Judgment : 1 The appellants/plaintiffs have preferred this appeal as against the judgment and decree dated 22.12.2000 made in O.S. No. 183 of 1995 on the file of the learned Subordinate Judge, Salem. 2 The trial Court, in its judgment in O.S. No. 183 of 1995 dated 22.12.2000, has, among other things, observed that the plaintiffs have no right to claim the reliefs of specific performance and permanent injunction and dismissed the suit without costs but directed the first defendant to pay a sum of ` 2,00,000/-received as advance to the plaintiffs within two months from the date of Judgment and in case of default, the plaintiffs are directed to pay 6% interest per anuum from the date of Decree till date of payment. 3 The trial Court has framed in all 6 issues for consideration. On behalf of the appellants/plaintiffs, witnesses P.W.1 and P.W.2 have been examined and Exhibits A-1 to A-10 have been marked. On the side of the respondents/defendants, D.W.1 to D.W.3 have been examined and Exhibits B-1 to B140 have been marked. Also, Exhibit C-1-Advocate Commissioner ‘ s Report and Exhibit C-2-Plan have been marked. 4 Aggrieved against the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court in O.S. No. 183 of 1995 dated 22.12.2000, the appellants/plaintiffs have preferred this appeal before this Court. 5 The point that arise for determination in this appeal is: “ Whether the appellants/plaintiffs are entitled to claim the relief of specific performance on the basis of Exhibit A-1-Agreement dated 15.4.1992? ” 6 Contentions, Discussions and Findings: According to the learned senior counsel for the appellants/plaintiffs, the trial Court has failed to appreciate the proper steps in sending notice to the 2nd respondent and the same has been received and marked as Exhibits A-9 and A-10 respectively and in fact, the 1st respondent/1st defendant has executed an illegal sale in favour of the 2nd respondent and that the sale deed has been presented only on 24.2.1995 before the Sub Registrar, Salem and that too after filing of the suit before the trial Court on 1.3.1995 praying for the relief of specific performance. 7 Advancing his arguments, the learned senior counsel for the appellants submits that the trial Court has not taken into account of the fact that the 2nd respondent has purchased the schedule mentioned property with lis pendens and further, the 2nd respondent has known about the existing sale agreement between the appellants deceased father Nanjappa Gounder and the 1st respondent and added further, the trial Court has overlooked the 1st respondent/1st defendant ‘ s written statement in admitting the execution of the sale agreement and the receipt of the payments. 8 It is the further contention of the learned senior counsel for the appellants that the trial Court has not framed a vital issue whether the 2nd respondent/2nd defendant is a bona fide purchaser or otherwise? and in fact, the trial Court has rendered findings in favour of the appellants/plaintiffs after elaborately discussing the issues, but wrongly come to the conclusion that the appellants/plaintiffs are entitled only to a sum of ` 2,00,000/-paid as an advance. 9 The other limb of the contention put forward by the learned senior counsel for the appellants is that the trial Court has failed to appreciate that the 1st respondent/1st defendant’s statement in cancelling the sale agreement between him and the 1st appellant’s deceased husband and 2 to 4 plaintiff’s father is an invalid and unsustainable one in the eye of law. 10 Lastly, it is the contention of the Learned senior counsel for the appellants that the trial Court has come to a wrong conclusion in respect of the date of purchase of sale deed stamp papers by the 2nd respondent. 11 The sum and substance of the contention put forward on the side of the appellants that the trial Court has mechanically passed the Judgment without applying its mind and indeed, it ought to have granted the relief of specific performance to the appellants/plaintiffs. 11 The sum and substance of the contention put forward on the side of the appellants that the trial Court has mechanically passed the Judgment without applying its mind and indeed, it ought to have granted the relief of specific performance to the appellants/plaintiffs. 12 Per contra, the learned senior counsel for the respondents submits that the trial Court has taken into account all the relevant attendant facts and circumstances of the case and also on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence available on record, come to the right conclusion of negativing the reliefs of specific performance and the permanent injunction but directed the 1st respondent/1st defendant to return the advance sum of ` 2,00,000/-to the appellants within two months from the date of judgment and in default, to pay an interest of 6% from the date of Decree till date of realisation and the same need not be interfered by this Court. 13 It is the evidence of P.W.1 (4th plaintiff) that his father Nanjappa Gounder and the 1st respondent/1st defendant have entered into sale agreement Exhibit A-1 dated 15.2.1992 for ` 5, 75,000/-and that an advance of ` 1,50,000/-has been paid and on 23.4.1992 a sum of ` 10,000/-has been paid to the 1st respondent/1st defendant and the said endorsement is Exhibit A-2 and on 19.9.1992 a sum of ` 30,000/-has been paid to the 1st respondent/1st defendant as per endorsement Exhibit A-3 and again another sum of ` 10,000/-paid to the 1st respondent/1st defendant on 20.9.1992 as per Exhibit A-4 and the balance ` 3,75,000/-is to be paid and his father has been ready to pay the said amount, but the 1st respondent/1st defendant has not executed the sale deed but obtain the extension of time for the reason that since in the sale agreement house a tenant has been residing and has not vacated and also that the 1st respondent/1st defendant’s father has been to foreign country and that a lawyer’s notice-Exhibit A-5 has been issued to the 1st respondent/1st defendant, who has received the same and sent a reply notice Exhibit A-6 and the contents of the same are not true. 14 P.W.1 in his further evidence has deposed that his father has expired on 8.12.1994 and after his death, his mother (1st plaintiff), sister (2nd plaintiff), brother (3rd plaintiff) and himself are the legal heirs and that the 2nd respondent/2nd defendant has purchased the suit property, who is very well known about the sale agreement and she has also enquired about it with him and further, she has been given the lawyer’s notice Exhibit A-7 which has been received and returned by her and the returned cover is Exhibit A-8. 15 P.W.1 (in chief examination) has deposed that on 6.2.1995 he issued notice to the 2nd respondent/2nd defendant and the copy of the said notice is Exhibit A-9 and the acknowledgement is Exhibit A-10 and they have been ready to pay the balance sale consideration and he does not know about the paper publication notice issued by the 1st respondent/1st defendant that the plaintiffs will have to take back the advance. 16 P.W.1 in his cross examination has categorically stated that, in the suit agreement, himself and other plaintiffs have not signed and the three months time prescribed in the sale agreement has been extended for a month and even after the sale agreement money has been paid and in the endorsements made he and other plaintiffs have not signed and further he does not know about the notice dated 1.3.1993 by the 1st respondent/1st defendant etc. and further, he does not know about the 1st respondent/1st defendant handing over to the post master of Asthampatti requesting him to serve the notice and that apart, he does not know again the 1st respondent/1st defendant has sent lawyer’s notice on 27.3.1993. and further, he does not know about the 1st respondent/1st defendant handing over to the post master of Asthampatti requesting him to serve the notice and that apart, he does not know again the 1st respondent/1st defendant has sent lawyer’s notice on 27.3.1993. 17 Proceeding further, P.W.1, in his cross examination, has also stated that it is not correct to state that the lawyer’s notice dated 27.3.1993 sent to the 1st respondent/1st defendant has been returned as an endorsement that the whereabouts of Nanjappa Gounder have been enquired with his son and since it has been informed that the whereabouts of the said Nanjappa Gounder have not been known, the said notice has been returned and moreover, he does not know the publication effected by the 1st respondent/1st defendant on 13.4.1993 in Dinamalar Daily to the effect that the sale agreement is being cancelled and the advance has to be received back within one week and he is not aware that the 2nd respondent/2nd defendant is in enjoyment of the sale agreement property. 18 P.W.1, in his cross examination, has admitted that an Advocate Commissioner has mentioned that the 2nd respondent/2nd defendant has made alteration in the suit property and that he has not filed his objections to the Commissioner’s Report-Exhibit C-1. 19 P.W.2 in his evidence has stated that he is aware of the Exhibit A-1-sale agreement and he only has made arrangement for the same and that the 2nd respondent/2nd defendant has known about the agreement and that the 2nd respondent/2nd defendant has known about the agreement of the 9th Month in the year 1994 and that he has been in the residence of P.W.1 and at that time the 2nd respondent/2nd defendant and her husband came there and asked whether the land is to be given to them for consideration and that P.W.1 informed that they themselves will retain the land and they are not parting with the same. 20 P.W.2 in his cross examination has stated that in Exhibit A-1-sale agreement dated 15.4.1992 he has affixed his signature and previously he used to sign like that of the one, seen in Exhibit A-1 agreement and presently he is signing like that of the one in evidence/deposition. 20 P.W.2 in his cross examination has stated that in Exhibit A-1-sale agreement dated 15.4.1992 he has affixed his signature and previously he used to sign like that of the one, seen in Exhibit A-1 agreement and presently he is signing like that of the one in evidence/deposition. 21 D.W.1 (the 1st defendant’s father) in his evidence has stated that the 1st defendant is in bed and therefore, he is not in a position to come to Court and that he is under his care and after the receipt of Court notice the 1st respondent/1st defendant has executed a power of attorney Exhibit B-1 in his favour and that the suit agreement in respect of the suit property has been written at Salem and that in the suit property there has been a tenant by name, Walter who has vacated on 4.12.1991 and as per Rental Agreement a sum of ` 3,000/-has been received from the said tenant as an advance and at the time when he has vacated the suit property on 4.12.1991 there has been a rental due of ` 500/-and except the rental due the balance amount has been paid through cheque to him and the cheque counterfoil is Exhibit B-2 and after vacating the tenant, Exhibit A-1-agreement has been entered into with the said Nanjappa Gounder and the sale consideration is ` 5,75,000/-and that the advance has also been received and in Exhibit A-1 he has affixed his signature as a witness and to a suggestion whether the 4th plaintiff (P.W.1) has been present at the time of writing of Exhibit A-1-agreement he has stated that he does not know who is Sengodan (4th plaintiff). 22 It is the further evidence of D.W.1 that in the sale agreement the time has been mentioned as 22.10.1992 and since there has been no information from the Nanjappa Gounder a registered notice has been sent on 1.3.1993 and the copy of the same is Exhibit B-3 and the said Exhibit B-3 notice has been returned as unserved with an endorsement door locked which is Exhibit B-4 and again on 27.3.1993 a notice has been sent (viz., copy of the earlier notice) and that has also been returned viz., Exhibit B-5 and when second time notice has been sent, an intimation has been given to the post master to serve the same and the intimation copy is Exhibit B-6 and the acknowledgement is Exhibit B-7 and no reply has been received from Nanjappa and if sale is not completed within 7 days, then, advance has been directed to be received back for which publication has been given in the daily which is Exhibit B-8 and even after the publication, there has been no reply received from the Nanjappan and later the suit property has been sold to the 2nd respondent/2nd defendant for a sum of ` 4,32,000/-, thereby incurring a loss of ` 1,23,000/-and when he has sold it to the 2nd respondent/ 2nd defendant, he has not informed him about the agreement already entered into with the said Nanjappan and it is not correct to state that just because he has gone to foreign country, the delay in execution of sale agreement has occurred. 