Judgment :- 1. This Second Appeal has been filed against the judgment and decree dated 28.06.2002 on the file if II Additional Subordinate Judge, Villupuram, in confirming the judgment and decree dated 05.02.2001 made in O.S. No.324 of 1996 on the file of II Additional District Munsif, Ulundurpet. 2. The averments in the Plaint are as follows: (i) The suit property originally belonged to one Muttiah Gounder. He is having two sons, by name, Manu Gounder and Ramaswamy, the first defendant. On 26.12.1963, they divided the property in pursuance of a registered partition deed. In the above said partition, the suit property and other properties were allotted to the share of Manu Gounder. He died intestate leaving behind Velayutha Gounder as his only son. After his death, Velayutha Gounder was in possession and enjoyment of the same. On 19.05.1987, he alienated the property in favour of the plaintiff on behalf of himself and his minor son Karunanidhi. From the date of purchase, the plaintiff is in possession and enjoyment of the same by way of mutation of revenue records and by paying kist for the patta No.105. The chitta and adangal also stands in the name of the plaintiff. The plaintiff and his predecessor-in-title were in possession and enjoyment of the same openly, continuously, without any interruption for more than a statutory period. So, the plaintiff prescribed title by adverse possession. (ii) The defendants are having no right over the property. The defendants are having property adjacent to the suit property. So, they attempted to interfere with the plaintiff’s possession, which was prevented. Since, at any time they may interfere with the possession, the plaintiff has come forward with the Suit for declaration of title and injunction and he prayed for a decree. 3. The gist andessence of written statement filed by the second defendant and adopted by the first defendant is as follows: (i) The averment in paragraph 2 of the Plaint is not correct. The suit property is not owned by Muttiah Gounder. There is no partition between the first defendant and plaintiff’s predecessor-in-title Manu Gounder. So, the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff is not true and genuine. The plaintiff has not prescribed title by adverse possession. The partition deed is not binding the defendants. It was not acted upon. The suit property was wrongly included in the partition deed. There is no partition between the first defendant and plaintiff’s predecessor-in-title Manu Gounder. So, the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff is not true and genuine. The plaintiff has not prescribed title by adverse possession. The partition deed is not binding the defendants. It was not acted upon. The suit property was wrongly included in the partition deed. So, Manu Gounder has no right over the property. So, his son Velayutha Gounder had not succeeded the property. The total extent of the suit survey number is 1 acre 64 cents. Western 1.33 cents originally belonged to second defendant’s father Marimuthu Gounder. He purchased the same under a registered sale deed dated 17.03.1944. He was in possession and enjoyment by way of transferring the patta in his name and paying kist till his life time. He died leaving behind his wife Dhanabagiyammal and daughter Nallammai, the second respondent/second defendant. For the non-impleading of Dhanabagiyammal, the Suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary party. Dhanabagiyammal and Nallammai, the second respondent were in possession and enjoyment for the past 53 years, without any interruption, so they prescribed title by adverse possession. Easter 0.31 cents, out of 1.64 cents is belonging to one Arunachalam @ Periyapaiyan, from whom, one Chinnapaiyan has purchased the same on 04.03.1947. He was in possession and enjoyment of the same. He died intestate leaving behind his son Mayavan and Murugesan. So, for the non-impleading of Mayavan and Murugesan, the Suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. So, the appellant/plaintiff is not entitled to any relief. Hence, he prayed for the dismissal of the Suit. 4. The Trial Court after considering the averments both in the Plaint and written statement had framed ten issues and considering the oral evidence of PWs. 1 and 2, DWs. 1 and 2 and Exs.A1 to A5, Exs.B1 to B7 and Exs.X1 to X7, decreed the Suit as prayed for in the Plaint. Against that, the defendants preferred an Appeal. The learned First Appellate Judge after considering the arguments of both counsel had framed two points for determination and allowed the Appeal, setting aside the decree and judgment of Trial Court and dismissed the Suit in Trial Court. Against that, the present Second Appeal has been preferred. 5. Against that, the defendants preferred an Appeal. The learned First Appellate Judge after considering the arguments of both counsel had framed two points for determination and allowed the Appeal, setting aside the decree and judgment of Trial Court and dismissed the Suit in Trial Court. Against that, the present Second Appeal has been preferred. 