JUDGMENT Hon'ble Rakesh Tiwari, J. - Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 2. The petitioner claims himself to be a tenant of premises No. B-31/21-A-1 in Mohalla-Lanka, District-Varanasi on paying a rent of Rs.200/- per month since 1991. Thereafter, he moved an application on 18.06.2004 for allotment of the premises in his favour. The Rent Control Inspector vide his report dated 28.8.2004 has stated that the petitioner was in occupation of the shop. However, Sri Harishchandra Vishwakerma, the landlord moved an application on 18.1.2005 under Section 16 (1) (b) of the Act No. 13 of 1972 for release of the premises in his favour. 3. The case set up by the petitioner-landlord with regard to alleged need was that his family is big and he needed the shop for establishment of his son Sri Mahendra Narain Vishwakerma in the business of Stationary Goods after renovating premises in dispute which is in a dilapidated condition. 4. The release application was contested by the petitioner by filing objection on 28.2.2005 interalia stating therein that petitioner is in occupation of the premises in dispute with the permission of the previous owner and hence release application is not maintainable under Section 16 (1) (b) of the Act. It was also stated in the objection that there was no need of the premises in dispute as the present landlord Shri Harishchandra Vishwakerma has an alternative accommodations available to him namely (1) Vikas Drawing Emporium, Shop No. 3, Vikram Building, Lanka, Varanasi; (ii) Vikas Education, Plot No. 2, Rashmi Nagar, Varanasi; (iii) Vikas U.P. Pen Service, Phoolwala Katra, Bansphatak, Varanasi and a two floor house in the name of his mother of area 1.5 Biswa situated at Shakuntala Devi, Chillupur, Lanka, Varanasi. It was also averred that in one of the room in the premises no. B-31/21-A-1 a tenant namely Sri C.D. Sharma was running a photostat shop had vacated it which was also available to the landlord to settle his son in business, hence the alleged need of the landlord was a mere desire and not a bonafide and that the application filed under Section 16 (1) (b) of the Act No. 13 of 1972 was barred by time. Hence the order dated 30.3.2005 passed by the Rent Control & Eviction Officer, Varanasi declaring vacancy in spite of acknowledging that the petitioner was in occupation of the premises with the consent of his earlier landlord is ex-fecie illegal. 5. Subsequently, release application of the landlord was rejected on 19.7.2005 holding that Sri Harish Chandra Vishwakerma has no bona fide need of the premises in dispute as the son of the petitioner Sri Raj Kumar is a minor and was still student and the parents of the petitioner is very old and sole source of livelihood was the shop in dispute. 6. Revision No. 66 of 2005 was preferred by the landlord challenging the validity and correctness of the order dated 19.7.2005 without impleading the petitioner-tenant compelling him to file an impleadment application which was allowed by the Court vide order dated 16.9.2005. 7. The order dated 16.9.2005 was challenged in C.M. Writ Petition No. 65771 of 2005 filed by the landlord which was allowed by judgment and order dated 14.9.2009. Hence a review application was filed in the said writ petition against the judgment and order dated 14.9.2009. During pendency of review application another writ petition No. 44970 of 2010 was filed by the tenant-petitioner challenging an order dated 20.7.2010 of the court below by which the premises in dispute was released in favour of Harish Chandra Vishwakerma the landlord. The said writ petition was dismissed on 17.8.2010. Thereafter the order dated 30.3.2005 declaring vacancy and the order dated 20.7.2010 were challenged by means of Review Application dated 10.8.2010 which was also rejected by judgment and order dated 6.9.2010. Hence the present writ petition. 8. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the vacancy could not have been declared as release application was filed by the landlord after more than 12 years which was barred by limitation. In this regard he has relied upon the following judgments: 1. AIR 1983 SC 1239 : Mansaram v. S.P. Pathak. 2. 2005 (1) ARC 144: Munna Lal Agarwal v. Rent Control & Eviction Officer/City Magistrate, Mathura and others. 3. 2006 (1) ARC 377 : Anil Kumar Dixit v. Smt. Maya Tripathi and another. 4. 2007 (2) ARC 629: Abdul Khaliq v. A.D.M. (Supplies/R.C. and E.O.), Varanasi. 5. 2008 (2) ARC 773: Orjun Manumdar v. R.C. & E.O.-I, Allahabad and others. 6. 2005 (1) ARC 144: Munna Lal Agarwal v. Rent Control & Eviction Officer/City Magistrate, Mathura and others. 3. 