23 It is the further evidence of D.W.1 that he has gone abroad on 15.7.1991 and returned on 23.10.1991 and thereafter he has not visited abroad and his passport is Exhibit B-11. 24 D.W.1 in his cross examination has stated that when the Court notice has come to her daughter, thereafter approximately within a week, a sale deed has been executed in favour of the 2nd respondent/2nd defendant. 24 D.W.1 in his cross examination has stated that when the Court notice has come to her daughter, thereafter approximately within a week, a sale deed has been executed in favour of the 2nd respondent/2nd defendant. 25 D.W.2 in her evidence has stated that the suit property belongs to her and that she has purchased the same from the 1st defendant and his mother for a sum of ` 4,32,000/-and has taken possession on the date of purchase and the sale deed is Exhibit B-12 and that she has purchased the present property from and out of the money given to by her father and her father has expired in the year 1997 and the sale deed has been written on the date of sale talk on 8.7.1994 and since the office time has expired at 5’o clock, on that day, though they have gone to the Registrar’s office on that day, they have been directed to come on Monday. The evidence of D.W.2 is to the effect that the 1st defendant and his mother though they have been informed to come on Monday they have not turned up and they have phoned up to them and they have been informed that the 1st Defendant has been admitted into hospital for heart ailment and that he has been admitted into hospital and after recovering from his illness they have promised to come and on 24.2.1995, they have come to Salem and on that day they have submitted the document at the Registrar’s Office and since it has been late, they have been directed to pay a fee for the purpose of registering the document and her father has paid the penalty and only later the said document has been registered and the penalty receipt is Exhibit B-14-receipt. 26 D.W.2, in her further evidence, has stated that she does not know about the sale agreement entered into by the 1st respondent/1st defendant with the Nanjappa Gounder, prior to her purchase and the 1st defendant or his father has not informed about the said sale agreement and that on 30.11.1994 she has not been there at the Palaniappa Nagar residence and she has been in the suit property and therefore, she does not know about the returned notice and the second notice has been received by her etc. 27 Furthermore, it is the evidence of D.W.2 that after occupying the suit property they have spent more than ` 5,00,000/-and they have constructed three new rooms and they have laid mosaic in the floor and constructed a compound, a water tank, sump and dug a well and also obtained a three phase electricity connection and that the water supply charges card are Exhibits B-17 and B-18. Exhibit B-19 is the order in respect of water charges transferred in her name and the payment of drainage water charges are Exhibits B-20 to B-25 and that the property assessment order changed in her name is Exhibit B-26 and that the new tax demand notice is Exhibit B-27 and the property tax receipts are Exhibits B-28 to B-35 and that the electricity charge receipts are Exhibits B-66 to B-91 and that the additional deposit notice is Exhibit B-65 and the house expenses is Exhibit B-92 to B139 and the house maintenance expense note book is Exhibit B-140. 28 D.W.3, in his evidence, has stated that he is doing the typing job pertaining to the writing of document and presently he is doing this job within Omalur Sub Registrar’s compound and he has been doing this kind of work for the past six years and that he knows the 2nd defendant’s father Govinda Gounder and he called him for writing a document and typing the same in respect of the house purchased for her daughter and he called him at 11 a.m. on Friday during the 7th month in the year 1994, but he does not know the date and he has taken him in a car at 2’o clock in the afternoon and he has taken with him the typing machine (sic) in the car and he has been asked to type with the Type Machine (sic) at the sale house itself. 29 D.W.3 has further deposed that the stamp papers pertaining to the sale deed have been kept by the 2nd defendant’s father and the 1st defendant’s father has been keeping a draft and he has been directed to type after seeing the draft and accordingly, he has typing the same and thereafter, he is called everybody and read over the same and at that time Pauline, his mother, father, one brother, Govinda Gounder and 2nd defendant have been present and after reading the same, he called for affixing the signature and Pauline has asked for the money and his daughter have paid ` 4,32,000/-and the Pauline’s father after counting the money said that the money is correct and directed his daughter to affix her signature and firstly Pauline has signed and later his mother has signed and the father of the Pauline and Pauline’s brother have signed as witnesses and he has affixed his signature and after his signature, advocate Senthil Kumar has affixed his attestation signature and he has been paid a sum of ` 25/-on the date of typing the document. Exhibit B-12 is the sale deed which has been typed and signed by him. 30 According to the learned senior counsel for the appellants, Nanjappa Gounder (deceased), being the husband of the deceased 1st appellant and father of the 2nd and 3rd appellants has entered into Exhibit A-1-Sale Agreement dated 15.4.1992 between 1 and 2 Respondents/Defendants in and by which the 1st respondent/1st defendant has agreed to sell the properties for a total sale consideration of ` 5,75,000/-and the 1st respondent/1st defendant has received a sum of ` 1,,000/-on the date of agreement itself and also agreed to execute the sale deed in favour of said Nanjappa Gounder or his nominees within three months from the date of agreement. 31 The learned senior counsel for the appellants submits that on 15.4.1992 the 1st respondent/1st defendant’s father Edwin Enos has received a sum of ` 50,000/-from Nanjappa Gounder as token advance and that the deceased Nanjappa Gounder has paid a sum of ` 1,50,000/-towards the agreement of the 1st respondent/1st defendant and it is also mentioned in the sale agreement itself and as per the agreement Exhibit A-1 dated 15.4.1992, the said Nanjappa Gounder has to pay a sum of ` 4,25,000/-being the balance of sale price and get the sale deed in his name. Further, the case of the appellants is that the 1st respondent/1st defendant received another sum of ` 10,000/-on 23.4.2992 and endorsed the same on the back of the agreement itself and moreover, on 19.9.1992 the 1st respondent/1st defendant received another sum of ` 30,000/-and ` 10,000/-on 20.9.1992 and all these payments have been endorsed on the back of the agreement itself and thus, the 1st respondent/1st defendant has received a total sum of ` 2,00,000/-from Nanjappa Gounder and that the deceased Nanjappa Gounder has always been ready and willing to perform his contract but the 1st respondent/1st defendant has postponed the execution of the sale deed on some pretext or other and the said Nanjappa Gounder requested the 1st respondent/1st defendant on so many occasions to execute the sale deed free of encumbrance after receipt of balance of sale price of ` 3,75,000/-but the 1st respondent/1st defendant has been postponing the execution on some pretext or other. 32 It is the contention of the learned senior counsel for the appellants that the said Nanjappa Gounder has issued a notice to the 1st respondent/1st defendant on 6.9.1994 requesting her to execute the sale deed but even before issuing the notice, the 1st Respondent/st Defendant has informed that her father has gone to foreign countries and she assured that she will execute the sale deed after her father returning from the foreign countries and even after the return of her father from foreign countries, she has not been in a position to vacate the tenants and execute the sale deed in favour of the Nanjappa Gounder, though the said Nanjappa Gounder has always been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. Proceeding further, the learned counsel for the appellants submits that for the notice issued by Nanjappa Gounder, the 1st respondent/1st defendant sent a false reply on 16.9.1994 mentioning false allegations and also stated that she is going to sell the properties to the 2nd Defendant and in the notice, it is mentioned that Nanjappa Gounder is not committed breach of contract and hence, the 1st respondent/1st defendant has no right to cancel the agreement. 33 The learned senior counsel for the appellants submits that the original agreement holder Nanjappa Gounder died intestate on 8.12.1994 leaving the plaintiffs as his heirs and they have filed the present suit for specific performance and it is the case of the appellants/plaintiffs that when they have come to know that the 1st respondent/1st defendant is making arrangements to sell the suit properties to the 2nd respondent/2nd defendant, the 3rd appellant/4th plaintiff caused a notice to the 2nd respondent/2nd defendant requesting her not to purchase the property from the 1st defendant as there is already an agreement in existence, but the notice has been returned and again on 6.2.1995 the 3rd appellant/4th plaintiff issued another notice to the 2nd respondent/2nd defendant and even after the demise of Nanjappa Gounder, the plaintiffs have asked the Defendants to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs after vacating the tenants and since the 2nd respondent/2nd defendant is a subsequent purchaser from the 1st respondent/1st defendant, she has been added as a necessary party to the suit. 34 According to the learned senior counsel for the appellants though the sale deed dated 8.7.1994 purported to have been executed by the 1st respondent/1st defendant in favour of the 2nd Respondent has come to be registered on 24.2.1995 there has been a delay of nearly 7 months in registering the said document. The learned counsel for the appellants adds that it is highly doubtful whether the document has been executed on 8.7.1994 and even on the date of filing of the suit on 1.3.1995 the sale deed dated 8.7.1994 has not been registered and even on the date of filing of the suit the appellants/plaintiffs have not known about the sale and the reason ascribed on behalf of the defendants is that on 8.7.1994 when the document has been written the time 5’o clock has expired and therefore, D.W.2 and Others have been directed to come to the Sub Registrar’s Office on Monday but since the 1st respondent has been suffering from heart ailment and since she has been admitted to hospital after recovering from illness they will come for registration etc. 35 The learned senior counsel for the appellants projecting his arguments submits that why the 1st respondent has not come to the Registrar’s Office on Monday as directed earlier and no records have been produced before the Court below to show that the 1st respondent/1st defendant has suffered from illness on Monday, the day on which she has been asked to come over to the Registrar’s Office and only after lapse of 7 months and odd the said sale deed dated 8.7.1994 has been registered on 24.2.1995 and in fact, the Registrar has condoned the delay and his condonation of delay in getting the sale deed registered is not to be taken into account and in fact, the stamp papers have been purchased from two or three persons and in fact, the appellants/plaintiffs have been searching for old stamp papers and therefore, it is evident that the sale deed would not have been executed on 8.7.1994. 36 The learned senior counsel for the appellants submits that on 8.7.1994 happens to be a Friday and because of the delayed presentation of the sale deed for registration the 1st respondent/1st defendant and D.W.2 have been asked to come on Monday but on Monday the 1st respondent/1st defendant has not turned to the Sub Registrar’s Office and that she resides in Madurai but she has come to Salem on 8.7.1994 for execution of the sale deed and in fact, the 1st respondent/1st defendant ought to have stayed back at Salem itself and till 23.2.1995 she has not undertaken journey because of heart ailment and in fact, she ought to have registered the sale deed on 11.7.1994 itself and as a matter of fact, D.W.1 (father of the 1st defendant) in his evidence has stated that it is correct to state that his daughter has been taking treatment for the past 10 years because of her ill health and since she cannot go to out station places she has given him the power. 