5. At the time of admission of the Second Appeal, the following substantial questions of law were framed for consideration: a. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Lower Appellate Court was right in holding that the appellant has not established his right and enjoyment of the suit schedule property is correct in law when it was admitted by the respondents in their evidence? b. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Lower Appellate Court was right in holding that the Suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties? 6. The appellant as plaintiff filed a Suit for declaration of title and injunction stating that the suit property originally belonged to one Muttiah Gounder and Ramaswamy, the first respondent/first defendant. The suit property was allotted to the share of Manu Gounder. He died intestate leaving behind his only son Velayutha Gounder. From whom, the appellant/plaintiff purchased the property under Ex.A2 on 19.05.1987 and respondents/defendants attempted to interfere with his possession. Hence, the plaintiff/appellant herein was constrained to file the Suit for declaration of title and injunction. 7. The second respondent/second defendant resisted the Suit stating that the Suit is bad for nonjoinder of necessary parties. She has further stated that 1.33 cents of the suit property originally belonged to second respondent/second defendant’s father Marimuthu Gounder. He died leaving behind his wife Dhanabagiyammal and daughter Nallammai, the second respondent/second defendant. So, for the non-impleading of Dhanabagiyammal, the Suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary party. The remaining 0.31 cents was purchased by one Chinnapaiyan. His legal heirs are Mayavan and Murugesan and they are in possession of the property and they were also not impleaded. For the non-impleading of Mayavan and Murugesan, the Suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. Hence, he prayed for the dismissal of the Suit. 8. The Trial Court after framing necessary issues and considering the oral and documentary evidence decreed the Suit as prayed for in the Plaint. For the non-impleading of Mayavan and Murugesan, the Suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. Hence, he prayed for the dismissal of the Suit. 8. The Trial Court after framing necessary issues and considering the oral and documentary evidence decreed the Suit as prayed for in the Plaint. Against that, the respondents herein as appellants preferred an Appeal, which was allowed by the First Appellate Court. Against that, the present Second Appeal has been preferred. 9. The learned counsel for the appellant would contend that the suit property originally belonged to one Muttiah Gounder. There was a partition between his sons – Manu Gounder and Ramaswamy, the first respondent/first defendant. In the partition that had taken place between Manu Gounder and first respondent/first defendant, ‘A’ schedule property – the entire suit property in R.S. No.103/4 – 1 acre 64 cents was allotted to Manu Gounder ‘B’ schedule property was allotted to Ramaswamy, the first respondent/first defendant. From whom, the appellant/plaintiff has purchased the property on 19.05.1987. The patta number is 105. He paid the kist as per Exs.A3 to A5. He is in possession and enjoyment of the property. 10. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant would further contend that even though the father of second respondent/second defendant is alleged to have purchased 1.33 cents out of 1.64 cents under a registered sale deed dated 17.03.1944, but, he is not in possession and enjoyment of the same. As per Ex.B7, one Chinnapaiyan has purchased the remaining 0.31 cents out of 1.64 cents on 04.03.1947 After the partition, since, Manu Gounder and his predecessor-in-title were in possession and enjoyment of the property openly, continuously, uninterruptedly for more than a statutory period, they prescribed title by adverse possession. From 1963 onwards their possession is adverse to the interest of the real owner. Hence, the appellant/plaintiff prescribed title by adverse possession. To substantiate his claim, the learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff relied upon the decisions reported in Utha Moidu Haji v. Kuningarath Kunhabdulla and others, 2007 (14) SCC 792 and Des Raj v. Bhagat Ram, 2007 (2) CTC 838 (SC): 2007 (9) SCC 641 . Hence, the appellant/plaintiff prescribed title by adverse possession. To substantiate his claim, the learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff relied upon the decisions reported in Utha Moidu Haji v. Kuningarath Kunhabdulla and others, 2007 (14) SCC 792 and Des Raj v. Bhagat Ram, 2007 (2) CTC 838 (SC): 2007 (9) SCC 641 . The learned counsel further contended that the Trial Court has considered all the aspects in a proper perspective and arrived at the correct conclusion, but whereas the First Appellate Court has not considered all the aspects property and hence, the decree and judgment passed by the First Appellate Court has to be set aside and he prayed for allowing of this Appeal. 11. