courts below ought to have seen that in the lease agreement, marked as Ex.A-12, the name of the purchaser of the stamp paper is mentioned as Mrs.Amudha, while the concerned stamp paper had been purchased by one Mrs.Sivakami Ammal. As such, the Courts below ought to have rejected Ex.A-12, as it was a fraudulent and concocted document. The Courts below ought to have seen that the power of attorney of the respondent has been in the habit of filing vexatious suits. The Courts below ought to have also noted the fact that the power of attorney was a party to the document, marked as Ex.B-16, wherein, the boundary description had been shown mentioning Arunachala Naicker’s property as one of the boundaries. 45. Further, the Courts below had ignored the criminal proceedings initiated against the power of attorney, for trespassing into the suit property, for the purpose of taking photographs. 45. Further, the Courts below had ignored the criminal proceedings initiated against the power of attorney, for trespassing into the suit property, for the purpose of taking photographs. The Courts below ought not to have relied upon the photographs, marked as Ex.A-15, as it had been taken in the absence of the appellants, by trespassing into the property concerned, for which criminal proceedings are pending before the competent Court. The Courts below ought to have seen that the production of additional documents, marked as Ex.A-20, relating to the demand of Corporation tax had been obtained by fraudulent representation, with the connivance of the corporation officials. 46. It had also been stated that the Courts below ought to have seen that, based on the legal proceedings initiated before the High Court of Judicature at Madras, the notice relating to the property tax demand, by the Corporation, had been withdrawn. Thereby, it is clear that the claim of the respondent, that she is in possession of the suit property, is false. The Courts below had erred in disbelieving the evidence of D.W.6, without sufficient reasons to do so. The Courts below ought to have appreciated the evidence of the independent witnesses, who are the owners of the lands having their properties situated adjacent to the suit schedule property. 47. The Courts below ought to have noted that the land acquisition proceedings, in respect of the suit property, had been quashed by the legal proceedings initiated by the appellants. The Courts below had erred in holding that no documents had been produced on behalf of the appellants to show that the sale deed, dated 14.7.1941, had not been acted upon. Further, both the trial Court, as well as the First Appellate Court, had erred in presuming Exs.A-1 to A-3 to be genuine and valid, as per Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The findings of the Courts below are perverse, as they are not based on the evidence available on record. As such, the judgment and decrees of the Courts below are contrary to law and the evidence available on record and as such, they are liable to be set aside. 48. The learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants had relied on the following decisions in support of his contentions: 48.1. As such, the judgment and decrees of the Courts below are contrary to law and the evidence available on record and as such, they are liable to be set aside. 48. The learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants had relied on the following decisions in support of his contentions: 48.1. In Sahul Hameed Rowther V. C.P.Mohideen Pichai (A.I.R (35) 1948 Madras 451), it had been held that where the plaintiff alleges that a sale deed executed by him in favour of the defendant was sham and nominal, and prays for a declaration to that effect and for an injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with his possession, the plaintiff need not pray for the cancellation of the deed and value his suit, for purposes of Court fee and jurisdiction, under Section 7 (iv-A) of the Court Fees Act, 1870. 48.2. In Adinarayana V. Rattamma (AIR 1944 Madras 408), it had been held that, in a suit for declaration of title and for possession, it has been averred by the plaintiff that the gift deed executed by him is a sham and nominal document and intended merely for screening the property from the creditors. There would be no necessity for the payment of the Court fee for the cancellation of the gift deed, as there would be no necessity to set aside the transaction or the deed. 48.3. In Sree Meenakshi Mills Ltd., Madurai V. Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras (A.I.R. 1957 S.C.49 (V 44 C 9 Feb.), it had been held as follows: “The word `benami’ is used to denote two classes of transactions which differ from each other in their legal character and incidents. In one sense, it signifies a transaction which is real, as for example, when A sells properties to B but the sale deed mentions X as the purchaser. Here the sale itself is genuine, but the real purchaser is B, X being his benamidar. This the class of transactions which is usually termed as benami. In one sense, it signifies a transaction which is real, as for example, when A sells properties to B but the sale deed mentions X as the purchaser. Here the sale itself is genuine, but the real purchaser is B, X being his benamidar. This the class of transactions which is usually termed as benami. But the word `benami’, is also occasionally used, perhaps not quite