Judgment The writ petition is directed against the charge memo issued to the petitioner by the second respondent in his proceedings No. 10455/VI/2010 dated 3. 2010. 2. The brief facts relevant herein are set down as follows: The petitioner joined in the service of the first respondent Registration Department as Sub Registrar during 1975 and he was promoted as District Registrar during 1987 and the petitioner was, on the date of his suspension vide G.O. (2D). No. 36 and on the date of issuance of charge memo dated 13. 2010 impugned herein, serving in the cadre of Assistant Inspector General of Registration Coimbatore Zone. The impugned charge memo contains single charge framed under Section 17(b) to the effect, that the petitioner was in the course of his tenure as District Registrar (AIG cadre, Vellore) between 1998-2002 adopted lesser value than the prescribed guide line value in respect of some of the properties thereby caused loss to the tune of Rs. 1,64,832/- to the Government and the same is in contravention amounting to misconduct under Rule 21 of Tamil Nadu Government (Disciplinary & Appeal) Rules. The validity of such Charge memo is questioned herein on the ground as follows: 1. There is-long and inordinate delay in initiating disciplinary proceedings. 2. The charge is vague non-specific and baseless. 3. The charge relate to the discharge of quasi judicial functions, the improper valuation of the property in question in the course of such discharge of quasi judicial function amounts to error of judgment and cannot without any allegations of mala fide corruption ill-motive or culpable negligence would not constitute misconduct to form basis for any Disciplinary Proceedings. 4. If Disciplinary Proceedings in respect of the charge memo is permitted to go on it will be prejudicial to the public interest particularly to the interest of the employee that too after the employee reached age of superannuation and 5. The impugned charge memo is tainted with mala fide bias and illegality. 3. Whereas the learned Additional Government Pleader appearing for respondents 1 and 2, vehemently oppose the claim both in law, and on facts. The impugned charge memo is tainted with mala fide bias and illegality. 3. Whereas the learned Additional Government Pleader appearing for respondents 1 and 2, vehemently oppose the claim both in law, and on facts. The first legal objection raised is that the writ petition against the show cause notice is not maintainable and the remedy available to the charged officer is to go before the disciplinary authority by way of his explanation and he is not entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, against the show cause notice and the writ petition is premature in nature. The official respondents have also denied the factual objections regarding the question of delay, vagueness and mala fide nature of the charges etc., 4. Both the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Additional Government Pleader hve placed their rival submissions at length in the light of the documents available in the typed set of papers and in the light of catena of judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court and our High Court for and against the submissions so made. 5. For the sake of proper appreciation of the relief and the ground on which the same is sought for in this writ petition, it is but necessary for this Court to deal with the objection raised for and against the charge memo together. 6. Before going into the validity of the charge memo on merits the 1st aspect to be considered is the maintainability of the writ petition against the impugned charge memo. 6. Before going into the validity of the charge memo on merits the 1st aspect to be considered is the maintainability of the writ petition against the impugned charge memo. It is true that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has in the authorities in (1) in State of U.P. v. Brahni Datt Sharma and Another AIR 1987 SC 943 : (1987) 2 SCC 179 and (2) in Union of India and Another v. Kunisetty Sathyanarayana (2006) 12 SCC 28 categorically held that mere charge sheet or show cause notice does not give rise to any cause of action because it die3s not amount to adverse order which affects the right of any party and it is quite possible the authority concerned may after considering the show cause notice or after holding enquiry drop the proceedings or hold the charges as not established and only when any adverse order is made in the course of disciplinary proceedings, the party can be said to have any grievance and hence writ jurisdiction being discretionary jurisdiction should not ordinarily be exercised by quashing the show cause notice or charge sheet. However, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the same judgment is pleased to observe that in some rare and exceptional cases, if the High Court finds the charge sheet or show cause notice wholly without jurisdiction or illegal, the same can be quashed. 