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents would, contend that the Manu Gounder and his predecessor-in-title are not the owner of the entire suit property. Out of the total extent of 1.64 cents, 1.33 cents was purchased by father of the second respondent/second defendant index Ex.B1. The remaining 0.31 cente has been purchased by one Chinnapaiyan under Ex.B7. They are in possession and enjoyment of the same. The mother of the second respondent/second defendant Dhanabagiyammal and children of Chinnapaiyan, by name, Mayavan and Murugesan, were not impleaded. So, the Suit is bad for non-joinder of was in possession of the suit property after Ex.A1 in the year 1963. So, they have not prescribed title by adverse possession. Per contra, the respondents herein/defendants have prescribed title by adverse possession. To substantiate the claim, the learned counsel for the respondents/defendants relied upon the decisions reported in P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy and others v. Revamma and others, 2007 (6) SCC 59 , Hemaji Waghaji Jat v. Bhikhabhai Kherngarbhai Harijan and others, AIR 2009 SC 103 . The learned counsel further submits that the first Appellate Court has considered all the aspects in a proper perspective and come to the correct conclusion. There is no infirmity or illegality in the judgment passed by the First Appellate Court. Hence, he prayed for the dismissal of the Second Appeal. 12. Substantial Question of Law No.2. The total extent of the suit property is 1.64 cents in R.S. No.103/4. It is true that ‘A’ schedule property was allotted to Manu Gounder under Ex.A1, which contains suit property. It is true that first respondent/first defendant is party to Ex.A1 dated 26.12.1963. Prior to 26.12.1963. 12. Substantial Question of Law No.2. The total extent of the suit property is 1.64 cents in R.S. No.103/4. It is true that ‘A’ schedule property was allotted to Manu Gounder under Ex.A1, which contains suit property. It is true that first respondent/first defendant is party to Ex.A1 dated 26.12.1963. Prior to 26.12.1963. no title deed has been filed by the appellant/plaintiff. Per contra, on the side of respondents/defendants. Ex.B1 has been filed to prove that second respondent’s father Marimuthu Gounder has purchased 1.33 cents out of 1.64 cents in R.S.103/4. It is also an admitted fact that Marimuthu Gounder had died intestate leaving behind his wife Dhanabagiyammal and daughter Nellammai, the second defendant/second respondent herein. At the time of filing the written statement itself. It is seen that in paragraph 5 of the written statement the second defendant/second respondent herein has raised the plea of non-joinder of necessary parties. She also filed a registered copy of Ex.B7-sale deed stating that remaining 0.31 cents out of 1.64 cents in R.S. No.103/4 has been purchased by Chinnapaiyan on 04.03.1947. He died intestate leaving behind his two sons – Mayavan and Murugesan. They are in possession. Hence, they are necessary parties to the proceedings. The Trial Court has considered the averment and framed Issue No.6 as to, whether the Suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties? The Trial Court had framed Issue No.6 as under: “6. TAMIL In page 7 of the printed judgment, the learned Trial Judge has come to the conclusion that after Exs.A1 and A2, neither DW2-Umaiyan nor the respondents herein have raised any objection for possession and change of patta and in such circumstances, they are not the owner of the property and therefore, the non-impleading of the person will not affect the case of the plaintiff/appellant and decreed the Suit. Against that, an Appeal has been filed. In the Appeal, no such plea of non-joinder of necessary parties has been raised. In paragraph 10 of the judgment, the learned First Appellate Judge has come to the conclusion that the Trial Court has committed an error in not impleading the necessary parties and dismissed the Suit. Against that, the present Second Appeal has been preferred. 13. In the Appeal, no such plea of non-joinder of necessary parties has been raised. In paragraph 10 of the judgment, the learned First Appellate Judge has come to the conclusion that the Trial Court has committed an error in not impleading the necessary parties and dismissed the Suit. Against that, the present Second Appeal has been preferred. 13. It is truethat the Suit cannot be dismissed for non-joinder of necessary parties as per Order 1, Rule 9, C.P.C. it is appropriate to incorporate Order 1, Rule 9, C.P.C., which reads as under: “rule 9. Misjoinder and non-joinder – No Suit shall be defeated by reason of the misjoinder or nonjoinder of parties, and the Court may in every Suit deal with the matter in controversy so far as regards the rights and interests of the parties actually before it: Provided that nothing in this Rule shall apply to non-joinder of a necessary party.” The necessary parties have to be impleaded in the Suit and they have to work out the remedy. The Suit is bad for non-joinder of party, or where in his absence, the decree that may be passed might become infructuous or inexecutable, the Court cannot dismiss a Suit for non-joinder of a person. When the question is such that it can be decided between the parties to the Suit, the Court cannot decline to do so because third persons might be interested therein. 