37 The learned senior counsel for the appellants contends that the stamp papers to the sale deed Exhibit B-12 have been purchased from more than one vendor and in fact, the appellants/plaintiffs have searched for old stamp papers and in view of the contradiction of evidence between D.W.1 and D.W.2 the stand of the appellants that the sale deed executed on 8.7.1994 is belied and indeed, the registration of sale deed has taken place in the present case after receipt of Exhibit A-9 notice dated 6.2.1995 and the acknowledgement for receipt of Exhibit A-9 notice is Exhibit A-10 dated 7.2.1995 and the 2nd respondent/2nd defendant cannot be a bona fide purchaser for value and in fact, the 2nd respondent/2nd defendant has not given a reply to Exhibit A-9 notice and if the 2nd respondent/2nd defendant is not a bona fide purchaser for value, then the suit has to be decreed as prayed for by the appellants/plaintiffs. 38 Expatiating his arguments, the learned senior counsel for the appellants submits that it is the evidence of D.W.1 (father of the 1st respondent/1st defendant) that Ramasamy is the Broker and through him only the talks in regard to the sale consideration price has taken place and for the agreement the endorsement made in regard to the payment of money has been made at Salem and that the paper publication has been made in a paper publish from Erode and further that they have not sent either directly or thorough lawyer’s notice addressed to Nanjappa Gounder to the cancellation of agreement. 39 The learned senior counsel for the appellants submits that P.W.2 (Broker) in his evidence has stated that the 2nd respondent/2nd defendant has known about the Exhibit A-1 agreement and the 2nd respondent/2nd defendant has known about the Exhibit A-1 agreement on 9.2.1994 and when he has been in the house of P.W.1 at that time the defendant and her husband have come there and asked whether the land is offered to them for profit but the 3rd appellant/4th plaintiff has stated that they will retain the land and not offering it for sale and in view of the specific evidence of P.W.2 referred to supra, the 2nd defendant has known about the existence of earlier agreement between the plaintiff’s father Nanjappa Gounder and the 1st respondent/1st defendant. 40 The learned senior counsel for the appellants submits that the petitioners/appellants 2 and 3 have taken out C.M.P. No. 631 of 2009 as per Order 6 Rule 17 of Code of Civil Procedure praying to amend the prayer in the plaint seeking a direction against the 2nd respondent/2nd defendant with a view to avoid any technicalities and by way of abundant caution and in this regard, limitation point will not arise, inasmuch as the amendment sought for is not introducing a new case and there is no change in cause of action and therefore, a Court of Law can grant the relief in this regard and also that the absence of prayer has not a decisive factor and the object of the suit has to be gathered from the overall facts and attendant circumstances of the case and as a rule, the amendment has to be allowed and merely on the basis of delay in regard to the amendment, the same cannot be dismissed in limini and further an amendment can be allowed at the appellate stage also and therefore, prays for allowing the Civil Miscellaneous Petition. 41 The learned senior counsel for the appellants, in regard to the proposition that plea of readiness and willingness is a concept relatable to an agreement and after conveyance, the question of readiness and willingness is really not relevant and as a matter of fact, after the conveyance, the question to be determined is whether an individual is a bona fide purchaser for value without notice? and the issue whether the appellants have been ready and willing is really of no consequence, relies on the decision of Honourable Supreme Court in M.M.S. Investments, Madurai and Others v. V. Veerappan and Others (2007) 9 SCC 660 at page 662 : (2007) 3 MLJ 608 wherein at paragraph 6 it is observed as follows at p. 609 of MLJ: “ 5. Questioning the plea of readiness and willingness is a concept relatable to an agreement. After conveyance the question of readiness and willingness is really not relevant. Therefore, the provision of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (in short “ the Act ” ) is not applicable. Questioning the plea of readiness and willingness is a concept relatable to an agreement. After conveyance the question of readiness and willingness is really not relevant. Therefore, the provision of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (in short “ the Act ” ) is not applicable. It is to be noted that the decision in Ram Awadh (dead) by LRs and Others v. Achhaibar Dubey and Another AIR 2000 SC 860 : (2000) 2 SCC 428 at page 431 : (2000) 2 MLJ 42 relates to a case where there was only an agreement. After the conveyance, the only question to be adjudicated is whether the purchaser was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice. In the present case the only issue that can be adjudicated is whether the appellants were bona fide purchasers for value without notice. The question whether the appellants were ready and willing is really of no consequence. In Ram Awadh (dead) by LRs and Others v. Achhaibar Dubey and Another (supra) the question of the effect of a completed sale was not there. Therefore, that decision cannot have any application so far as the present case is concerned. Once there is a conveyance the concept would be different and the primary relief could be only cancellation. ” 42 He also relies on the decision of this Court in A. Ramanathan Chettiar v. R. Ranganayaki and Others (2008) 4 MLJ 766 wherein it is, among. other things, held that ’the subsequent purchaser cannot be heard to contend the facts relating to the transaction which emerged between parties to agreement of sale and in strict sense he cannot defend on behalf of the Vendor and pick holes in case of the plaintiff and at the most can only contend whether he is a bona fide purchaser for value or not. ‘ 43 The learned senior counsel for the appellants seeks in aid of the decision in Ramdhah v. Bhanwarlal AIR 1985 Rajasthan 185 wherein it is held as follows: “ To allow an amendment in respect of presentation or signing or verification of the pleading is a matter of discretion of the Court and the same may be said regarding a defect in the relief claimed in the suit or the election petition. The prayer is ordinarily implicit in the filing of an election petition, namely, that the election of the returned candidate be declared to be void. ” 44 He invites the attention of this Court to the decision in Rajendra Kantilal Dalai v. Bombay Builders Co. (P) Ltd. and OthersAIR 2002 Bombay 408 at page 409 wherein 28 it is held that’... specific performance of a contract may be enforced against a subsequent purchaser also vide Section 19 and that in such a suit for specific performance of a contract, the plaintiff may also claim compensation for its breach either in addition to or in substitution of such performance. ‘ 45 To lend support to the contention that amendment of pleadings pertaining to the main dispute/controversy ought not to be refused on mere technical grounds, the learned senior counsel for the appellants places reliance on the decision of Honourable Supreme Court in Harcharan v. State of Haryana AIR 1983 SC 43 : (1982) 3 SCC 408 at page 409 wherein it is held that ’The amendment may be allowed at any stage of the proceedings for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties. ‘ 46 He also brings it to the notice of this Court to the decision of Honourable Supreme Court in Pandit Ishwardas v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Other s AIR 1979 SC 551 : (1979) 4 SCC 163 wherein it is held that ’New plea can be allowed at the appellate stage and appellate Court not always bound to refuse such amendment merely because of absence of necessary materials before it. ‘ 47 Per contra, the learned senior counsel for the respondents 1 and 2 submits that the appellants/plaintiffs have not made out a case so as to enable a Court of Law to exercise its discretion in their favour and in fact, in Exhibit A-1 agreement dated 15.4.1992 there are no recitals that the tenants should be evicted and that the appellants/ plaintiffs have projected a false case before the Court and in para 5 of the plaint there is an allegation that as per the agreement, the 1st respondent/1st defendant has to vacate the tenants who are in possession and enjoyment of the properties agreed to be sold within the time stipulated in the agreement etc. and further it is mentioned that the 1st respondent/1st defendant has not been able to vacate the tenants and hand over possession of the property as agreed upon and in a suit for specific performance evidence and proof of agreement must be the basis of an action and since the recitals in Exhibit A-1 agreement dated 15.4.1992 do not refer anything about vacating the tenants, the contra pleading made by the appellants/plaintiffs in the plaint are of no use. In fact, in a suit for specific performance greater amount or decree of certainty is required and that the 2nd respondent/2nd defendant has filed the written statement in the year 1997 and as per Article 113 of the Limitation Act the period of limitation is three years and the time begins to run when the right to sue accrues and in the year 1997 the right to sue has accrued and the present amendment sought for in C.M.P. No. 631 of 2009 is barred by limitation. 48 Proceeding further, the learned senior counsel for the respondents/defendants submits that in regard to the presence of tenants there is no finding rendered by the trial Court and in the instant case the 2nd respondent is a subsequent purchaser and if the plaintiffs having regard to the conduct are not entitled to the relief, the misconduct of the defendants cannot result in plaintiffs being entitled to such reliefs and the 2nd respondent/2nd defendant has purchased the property from the 1st respondent/1st defendant on 8.7.1994 itself and if the purchase is made with notice of agreement sale cannot be assailed and as per Order 6 Rule 4 of Code of Civil Procedure particulars will have to be stated and in the plaint there is no mention about fraud and hence, no amount of evidence can be looked into without pleading. 49 According to the Learned senior counsel for the respondents/defendants, there is total lack of readiness and willingness on the part of the deceased Nanjappa Gounder and that the sale agreement Exhibit A-1 dated 15.4.1992 and that at the time of execution of Exhibit A-1 agreement already there is a reference to the receipt of a total sum of ` 1,50,000/-being the advance and Exhibit A-2 is the endorsement for the payment of ` 10,000/-received from Nanjappa Gounder by the 1st respondent/1st defendant and Exhibit A-3 is the further sum of ` 30,000/-paid by the deceased Nanjappan to the 1st respondent/1st defendant and Exhibit A-4 is the endorsement dated 20.9.1992 for the payment of ` 10,000/-made by the deceased Nanjappan to the 1st respondent/1st defendant. 50 Apart from the above, it is the submission of the learned counsel for the respondents/defendants from 20.10.1992 nothing has happened and that the father of the 1st defendant has not left for any foreign country after the agreement Exhibit A-1 dated 15.4.1992 and that the Exhibit B-5 advocate notice with acknowledgement, sent to the Nanjappa Gounder has been returned unserved and on the back of the cover in Exhibit B-5 there is an endorsement dated 29.3.1995 made by the postal authority that the enquiry has been made with that of the addressee’s son but he has stated that the addressee is not available here and when asked about the address of Nanjappa Gounder his son has stated that he does not know and therefore, the said cover has been returned unserved and the 1st respondent/1st defendant has taken a proper effort by addressing the Nanjappa Gounder with a lawyer’s notice and also that he has made paper publication Exhibit B-8 in Dinamalar Tamil Daily dated 13.4.1993 wherein the 1st respondent/1st defendant’s advocate has cancelled the Exhibit A-1 agreement dated 15.4.1992 from 21.10.1992 and further informed that if advance is not taken back within 7 days from the date of publication then the said amount of advance paid by Nanjappa Gounder will not be returned. 