7. Our Apex Court has in number of judgments in 1) in State of U.P. v. N. Radhakrishnan AIR 1998 SC 1833 : (1998) 4 SCC 154 ; 2) Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar v. Union of India AIR 1999 SC 2881 : (1999) 7 SCC 409 : 2000-I-LLJ-728 and 3) P.V. Mahadevan v. M.D., T.N. Housing Board 2005-III-LLJ-527 : 2005 (4) CTC 403 and the Division Bench of our High Court has in the judgment in (1) in A. Obaidhullah v. State of T.N. 2006-IV-LLJ-216 : 2005 (5) CTC 380 and (2) in G. Anand v. Principal Commissioner and Commissioner of Revenue Administration and Others (2007) 8 MLJ 10 : 2006 (5) CTC 723 laid down that the validity of the charge memo on the ground of inordinate delay and vagueness and prima facie unsustainable nature can be decided by invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. That being the legal position, the writ petition filed against the charge memo cannot be without going into the other factual objections on merits raised herein, declined to be entertained at the threshold on the ground of maintainability. 8 Regarding the other factual objections against the charge memo, the allegations contained in the charge memo are, as already referred to, relating to improper valuation of buildings/property in question during 1998-2002 while he was serving as District Registrar at Vellore whereas the charge memo was served on him during 2010 while he was serving in the cadre of Additional Inspector General of Registration at Coimbatore. The petitioner was from Vellore transferred to Chennai, and then from Chennai to Coimbatore and while he was at Coimbatore, he was due to retire on reaching superannuation on the afternoon of 22. 2010 and he was placed under suspension on 22. 2010 just one day prior to his date of his retirement and he was retained in service and was not permitted to retire and the charge memo was issued on 3. 2010. 9. It is note-worthy to mention at this juncture that the petitioner was on earlier occasion issued with charge memo containing same and similar charge and the charge memo dated 30.1.2004, 110. 2004 and 29. 2006 were all the subject matter of judicial review in batch of writ petitions in W.P. Nos. 20807 of 2008, 12044 of 2009 and 14682 of 2009. All these writ petitions are jointly tried by our High Court and are disposed of on 22. 2010, by common order just two days prior to the date of the petitioner’s suspension in respect of the present charge memo and three days prior to his retirement on superannuation. Our High Court is after analyzing the entire history of the case in detail, pleased to quash all the impugned charge memos both on legal and factual grounds and the same can be in detail recollected at later stage of this order. It is suffice to say at this juncture that one of the charge memos dated 30.1.2004 is pertaining to same allegation as raised herein that the petitioner was during his tenure at District Registrar, Vellore from 33. 1997 to 37. It is suffice to say at this juncture that one of the charge memos dated 30.1.2004 is pertaining to same allegation as raised herein that the petitioner was during his tenure at District Registrar, Vellore from 33. 1997 to 37. 2002 inspected several buildings, during the year 2001 and the petitioner calculated the value of the buildings covered under 10 documents registered before Sub Registrar, Vaniyambadi at lower rate and caused loss to the Government. Within two days from the date of disposal of earlier writ petitions quashing such charge memo, the petitioner was placed under suspension in connection with the present charge memo, which is also for the same misconduct allegedly committed by the petitioner during his tenure as District Registrar, Vellore. While the period and the number of documents covered under earlier charges is 33. 1997 to 37. 2002 and 10 documents registered before the Sub Registrar, Vaniyambadi during 2001 the period covered under the present charge memo is 1998-2002 without specifying nature and number of documents which are the subject matter of the impugned charge memo. 10. However, the nature of the allegations raised against the petitioner in the previous and the present charge memo are one and the same, that the petitioner has improperly valued some of the properties adopting lower rate than the guideline value thereby caused loss to the Government. The reading of the judgment made, in the earlier writ petitions in 2010 (2) LW 964 would reveal that the charge memo dated 30.1.2004 pertaining to the allegation regarding his tenure as District Registrar, Vellore for the same period is based on the re-inspection of the buildings by the Sub Enquiry Officer. But, the averments raised in the counter filed by the respondent in the writ petition proceed as if the present charge memo containing same allegations against the same person is based on the report of Vigilance and Anti Corruption. While answering the grounds at page 6 clause-F, it is specifically stated in the counter that