14. Considering the above aspects, now this Court has to decide, whether the impleading of Dhanabagiyammal, Mayavan, Murugesan and Sadhu, is necessary. 15. At this juncture, it is appropriate to consider the evidence of DW1-Nellammai/second respondent/second defendant, who is none other than the sister-in-law of Manu Gounder. It is her candid admission that she is well aware of the fact that the suit property was included in the partition deed. The partition deed has been accepted and acted upon. In her cross-examination, she has fairly conceded that she does not know whether the patta has been changed in her name after the death of her father. She also fairly conceded that there is no document to show that the respondents/defendants are in possession and enjoyment of the suit properties viz., 1.33 cents out of 1.64 cents. DW2-Umaiyan has stated that after Chinnapaiyan has purchased the property, he has mortgaged the property to one Karuppa Gounder under Ex.X2. She also fairly conceded that there is no document to show that the respondents/defendants are in possession and enjoyment of the suit properties viz., 1.33 cents out of 1.64 cents. DW2-Umaiyan has stated that after Chinnapaiyan has purchased the property, he has mortgaged the property to one Karuppa Gounder under Ex.X2. He has also stated that his father died 20 years back leaving behind Umaiyan, Murugesan and Sadhu. He has further stated that they are in possession and enjoyment of the same. He has stated that his another name is Mayavan. He has also fairly conceded that he has not filed any document to show that they are in possession and enjoyment of 0.31 cents. He has also fairly conceded that he has not changed the patta in his name. Both DWs. 1 and 2 who are claiming under Exs.B1 and B7 have fairly conceded that a partition has taken place been Manu Gounder and Ramaswamy, the first respondent herein, in the year 1963 and in the partition deed-Ex.A1 dated 26.12.1963 the suit property has been mentioned and they are in possession, even though, after that the appellant/plaintiff has purchased the property, changed the patta in his name and paying kist. Both DWs. 1 and 2 never raised any document to show that they are in possession from the date of Ex.A1. Moreover, after that, the second respondent has not taken any steps to implead her mother as party to the proceedings. The evidence of DWs 1 and 2 have clearly proved that neither the second respondent nor the legal representatives of Chinnapaiyan are in possession and enjoyment of the entire extent of suit property of 1.64 cents. They are not having any document to show they are in possession after EX.A1 came into existence. In the above said circumstances, the Trial Court has considered all the aspects in a proper perspective in page 7 in Issue Nos. 4, 5 and 6 and come to the conclusion that they have not raised any objection for possession and mutation of revenue records after 1963 till the date of filing of the Suit. They also fairly conceded they are not having any document to show they are in possession and enjoyment of the same. 4, 5 and 6 and come to the conclusion that they have not raised any objection for possession and mutation of revenue records after 1963 till the date of filing of the Suit. They also fairly conceded they are not having any document to show they are in possession and enjoyment of the same. In the above said circumstances, I am of the view that Dhanabagiyammal, the mother of second respondent/second defendant and children of Chinnapaiyan viz., Umaiyan @ Mayavan, Murugesan and Sadhu, are not having any interest and their right has been extinguished by the open, long, continuous uninterrupted possession of the plaintiff/appellant and his predecessor-in-title and they prescribed title to the suit property. 16. It is relevant to consider, whether the persons are necessary parties for proper adjudication of the Suit. Order 1, Rule 10, C.P.C., deals with who are the necessary parties. A person may be added as a party to a Suit in the following two cases – (i) when he ought to have been joined as plaintiff or defendant, and is not joined so, or (ii) when, without his presence, the questions in the Suit cannot be completely decided. There is no jurisdiction to add a party in any other case. Thus, a person should not be added as a defendant merely because he would be incidentially affected by the judgment. The power of a Court to add a party to a proceedings cannot depend solely on the question whether he has interest in the suit property. The question is whether the right of a person may be affected if he is not added as a party. Such right, however, will include necessarily an enforceable legal right. A necessary party is one without whom no order can be made effectively. While considering these aspects, I am of the opinion that Dhanabagiyammal, Mayavan, Murugesan and Sadhu are not necessary party for proper adjudication of the Suit. That factum has been considered by the