JUDGMENT Jayant Patel, J. 1. As in all the appeals common question arises for consideration and the judgment was also common, they are being considered by this common order. 2. All the First Appeals arise from the common judgment and decree dated 30th September, 1994 passed by the learned City Civil Judge in Civil Suit Nos. 2452, 2453, 2454, 2455, 2470 and 3006 of 1976, whereby the learned City Civil Judge has decreed the suits in favour of the Plaintiffs-Appellants herein. However, on the aspects of interest, the trial Court has awarded 6% p.a., from the respective date until the amount is realized and not 14% p.a., as claimed by the Appellants-Plaintiffs. Hence, the present appeals. 3. We have heard Mr. Dave with Mr. Jani, learned Counsel for the Appellants. Ms. Davawala, learned Counsel has appeared for Respondent No. 5 in First Appeals No. 5144, 5145, and 5148 of 1995. 4. As such on the aspects of factum of filing of the suits, leading of the evidence by both the sides, consideration of the matter by the learned Judge and passing of the judgment and decree, are not much in dispute, nor such a ground is under challenge in the present appeals, save and except on the aspects of liability to pay interest and, if yes, the entitlement of the rate of interest, hence, we find that it would not be necessary to deal with the facts elaborately and we may rather concentrate on the question and the relevant evidence in context in contention raised before us by the Appellant. 5. It may also be recorded that the learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant in all the matters has contended the only question of non-awarding of interest at the rate of 14% by the trial Court and awarding of only 6% of the interest and it was submitted that the other part of the judgment and decree of the trial Court are not under challenge. 6. The contention raised on behalf of the Appellant is that though found and considered by the learned Judge of the trail Court, after drawing of the instrument, the communication was made by the Appellant Bank to the party concerned that if the instrument is not honoured or the payment is not made as per the instrument, interest at the rate of 14% per annum would be charged from the due date of payment. The learned Counsel submitted that the trial Court ought not to have discarded that part of the evidence and could have considered the same as a valid piece of evidence binding to both the sides and more particularly the Defendant therein and the interest as per the terms and conditions of the contract was required to be awarded at the rate of 14% per annum. It was alternatively submitted that Section 80 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act;) was also amended w.e.f. 30.12.1988 and the interest provided was 18% per annum, whereas the learned Judge has proceeded on the basis of 6% per annum. He submitted that when the statute was already amended on the date when the judgment and decree was passed, the Court ought to have considered that part and the interest was required to be awarded at the rate of 14% p.a., as agreed or alternatively it could also be 18% p.a. He submitted that, therefore, the aspect of awarding of interest at the rate of 6% p.a., is erroneous and the appeals deserve to be allowed to that extent. 7. It deserves to be recorded that the learned Advocate for the Appellant has not been able to show any admission of interest at the rate of 14% p.a., by the concerned Defendants by way of pleading in the record of the trial Court. Therefore, in absence of any admission by the Defendants concerned on the aspect of quantum of interest at the rate of 14% per annum, if the learned Judge has proceeded to examine the evidentiary value the documents of the instrument and the communication thereafter between the parties, the same cannot be said as erroneous. 8. Further, the pertinent aspect is that it is not the case of the Appellant-Plaintiff also that any rate of interest was specified in the instrument itself, therefore, there was liability to pay the interest at the rate of 14% per annum, but on the contrary even as per Appellant-Plaintiff the liability of paying interest at the rate 14% p.a., is stated to be in the form of acceptance memo, which is a different document than the instrument itself. Therefore, the learned Judge while recording the reasons on the aspects of liability and the quantification of interest at para 173 has observed, thus, 'this acceptance memo admittedly used to be prepared and issued subsequently to the date on which the hundies were presented by duly accepted before the Plaintiff bank.' 9. Therefore, the evidence can be segregated into two parts; one for all the instruments themselves and another for agreed rate of interest after the instruments were drawn and presented. It is in that light of the evidence the effect is to be given to Section 80 of the N.I. Act. Section 80 of the N.I. Act, for ready reference reads as under: Section 80. Interest when no rate specified.- When no rate of interest is specified in the instrument, interest on the amount due thereon shall, [notwithstanding any agreement relating to interest between any parties to the instrument], be calculated at the rate of [eighteen per centum] per annum, from the date at which the same ought to have been paid by the party charged, until tender or realization of the amount due thereon, or until such date after the institution of a suit to recover such amount as the Court directs. Explanation.- When the party charged is the endorser of an instrument dishonoured by non-payment, he is liable to pay interest only from the time that he receives notice of the dishonour. 