51 The learned senior counsel for the Respondents contends that the Legal Representatives of Nanjappa Gounder have issued the notice and they have filed the suit for specific performance and from 13.4.1993, the date of Exhibit B-8 paper publication in Dinamalar till 8.12.1994 being the date of death of Nanjappa Gounder during the intervening period the said Nanjappan has not filed a suit and mere averment in the plaint that’... though Nanjappa Gounder was always ready and willing also alike to perform his part of the contract’and also the averment that’the plaintiffs are always ready and willing to perform on their part of the contract’will not suffice and in fact, there is no pleading that the sale deed Exhibit B-12 dated 8.7.1994 that it is anti dated or a fraudulent one and indeed, the appellants/plaintiffs cannot traverse beyond pleadings and also that just because the stamp papers have been purchased from different vendors the same will not invalidate the sale deed. 52 To lend support to the contention that greater degree of certainty is required in case of specific performance agreement, the learned senior counsel for the respondents/defendants cites the decision of Honourable Supreme Court in Ganesh Shet v. Dr. C.S.G.K. Setty and Others AIR 1998 SC 2216 : (1998) 2 LW 749 at page 750 wherein it is held as follows: “ In case of an agreement which is to be specifically executed in equity, there must be greater amount or degree of certainty than in a contract which is to be the basis of an action at law for damages and whether relief can be granted on the basis of evidence and whether plaintiff can be allowed to give the go by to the specific plea in the plaint. ” 53 As regards the contention that if no steps have been taken to file an application for amendment of plaint, the accrued right in favour of the party will be defeated if the amendment is allowed by the Court, the Learned senior counsel for the respondents relies on the decision in Radhika Devi v. Bajrangi Singh and Others AIR 1996 SC 2358 : (1996) 7 SCC 486 : (1996) 1 MLJ 134 : (18.1.1996 SC) MANU/SC/0594/1996 wherein at paragraph 6 it is observed as follows at p. 135 of MLJ: “ 6. …..... …..... In the present case, the gift deed was executed and registered as early as 28.7.1978 which is a notice to everyone. Even after filing of the written statement, for 3 years no steps were taken to file the application for amendment of the plaint. Thereby the accrued right in favour of the respondents would be defeated by permitting amendment of the plaint. The High Court, therefore, was right in refusing to grant permission to amend the plaint. ” 54 He also relies on the decision in Muni Lal v. Oriental Fire & General Insurance Company Ltd. and Another AIR 1996 SC 642 : (1996) 1 SCC 90 : (9.11.1995-SC) MANU/SC/0162/1996 wherein at para 6 it is held as follows: “ 6. On a consideration of this case in its proper perspective, we are of the view that granting of amendment of plaint seeking to introduce alternative relief of mandatory injunction for payment of specified amount is bad in law. The alternative relief was available to be asked for when the suit was filed but not made. He cannot be permitted to amend the plaint after the suit was barred by limitation during the pendency of the proceeding in the appellate Court or the second appellate Court. Considered from this perspective, we are of the opinion that the District Court and the High Court were right in refusing the prayer of amendment of the suit and, the Courts below had not committed any error of law warranting interference. ” 55 The learned senior counsel for the Respondents brings it to the notice of this Court the decision in Indravanthi v. Kamala (2000) 3 MLJ 106 wherein it is held that ’A suitor who comes to Court with mutually conflicting versions in the pleadings and evidence cannot claim or obtain an equitable remedy and also it is further held that long lapse of time from date of notice is a ground of deny the relief of specific performance. ‘ 56 Even a subsequent purchaser of the property or his legal representatives who have been the defendants in the suit can raise the plea the plaintiff has been ready and willing to perform his part of the agreement, the learned senior counsel for the respondents places reliance on the decision of Honourable Supreme Court in Ram Awadh (dead) by LRs and Others v. Achhaibar Dubey and Another (supra) wherein it is held that’... It is open to any defendant to contend and establish that he mandatory requirement of Section 16 (c) has not been complied -with and it is for the Court to determine whether it has or has not been complied with and, depending upon its conclusion, decree or decline to decree the suit. ‘ 57 In support of the contention that the plaintiff has to claim relief on the basis of his conduct and if on account of his own talk, he is not entitled to relief he cannot rely on the misconduct of the Defendants to secure such relief, the learned senior counsel for the respondents cites the decision of this Court in Bhagwandas Fatechand Daswani and 4 Others v. H.P.A. International, a partnership firm carrying on its business rep. by its Managing Partner H.A. Md. Aleemuddin and 2 Others(2000) 2 MLJ 24 : 2001 (3) CTC 86 at page 123 wherein it is held thus: “ ... What does not exist in the eye of law cannot be deemed to exist, because of the acts of omission or commission of the defendant during the course of the trial. If the plaintiff having regard to its own conduct is not entitled to the relief, the misconduct of the defendants cannot result in plaintiff becoming entitled to such relief. ” 58 That apart, the Learned senior counsel for the respondents cites the decision of Honourable Supreme Court in M.M.S. Investments, Madurai and Others v. V.Veerappan and Others (supra) wherein it is held that ’After the conveyance, the only question to be adjudicated is whether the purchaser was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice and the question whether the appellants were ready and willing is really of no consequence and once there is a conveyance, the concept would be different and the primary relief could be only cancellation. ‘ 59 As regards the contention that no amount of evidence on a plea that has not been raised in the pleadings can be looked into by a Court of Law, the learned senior counsel for the Respondents cites the decision of Honourable Supreme Court in State Bank of India and Others v. S.N. Goyal (2008) 5 MLJ 695 : (2009) 1 LW 1 at page 2 wherein it is held that ’In the absence of necessary pleading and issue, neither the trial Court could have considered the contention and recorded a finding thereon ’and it is further observed that ’While there is no need to plead evidence, the grounds of challenge and the facts in support of each ground, will have to be pleaded. ‘ 60 In regard to his contention that the discretionary relief of the specific performance of contract has to be exercised judiciously by a Court of Law, the learned senior counsel for the respondents/defendants cites the decision of Honourable Supreme Court in Mohammadia Cooperative Building Society Limited v. Lakshmi Srinivasa Cooperative Building Society Limited and Others (2008) 7 SCC 310 at page 311 wherein it is laid down as follows: “ Grant of a decree for specific performance of contract is a discretionary relief. Though the discretion has to be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily, yet the plaintiff’s conduct plays an important role. The Courts ordinarily would not grant any relief in favour of the person who approaches the Court with dirty hands. ” 61 In regard to the plea that stamp papers for the sale deed-Exhibit B-12 have not been purchased from the same stamp vendor etc. the learned senior counsel for the respondents submits that the said sale deed can be accepted and in this connection, he relies on the decision in Thiruvengadam Pillai v. Navaneethammal and Another (2008) 4 SCC 530 at page 532 : (2008) 2 MLJ 1115 wherein the Honourable Supreme Court has inter alia observed as follows at p. 1119 of MLJ: “ 12. Stamp Rules, 1925 applicable to Tamil Nadu, do not contain any provision that the stamp papers of required value should be purchased together from the same vendor with consecutive serial numbers. Stamp Rules, 1925 applicable to Tamil Nadu, do not contain any provision that the stamp papers of required value should be purchased together from the same vendor with consecutive serial numbers. The Rules merely provide that where two or more sheets of paper on which stamps are engraved or embossed are used to make up the amount of duty chargeable in respect of any instrument, a portion of such instrument shall be written on each sheet so used. No other rule requires use of consecutively numbered stamp papers in the State of Tamil Nadu. ” 62 In support of the contention that the 2nd respondent/2nd defendant is a bona fide purchaser for value and obtained the conveyance in his favour in good faith, the learned senior counsel for the respondents/defendants cites the decision of this Court in Sukumaran v. Panneerselvam and Ayyasami (22.4.2008-MADHC) MANU/TN/0743/ 2008 wherein at paragraph 7 it is observed as follows: “ Now we shall find out the legal position with reference to the burden of proof that is expected from either of the parties. Section 19 , Clauses (a) and (b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, reads as follows: Except as otherwise provided by this Chapter, specific performance of a contract may be enforced against- (a) either party thereto; (b) any other person claiming under him by a title arising subsequently to the contract, except a transferee for value who has paid his money in good faith and without notice of the original contract.... These clauses of Section 19 of the New Act corresponded to Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 27 of the Old Specific Relief Act. On a plain reading of the above clauses, it appears that Clause (a) only lays down the general principle that it is only a party to the contract who can be used. In other words, this clause recognises and follows the general rule that a stranger to the contract is not a proper or necessary party to a suit to enforce it; but Clause (b) provides exceptions to the general rule, according to which a subsequent purchaser, in order to successfully resist a suit for specific performance of a prior agreement for sale, must establish that he is a purchaser for value without notice of the general agreement of sale and he paid the consideration money for the sale before he had notice of the prior agreement. Clause (b) of Section 19 requires four elements to be proved to successfully claim the benefit of the exception, viz., 1. that the transfer is for value; 2. that the consideration has been paid; 3. that the subsequent transferee has taken the transfer in good faith; and 4. that both the purchase and the payment of the consideration had been made without notice of the prior contract. The first two elements are positive and the rest are negative in character. Clause (b) lays stress upon the payment of money by the transferee in good faith and without notice of the original contract, and does not go further. It contemplates a transferee who has got a document executed, who had paid the money in good faith and without notice and who gets the document registered in accordance with law, giving retrospective effect to the transaction from the date of execution. Thus, where a buyer paid full money before the date of the execution of the deed in good faith and before the receipt of the notice of the contract of sale from a buyer, he is a transferee in law from the date of execution of the conveyance within the meaning of Section 19 (h) of the Act and the transferee is protected. ” 63 The learned senior counsel for the respondents relies on the decision in Durga Prasad and Another v. Smt. Lilawati and Anotherr AIR 1972 Allahabad 396 at page 398 and 399 wherein it is observed thus: “ 13. Durga Prasad entered the witness box and denied on oath that he had any knowledge or notice of the earlier contract for sale. He, therefore, by this denial discharged the burden which initially lay on him. It was then for the plaintiff-respondent to prove by some evidence that Durga Prasad had notice of the telegram and the agreement for sale. This the plaintiff-respondent has miserably failed to prove, and, as observed above, her evidence on this point is not worthy of credence. When there are two or more than two persons who have purchased the property the person who had the earlier contract for sale in his favour must prove that which of the persons who purchased the property in question had notice of the agreement for sale. If he is not able to prove this against one of the vendees, his suit would not succeed. If he is not able to prove this against one of the vendees, his suit would not succeed. In view of this finding, I am, therefore, of the opinion that the plaintiff’s suit for the specific performance also fails. 14. Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act lays down that specific performance of a contract may be enforced against a person claiming title arising out of a subsequent contract, except in case of a transferee for value who has paid the money in good faith and without notice of the original contract. In the instant case, Durga Prasad had no notice of the contract for sale. There is no doubt that he is a purchaser for value and has paid the sale consideration. So far as the question of good faith is concerned, the evidence on the record clearly goes to show that Durga Prasad was a purchaser for value in good faith. He had no notice of the earlier transaction and as such, even if Jalauddin had any such notice that would not be of any avail to the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s suit for specific performance of the contract cannot succeed on this ground. ” and submits that in the instant case, the 2nd respondent/2nd defendant is a bona fide purchaser for value who has paid the sale consideration and she has purchased the suit property in good faith without notice of the earlier agreement and therefore, the appellants/plaintiffs are not entitled to obtain the relief of specific performance. ” and submits that in the instant case, the 2nd respondent/2nd defendant is a bona fide purchaser for value who has paid the sale consideration and she has purchased the suit property in good faith without notice of the earlier agreement and therefore, the appellants/plaintiffs are not entitled to obtain the relief of specific performance. 