Trial Court. So, I am forced to concur with the finding of the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court has not considered these aspects. Merely on the basis of Exs.B1 and B7, which came into existence before 1963, the First Appellate Court has set aside the decree, which is erroneous. That factum has been considered by the Trial Court. So, I am forced to concur with the finding of the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court has not considered these aspects. Merely on the basis of Exs.B1 and B7, which came into existence before 1963, the First Appellate Court has set aside the decree, which is erroneous. Hence, I am of the opinion, the First Appellate Court has erroneously concluded that the Suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. The Substantial Question of Law No. 1 is answered accordingly. 17. Substantial Question of Law No. 2: The person, who plead adverse possession must prove that he in open, continuous, long and uninterrupted possession with the knowledge of the true owner, adverse to the interest of the true owner, for more than a statutory period. 18. To substantiate his claim that the appellant/plaintiff prescribed title by adverse possession, the learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the decision reported in Utha Moidu Haji v. Kuningarath Kunhabdulla, 2007 (14) SCC 792 , the Supreme Court has held as under: “14. A grandfather from the mother’s side, under the Mohammedan Law, is not a co-owner of a property. Moosa Haji as a predecessor-in-interest of the said property also thus did not become the co-owner of the plaintiff. The expression co-owner presupposes ownership. If the contention of the respondent-plaintiff that Moosa haji did not acquire any interest in the property so far as the plaintiff is concerned is correct, the question of his becoming co-owner of the property by reason of the said deed of sale or otherwise would not arise. When a person enters into possession of a land under a void or voidable transaction, his possession becomes adverse from the date he comes in possession. His possession becomes adverse from the date he comes in possession. His possession would be exclusive, it will be a repetition to state or not, in the capacity of a co-owner. The concept of co-owner, therefore, in our opinion, has not been correctly applied in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case. Reliance has been placed by Mr. Vishwanath Iyer on a decision of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Jagannath Marwari v. Chandni Bibi, AIR 1921 Cal. 647. The concept of co-owner, therefore, in our opinion, has not been correctly applied in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case. Reliance has been placed by Mr. Vishwanath Iyer on a decision of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Jagannath Marwari v. Chandni Bibi, AIR 1921 Cal. 647. Therein the parties were co-shares and a question was raised as to whether a co-sharer becomes entitled to claim in defeasible title by starting possession of the property adverse the interest of the plaintiff who was a minor at that point of time. The Calcutta High Court opined that the question of adverse possession as against the minor to his knowledge would arise only from the date of his attaining majority and not prior thereto. We also agree with Mr. Ramamoorthy that it was also not a case where the vendor held the property in Suit in trust for the plaintiff. As noticed hereinbefore, we are not concerned with such a situation in the present case as the only question which fell for consideration before the learned Trial Judge was that whether the provisions of Article 60 of the Schedule appended to the Limitation Act would be attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case.” 19. In the decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant reported in Des Raj v. Bhagat Ram, 2007 (2) CTC 838 (SC), 2007 (9) SCC 641 , The Supreme Court has referred to the decision reported in T. Anjanappa v. Somalingappa, 2006 (5) CTC 378 (SC), wherein the Supreme Court has held as under: “12. The concept of adverse possession contemplates a hostile possession i.e., a possession which is expressly or impliedly in denial of the title of the true owner. Possession to be adverse must be possession by a person who does not acknowledge the other’s rights but denies them. The principle of law is firmly established that a person who bases his title on adverse possession must show by clear and unequivocal evidence that his possession was hostile to the real owner and amounted to denial of his title to the property claimed. For deciding whether the alleged acts of a person constituted adverse possession, the animus of the person doing those acts is the most crucial factor. Adverse possession is commenced in wrong and is aimed against right. For deciding whether the alleged acts of a person constituted adverse possession, the animus of the person doing those acts is the most crucial factor. Adverse possession is commenced in wrong and is aimed against right. A person is said to hold the property adversely to the real owner when that person in denial of the owner’s right excluded him from the enjoyment of his property.” 