10. It is also undisputed position that prior to 30th December, 1988 on the statute book, the interest rate provided was 6% and only after amendment by Act No. 66 of 1988 the word (figure) 6%' has been substituted by 18%'. If the above referred section is read as it is, it provides that when no interest rate is specified in the instrument, the interest on the amount due notwithstanding any agreement relating to the interest between the parties to the instrument shall be calculated at the rate, prior to 1988, 6% per annum and after 1988 is 18% per annum. In order to apply the section, matter can be bifurcated into two parts; one for providing of rate of interest as specified in the instrument and another is of any agreement relating to the interest between the parties to the instrument. In order to apply the section, matter can be bifurcated into two parts; one for providing of rate of interest as specified in the instrument and another is of any agreement relating to the interest between the parties to the instrument. If the first position prevails namely; the interest is specified in the instrument, section provides that the interest as specified in the instrument will prevail so as to attract the liability of interest. However, in the second and third situations namely; that either there is any agreement relating interest between the parties to the instrument, or there is no agreement relating to interest between the parties to the instrument, section shall have the role. The fact that the Parliament has used the words 'notwithstanding any agreement relating to the interest between the parties to the instrument' makes it clear that as per section, there shall be overriding effect upon any agreement relating to the interest between the parties to the instrument. If there is no specified rate of interest in the instrument itself, then in that case, prior to 1988 the liability would be 6% to pay interest and post 1998 the liability would be to pay interest at the rate of 18% per annum. Same situation would prevail in the event there is no agreement at all between the parties to the instrument to pay interest namely; the liability pre-1988 would be 6% per annum and post-1988 would be 18% per annum. At this stage, we may profitably refer to the decision of Madras High Court, in the case of M. Rajgopal and Anr. v. Thiagarajan and Ors. reported in (1999) 95 Comp Cas 286 and more particularly the observations made on page 302, the relevant of which reads as under: 51 This section governs a case where, in a negotiable instrument, payment of interest is mentioned but no rate is stipulated and also a case where there is no interest mentioned at all in the instrument. Any agreement between the parties contemporaneous with or subsequent to the date of the negotiable instrument, as to interest will not have any effect and such a agreement will not be enforceable because the section specifically states that 'notwithstanding any agreement relating to interest between any parties to the instrument', interest shall be calculated at the rate of six per cent. per annum (of course from December 30, 1988, onwards eighteen per cent. per annum). The non-obstante clause contained in the section supersedes or sets aside such agreement if any between the parties to the instrument. The section further provides 'interest on the amount due thereon shall be calculated at the rate of six per cent. per annum from the date at which the same ought to have been paid by the party charged until tender or realisation of the amount due thereon or until such date after the institution of a suit to recover such amount as the court directs'. Thus the rate of interest on the amount due under the instrument attracting Section 80 of the Act as it stood prior to December 30, 1988, will have to be calculated at the rate of 6 per cent. per annum from the date the amount ought to have been paid and until it is tendered or realised. The amendment effected by Act No. 66 of 1988 which came into force on December 30, 1988, does not apply to the transactions effected prior to December 30, 1988. The amendment applies to the transactions effected on and from December 30, 1988. 52. The above conclusion makes the position clear that the amendment effected by Act No. 66 of 1988 which came into force on December 30, 1988, does not apply to the transaction effected prior to December 30, 1988. There is no dispute in all cases before me that the transactions were effected long prior to December 30, 1988. As stated earlier, in the absence of any written agreement with regard to rate of interest or acceptable evidence and when the instrument is silent as to the rate of interest, the Plaintiff is entitled to interest only at the rate of 6 per cent. as per Section 80 of the Act. The same view has been expressed by Swamikkannu, J. in a decision in Syndicate Bank v. N.C. Kalyani AIR 1983 Mad 254 . 11. as per Section 80 of the Act. The same view has been expressed by Swamikkannu, J. in a decision in Syndicate Bank v. N.C. Kalyani AIR 1983 Mad 254 . 11. If the contention of the learned Counsel for the Appellant is considered in light of the above referred legal position, it is an admitted position that the instruments in question were prior to 30th December, 1988, therefore, the amendment of 1988 will have no applicability and the learned Trial Judge has rightly awarded interest at the rate of 6% per annum as provided in Section 80 of the Act. 12. So far as the contention that the subsequent agreement could have been effected to between the parties and not the interest as specified in Section 80 of the Act, would also get answered by the above referred discussion inasmuch as Section 80 of the Act would prevail, if there is no agreement specified in the instrument. Further as per language of Section 80 even if there is subsequent agreement between the parties to the instrument for a particular rate of interest, the same would not be enforceable but the liability would stand reduced or quantified to the extent of 6% p.a., only as the instruments were drawn and the amount was to be paid prior to 30th December, 1988. 13. It is true that the learned Judge in the discussion has not considered the said agreement subsequent to the drawing of the instruments as valid, but in our view, in view of the aforesaid observations and discussions, if the matter is considered on the terms with the agreement subsequent to the instruments were valid, then also the same was unenforceable on the face of provisions of Section 80 of the Act. Hence, we find that if Section 80 of the Act was to prevail over the agreement between the parties, which was subsequent to the drawing of the instruments and when Section 80 of the Act provided for liability to pay interest at the rate of 6%, which ultimately has been so ordered by the learned Judge, no useful purpose would be served in interfering with the judgment of the learned Judge on such ground. 14. 14. In view of the aforesaid observations and discussion, the contention of the learned Counsel for the Appellant for assailing the judgment and decree of the trial Court awarding interest at the rate of 6% per annum, can be said as meritless. Hence, the same is rejected. 15. No other contention is raised. 16. In the result, all the appeals are meritless. Hence, dismissed.