64 The learned senior counsel for the respondents/defendants contends that in the present case on hand, Exhibit B-12 sale deed dated 8.7.1994 has been executed before filing of the suit for specific performance and that the sale deed has been accepted for registration/admission to registration as directed by the District Registrar of Salem by his order dated 13.3.1995 on payment of fine of ` 4,320/-for the delayed presentation under Section 25 /under Section 34 of the Indian Registration Act, as endorsed by the Registrar dated 21.3.1995 and later the same has been registered in Book I Volume 2822 pages from 27 to 31 as Document No. 890/95 on 17.4.1995 and even though the present suit has been filed on 1.3.1995, the 2nd respondent/2nd defendant (purchaser) is not be affected by the Decree and in this regard, he cites the observation made by MULLA in the Registration Act, 1908 11th Edition at page 403 under Section 47 of the Registration Act which reads as follows: “ Where a deed of sale is executed before the institution of a suit for specific performance and the deed of sale is registered after the suit is filed, the purchaser is not affected by the decree in the suit (Sadei Sahu v. ChandramaniAIR 1948 Pat 60). ” 65 The learned senior counsel for the respondents also informs that the Special Deputy Collector Stamps, Salem-Dharmapuri District, Salem has collected a sum of ` 29,692/-being the difference of amount in the stamp duty fixed under sub-rule (1) and Rule 7 of the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Under Valuation of Instrument Rules, 1968 and the stamp duty already paid and also the Joint Registrar No. 1 (In the Grade of District Registrar) has collected a deposit registration amount of ` 2,350/-and all these details of endorsements have been made available on the backside 4th page of sale deed Exhibit B-12 and since the Exhibit B-12 sale deed is free from all defects there is no doubt about the authenticity of the said document in the eye of law. 66 Exhibit A-1 is the sale agreement dated 15.4.1992 entered into between the deceased Nanjappa Gounder and the 1st respondent/1st defendant in respect of the suit property. In the said agreement, there is already a reference in page 2 of the document that the father of the 1st respondent/1st defendant has received a sum of ` 50,000/-on 5.4.1992 from the Nanjappa Gounder as per token receipt and further, the 1st respondent/1st defendant has also received a sum of ` 1,00,000/-on 15.4.1992 and thus, in all, a sum of ` 1,50,000/-paid has to be treated as an advance to the sale agreement. Further, the total sale consideration in the Exhibit A-1 agreement is mentioned as ` 5,75,000/-. The sale deed is to be executed within three months from the date of execution of Exhibit A-1 sale agreement dated 15.4.1992. 67 A perusal of Exhibit A-2 endorsement dated 23.4.1992 points out that as per Exhibit A-1 agreement, apart from the advance of ` 1,50,000/-received from and out of the balance sale consideration amount, the 1st respondent/1st defendant has received from Nanjappa Gounder a sum of ` 10,000/-in cash and in total the 1st respondent/1st defendant has received a sum of ` 1,60,000/-in the presence of witnesses D.W.1 (Edwin Enos) and his wife. 68 Exhibit A-3 is the endorsement dated 19.9.1992 which refers to the receipt of ` 30,000/-by the 1st respondent/1st defendant from Nanjappa Gounder, apart from sum of ` 1,60,000/-advance received by her and in all, the 1st respondent/1st defendant has acknowledged that she has received a sum of ` 1,90,000/-and also extended the time. 69 Exhibit A-4 is the endorsement dated 20.9.1992 made by the 1st respondent/1st defendant inter alia to the effect that she has received a total sum of ` 1,90,000/-towards advance and from and out of the balance consideration to be paid, she has received from Nanjappa Gounder a sum of ` 10,000/-in cash, thus, totalling in all, she has received a sum of ` 2,00,000/-and also she has extended one month time. 70 In Exhibit A-5-Lawyer’s notice dated 6.9.1994 issued on behalf of the Nanjappa Gounder and addressed to the 1st respondent/1st defendant, it is, among other things, mentioned that the 1st respondent/1st defendant has received a sum of ` 1,50,000/-for the agreement dated 15.4.1992 and as per the agreement, she has to vacate the tenants who are in possession and enjoyment of the house agreed to be sold and that his client has to pay ` 4,25,000/-being the balance and get the sale deed executed but she has not been able to vacate and hand over possession of the house to his client as agreed upon and also that the 1st respondent/1st defendant has received another sum of ` 10,000/-and endorsed the same on the back of the agreement itself and also on 19.9.1992 she has received another sum of ` 30,000/-which has also been endorsed on 20.9.1992 and further she has received another sum of ` 10,000/-from his client and that the endorsements have been made on the back of the agreement itself and thus, the 1st respondent/1st defendant has received a total sum of ` 2,00,000/-towards the agreement. 71 Significantly, in Exhibit A-5 lawyer’s notice issued on behalf of the deceased Nanjappa, it is also stated that the said Nanjappa is always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and requested the 1st respondent/1st defendant through his son and in person on so many occasions to execute the sale deed but she has represented that she has not been able to vacate the house and hand over possession and requested Nanjappa to wait for some time to get the sale deed and further, she has told Nanjappa that her father has gone to foreign country and only after his return, she will make arrangements to evict the tenants who were in occupation of the properties to be sold and even after the return of her father, she has not been able to get the possession of the properties and execute the sale deed, though Nanjappa has always ready and willing and capable of performing his part of the contract and therefore, the 1st respondent/1st defendant is bound to execute the sale deed free of encumbrance and hand over the possession. 72 In Exhibit A-6, the 1st respondent/1st defendant’s reply lawyer notice addressed to the Nanjappa’s counsel for Exhibit A-5 it is among other things mentioned that ... on 20.9.1992 Nanjappa requested for extension of one month time for payment of the balance amount, sale and registration and that she has agreed to extend the agreement till 20.10.1992 as a final chance to him and this has been specifically written and endorsed on the back of the sale agreement itself and after 20.9.1992 Nanjappa never cared to perform his part of the agreement etc. 73 That apart, in Exhibit A-6, reply lawyer’s notice the 1st respondent/1st defendant has also made mention of that her father never left for any foreign country after the sale agreement has been entered and also she has stated that the agreement property has been vacant at the time of agreement and also the property has been kept vacant for more than 1½ years as requested by Nanjappa and only on 16.7.1993 the property has been given for tenancy occupation. 74 Moreover, in Exhibit A-6 reply lawyer’s notice the 1st respondent/1st defendant has also through her lawyer stated that she has directed an advocate notice to Nanjappa on 1.3.1993, but it has been returned back to the sender with the postal endorsement Door Locked and subsequently, she has directed another advocate notice to Nanjappa on 27.3.1993 and the same also returned back to the sender with the postal endorsement Addressee not residing in the address and thereafter, the 1st respondent/1st defendant has been constrained to make a paper publication in Erode Edition Dina-Malar on 13.4.1993 mentioning that the sale agreement stands cancelled and also asking Nanjappa to come and take back the advance paid by him to her and even after the publication, Nanjappa has not cared to turn up and that the 1st respondent/1st defendant has acted as a bona fides seller. As a matter of fact, even in Exhibit A-6 reply, lawyer’s notice dated 16.9.1994 the 1st respondent/1st defendant has stated that the sale agreement between her and Nanjappa has been cancelled and over with effect from 21.10.1992 and she is selling her property to one Ms. Sarada wife of Mr. Satyendran and having committed breach of contract, Nanjappa is now with mala fide intention is trying to thwart the sale. Sarada wife of Mr. Satyendran and having committed breach of contract, Nanjappa is now with mala fide intention is trying to thwart the sale. 75 In Exhibit A-7 lawyer’s notice dated 30.12.1994 issued on behalf of the 3rd appellant/4th plaintiff addressed to the 2nd respondent/2nd defendant it is inter alia stated that she is aware of the agreement-Exhibit A-1 dated 15.4.1992 and that the said agreement is still in force and she has been warned not to purchase the property which is subject matter of agreement dated 15.4.1992 with the 1st respondent /1st defendant. It is relevant to make a mention that in Exhibit A-7 lawyer’s notice, it is categorically stated that the 2nd respondent/2nd defendant is also aware of the agreement. 76 In Exhibit A-9-Xerox copy of lawyer’s notice dated 6.2.1995 issued on behalf of the 3rd appellant/4th plaintiff it is among other things mentioned that the 2nd respondent/2nd defendant is aware of the Exhibit A-1 agreement dated 15.4.1992 and that the said agreement is in force and further she has been warned not to purchase the subject matter of property which is covered under the agreement. 77 From the perusal of Exhibit B-1-Power of Attorney dated 18.4.1995, executed by the 1st respondent/1st defendant to and in favour of D.W.1 (Edwin Enos) it is among other things mentioned that the ’Attorney’is her father and he is aware of the facts and necessary details as regards O.S. No. 183 of 1995 and since she is not attend to defend herself in the aforesaid suit she is executing the power deed. 78 Exhibit B-3 is the lawyer’s notice dated 27.3.1993 issued on behalf of the 1st respondent/1st defendant addressed to the Nanjappa Gounder wherein it is inter alia mentioned that the 1st respondent/1st defendant has contacted the said Nanjappa on various times personally but he has personally chosen to remain silent and since he has shown no interest in calling the agreement and inasmuch as the time stipulated in the agreement has elapsed she is informing that the agreement dated 15.4.1992 stands cancelled with effect from 21.10.1992 and also stated that she is entitled to withhold and forfeit the entire amount of advance of ` 2,00,000/-for the loss incurred by her but she magnanimously agrees to return the advance amount of ` 2,00,000/-. If he specifies by way of written communication within 7 days after the receipt of the notice about the mode of refund, whether it is to be paid by cheque or draft. 79 According to Exhibit B-3 lawyer’s notice also points out that Exhibit B-3 letter has been sent to Nanjappa on 1.3.1993 by registered post with acknowledgement due, but the same has been returned to the 1st respondent/1st defendant’s counsel by the postal department with an endorsement that his door has been locked. 80 In Exhibit B-6 copy of lawyer’s notice dated 27.3.1993 addressed to the Post Master, Astham Patti, Post Office, Salem it is mentioned that already a registered notice on behalf of his client has been sent to Nanjappa Gounder, Door No. 104-B, Kamaraj Street, Peramannur, Salem 636 007 on 1.3.1993 and it has been returned bearing the endorsement that the door was locked and further it has been stated that he serving this notice again by RPAD and that it has come to his knowledge and information that the addressee was evading the service of notice with the connivance of the concerned postman and therefore, as requested him to kindly look into the matter and see to it that atleast the second notice sent to Nanjappa Gounder by RPAD is served on him as he is very much available at the said address. 