20. The learned counsel for the respondents relied upon the decision reported in P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy and others v. Revamma and others, 2007 (6) SCC 59 , wherein the Supreme Court has held as under: “Adverse possession in one sense is based on the theory or presumption that the owner has abandoned the property to the adverse possessor on the acquiescence of the owner to the hostile acts and claims of the person in possession. It follows that sound qualities of a typical adverse possession lie in it being open, continuous and hostile.” 21. In the decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents reported in Hemaji Waghaji Jat v. Bhikhabhai Khengarbhai Harijan and others, AIR 2009 SC 103 , the Supreme Court has held as under: “Person claiming title over property on the basis of adverse possession must clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to establish his adverse possession.… In the said decision, the Supreme Court has referred to the decision reported in Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Government of India, 2004 (10) SCC 779 , wherein it was held as under: “In the eye of the law, an owner would be deemed to be in possession of a property so long as there is no intrusion. Non-use of the property by the owner even for a long time won’t affect his title. But the position will be altered when another person takes possession of the property and asserts a right over it. Adverse possession is a hostile possession by clearly asserting hostile title in denial of the title of the true owner. It is a well-settled principle that a party claiming adverse possession must prove that his possession is “nec vi, nec clam, nec precario”, that is, peaceful, open and continuous. The possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that their possession is adverse to the true owner. It is a well-settled principle that a party claiming adverse possession must prove that his possession is “nec vi, nec clam, nec precario”, that is, peaceful, open and continuous. The possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that their possession is adverse to the true owner. It must start with a wrongful disposition of the rightful owner and be actual, visible, exclusive, hostile and continued over the statutory period.” The Court further observed the plea of adverse possession is not a pure question of law but a blended one of fact and law. Therefore, a person who claims adverse possession should show: (a) on what date he came into possession, (b) what was the nature of his possession, (C) whether the factum of possession was known to the other party, (d) how long his possession has continued, and (e) his possession was open and undisturbed. A person pleading adverse possession has no equities in his favour. Since he is trying to defeat the rights of the true owner, it is for him to clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to establish his adverse possession.” 22. Here, DW1-Nellammai, the daughter of Marimuthu Gounder and DW2-Umaiyan @ Mayavan, son of Chinnapaiyan, who are the vendee under Exs.B1 and B7 have categorically admitted that they are aware that there was a partition taken place between the appellant/plaintiff and second respondent/second defendant. In that partition, the suit property was allotted to Manu Gounder. In pursuance of that, Manu Gounder changed the patta in his name and he is in possession. The partition deed has been accepted and acted upon. The plaintiff/appellant purchased the same and changed the patta in his name and paid the kist and enjoying the same. Besides, DWs 1 and 2 have fairly conceded they are not having any document to show that they are in possession of the suit property, which has clearly proved that with the knowledge of the true owner, the plaintiff/appellant herein is in possession and enjoyment of the same. Hence, I am of the opinion that the appellant herein/plaintiff has prescribed title by adverse possession. Since, the First Appellate Court is the last fact finding Court, it ought to have considered both the oral and documentary evidence and come to the conclusion. Exs.B1 and B7 are before 1963. Hence, I am of the opinion that the appellant herein/plaintiff has prescribed title by adverse possession. Since, the First Appellate Court is the last fact finding Court, it ought to have considered both the oral and documentary evidence and come to the conclusion. Exs.B1 and B7 are before 1963. The oral evidence of DWs 1 and 2 corroborates with the documentary evidence of plaintiff/appellant. In the above said circumstances, the finding of the First Appellate Court is erroneous. The appellant herein/plaintiff has prescribed title by adverse possession. So, the Second Appeal is liable to be allowed. The Substantial Question of Law No.2 is answered accordingly. 23. In fine, -- i. The Second Appeal is allowed. ii. No costs. iii. The decree and judgment of First Appellate Court is set aside. iv. The decree and judgment of Trial Court is restored to file.