2006 (1) ARC 377 : Anil Kumar Dixit v. Smt. Maya Tripathi and another. 4. 2007 (2) ARC 629: Abdul Khaliq v. A.D.M. (Supplies/R.C. and E.O.), Varanasi. 5. 2008 (2) ARC 773: Orjun Manumdar v. R.C. & E.O.-I, Allahabad and others. 6. 2008 (3) ARC 632: Sarla Devi (Smt.) v. Shailesh Kumar and others. 7. 2009 (1) ARC 266: Jamuna Devi (Smt.) vs. District Judge, Kanpur Nagar and others. 8. 2009 (2) JCLR 704 (All):Rajesh Kumar Singh v. State of U.P. & others and 9. 2009 (2) ARC 117: Hazi Naseem Ahmad v. R.C. & E.C./Addl. District Magistrate (Civil Supply), Varanasi & Ors. 9. The aforesaid judgments cited by the petitioner's counsel lay down that the allotment/release application cannot be filed after 12 years and hence such allotment/release application is not maintainable being barred by time. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that he is not a prospective allottee as he was in possession of the accommodation in dispute with the permission of the previous landlord and has relied upon the following judgments in support of his contention: 1. 2002 ACJ 1351 : Ram Narayan Sharma v. Shakuntala Gaur. 2. 1995 (2) JCLR 743 : Mahesh Chand Goel & another v. City Magistrate, Agra & another. 3. 1983 ACJ 572 : Lajpat Rai Bhatia v. Addl. District Judge. The ratio of law laid down in the aforesaid judgments is that an allottee-tenant in possession since before purchase of a tenanted accommodation cannot be treated as the prospective allottee as is disabled to challenge the release application filed by a subsequent purchaser/landlord. 11.Learned counsel for the petitioner has further relied upon the following judgments and has urged that there was a valid lease between him and the previous landlord/owner of the premises in dispute. 1. (1986)3 SCC 83 : Nanakram v. Kundalrai 2. 2002 (2) ARC 646 : Nutan Kumar v. IInd A.D.J. 3. (2002) 8 SCC 31 : Nutan Kumar and others v. IInd A.D.J. & others. 4. Civil Appeal No. 3322 of 1998: Achal Misra v. Rama Shanker Singh, decided on 11.4.2005 and 5. 2008 (1) ARC 821 : Mahesh Kumar Agrawal (Dr.) V. Vijay Pal Goel. 12. 2002 (2) ARC 646 : Nutan Kumar v. IInd A.D.J. 3. (2002) 8 SCC 31 : Nutan Kumar and others v. IInd A.D.J. & others. 4. Civil Appeal No. 3322 of 1998: Achal Misra v. Rama Shanker Singh, decided on 11.4.2005 and 5. 2008 (1) ARC 821 : Mahesh Kumar Agrawal (Dr.) V. Vijay Pal Goel. 12. It is also submitted that here it is binding upon the parties even if the lease is in violation of clause 22 of the Rent Control Order and he cannot be evicted from his possession of the tenant. In this regard emphasis has been laid upon paragraph 12 of Nanakram v. Kundalraj (supra) quoted below: "Nowhere does the Rent Control Order mandate that the Deputy Commissioner must eject a person who has entered into possession of a house in violation of Clause 22. If upon a view of the circumstances prevailing then, the Deputy Commissioner takes no action in the matter, there is no reason why the lease between the landlord and the tenant, although inconsistent with Clause 22, should not be binding as between the parties thereto. It is not a void transaction. There is nothing in the Rent Control Order declaring it to be so. Now if the lease is not void then it is not open to either party to avoid the lease on the ground that it is inconsistent with Clause 22. The parties would be bound, as between them, to observe the conditions of the lease, and it cannot be assailed by either party in a proceeding between them." 13. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that admittedly petitioner is an unauthorized occupant who moved an application for allotment of shop in dispute situated in House No. B-31/21-A, Mohalla-Lanka, Varansi against which respondent no. 3/landlord filed release application u/s 16 (1) (b) read with Section 12 of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972. He submits that a landlord can move application for declaring of vacancy or for release of an accommodation of which alleged possession be given by the previous owner to any person and any lease between the previous owner and the unauthorized occupant/prospective allottee or alleged tenant could only be binding upon them and not upon the subsequent purchaser. 14. In support of his case he has relied upon the following judgments: 1. 14. In support of his case he has relied upon the following judgments: 1. 2008 (1) AWC 223 : Babloo V. Munna Lal Verma and another. 2. 2007 (2) AWC 1409 : Rizwan Akhtar v. Shrawan Kumar Bhatia and another. 3. 2008 (71) ALR 655 : Ajay Pal Singh v. D.J. Meerut & others. 