81 In Exhibit B-8 paper publication in Erode Edition dated 13.4.1993, the 1st respondent/1st defendant’s lawyer has issued a public notice mentioning that the Nanjappa Gounder has entered into a sale agreement dated 15.4.1992 with the 1st respondent/1st defendant and that he is not making any attempt to get the sale deed in his favour and he is delaying the matter and therefore, through this notice the 1st respondent/1st defendant is cancelling the agreement dated 15.4.1992 from 21.10.1992 and that the Nanjappa Gounder can get back his advance amount within 7 days from the publication of the notice etc. 82 In regard to the contention that at the time of Exhibit A-1 agreement dated 15.4.1992 in the suit property there have been tenants and the 1st respondent/1st defendant has agreed with the Nanjappa Gounder that she will evict the tenants and hand over the possession of the suit property, it is to be pointed out that in Exhibit A-1 agreement dated 15.4.1992 entered into between the Nanjappan and the 1st respondent/1st defendant there are no recitals found as to the tenants to be evicted and vacant possession being handed over the deceased Nanjappa. In fact, Exhibit A-1 agreement dated 15.4.1992 does not expressly or impliedly speaks of any assurance or undertaking given by the 1st respondent/1st defendant to the deceased Nanjappa. Generally, no oral evidence is permitted to be let in much to the exclusion of recitals found in a document, as per Section 91 of the Indian Evidence Act. 83 The stand of the respondents/defendants is that at the time of Exhibit A-1 agreement dated 15.4.1992 in the suit property, there have been no tenants and also it is the clear cut evidence of D.W.1 (father of the 1st defendant) that the erstwhile tenant Waller has vacated on 4.12.1991 itself and since the tenant has paid an advance of ` 3,000/-at the time of his tenancy since he has been in arrears of ` 500/-the same has been deducted and balance has been sent through cheque on 4.12.1991 which is evident from the entry in Exhibit B-2 counterfoil of the cheques wherein it is endorsed that a sum of ` 2,500/-has been returned as balance of advance refund to the said Waller. Therefore, the contention of the appellants/plaintiffs that at the time of Exhibit A-1 agreement in the suit property, there have been tenants has not been established to the subjective satisfaction of this Court. Therefore, the contention of the appellants/plaintiffs that at the time of Exhibit A-1 agreement in the suit property, there have been tenants has not been established to the subjective satisfaction of this Court. 84 Coming to the plea of the appellants/plaintiffs that the 1st respondent/1st defendant’s father has gone abroad and only after his return the sale deed will have to be executed and in this regard, the 1st respondent/1st defendant has delayed the matter, it is to be pertinently mentioned that the perusal of Exhibit B-1 Passport does not contain any record of entry to the effect that at the time of Exhibit A-1 agreement dated 15.4.1992 or at later point of time he has gone abroad and as such, the contra plea taken by the appellants/ plaintiffs is unacceptable to this Court. 85 It transpires from the perusal of Exhibit A-1 agreement dated 15.4.1992 in Exhibit A-3 endorsement for receipt of ` 30,000/-on 19.9.1992 and acknowledging that the 1st respondent/1st defendant has totally received ` 1,90,000/-there is a recital that the time for completion of sale has been extended. Similarly, in Exhibit A-4 endorsement dated 20.9.1992 for payment of ` 20,000/-and acknowledging the receipt of ` 2,000/-by the 1st respondent/1st defendant there is a recital of extending the time limit for one month for completion of the sale. Even in Exhibits A-3 and A-4 endorsements or as a matter of fact, in Exhibit A-2 endorsement dated 23.4.1992, no recitals are seen/found to the effect that because of the inability of the 1st respondent/1st defendant to vacate the tenants, she has not been in a position to hand over the possession of the suit property or she has not been in a position to execute the sale deed in favour of the deceased Nanjappa. Hence, it cannot be construed by no stretch of imagination that the 1st respondent/1st defendant has been responsible for extending the time limit for completion of the sale, as opined by this Court. 86 In the present case, Exhibit B-3 notice dated 27.3.1993 mentions that the same letter dated 1.3.1993 has been sent by registered post with acknowledgement due to the deceased Nanjappa Gounder and the same has been returned by the postal authority with an endorsement that the door has been locked and therefore, the same notice is sent to the Nanjappa. The unserved notices have been marked as Exhibits B-4 and B-5. The unserved notices have been marked as Exhibits B-4 and B-5. In Exhibit B-4 notice addressed to the Nanjappa on the backside of the cover, it is mentioned as door locked on 3.3.1993 and 4.3.1993. Similarly, in Exhibit B-5 on the backside of the cover it is mentioned that the address of the addressee has been enquired with the son of Nanjappa and informed that Nanjappa is not available here and further, he has stated that he does not know about his address and therefore, the cover has been returned unserved. Therefore, the 1st respondent/1st defendant has through lawyer issued a public notice in Exhibit B-8 Dinamalar paper publication mentioning that the sale agreement is cancelled with effect from 21.10.1992 and therefore, Nanjappa has been asked to take back the advance within 7 days from the date of publication of the notice. 87 Therefore, it is candidly clear that the 1st respondent/1st defendant has taken genuine and reasonable endeavours in issuing notice to the said Nanjappa and the said notices have been returned unserved viz., Exhibits B-4 and B-5 for the reasons mentioned supra and as such, the 1st respondent/1st defendant cannot be found fault with, in the considered opinion of this Court. 88 In regard to the contention of the Learned senior counsel for the appellants that stamp papers to the Exhibit B-12 sale deed have been purchased from more than one vendor and in fact, the appellants/plaintiffs has searched for old papers etc., it is to be pointed out that as seen from Exhibit B-12 certified copy of sale deed (substituted as per order in I.A. No. 561 of 2001 dated 30.4.2001) the first 8 stamp papers are in the name of N. Balasubramanian, Stamp Vendor, District Registrar’s Office, Salem – 1, Tamil Nadu Licence No. 31100/67 and the stamp papers beginning from 9th page of the sale deed are in the name of P. Kandasamy, Stamp Vendor, District Collector’s Office Complex, Salem – 1 (Tamil Nadu) bearing Licence No. 2772/73. The first 8 stamp papers in Exhibit B-12 sale deed dated 30.6.1994 and other stamp papers are dated 29.6.1994 and the other stamp papers in the name of Stamp Vendor-Kandasamy are also dated 30.6.1994. The first 8 stamp papers in Exhibit B-12 sale deed dated 30.6.1994 and other stamp papers are dated 29.6.1994 and the other stamp papers in the name of Stamp Vendor-Kandasamy are also dated 30.6.1994. Just because some of the stamp papers in Exhibit B-12 sale deed are in the name of one vendor and other stamp papers are in the name of another vendor containing dates dated 30.6.1994, 29.6.1994 etc., it cannot be said that the respondents 1 and 2/defendants have searched for the old stamp papers because of the simple fact that the Stamp Rules 1925 which is applicable to this State has no provision to the effect that stamp papers of required value ought to be purchased together from the same/single vendor with consecutive/chronological serial numbers, in the considered opinion of this Court. Therefore, one cannot doubt the Exhibit B-12 sale deed just because some stamp papers of required value have been purchased from more than one vendor and therefore, the contra contention on the part of the appellants is negatived by this Court. 89 The evidence of D.W.2 is to the effect that on 8.7.1994 when the document has been written the time has been around 5’o clock in the evening and when they went to the Sub Registrar’s Office at that time, they have been directed to be come on Monday and that on Monday the 1st respondent/1st defendant, though as agreed to come, has not come and he phoned up he has been informed that the 1st respondent/1st defendant has in ailment and therefore, she has been admitted into hospital and she will come for registration for recovering from illness and later she has come on 24.2.1995 at Salem and on that date, the sale document has been registered and that the said document has been written by one Shanmugam (D.W.3). 90 In fact, D.W.3 (Shanmugam) has also in his evidence has deposed that the 2nd defendant’s father has taken him in a car at about 2’o clock in the afternoon and he has taken along with him the typewriter in the car and that he has typed the sale deed in the house of the 2nd respondent/2nd defendant’s father and he has typed the matter after seeing the draft and that the 2nd respondent/2nd defendant and her father have given money of ` 4,32,000/-and that after typing and reading the contents of document for getting the signature it has taken time till 4.45 p.m. or 5’o clock and that they are agreed to make arrangements for registration. Thus, it is candidly clear from the evidence of D.W.2 and D.W.3 that for typing the contents of sale deed and reading over the same, the time taken has around 4.45 p.m. or 5’o clock in the evening and therefore, when the document has been taken for registration it is quite natural and highly probable that D.W.2 and others have been informed to come on Monday because of the fact that time has expired for the working hours of the office of the Sub Registrar’s and also the version that the 1st respondent/1st defendant being a heart patient has been admitted in the hospital and that later on the said document has been registered on 24.2.1995 and in this regard, the version of the D.W.2 and D.W.3 cannot be so easily brushed aside because of the fact it is cogent, coherent, convincing and in short, it is worthy of acceptance by this Court. To put it differently, the evidence of D.W.2 and D.W.3 in this regard are not artificial but they are quite natural and they have spoken about the happenings in a usual way, about which no motive can be attributed, as opined by this Court. To put it differently, the evidence of D.W.2 and D.W.3 in this regard are not artificial but they are quite natural and they have spoken about the happenings in a usual way, about which no motive can be attributed, as opined by this Court. 91 In regard to the contention on the side of the appellants that Exhibit B-12 sale deed is dated 8.7.1994 in favour of the 2nd respondent/2nd defendant executed by the 1st respondent/1st defendant and her mother has been registered on 24.2.1995 after a gap of nearly 7 months and 16 days and that the condonation of delay by the Registrar concerned in regard to the registration of sale deed is not to be taken into consideration, this Court points out that Section 23 of the Registration Act, 1908 speaks of the time limit for presenting the documents for registration. 92 A reading of Section 23 of the Registration Act makes it clear that except in cases mentioned in subsequent Sections 23-A, 24, 25 and 26 no document can be registered, if it is presented beyond four months of the date of execution. It. is to be borne in mind that the term execution shall mean that the deed has been executed with all the formalities necessary of its completion. As a matter of fact, execution refers to something more than mere writing on a document and signing execution, including due execution viz., including all facts which are necessary to prove due execution. Although the term execution has not been defined in the statute, yet it is accepted that execution comprises in signing a document which has been writing read over and understood, and he does not mean merely signing a name upon a blank paper sheet. To put it precisely, the execution of a document is signing by the parties, the attesting by the witnesses and the delivery of the same. All the formalities essential for the validity of a legal act have to complete or give validity to by performing what law requires to be done as by signing, ceiling etc. and it means something more than signed as per decision in Central Warehouse Corporation, New Delhi v. Registrar for Registration of Documents-cum-Collector, Hissar, 1990(1) Punj. LR 571 at 575. All the formalities essential for the validity of a legal act have to complete or give validity to by performing what law requires to be done as by signing, ceiling etc. and it means something more than signed as per decision in Central Warehouse Corporation, New Delhi v. Registrar for Registration of Documents-cum-Collector, Hissar, 1990(1) Punj. LR 571 at 575. 