JUDGMENT B.P. Katakey, J. 1. These two appeals, under Section 10F of the Companies Act, 1956 (in short "the Act"), are directed against the orders dated June 15, 2004, passed in C.A. No. 41 of 2004 and dated July 19, 2005, passed in C.A. No. 99 of 2005, by the Company Law Board, both arising out of C.P. No. 82 of 2000. By order dated June 15, 2004, which is the subject-matter in Company Appeal No. 8 of 2004, the Company Law Board has rejected the application, registered and numbered as C.A. No. 41 of 2004, filed by the appellant, praying for a direction for adjustment of the amount paid by respondent No. 1, pursuant to the Company Law Board's order dated December 31, 2001, passed in C.P. No. 82 of 2000 (Deepak Lohia v. Kamrup Developers P. Ltd. [2003] 116 Comp Cas 188 ), which was affirmed by the company judge of this Court in Company Appeal No. 1 of 2002 vide judgment dated January 29, 2004, first against the interest payable on such amount then against the principal, with a further prayer for injunction and appointment of receiver till the entire amount is paid. By order dated July 19, 2005, passed in C.A. No. 99 of 2005, registered on the basis of the application filed by respondent No. 1, praying for waiver of interest on the amount payable to the appellant in terms of the aforesaid order dated December 31, 2001, which is the subject-matter in Company Appeal No. 4 of 2005, the Company Law Board restricted the payment of interest at 20 per cent, per annum up to August 31, 2002, with a further direction to pay the same by September 15, 2005. Since the aforesaid orders under challenge in these appeals arise out of C.P. No. 82 of 2000, both are taken up together for hearing and disposal, as agreed to by learned Counsel for the parties. 2. Since the aforesaid orders under challenge in these appeals arise out of C.P. No. 82 of 2000, both are taken up together for hearing and disposal, as agreed to by learned Counsel for the parties. 2. The facts relevant for the purpose of the present appeals may be summarised as under: (i) The appellant had filed an application under Section 397/398 of the Act alleging oppression and mismanagement in the running of the affairs of respondent No. 1 company, contending, inter alia, that on the basis of an understanding reached between him and the Agarwal group, respondent No. 1 company was incorporated in the year 1998 with an authorised capital of 5,000 equity shares of Rs. 100 each. The paid-up capital of the company consisted of 200 equity shares of Rs. 100 each, out of which the appellant was allotted 100 shares and the remaining 100 shares were held by respondent No. 3 Shri Ashok Kumar Agarwal. Respondent No. 2 Shri Bhajanlal Agarwal, who was the owner of a plot of land, allowed his land to be developed by respondent No. 1 company and for the purpose of which respondent No. 2 had executed an irrevocable power of attorney in favour of the company in return for a consideration of Rs. 16,00,000. According to the appellant, both the groups, namely, Lohia group, headed by the appellant and Agarwal group, headed by respondent No. 3, also contributed Rs. 2.5 lakhs each as share application money and the Lohia group had brought in an additional amount of Rs. 2.25 crores to the company, either as unsecured loans or as advances against booking of space in the building to be constructed in the plot of which respondent No. 1 was the owner. The further case of the appellant was that sometime in the month of November, 1999, he noticed certain discrepancies in the accounts of the company, which respondent No. 3 could not satisfactorily explain and which led to the appointment of an arbitrator and execution of a memorandum of understanding by and between the parties on May 2, 2000. According to the appellant, the said memorandum of understanding was not honoured by the Agarwal group and thereafter the said group by fabricating the records maintained by the company, had inducted two additional directors belonging to the Agarwal group thereby reducing the Lohia group to a minority. According to the appellant, the said memorandum of understanding was not honoured by the Agarwal group and thereafter the said group by fabricating the records maintained by the company, had inducted two additional directors belonging to the Agarwal group thereby reducing the Lohia group to a minority. It was further contended in the said application that on September 1, 1999, allotment of 2,600 shares were made in favour of the Agarwal group, whereas 2,400 shares were allotted to the Lohia group and such allotment was made by fabricating and falsifying the company's record and in breach of the understanding reached between the parties that both the sides were to have parity in the shareholding or in the representation of the company. A further allegation that the Agarwal group was not holding the annual general meetings or the board meetings of the company, was also made. (ii) The said application was resisted by the Agarwal group denying reaching of any understanding between the parties to maintain the parity in the shareholding or in the representation in the board of directors as projected by the Lohia group. According to the Agarwal group, the understanding was that they would hold the majority shares. The allegations of mismanagement as well as of not holding the board meetings and the annual general meetings were also denied. (iii) The Company Law Board on consideration of the materials placed on record as well as the respective cases projected, took the view that it was the understanding and intention of the parties to have equal shares and representation in shareholding of the company as well as in its board. It was also found by the Company Law Board that the induction of the additional directors belonging to the Agarwal group as well as the allotment of additional shares to the said group were in breach of the agreement and understanding between the parties, and therefore constituted acts of oppression. Having held so, the Company Law Board directed respondent No. 1 company to repay all the amounts of unsecured loans and booking advance taken from the appellant, his associates, relatives, etc., i.e., the Lohia group, as indicated in annexure P4 and annexure P5 to the said application together with interest as specified therein with a further direction to repay the appellant all the amount due within 8 (eight) months. Such directions were issued after noticing that the proceedings had brought out complete lack