15. In paragraphs 16, 17, 18 and 19 relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent in the case of Babloo v. Munna Lal Verma and another (supra) the Court held that there can be no limitation , certainly the rights of the landlord to file an application for release as the Act does not provide for such limitation. For ready reference these paragraphs are quoted below:- "16. As regards, the case of Smt. Brij Bala Jain v. Smt. Amarjeet Kaur and others, is concerned it is of no help to the petitioner for its considering the arguments that there is no limitation for declaration of vacancy under the Act. If for some reason the landlord would not file an application for vacancy, it would not extinguish his rights for getting an order of vacancy from the authority. It is relevant that when the need has occurred for the landlord for the accommodation in dispute which is relevant". "17. The whole scheme of the Act provides that in certain circumstances, the relationship of tenant and landlord can be legally brought to an end if the landlord is restrained by a blanket decision of the Court in garb that proceedings cannot be initiated beyond a certain period, i.e., on the ground of reasonable limitation, the landlord has to exercise his option within certain period, or within reasonable time by the Courts. In that circumstances, the landlord would not be able to bring or institute any suit against the tenant being "beyond the reasonable period of time" this would be in direct conflict with object and reasons, as well as scheme in the provisions of the Act." "18. The court below relying upon paragraph 10 of the judgment rendered in the case of Mansaram v. S.P. Pathak and others, AIR 1983 SC 1239 , held that: "There is no limitation for taking such steps either by the landlord or by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. The court below relying upon paragraph 10 of the judgment rendered in the case of Mansaram v. S.P. Pathak and others, AIR 1983 SC 1239 , held that: "There is no limitation for taking such steps either by the landlord or by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. Where the Act does not provide for specific limitation for taking such action, the Court has held in various decisions that it should be within a reasonable time". "19. In view of the discussions stated above, I am of the considered view that where no limitation is provided under the Act, it will not extinguish the rights of the landlord to take action which is taken upon various factors and his need cannot be obstructed on the plea that it has not been raised within a reasonable time as provisions of Limitation Act would not be applicable. Hence, the need of the landlord for release for the accommodation is neither dependent upon the Limitation Act". 16. In this regard, paragraph 32 relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent in the case of 2007 (2) AWC 1409 : Rizwan Akhtar v. Shrawan Kumar Bhatia and another quoted below may also be referred to:- "32. (f) and (g) The next contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that in any case, the vacancy which has occurred long before cannot be disturbed after such a long time and if any vacancy was there in the premises in dispute in the year 1996, it no longer remained after the landlord let out the space under the balcony bounded by grills to the petitioner is concerned, it may be noted that under a scheme of the Act the Legislature in its wisdom has not deliberately provided any limitation under Section 16 of the Act. The U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 is a special Act, hence the provisions of Limitation Act would apply subject to the conditions specifically provided under Section 35 of the Act. Section 35 of the Act provides specifically that Sections 4, 5 and 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (Act No. 36 of 1963) shall mutatis mutandis apply to all proceedings under the Act." 17. In the case of Ajay Pal Singh Vs. Section 35 of the Act provides specifically that Sections 4, 5 and 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (Act No. 36 of 1963) shall mutatis mutandis apply to all proceedings under the Act." 17. In the case of Ajay Pal Singh Vs. District Judge, Meerut and others (cited above), it has been held that "unauthorized occupant/prospective allottees has no right to interfere in the proceedings of release under section 16 (1) (b) of the Act." 18. Admittedly, the landlord purchased the house in dispute on 15.5.2001 from Sri Hari Narain Malviya who had filed release application on 18.6.2004. Thus, it cannot be said that the landlord had moved release application beyond 12 years. Therefore, the case relied upon by the petitioners are not applicable in the present case and the authority had jurisdiction to proceed with the release application. 