JUDGMENT Jitendra Chauhan, J. - The present appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 24/30.4.2001 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Ilisar, whereby, the accused/appellants have been convicted for the offence under Sections and 304-B Indian Penal Code and ordered to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- each for the offence under Section 498-A Indian Penal Code and in default of payment of fine, to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one month and for the offence under Section 304-B Indian Penal Code, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of seven years. Both the sentences were ordered to run concurrently. 2. The brief facts of the prosecution case are that on 8.10.1996, a wireless message was received at Police Post, Bass, Police Station Narnaud from I/C Police Post, Government Hospital, Bhiwani, regarding the admission of Smt. Birmati in the hospital having injuries on her person On receipt of the said VT message, ASI Jagmal reached Government Hospital, Bhiwani and moved application Exhibit PB, seeking opinion of the doctor about the fitness of injured whether she was fit to make the statement or not. The Medical Officer made an endorsement, Exhibit PB/2, on the application with a note that the patient was referred to PGIMS Rohtak. 3. ASI Jagmal Singh reached PGIMS, Rohtak and found that the patient was in critical condition. He moved an application, Exhibit PA, before the Sub Divisional Magistrate to get recorded the dying declaration of Smt.Birmati, the deceased, who vide endorsement Ex.PA/l directed Tehsildar to do the needful but on account of her being unfit, statement could not be recorded. Thereafter, the dying declaration of Smt. Birmati could be recorded only on 10.10.1996 in the presence of Chief Judicial Magistrate, which is Exhibit PD and reads as under : "That her marriage was solemnised one and half year ago. No child was born. Husband was not doing anything. Husband was making scheme to get a job. In the house, her parents-in-law and sister-in-law (husbands brothers wife) live. She received burn injuries four days ago. The parents-in-laws used to taunt her that she did not bring any item. They used to quarrel daily. One day she was asked to bring tea at 11.30 A.M. Her mother-in-law poured kerosene upon her and set her afire. Father-in-law did not set her afire. She received burn injuries four days ago. The parents-in-laws used to taunt her that she did not bring any item. They used to quarrel daily. One day she was asked to bring tea at 11.30 A.M. Her mother-in-law poured kerosene upon her and set her afire. Father-in-law did not set her afire. Husband was on the first floor. He came down. He brought jeep and took her to Kheri. Husband also used to have quarrel with her. On that very day in morning hours, she was given beating by dandas. She was rescued by her sister-in-law. The dispute was qua the dowry. She was asked again and again that she did not bring anything. Her mother-in-law also demanded cooler from her." 4. On the basis of statement, formal FIR, Exhibit PK/2 was recorded under Section 307 and 498-A Indian Penal Code against accused Bijender Singh, his mother Prem Devi and his father Dalip Singh. Smt. Birmati, the deceased, expired on the night of 13th October, 1996 thereupon Section 304-13 Indian Penal Code was also added. The inquest report, Exhibit P1-1/3 was prepared. 5. The accused were arrested on 17.10.1996. 6. After completing investigations final report under section 173 Criminal Procedure Code was presented and on its basis, the accused were charge sheeted for the offence under Section 498-A and 304-B read with Section 34 Indian Penal Code, to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. 7. It is pertinent to mention here that during the pendency of the trial, accused Dalip Singh expired and the proceedings against him were abated. 8. To prove its case, the prosecution examined as many as 13 witnesses, namely, Mahabir Parshad, Tehsildar, Rohtak, as PW1;Sh.A.K.Bimal, Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rohtak, as PW2; Dr.S.K.Anand, E.S.I. Hospital, Bhiwani as PW3;Girish Kumar, Draftsman, as PW4; HC Mandrup Singh, as PW5; Dr. P.P. Lamboria, (Medical Officer, General Hospital, Rohtak) as PW6; ASI Ram Kumar, P.S. Adampur, as PW7; Dhup Singh, as PW8; Matu Ram, as PW9; ASI Jagmal Singh as PW 10; Dr. A.S. Gupta, (M.D. Pathology, PGIMS, Rohtak) as PW 11; SI Partap Singh as PW12; Dr. A.S. Gupta, Medical Officer,Civil Hospital, Narnaul as PW 13. 9. P.P. Lamboria, (Medical Officer, General Hospital, Rohtak) as PW6; ASI Ram Kumar, P.S. Adampur, as PW7; Dhup Singh, as PW8; Matu Ram, as PW9; ASI Jagmal Singh as PW 10; Dr. A.S. Gupta, (M.D. Pathology, PGIMS, Rohtak) as PW 11; SI Partap Singh as PW12; Dr. A.S. Gupta, Medical Officer,Civil Hospital, Narnaul as PW 13. 9. Mahabir Parshad (PW 1), Tehsildar, Rohtak, has deposed that as per order, Exhibit PA/1, he went to record the statement/dying declaration of Birmati, the deceased, but the same could not be recorded as the patient was not found fit to make statement. 10. Sh. A.K. Birnal (PW2), Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rohtak, has deposed that he recorded the dying declaration, Exhibit PD of Birmati in the question-answer form. He also deposed that while recording the statement, the patient remained fit. He admitted in his cross-examination that during the course of recording of the statement of injured, none except the doctor was allowed. 11. Dr.S.K.Anand, PW3, has deposed that he medico-legally examined the injured on 8.10.1996 at 11.40 a.m. Smell of kerosene oil was present at that time and the burns were 100%. 12. Dr. P.P. Lamoria, PW6, deposed that he conducted the post-mortem examination on the dead body of Birmati, the deceased. He further deposed that there were 100% burns on the dead body of Birmati. He opined that the cause of death was shock as a result of burns and other complications. 