charge memo issued immediately on receipt of Vigilance and Anti Corruption report and there is no delay in initiating the departmental proceedings. The copy of the report is not referred to as one of the documents in the list of evidence appended to the charge memo impugned herein. The copy of the report is not referred to as one of the documents in the list of evidence appended to the charge memo impugned herein. The respondent has also not furnished the particulars in their counter about the date on which the report is received. Be that as it maybe, the source of information in respect of the allegation raised herein is, in my opinion available to the respondents, in the shape of re-inspection report referred to in the earlier charge memo, even during 2004 but this charge memo came to be issued only in 2010 after six years from the date of such re-inspection made by the sub-enquiry officer. 11. In that event, there is no reason assigned either in the charge memo or in the counter for the inordinate delay in issuing the second charge memo containing same allegations as that of earlier charge memo dated 30.1.2004. Further, it is also as rightly argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner amounting to double jeopardy, when the department had on earlier occasion chosen to issue charge memo for same irregularity pertaining to same tenure of service in the same cadre in the same office that too immediately after the earlier charge memo is quashed by this Court. That being the factual state of affairs, under which the impugned charge memo came to be issued on 3. 2010 that too without explaining the reason for the delay and for the failure to initiate the disciplinary proceedings along with earlier charge memo, the same speaks volume. 12. Further, the allegations raised herein are also not specific in the sense that (sic) the charges do not contain particulars of the properties in question, particulars of the nature and number documents the guideline value for the same, the value adopted by the District Registrar and the reason for adopting lower rate etc. Further, the list of documents appended to the charge memo particularly documents 2 and 3 reveals that the original file relating to valuation which is the basis of the allegations raised are not available and the same are destroyed by the order of the District Registrar. Though, in the counter, it is stated, the petitioner has in his capacity as District Registrar ordered for the destruction of the files with mala fide intention to escape from the clutches of law no charges is framed separately to that effect. Though, in the counter, it is stated, the petitioner has in his capacity as District Registrar ordered for the destruction of the files with mala fide intention to escape from the clutches of law no charges is framed separately to that effect. The allegation raised are that he has improperly valued the property by adopting the lower rate than the guideline value. The charges also do not contain any allegations of impurity, mala fide, ill-motive or undue advantage what is to be considered herein in that the files which are destroyed are the files relating to the mode of value adopted by the petitioner and the reasons for which such rate is adopted. If so, non-availability of the files is likely to prejudice the petitioner as he may be deprived of the opportunity to know the reasons in support of his action complained of and he will be unable to defend his case effectively in the disciplinary proceedings. Thus way, the charge memo is not only vague but also the delay in issuing the same will certainly prejudice the interest of the delinquent officer. 13. In such circumstances, the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court and our High Court in the judgments in P.V. Mahadevan v. M.D., T.N. Housing Board (supra) and Division Bench of our High Court in the Special Commissioner and Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Chepauk, Chennai-5 and Another v. N. Sivasamy and Another (2005) 4 MLJ 659 : 2005 (5) CTC 451 is to be squarely applied herein. In the case of P.V. Mahadevan v. M.D., T.N. Housing Board (supra) dealt with by the Apex Court, the charges memo was issued in the year 2000 in respect of the act committed in 1990, and the delay is sought to be explained on the ground that the lapses came to the light in the audit report relating to the year 1994-1995. The Supreme Court has observed that the delay would render departmental proceedings vitiated in the absence of any explanation for the inordinate delay. The Supreme Court has also referred to the earlier judgment of the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Bani Singh and Another AIR 1990 SC 1308 : 1990 Supp. SCC 738 : 1990-II-LLJ-529. The Supreme Court has observed that the delay would render departmental proceedings vitiated in the absence of any explanation for the inordinate delay. The Supreme Court has also referred to the earlier judgment of