19. It may also be noted that the main order dated 20.7.2010 passed by the Court, the landlord challenged the same by means of Writ Petition No. 44970 of 2010 which has already been dismissed on 17.8.2010. The order dated 17.8.2010 is quoted as under: "It appears from the record that petitioner had moved an application on 18.6.2004 for declaring the vacancy in the premises in dispute. Consequently, the application dated 18.1.2005 filed by Harishchandra Vishwakerma under section 16 (1) (b) of the Act, was rejected. Aggrieved by the said order, the subsequent landlord-Harishchandra Vishwakerma filed revision no. 66 of 2005. An impleadment application was filed by the petitioner-tenant in the aforesaid revision on the ground inter alia that though he is the person who may be affected by order of release yet has not been impleaded as party in the revision. The impleadment application filed by the petitioner was allowed. Aggrieved by the order impleading the petitioner Aditya Bharadwaj, the subsequent landlord Harishchandra Vishwakerma filed writ petition no. 65771 of 2005 which was decided by the Court vide judgment and order dated 14.9.2009. In the meantime, the aforesaid writ petition was decided, the release application of the landlord was allowed by order dated 20.7.2010 which is challenged by the tenant in the present writ petition. It may also be noted here that a review application was filed by the petitioner, Aditya Bhardwaj in the aforesaid writ petition which was rejected by the Court on 9.8.2010 thus:- "This is a review application on behalf of respondent no. It may also be noted here that a review application was filed by the petitioner, Aditya Bhardwaj in the aforesaid writ petition which was rejected by the Court on 9.8.2010 thus:- "This is a review application on behalf of respondent no. 2 Aditya Bharadwaj in Writ Petition No. 65771 of 2005 decided by this Court on 14.9.2009. Claim of the applicant is that he is tenant of disputed shop since the year 1991 and he filed an impleadment application in the pending Revision No. 66 of 2005 under Section 18 of Act No. XIII of 1972. The impleadment application was allowed and a writ petition was preferred against the said order. The writ petition was allowed treating the applicant as prospective allottee since he did not possess order of allotment in his favour. It appears that consequent to the order of this Court in the instant writ petition, release order has been passed which is again challenged in pending writ petition. Sri Arvind Srivastava Advocate has tried to emphasize on certain findings of this Court whereby while allowing the writ petition, in the concluding part of the judgment this Court had directed the revisional court to decide the release application expeditiously and the order of impleadment was set at naught. Grievance of the applicant is that since the writ petition was filed against the order of impleadment, therefore, any further direction was beyond the scope of writ petition and secondly that he is an aggrieved person. He has relied on a number of decisions of this Court as well as that of the Apex Court and he apprehends that because of findings of this Court, he will not be heard in the pending writ petition filed against the subsequent order of release. After hearing both the counsels, I can not overlook the fact that it is review application and ambit of review can not be enhanced only because certain findings or observations by the Court might effect the subsequent proceedings. The order was not challenged in the Apex Court. No doubt, in the original order I had directed the R.C.& E.O. to consider the entire matter afresh which was subsequently corrected after a correction application was moved and word R.C.& E.O. was scraped of and the word 'Revisional Court' was substituted, since the revision was pending at the relevant time. The order was not challenged in the Apex Court. No doubt, in the original order I had directed the R.C.& E.O. to consider the entire matter afresh which was subsequently corrected after a correction application was moved and word R.C.& E.O. was scraped of and the word 'Revisional Court' was substituted, since the revision was pending at the relevant time. Once again I do not find any correction since the order of the R.C.& E.O. was passed in favour of the applicant. However, the claim of the applicant's counsel is that if the said correction would not have been made and matter was remitted to the R.C.