13. Dhup Singh, PW8, (brother of the deceased) deposed that they are three brothers and three sisters. Birmati, the deceased, was his younger daughter and in her marriage, they had spent as per their capacity. After one month of marriage, his sister came back to parental home and told that her father-in- law, mother-in-law and husband taunted her that she had come from a hungry family and has not brought anything. They also harassed and gave beatings to her. This witness further deposed that when her parents fulfilled their dowry demand, she came back to her matrimonial home. But after some days, his sister was again harassed by her in-laws and then appellant No. 2 (husband of the deceased) came to him and told that he was separated by his parents and therefore, he needed some money. This witness has further deposed that they paid him Rs. 35,000/- in some installments. But after some days, his sister was again harassed by her in-laws and then appellant No. 2 (husband of the deceased) came to him and told that he was separated by his parents and therefore, he needed some money. This witness has further deposed that they paid him Rs. 35,000/- in some installments. But one month before the death of his sister, appellant No. 2 again came to their house and demanded Rs. 5,000/-. However, they refused to pay the said amount to him. On 9.10.1996, he came to know that his sister was seriously ill and was admitted in Medical College & Hospital, Rohtak. 14. Matu Ram, PW9, (father of the deceased) has deposed almost on the same lines of Dhup Singh, PW8 (brother of the deceased). 15. After completion of prosecution evidence, the accused/appellants were examined under Section 313 Criminal Procedure Code and recorded their statements, wherein they denied the circumstances appearing against them in prosecution evidence and pleaded innocence. However, in defence, they did not lead any evidence. 16. After hearing both the parties, the learned trial Court convicted and sentenced the accused/appellants as noticed at the outset of this judgment. 17. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned trial Court, the present appeal has been preferred by the appellants and the same was admitted by this Court on 29.5.2001. 18. Learned counsel for the appellants has argued that even as per the alleged dying declaration, Exhibit PD, appellant No. 2 was on the first floor of the house. Immediately, after the incident, the appellant No. 2 arranged the vehicle and removed the patient to the hospital. No role is attributed to the appellant No. 2. It was a case of accidental fire. 19. It has further been argued that the occurrence took place on 8.10.1996, whereas the dying declaration of the deceased was recorded on 10.1996. Therefore, the possibility of the deceased having been tutored cannot be ruled out. 20. Learned counsel has also argued that there are material contradictions in the statements of brother and father of the deceased. From the statements of these witnesses, it is established that they had concocted the story to implicate the accused/appellants falsely. 21. On the other hand learned counsel for the State has argued that there is no delay in recording the dying declaration of the deceased. From the statements of these witnesses, it is established that they had concocted the story to implicate the accused/appellants falsely. 21. On the other hand learned counsel for the State has argued that there is no delay in recording the dying declaration of the deceased. At the time of recording the statement, apart from the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, only the attending doctor was present and therefore, there was hardly any scope of tutoring of the deceased. The appellant did not lead any evidence in their defence. The case of prosecution is fully proved on the strength of dying declaration. 22. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and persued the record with their able assistance. 23. The evidence appearing against the Appellants is chiefly in the form of the dying declaration of the deceased Smt. Biramati wherein she made specific and categoric allegations against her husband and parents in law regarding dowry demand and wherein she also specifically implicated her mother in law as the one who set her on fire. 24. The contents of the dying declaration has been corroborated in general terms by the evidence of PW8 and PW 9, brother and father of the deceased respectively who have deposed giving details of how the deceased was constantly maltreated on account of dowry demand. Besides specific instances of dowry demands and their fulfilment by the father of the deceased have also been given in detail. 25. The appellants led no evidence in their defence before the trial court. Their defence in the trial court was chiefly on the strength of arguments raised by the defence counsel, which are identical to the arguments raised in this Appeal also. 26. The Appellant No. is sought to be shown as innocent on the strength of his conduct immediately after the burning of the deceased since he arranged for a jeep and took her to the hospital. Qua the mother in law, the defence put forth is in the form of a strong possibility of tutoring of the deceased regarding her dying declaration as also the contradictions appearing in the statements of PW 8 and PW 9. 27. The evidentiary value attached to the dying declaration under the Indian evidence Act is of a very high order. Qua the mother in law, the defence put forth is in the form of a strong possibility of tutoring of the deceased regarding her dying declaration as also the contradictions appearing in the statements of PW 8 and PW 9. 27. The evidentiary value attached to the dying declaration under the Indian evidence Act is of a very high order. However, since dying declarations per se is itself a complete piece of evidence of an alleged act, certain safeguards have also been established by judicial pronouncements before a dying declaration can be acted upon by a court to convict an accused implicated therein. The safeguards have been set up to ensure that a dying declaration itself is a voluntary and uninfluenced statement. If the parameters, as have been laid down to test the veracity of a dying declaration are met, there is no reason that such a dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of a conviction even in the absence of corroboration from supplementary sources or attending circumstances. 