93 In this connection, it is to be stated that Section 25 of the Registration Act provides a exception, viz., that if, owing to urgent necessity or unavoidable accident, a document has not been presented till after the period of four months the Registrar, in cases where the delay in presentation does not exceed four months, may direct that such document shall be accepted for registration. In a case, the document on which the Defendant claims that it has been presented for Registration beyond four months from the date of his execution, the burden, therefore, heavily lies on the defendant to establish that the requirement of law has been fulfilled, before it can be assumed by any Court that the document has been registered within the meaning of Section 25 of the Indian Registration Act. One cannot say that a presumption must be raised in favour of the defendant under Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, in view of the Registration Act shows that the District Registrar has the power to condone the delay in the presentation of a document for registration, for a period of four months after the lapse of the period of four months from the date of execution of the said document and he is competent and authorised to exercise his discretion in this matter by levying a appropriate fine thereto. There is nothing in the Registration Act to prevent a party from applying to the Registrar to excuse the delay, if the Registrar condones the delay, then in the words of Section 25 he may direct that such document may be accepted for registration. In short, the Registrar has given the discretion under Section 25 of the Act to decide whether there has been an urgent necessity or unavoidable delay which let to the delay in presentation of the document for registration. In short, the Registrar has given the discretion under Section 25 of the Act to decide whether there has been an urgent necessity or unavoidable delay which let to the delay in presentation of the document for registration. Certainly, it is not the domain of the Civil Court in a suit filed under Section 77 of the Act to sit an Appeal over its decisions in such discretionary matter, when no such appeal is allowed by the provisions of the Act as per decision in Abdul Ghafoor v. Ganga Bux Singh (1950) 5 D.L.R. (All) 340. 94 At this stage, this Court aptly points out the decision in Ram Singh Sant Ram v. Jasmer Singh Hardit Singh and Another AIR 1963 Punjab 100 at page 101 wherein it is mentioned that ’the maximum period for presenting a document for registration is 8 months under Section 23 read with Section 25 and that the document presented after about a year of its execution cannot be registered under any circumstances. ‘ 95 A perusal of Exhibit B-12 certified copy of sale deed dated 8.7.1994 shows that the document has been admitted for registration as per the order of the District Registrar of Salem vide his order No. 4279/B1/95 dated 13.3.1995 on payment of fine of ` 4,320/-for the delayed presentation under Section 25 and Section 34 of the Indian Registration Act and that the Registrar has affixed his signature on 21.3.1992. Also in Exhibit B-12 sale deed, there is a certificate of endorsement made by the Joint Sub Registrar No. 1 (in the Grade of District Registrar) dated 16.6.1995 for the collection of sum of ` 940/-from the 2nd respondent/2nd defendant as per Section 70 sub-clause (2) of the Indian Stamp Act. 96 It is to be borne in mind that Section 34 of the Indian Registration Act refers to an enquiry before registration of a document by the Registering Officer. Section 34 of the Act is special to the ingredients of various Sections including Section 77 is not intended to laid down any limitation upon the effect of Section 71 and Section 77. It provides that the document shall not be registered unless the delay is condoned. 97 By Section 23 of the Act, a document can be accepted for registration, if it is presented for that purpose to the proper officer within four months from the date of its execution. It provides that the document shall not be registered unless the delay is condoned. 97 By Section 23 of the Act, a document can be accepted for registration, if it is presented for that purpose to the proper officer within four months from the date of its execution. But this period may be extended under Section 25 of the Act for a further period of four months on payment of fine. The proviso to Section 34 also allows a further period of four months (in addition to the four months allowed by Section 25) within which to appear on payment of further fine in cases of unavoidable accident or urgent necessity as per decision in Tallochand v. GokulbhoyILR 21 Bom. 724. The net result is that while the maximum period for presenting an instrument for registration is eight months, that for appearance of execution is twelve months as per decision in Veerabhadra v. Rama Gounder 1928 MWN 886. It is incumbent on registering officers to satisfy themselves by evidence and enquiry that instruments are honestly presented in their offices for registration as per decision in Ramehandra Das in the matter of v. ILR 1 All. 318 at page 321. 98 It is not out of place for this Court to make a mention that Section 70 of the Registration Act, 1908 enjoins that ’the Inspector-General may also, in the exercise of his discretion remit wholly or in part the difference between any fine levied under Section 25 or Section 34 , and the amount of the proper registration fee. ‘ 99 In the instant case on hand, the Registrar has exercised his discretionary power to condone the delay for registration of sale deed and has admitted the sale deed for registration by adhering to the relevant provisions of the Indian and therefore, the contention put forward on the side of the appellants that the condonation of delay in getting the sale deed registered is not to be taken into account is not accepted by this Court. 100 It is the evidence of D.W.1 (1st defendant’s father) that within one week from the date of receipt of the suit summons by her daughter, the sale deed has been executed in favour of the 2nd respondent/2nd defendant and therefore, this is one circumstance which goes to show that the sale deed is anti dated as contended on behalf of the appellants. Since the perusal of Exhibit B-12 sale deed dated 8.7.1994 shows that it has been presented before the Salem District Registrar’s Office at 24.2.1995 at about 4.15 p.m. and a sum of ` 4,350/-has been paid as necessary charges thereto etc. and also that the Registrar has accepted the sale deed for registration/admission as per his order dated 13.3.1995 on payment of ` 4,320/-for the delayed presentation etc., the validity of the Exhibit B-12 sale deed cannot be assailed in any manner since the procedural requirements contemplated under the have been fully satisfied and as such, the contra contention put forward on the side of the appellants is rejected by this Court. 101 In regard to the contention that the 2nd respondent/2nd defendant has known about the Exhibit A-1 agreement on 9.2.1994 etc. it is to be pointed out that the D.W.1 in his evidence has stated that when the sale has been effected in favour of the 2nd respondent/2nd defendant at that time the 2nd respondent/2nd defendant has not been informed about the earlier agreement entered into with the Nanjappa. Further, D.W.2 in her evidence has stated that at the time of sale she has not been aware of the earlier agreement and only after the receipt of Exhibit A-9 notice on 6.2.1995, she has come to know about the earlier agreement. At this stage, this Court points out that P.W.1 in his evidence has stated that during September 1994 or during the month of October the 2nd respondent/2nd defendant and her husband Satyendran have come to his house and informed that they have spoken about the earlier agreement informed P.W.1 that they will pay more money and at that time one Ramasamy has also been present. 102 P.W.2 also in his evidence has stated during the month of September 1994 the 2nd respondent/2nd defendant has known about the earlier agreement and at that time, 2nd respondent/2nd defendant and her husband have come to the P.W.1 s house and they informed that they will pay more money and asked for the land to be sold to them and at that time the 3rd appellant/4th plaintiff has informed them that they are retaining the land and not selling the same. Both the witnesses viz., P.W.1 and P.W.2 in their evidences have not pin pointedly referred to the exact date on which the 2nd respondent/2nd defendant and her husband have come and asked P.W.1 about the offer of more money made in this regard. Significantly, Exhibit A-7 notice dated 30.12.1994 or the Exhibit A-9 notice dated 6.2.1995 also does not refer to the 2nd respondent/2nd defendant and her husband coming to the house of P.W.1 and has offered more money towards the land. Even the plaint is also silent about these aspects. 103 Therefore, in view of the fact that D.W.1 has specifically in his evidence has stated that he has not stated anything about the earlier agreement to the 2nd respondent/2nd defendant, this Court comes to an inevitable conclusion that the contention on the side of the appellants that the 2nd respondent/2nd defendant has known about the earlier agreement is unacceptable to this Court. Moreover, the 2nd respondent/2nd defendant has received the Exhibit A-9 notice dated 6.2.1995 issued on behalf of the appellants/ plaintiffs on 7.2.1995 as seen from Exhibit A-10 acknowledgement and at best only to this limited extent it can be safely concluded that before registration of the Exhibit B-12 sale deed the 2nd respondent/2nd defendant has been made aware of the earlier agreement entered into with deceased Nanjappa. 104 Coming to the aspect of the 2nd respondent/2nd defendant is not a bona fide purchaser for value without notice, it is to be pointed out that D.W.1 and D.W.2 in their evidences have stated that on 8.7.1994 itself entire sale amount has been paid and within one week from the date of sale deed, she has come into occupation of the suit property. Taking into consideration of the evidence of D.W.1 and D.W.2 this Court is of the considered view that the appellants/plaintiffs cannot seek the aid of Section 19 (b) of the Specific Relief Act, in the considered opinion of this Court. 105 As per Section 47 of the Indian Registration Act, a registered document will operate from the time from which it would have commenced to operate, if no registration thereof has been required or made and not from the time of its registration. It is well settled principle in law that a document on subsequent registration will take effect from the time when it has been executed and not from the time of its registration. It is well settled principle in law that a document on subsequent registration will take effect from the time when it has been executed and not from the time of its registration. 106 In the present case, though the sale deed Exhibit B-12 dated 8.7.1994 has been presented on 24.2.1995 before the Salem District Registrar’s Office and later the same has been accepted for registration/admission as directed by the District Registrar, Salem as per his order dated 13.3.1995 on payment of fine of ` 4,320/-as per endorsement dated 21.3.1995 etc., the said sale deed will operate from 8.7.1994 when it has been actually executed. At this stage, this Court recalls the decision in Mani Ram Major v. Dharam Singh (1973) 15 Punjab LR. 787 at page 790 wherein it is held that’... Even though the sale deed has been registered on 26.3.1954, it would operate from 28.8.1953 when it was actually executed. ’The moment a document is registered, the title in the property will pass to the transferee from the date of its execution as per the decision of this Court in V.M. Rao v. Parameshvari Ammal AIR 1998 page 230 at page 237. 107 To put it precisely, Section 47 of the Registration Act operates not only as between the parties to the document, but also affects the right of third parties, though subject to certain exemptions as per the decision in Nabir Ganai v. Mohammed Ismail Ganai AIR 1960 J & K 112 at page 113. 108 Coming to the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants in regard to the plea of lis pendens as per Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act that the trial Court has not properly considered the scope of the same. It is to be pointed out that a deed of transfer executed before the filing of a suit in respect of the property covered by the transfer but registered after the filing of the suit is not affected by the doctrine of lis pendens as per the decision in Sudama Devi v. Rajendra Singh AIR 1973 Pat. 199 at page 205. 199 at page 205. Again, in the decision of this Court in Akki Gaxru Bassappa v. Valu Vathi Setra Santhappa AIR 1925 Mad 710, it is held that a deed of sale executed before filing of the suit for specific performance of prior contract for sale of the same property but registered thereafter cannot be held to be executed pendente lite. 109 To put it differently, it is the registration of the sale deed which completes it and makes it valid and effective. Delay in effecting registration where registration is effected within the period permissible by law, may not amount to negligence. In fact, Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act ought not to be so read as to conflict with the provisions of the Section 47 of the Registration Act as per the decision in Mathur Kalwar v. Ambika ThatAIR 1914 All. 313 at page 314. 