accurately, to refer to a sham transaction, as for example, when A purports to sell his property to B without intending that his title should cease or pass to B. The fundamental difference between the two classes of transaction is that whereas in the former there is an operative transfer resulting in the vesting of title in the transferee, in the latter there is none such, the transgeror continuing to retain the title notwithstanding the execution of the transfer deed. It is only in the former class of cases that it would be necessary, when a dispute arises as to whether the person named in the deed is the real transferee or B, to enquire into the question as to who paid the consideration for the transfer, X or B. But in the latter class of cases, when the question is whether the transferor is genuine or sham, the point for decision would be, not who paid the consideration but whether any consideration was paid.” 49. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent had submitted that the Courts below were right in coming to their conclusions holding that the appellants had not proved their claims, by sufficient evidence, either oral or documentary. The Courts below had rightly held that the respondent is in possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property. The appellants have not been in a position to show that the sale deed, dated 14.7.1941, marked as Ex.A-3, entered into between Arunachala Naicker and M.Somasundara Mudaliar, was a sham and nominal document and that it had not been acted upon. It had also been submitted that the High Court of Judicature at Madras had probated the Will, dated 5.3.1976, marked as Ex.A-4 and the Codicil, dated 4.3.1983, marked as Ex.A-5, by its order, dated 23.7.1986, marked as Ex.A-7, and therefore, the contention raised on behalf of the appellants, that the suit schedule property does not belong to the respondent, cannot be accepted. 50. 50. It is clear that, neither Arunachala Naicker, nor the appellants in the present second appeals, had raised any objection against the Will, dated 5.3.1976, and the Codicil, dated 4.3.1983. No documents were filed, either before the trial Court, or before the First Appellate Court, to show that the appellants are in possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property. The appellants had not objected to the power of attorney agent, Loganathan, appearing on behalf of the respondent, Amudha. 51. Once it is found that the appellants had not disputed the fact that a sale deed, dated 14.7.1941, had been executed by Arunachala Naicker, in favour of M.Somasundara Mudaliar, it is not open to them to contend that the said sale deed had not been acted upon thereafter, without showing sufficient proof to substantiate their claim. The claim of the appellants that the sale deed was a sham and nominal document, stating that it was executed only to ward off the claims being made by certain creditors, had not been proved. Further, no explanation had been submitted by the appellants, as to how the original documents, relating to the properties in dispute, were available with the respondent, for being marked as exhibits before the trial Court. 52. Even though Arunachala Naicker’s lands had been mentioned as the boundaries, by some of the land owners, they cannot be taken to be substantial evidence to prove the claim of the appellants that they are in possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule properties. When the neighbouring land owners had stated that they do not know as to who has the title or the possession in respect of the suit schedule properties, such evidence cannot be taken to be in favour of the claims made by the appellants. The suit filed by the appellants, in O.S.No.3697 of 2003, praying for a decree of bare injunction, without asking for declaration of title, cannot be maintained in the eye of law. 53. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent had relied on the following decisions in support of his contentions: 53.1. The suit filed by the appellants, in O.S.No.3697 of 2003, praying for a decree of bare injunction, without asking for declaration of title, cannot be maintained in the eye of law. 53. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent had relied on the following decisions in support of his contentions: 53.1. In Raj Narain Sarin V. Laxmi Devi ( 2002(10) SCC 501 ), the Supreme Court had held that the rejection of the plaint was justified, as it had been stated therein that the execution of the sale deed was within the knowledge of the plaintiff and that he had taken no steps to have the deed declared invalid or not binding, or ineffective. 53.2. In Ramni Rai and another Vs. Jagdish Mallah (Dead) Through Lrs. And another ( 2007(14) SCC 200 ), the Supreme Court had held that, in a suit for permanent injunction simipliciter, to restrain the defendants therein from interfering with the possession of the plaintiffs, a prayer for declaration of title is not necessary. 53.3. In Ajay Mohan V. H.N.Rai ( 2008(2) SCC 507 ), the Supreme Court had held that in a suit for permanent injunction it is necessary for the party concerned to plead entitlement and the basis for seeking such a relief. It had also been held that the suit was not maintainable in the absence of the prayer for cancellation and for setting aside the sale. 53.4. In Vimal Chand Ghevarchand Jain V. Ramakant Eknath Jajoo (2009(2) CTC 858), the Supreme Court had held as follows: “The burden of proof is heavy on a person questioning the sale deed and claiming the same to be nominal. He should adduce proper extrinsic evidence to establish his case. A distinction must be borne in mind in regard to the nominal nature of a transaction which is no transaction in the eye of law at all and the nature and character of a transaction as reflected in a deed of conveyance.” 