the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Bani Singh and Another AIR 1990 SC 1308 : 1990 Supp. SCC 738 : 1990-II-LLJ-529. The reading of the judgment of the Apex Court would real that irregularities in that case related to the year 1975-1977 and charge memo was issued in the year 1987 after 12 years and while discussing about the same the Supreme Court has observed that even in April 1997 there was some doubt about the involvement of the officer in the said irregularities as investigation was going on since then and in that case, it is unreasonable to think that they would have taken more than 12 years to initiate the disciplinary proceedings and there is no satisfactory explanation and it will be unfair to permit the disciplinary proceedings to be proceeded with at that stage./ Here also, there was earlier charge memo with same or identical allegations relating to same period and the department was more likely to be aware of the improper valuation of the documents during the relevant period but the department has chosen to issued this charge memo only six years thereafter that too after the earlier charge memo was quashed by this Court. This is also no explanation for the delay of six years in issuing this charge memo. 14. In the Division Bench judgment of our High Court, the occurrence was between 1992-1995 and the charge memo was issued on 17. 1997 and the retirement was on 37. 1997 and the Divisional Bench of our High Court is pleased to hold that inordinate delay in initiating charge memo that to seven days before the date of superannuation, with regard to the lapses occurred in 1995 is vitiated and the department is not permitted to proceed with the same. In this case, the petitioner stands on better footing, he was placed under suspension on 22. 2010 one day prior to the date of his retirement and charge memo was served on; him two days after his retirement on 13. In this case, the petitioner stands on better footing, he was placed under suspension on 22. 2010 one day prior to the date of his retirement and charge memo was served on; him two days after his retirement on 13. 2010 and by considering the circumstances under which and the delay with which the charge memo is issued and by applying the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court and our High Court, the impugned charge memo also has to face the same fate. 15. It is argued by the learned Additional Government Pleader, that mere delay cannot be a ground to quash the charge memo and each case needs to be examined by considering the nature of the charges and the reasons for delay. The learned Additional Government Pleader has also dated the judgments in Secretary to Government, Prohibition & Exer4cise Department v. L. Srinivasan (1996) 3 SCC 157 : 1996-II-LLJ-245 and Government of A.P. and Others v. Appalaswamy (2007) 14 SCC 49 in support of such argument. As far as Secretary to Government, Prohibition & Exercise Department v. L. Srininvasan (supra) case is concerned , allegations therein are regarding embezzlement and fabrication of records and the Apex Court was of the view that delay in checking the records to be done in secrecy leading to delay in initiating disciplinary proceedings. But, that is not the case herein, as the department had occasion to detect the irregularities as early as on 2004, the ruling above cited is not applicable to the present case. In the case in Government of A.P. and Others v. Appalaswamy (supra) the principle laid down is that proceedings, initiated belatedly can be quashed on two grounds (i) where by reason of the delay, the employer condoned the lapses on the part of the employee (ii) where the delay caused prejudice to the employee. 16. That being so, the learned Additional Government Pleader cannot be now heard to say the delay cannot at all be considered for quashing the charge memo. The inordinate and unexplained delay coupled with vagueness if viewed in the light of the stage at which the charge memo is issued and in the light of the non-availability of the files relating to the charges and the likelihood of prejudice caused the employees in defending his case effectively would render the impugned charge memo vitiated. 17. The inordinate and unexplained delay coupled with vagueness if viewed in the light of the stage at which the charge memo is issued and in the light of the non-availability of the files relating to the charges and the likelihood of prejudice caused the employees in defending his case effectively would render the impugned charge memo vitiated. 