110 Be that as it may, this Court points out the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in Swami Ganesh Dassji v. Shri Sita Ram Thapar AIR 1996 SC 2095 at page 2096 : (1996) 4 SCC 526 wherein it is observed that “ ready and willing to perform ” has to be inferred from the contact of the party and attending circumstances and that the vendor in dire need of cash amount for celebrating his daughter’s marriage and time is the essence of contract and the purchaser not having enough funds to pay consideration and the draft sale deed not returned by him after being duly approved within seven days as stipulated and the relief of specific performance has been rightly refused. ” 111 In the another decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in N.P. Thirugnanam (D) by L.Rs, v. Dr. R. Jagan Mohan Rao and OthersAIR 1996 SCC 116 : (1995) 5 SCC 115 : (1995) 2 MLJ 118 it is observed as follows at p. 120 of MLJ: “ 5. … To adjudge whether the plaintiff is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, the Court must take into consideration the conduct of the plaintiff prior and subsequent to the filing of the suit along with other attending circumstances. The amount of consideration which he has to pay to the defendant must of necessity be proved to be available. The amount of consideration which he has to pay to the defendant must of necessity be proved to be available. Right from the date of the execution till date of the decree he must prove that he is ready and has always been willing to perform his part of the contract. ” 112 In Veerayee Ammal v. Seeni Ammal AIR 2001 SC 2920 : (2002) 1 SCC 134 : (2002) 1 MLJ 134 , the Honourable Supreme Court has, among other things, observed that’... Even if it is not the essence of contract, for granting relief, reasonable time has to be ascertained from all facts and circumstances of the case. ‘ 113 In Lourdu Mari David and Others v. Louis Chinnaya Arogiaswamy and Others AIR 1996 SC 2814 : (1996) 5 SCC 589 , the Honourable Supreme Court has held that ’it is settled law that the party who seeks to avail of the equitable jurisdiction of a Court and specific performance being equitable relief, must come to the Court with clean hands. In other words, the party who makes false allegations does not come with clean hands and is not entitled to the equitable relief. ‘ 114 It is not quite relevant for this Court to point out that though in Exhibit A-4 endorsement dated 20.9.1992 the time has been extended for a further period of one month, from 20.10.1992 nothing has happened on the side of the appellants/plaintiffs. It is true that the grant of relief of specific performance is a discretionary remedy and in the pre sent case on hand, there has been a delay on the part of the deceased Nanjappa in fulfilling the agreement of specific performance, notwithstanding the time fixed earlier for performance as per Exhibit A-1 and lastly the time being extended for one more month on 20.9.1992, as per endorsement Exhibit A-4. One cannot ignore an important fact that the 2nd respondent/2nd defendant has purchased the property from the 1st respondent/1st defendant and the 2nd respondent/2nd defendant is in possession and enjoyment of the suit property and has made significant improvement in the property and is paying house tax, electricity charges etc. and in the face of these circumstances, the appellants/plaintiffs are not entitled to the relief of specific performance. and in the face of these circumstances, the appellants/plaintiffs are not entitled to the relief of specific performance. 115 In short, the readiness and willingness to perform the contract on the part of the Nanjappa or the other appellants/plaintiffs when determined from the entirety of the facts and circumstances of the present case lead to an irresistible conclusion that the deceased Nanjappa or other appellants/plaintiffs have not proved to the satisfaction of this Court that they have been ready and willing to perform their part of the contract. C.M.P. No. 631 of 2009 116 In regard to C.M.P. No. 631 of 2009 filed by the petitioners/appellants 2 and 3 under Order 6 Rule 17 of Code of Civil Procedure praying permission of the Court to amend the plaint pertaining to the cause of action paragraph 12 of the plaint filed earlier and also amending the relief portion like directing the defendants 1 and 2 to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs regarding the under mentioned property free of encumbrance at the cost of the plaintiffs etc. and also in the event of failure, the Court may execute the sale deed on behalf of the 1st defendant after receipt of balance of sale price of ` 3,75,000/-as co-deposit, the learned senior counsel for the appellants relies on the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in Pandit Ishwardas v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Others (supra) wherein the Honourable Supreme Court has observed that’New plea can be allowed at the appellate stage and the appellate Court is not always bound to refuse such amendment merely because of absence of necessary materials before it. ‘ 117 He also relies on the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in Harcharan v. State of Haryana (supra) wherein the Honourable Supreme Court has observed that’The application filed before High Court seeking amendment of memorandum of appeal on the question of nature and potentiality of the land and referring to relevant decisions of the High Court cannot be dismissed in limine, solely on the ground of delay in filing the application. ‘ 118 On the other hand, the learned senior counsel for the respondents submits that the Petitioners are not entitled to seek the relief of direction directing the 2nd respondent/2nd defendant to execute the sale deed, inasmuch the said relief is time barred insofar as it relates to her and as such, the amendment cannot be allowed. 119 The learned senior counsel for the respondents cites the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in Muni Lal v. Oriental Fire & General Insurance Company Ltd. and Another (supra) wherein it is observed that’when the alternative relief was available to be asked for when he had filed the suit for declaration but he failed to do so and he cannot be permitted to amend the plaint after suit was barred by limitation during pendency of proceeding in Appellate Court. ‘ 120 It is to be noted that technicalities of law should not be permitted to hamper the Court in the administration of justice. Also the amendments are allowed in the pleadings to avoid uncalled for multiplicities of litigation. Moreover, a Court of Law will have to adopt a liberal approach where any prejudice suffered by the other side can be compensated by cause while dealing with an application filed under Order 6 Rule 17 of Code of Civil Procedure it cannot be forgotten that the principles which are applicable to the amendment of pleadings under Order 6 Rule 17 of Code of Civil Procedure equally applies to the amendment in written statement also. 121 In this connection, this Court points out that the appellants in para 8 of the C.M.P. No. 631 of 2009 has inadvertently stated as follows: “ ... Hence, I submit that in our written statement an amendment may be permitted to be made by adding one paragraph in the written statement as detailed below and an amendment of prayer as detailed below. ” 122 However, a careful scrutiny of the averments in C.M.P. No. 631 of 2009 indicates that the appellants have sought the inclusion of paragraph 12 has made mention of in the amendment petition and also the prayer directing defendants 1 and 2 to execute the sale deed on behalf of the 1st defendant after receipt of balance of sale price of ` 3,75,000/-as co-deposit. Though a Court of Law has adopted a liberal approach while dealing with an application/petition under Order 6 Rule 17 of Code of Civil Procedure praying for amendment of pleadings then one cannot ignore an important fact that where a legal right has accrued to a party due to lapse of time an amendment can result in defeat of such a right ought not to be allowed, as opined by this Court. 123 In the instant case, the suit filed by the appellants/plaintiffs is of the year 1995. C.M.P. No. 631 of 2009 praying for amendment of plaint under Order 6 Rule 17 of Code of Civil Procedure has been filed by the appellants/plaintiffs on 24.6.2009. At this stage, a reading of Section 15 (a)(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 indicates that the relief of specific performance of the contract may be obtained by any party thereto or their representative in interest. This expression includes the transferees and assignees from the contracting party in whose favour the right exists. Therefore, it is quite clear that a Court of Law has the power to direct any party to execute the sale deed even in the absence of any relief is sought against him. However, to avoid multiplicities of future litigation and also because of the fact that the amendment sought for in C.M.P. No. 631 of 2009 do not change the cause of action, this Court is of the considered view that the said amendment is legally permissible even though the said miscellaneous petition has been filed belatedly after a gap of 14 years and accordingly, allows the Civil Miscellaneous Petition to promote substantial cause of justice. 124 Already, this Court, in the light of qualitative and detailed discussions, has come to the resultant conclusion that the appellants/plaintiffs are not entitled to claim the relief of specific performance as against the respondents/defendants 1 and 2. However, it is not in dispute that the 1st respondent/1st defendant has received a total advance of ` 2,00,000/-from the deceased Nanjappa Gounder. However, it is not in dispute that the 1st respondent/1st defendant has received a total advance of ` 2,00,000/-from the deceased Nanjappa Gounder. In short, the 1st respondent/1st defendant has received a sum of ` 50,000/-on 5.4.1992, ` 1,00,000/-on 15.4.1992 as seen from Exhibit A-1 agreement dated 15.4.1992 and moreover, the 1st respondent/1st defendant has received a sum of ` 10,000/-on 23.4.1992 as per Exhibit A-2, a further sum of ` 30,000/-on 19.9.1992 as per Exhibit A-3 and also the 1st respondent/1st defendant has received a sum of ` 10,000/-on 20.9.1992 as per endorsement Exhibit A-4. Thus, in all, the 1st respondent/1st defendant has received a total sum of ` 2,00,000/-from the deceased Nanjappa. 125 A cursory glance of Exhibit A-1 agreement dated 15.4.1992 entered into between the deceased Nanjappa and D.W.1 (1st respondent/1st defendant’s father) shows that there is no condition that the deceased Nanjappa will forfeit his advance amount tendered by him in case, he fails to get the sale deed executed in his favour in time by paying the balance sale consideration. In the absence of forfeiture clause in Exhibit A-1 agreement dated 15.4.1992 and in view of the fact this Court has not granted the relief of specific performance to the appellants/ plaintiffs, this Court, on the basis of equity, fair play, justice and also exercising its discretion as per Section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure, directs the 1st respondent/1st defendant to return the advance of ` 2,00,000/-to the appellants/plaintiffs together with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of filing of the suit till date of payment (even though Exhibit A-1 agreement does not refer to any payment of interest towards the advance amount so paid) to be paid within two months from the date of receipt copy of the judgment. Per contra, the view taken by the trial Court, that the 1st respondent/1st defendant is not liable to pay interest to the total advance amount of ` 2,00,000/-and further directing the 1st respondent/1st defendant to pay interest of 6% per annum in case of default being committed thereto within two months time, are not correct. 126 In the result, the appeal is dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. 126 In the result, the appeal is dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. However, the 1st respondent/1st defendant is directed to return the advance amount of ` 2,00,000/-received from Nanjappa to the appellants/plaintiffs herein together with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of filing of the suit till date of payment within two months from the date of receipt of copy of the judgment. Resultantly, the appellants/plaintiffs are not entitled to claim the relief of specific performance as against the respondents. However, CM.P. No. 631 of 2009 filed by the appellants/plaintiffs is allowed.