53.5.In Vishwanath Bapurao Sabale V. Shalinibai Nagappa Sabale ( 2009(12) SCC 101 ), the Supreme Court had held that as per Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908, there would be a presumption of valid execution of a registered document, unless sufficient evidence is shown to the contrary. It had also held that peaceful, open and continuous possession being the ingredients of `adverse possession, long possession by itself would not be sufficient to prove adverse possession. 53.6. In Andi Reddiar K.V. Ovu Ammal (2000(II) CTC 184), this Court had held as follows “The plaintiff who was a third party was not liable to prove the genuineness of the Will, as it was for the defendants to prove that the Will had been obtained by fraud or coercion. It had also been held that the sale which had been executed based on the Will was held to be true, as it was not sham and nominal.” 53.7. In Sadasivam.K. V. B.Harikrishnan ( 2001(2) CTC 590 ), this Court had held that, as possession is the pre-requisite for grant of injunction, the plaintiff ought to prove exclusive possession of the property in question on the date of the filing of the suit. 53.8. In Chinnu V Nagammal ( 2006(1) CTC 274 ), this Court had held as follows: “The plea that the sale deed in favour of the purchaser was not valid, had been dismissed, as the defendants in the suit had not challenged the validity of the sale deed, independently, or by sufficient proceedings” 53.9. In Chinna Nachiappan V. PL.Lakshmanan (2007(4) CTC 70), this Court had held that a suit for bare injunction is not maintainable, without praying for the declaration of title when the plaint itself refers to certain serious disputes in respect of the suit property. 53.10. In R.Shanmugampillai V. K.Chidambara Devar (2008(6) CTC 267), this Court had held that the plaintiff cannot maintain a suit for bare injunction, without seeking the relief of declaration. 53.11. In M.B.Subramanian V. A.Ramasamy Gounder ( 2009(3) CTC 59 ), this Court had held that, as per Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, the person seeking any relief in suit, in which there is a serious dispute of title, he should necessarily seek the relief of declaration of title and that, as per Sections 101 to 103 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the burden of proof would not be on the person executing a sale deed, but on the person pleading failure of payment of consideration. 54. 54. In view of the submissions made by the learned counsels appearing on behalf of the appellants, as well as the respondents in the above second appeals, and in view of the submissions made by the parties concerned and on the evidence available on record this Court is of the considered view that the appellants have not shown sufficient cause or reason to interfere with the concurrent findings of the Courts below. Both the Courts below had rightly arrived at their conclusions, based on the evidence available on record. The appellants have not been in a position to show Ex.A-3 sale deed, dated 14.7.1941, is a sham and nominal document, as claimed by them. Sufficient evidence had not been adduced by the appellants to show that they have been in possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule properties. 55. It is clear from the evidence on record that Arunachala Naicker and his legal heirs had not raised any objections for the execution of the Will, dated 5.3.1976, marked as Ex.A-4 and the Codicil, dated 4.3.1983, marked as Ex.A-5, executed by M.Somasundara Mudaliar, in favour of the respondent. In fact, it is seen that the said Will and the Codicil had been probated by an order of the High Court of Judicature at Madras, dated 23.7.1986, marked as Ex.A-7. While so, it is not open to the appellants, at this stage, to contend that the title and possession of the properties in dispute continued to vest with Arunachala Naicker and with the appellants, after his death, in the year, 1980. In such circumstances, the contentions raised on behalf of the appellants cannot be countenanced. Even though there is a presumption in favour of the genuineness of certain documents, which had come into existence before 30 years, as per Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, it was still open to the appellants to disprove the same. 56. Even though the Courts below had held that there was a presumption in favour of the genuineness of certain documents, marked in favour of the respondent, as per Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, it is clear that the appellants had not been in a position to show, by sufficient evidence, that the documents cannot be relied upon to substantiate the claims made on behalf of the respondent. In such circumstances, this Court finds that there is no cause or reason to allow the second appeals, by setting aside the judgment and decrees of the Courts below. As such, the second appeals are liable to be dismissed. Hence, they are dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.