17. `The other ground on which the charge memo cannot be allowed to be sustained is that the allegations regarding improper valuation the buildings cannot form basis for any disciplinary proceedings without further allegation of mala fide, ill-motive and undue advantages. In this case, no such allegations of mala fide are raised in the charge memo. It is sought to be introduced only in the counter filed by the respondent. The reading of the counter dispose that it only proceeds on the basis that the allegations are proved and the petitioner is guilty of misconduct and it is the petitioner who has destroyed the files with an intention to avoid the disciplinary proceedings etc. Be that is may be, it is not in dispute that the nature of the job performed by the petitioner as District Registrar in assessing the value is quasi judicial in nature. The catena of judgments of the Apex Court and our High Court have clearly held that failure to exercise quasi judicial functions cannot be the subject mater of the disciplinary proceedings. The judgments in State of U.P.v. Brahm Datt Sharma and Another (Supra) and our High Court judgment in Special Commissioner and Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Chepauk, Chennai-5 and Another v. N. Sivasamy and Another (Supra) have clearly held that the action taken by the quasi judicial authority amount to an error of law and it was to constitute charge of misconduct, it could impinge upon independent functioning of quasi judicial officer and that misconduct is not coming within purview of mere error in judgment, carelessness or negligence in performance of duty and wrong interpretation of law cannot be ground for misconduct as wrong exercise of jurisdiction can be corrected in appeal and the same cannot always form basis for initiating disciplinary proceedings against an officer while he was acting as quasi judicial authority. 18. 18. All these aspects are discussed in detail by our High Court while disposing of the writ petition filed by the petitioner herein against the earlier charge memo issued against him for the same period in the judgment in 2010-2-LW 964. This Court has in the earlier writ petition dealt with all these aspects relating to delay and vagueness of the charge memo s to how improper exercise of quasi judicial power would not amount to mis-conduct and also about the unfair and unreasonable manner in which the earlier proceedings are held against the petitioner. 19. Our High Court has in para 15 of its judgment dealt with the aspect of failure to exercise quasi judicial power and has after relying on Supreme Court judgment and our High Court judgment in S. Muthuramu v. State of Tamil Nadu (2006() 3 MLJ 766 and Insp3ectr Prem Chand v. Government of NCJ of Delhi (2007) 4 SCC 566 concluded that the charge memo issued against the petitioner creates hardship and the entire proceedings is not conducted in fair and reasonable manner and the petitioner is to be necessarily discharged at that stage of the proceedings. IT is also observed that there is no sufficient and cogent material to establish that the petitioner willfully under-valued the buildings and destroyed the files relating to the mode of valuation of the buildings. The same logic and reasoning can be applied to the present charge memo will all force. Thus in the absence of any allegations of mala fide for the so called act of under-valuation adopted by the petitioner no disciplinary proceedings can be allowed to proceed against the petitioner herein. Further, the categorical statement made by respondent in the counter that the petitioner is guilty of misconduct does, in my considered view, amount to prejudging the issue and shows the biased nature with which the proceedings are likely to be proceeded with and the petitioner is not likely to get adequate opportunity. 20. One more aspect to be considered herein is that the respondent has in the counter more than once referred to Vigilance and Anticorruption report as the basis for initiating disciplinary proceedings. 20. One more aspect to be considered herein is that the respondent has in the counter more than once referred to Vigilance and Anticorruption report as the basis for initiating disciplinary proceedings. Whereas our High Court in the judgment in R. Tirupathy and Others v. District Collector, Madurai District Collectorate, Madurai-2 and Others 2006 (2) CTC 574 in has in paragraphs 41 and 42 clearly held that the Vigilance and Anti Corruption department investigation cannot be a ground for initiating disciplinary proceedings. It is observed so by our High Court by following Apex Court judgment in Nagaraj Shivarao Karjagii v. Syndicate Bank and Another AIR 1991 SC 1507 : (1991) 3 SCC 219 : (1991) 2 MLJ 7. 21. It is not in dispute, the date of retirement of the petitioner was on 22. 2010 and the petitioner was retained in the service only for the purpose of disciplinary proceedings. This Court from the discussions held above arrived at irresistible conclusion that the impugned charge memo is liable to be quashed. In that event, the petitioner shall be permitted to retire with effect from the date of his actual superannuation with other attendant and all his retirement benefits legally due to him. 22. In the result, the writ petition is allowed as prayed for, thereby the impugned charge memo dated 3. 2010 passed by the 2nd respondent stands set aside. No costs. Petition allowed.