& E.O., he would be deprived to move a writ petition after the order. Whatever the observation in the instant writ petition in which the review application has been moved, was meant only for the revisional court and the order allowing impleadment application. So far other arguments are concerned, it is open for the applicant who submits that he is an aggrieved party, to make submissions before the appropriate Court. In the instant writ petition, before I part with the order, I am of the view and in agreement with the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Parsion Devi and others Vs. Sumitri Devi and others, JT 1997 (8) S.C., 480 that review proceedings are to be strictly confined to ambit and scope of Order 47 Rule 1 C.P.C. An error which is not self evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 C.P.C. In view of this principles, I am not inclined to review my judgment and review application is accordingly dismissed." It is apparent from the above order that the petitioner is only prospective allottee. Release application of the landlord filed under section 16 (1) (b) of the Act has also been allowed. Therefore, status of the petitioner is not better than prospective allottee. It is settled law that prospective allottee has no right to claim himself to be a tenant of any accommodation or exercise right for tenant. For all the reasons stated above, the writ petition is dismissed." 20. Therefore, status of the petitioner is not better than prospective allottee. It is settled law that prospective allottee has no right to claim himself to be a tenant of any accommodation or exercise right for tenant. For all the reasons stated above, the writ petition is dismissed." 20. The question as to whether the petitioner was a prospective allottee or not and other incidental question as raised by the petitioner assailing the findings of the court below have been firmly settled by the High Court in Writ Petition No. 44970 of 2010 and the Review application, hence they do not require a fresh order merely because the counsel for the petitioner is not satisfied and has challenged the order dated 30.3.2005 and 6.9.2010. Suffice it to say that petitioner has not challenged the judgment and order of the High Court in Writ Petition No. 44970 of 2010 aforesaid before the Apex Court and it is binding upon him. Therefore, he cannot be permitted to raise the points again and again in subsequent writ petition. Once the judgment of High Court has attained finality, this amount to abuse of process of Court. The court below has also recorded a finding in the impugned order that it could not be judicious exercise to consider the application of the petitioner again and again on objection which has been finally settled by Court. Once the judgment of High Court has attained finality, this amount to abuse of process of Court. The court below has also recorded a finding in the impugned order that it could not be judicious exercise to consider the application of the petitioner again and again on objection which has been finally settled by Court. The relevant finding of the court below in this regard is thus:- ^^pw¡fd izLrqr izdj.k esa bl lUnHkZ esa foLr`r fu"d"kZ fn;k tk pqdk gS] vr% iqu% fueqZfDr vkosnu@ vkns'k ds lUnHkZ esa foospuk fd;k tkuk fof/k laxr ugha gksxkA blds vfrfjDr ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; ds }kjk Hkh fjV ;kfpdk la0 44970@2010 vkfnR; Hkkj}kt cuke vij ftyk tt okjk.klh rFkk vU; esa fn0 17-08-10 dks ikfjr fd;s x;s vkns'k ls bl U;k;ky; }kjk ikfjr fd;s x;s fn0 20-07-10 ds vkns'k dks laiq"V dj fn;k x;k gSA vr% bu fcUnqvksa ij bl iqufoZyksdu vkosnu esa iqu% fu"d"kZ fn;k tkuk fof/k laxr ugha gksxk fd izkFkhZ dks fuxjkuh esa i{kdkj cuk;k tkuk vko';d Fkk vFkok ugha vkSj bl U;k;ky; dks iz'uxr Hkou dks /kkjk&16 ¼1½ ¼ch½ m0iz0 vf/kfu;e la0&13@72 ds vUrxZr fueqZDr fd;s tkus dk {ks=kf/kdkj Fkk vFkok ugha\ 17- mi;qZDr foospuk ds vk/kkj ij bl fu"d"kZ ij igq¡ph gw¡ fd fd izkFkhZ ds }kjk nkf[ky iquZfoyksdu vkosnu vUrxZr /kkjk 16 ¼1½ ¼ch½ m0iz0 vf/kfu;e la0&13@72 fof/kr% iks"k.kh; u gksus ds dkj.k fujLr fd;s tkus ;ksX; gSA** 21. It may also be noted here that during pendency of writ petition No. 44970 of 2010, petitioner filed Review Application to set aside the order dated 20.7.2010, passed by Revisional Court/respondent no. 1, as well as order declaring vacancy dated 30.3.2005, passed by Revisional Court/respondent no. 2 which was rejected on 6.9.2010. 22. In view of the above, the impugned orders do not require any interference by this Court in exercise of extraordinary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 23. For all the reasons stated above the Court is of the view that there is no illegality or infirmity in the orders impugned. 24. The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed. Petition Dismissed