28. In the present case, the dying declaration was recorded by the Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate after the Investigating Officer had sought an opinion from the treating doctor to the effect that the deceased (injured at the time of recording the statement) is in a fit state to make a statement. This opinion of the doctor itself was given after two days of the occurrence since deceased had suffered 100% burns and on two earlier occasions, when an application was made by the Investigating Officer for recording the statement of the injured/deceased, the treating doctor had opined that she is not in fit state to make any statement. In other words, the opinion given by the treating doctor was after a careful observation of the condition of the injured/ deceased. Besides this, the Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate again sought an opinion of the doctor, before he started to record the statement of the deceased, as to whether the injured was in a position to make a statement, to which the treating doctor opined that the injured was in a fit state to make a statement. Even further, after the statement had been recorded, another endorsement was made by the treating doctor to the effect that the injured remained in a fit state during the recording of the statement. All these facts are borne out from the record and are undisputed. Even further, after the statement had been recorded, another endorsement was made by the treating doctor to the effect that the injured remained in a fit state during the recording of the statement. All these facts are borne out from the record and are undisputed. In view of the un-rebutted factual position regarding the recording of the dying declaration, there is no hesitation in concluding that the dying declaration in question was absolutely genuine and could be relied on for conviction sans any other evidence. 29. Having arrived at the aforesaid conclusion, what remains to be perused is whether the dying declaration contained such allegations against the appellants i.e. mother in law and husband of the deceased, which is sufficient to convict them for the offence under section 498 - A and Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code. 30. A careful reading of the dying declaration clearly brings out the fact that the deceased was harassed by her mother in law, father in law and husband on account of dowry demands. The deceased specifically pointed out that on the day of occurrence, it was her mother in law who set her ablaze. She also specifically pointed out that her father in law did not set her on fire. She also stated that she was removed to the hospital immediately by her husband. The dying declaration also contained the allegation that in the morning of the day of occurrence, she was beaten up by her husband on account of dowry. 31. It is thus patent that not only was the deceased was being harassed repeatedly by her parents in law but even her husband was harassing her for dowry demands till the day of unfortunate occurrence. Besides, the deceased specifically pointed that it was her mother in law who set her on fire on the day of occurrence. Her specific denial of the role of her father in law in setting on her fire and pointing out the fact that her husband immediately removed her to the hospital proves the veracity if the dying declaration. There is thus no escape from the conclusion that appellant No. 1 (mother-in- law of the deceased) set the deceased on tire on the day of occurrence. 32. There is thus no escape from the conclusion that appellant No. 1 (mother-in- law of the deceased) set the deceased on tire on the day of occurrence. 32. Even though the husband did act promptly and removed the deceased to the hospital, yet his role in maltreating and harassing his wife on account of dowry demands is clearly borne out from the allegation made in the dying declaration. Even on the morning of the day when the deceased was burnt alive, the husband is stated to have beat her with a danda on account of dowry. Thus, the mitigating act of the husband/ appellant on removing the deceased to the hospital is far outweighed by the acts that he had been maltreating and even physically assaulting the deceased for dowry. This Court is thus unable to arrive at a conclusion that the husband was innocent. He infact was hand in glove with his parents for maltreating and harassing his wife/deceased on account of dowry. His act of removing his wife to the hospital was a flash action which was more out of shock rather than sympathy or love and care for the deceased. 33. The argument regarding the possibility of the deceased having been tutored before her dying declaration was recorded is negatived from the fact that at the time of recording the statement, apart from the Id. Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, only the treating doctor was present in the room. There was thus hardly any scope for tutoring of the deceased. Moreover, for two days she had been in an unfit position to make a statement due to the fact that she suffered 100% burns. However, as soon as she was in fit state to make statement, the same was recorded without any delay. Thus from no angle can the dying declaration be said to be a tutored act. 34. The contradictions pointed out in the testimony of the brother and father of the deceased are insignificant and in any case have no relevance at all in the face of the unimpeachable statement of the deceased herself wherein she had very categorically given details of the act/ role of the appellants. 35. For the foregoing reasons, this Court is in agreement with the view taken by the learned trial court. Accordingly, the present appeal is dismissed. 35. For the foregoing reasons, this Court is in agreement with the view taken by the learned trial court. Accordingly, the present appeal is dismissed. The judgment and order dated 24/30.4.2000 passed by the learned trial Court is maintained. The appellants are stated to be on bail. Their bail bonds shall stand cancelled. They be taken into custody forthwith to undergo the remaining part of their sentence. Appeal dismissed.