of confidence between the two groups each alleging fabrication of documents by the other side and both were found to be acting in a manner prejudicial to each other resulting in the company's welfare being affected and the project in which substantial amount had been spent had come to a standstill, for which though there was every justification to wind up the company on just and equitable grounds, the same would not be in the interest of any of the shareholders. The Company Law Board, therefore, found that in the interest of the company, one of the groups should go out of the company. Relating to the payment of interest, the Company Law Board having noticed that the appellant did not get any benefit out of his investment in view of his going out of the company and respondent No. 1 company has utilised the said amount on the project to which it would have otherwise raised funds on interest, found it appropriate to direct payment of interest at 20 per cent, (simple) from the date of receipt of the funds by respondent No. 1 company till the date of payment to the appellant with a further direction to pay the principal amount and interest in one or more instalments on or before August 31, 2002 and till such time, it was further directed that, the appellant will continue to be a director in the company and the shareholders from his group (Lohia group) will exercise all the rights as shareholders. (iv) The said order of the Company Law Board was put to challenge by respondents Nos. 1 and 3 in Company Appeal No. 1 of 2002, before the High Court, under Section 10F of the Act, which was however, dismissed vide judgment and order dated January 29, 2004. (iv) The said order of the Company Law Board was put to challenge by respondents Nos. 1 and 3 in Company Appeal No. 1 of 2002, before the High Court, under Section 10F of the Act, which was however, dismissed vide judgment and order dated January 29, 2004. (v) An application was, thereafter, filed by the appellant before the Company Law Board, which was registered and numbered as C.A. No. 41 of 2004, praying for an order of injunction restraining respondent No. 1 company and others from selling, dealing with and/or encumbering and/or disposing of any flats, shops or office spaces in the building constructed; for appointment of receiver and/or special officer in respect of the office spaces, shops and flats in the said building and to take possession; to direct such receiver and/or special officer to sell the office spaces, flats, shops, etc., in the said building, which remain unsold, by public auction, etc., and to realise the sale proceeds and hand over the same to the appellant for disbursement to the entities mentioned in annexures P4 and P5 in C.P. No. 82 of 2000 and to disclose to the appellant all particulars with regard to the dealings and transactions in respect of the flats and office spaces in the said building, basically contending that despite the order passed by the Company Law Board on December 31, 2001, which had been upheld by the High Court vide judgment and order dated January 29, 2004, respondent No. 1 company did not pay the entire dues payable except making payment of Rs. 50,00,000 and leaving a balance of Rs. 81,18,136 including interest in so far as the entities concerned in annexure P4 and a sum of Rs. 2,32,48,567 including interest in respect of the entities in annexure P5 are concerned and on the other hand, respondent No. 1 company and other contesting respondents are contemplating to sell the flats, office spaces, shop rooms and the building under construction, to avoid their liability to make the payment in terms of the Company Law Board's aforesaid order. (vi) The said application has been contested by respondent No. 1 company denying the claim of the appellant and contending, inter alia, that out of the principal amount of Rs. 71 lakhs, an amount of Rs. 56 lakhs has already been paid leaving the balance of Rs. (vi) The said application has been contested by respondent No. 1 company denying the claim of the appellant and contending, inter alia, that out of the principal amount of Rs. 71 lakhs, an amount of Rs. 56 lakhs has already been paid leaving the balance of Rs. 15 lakhs towards the principal in respect of the entities in annexure P4 and an amount of Rs. 114.25 lakhs is outstanding towards the principal amount due on account of annexure P5 entities, but since the payments could not be made due to unforeseen circumstances and reasons beyond the control of the company, as mentioned in the said written objection, respondent No. 1 company sought for a year's time for repayment of the outstanding principal amount in respect of the entities in annexures P4 and P5. In the said objection, it has further been stated that it would be inequitable and harsh for the company to pay a further sum of Rs. 81 lakhs on account of annexure P4 entities and a sum of Rs. 2.32 crores on account of annexure P5 entities and calculation of such amount is erroneous and incorrect, when the payments made by respondent No. 1 company were to be adjusted against the principal and not intended to be adjusted against the interest payable. (vii) The averments made in the said application as well as the objection filed thereto, gave rise to the question before the Company Law Board, as to whether the amount paid by respondent No. 1 company to the Lohia group, in terms of the order dated December 31, 2001, passed by the Company Law Board in C.P. No. 82 of 2000, is to be adjusted against the principal amount due and payable or against the interest accrued thereon, first. The Company Law Board by order dated June 15, 2004, has held that since the order for payment of interest was based purely on equitable grounds, in exercise of its equitable jurisdiction, to do justice to the parties, such direction cannot be treated to be a decree and as such the amount paid by respondent No. 1 cannot be directed to adjusted first against the interest due and payable and the remaining against the principal amount due and payable under the order dated December 31, 2001, passed by it. (viii) Another application was filed by respondent No. 1 company before the Company Law Board, which was registered and numbered as C.A. No. 99 of 2005, praying for recording that all amount due and payable by it to the present appellant, pursuant to the order dated December 31, 2001, passed in C.P. No. 82 of 2000, have been paid and there is no other amount due and payable by respondent No. 1 company and/or by respondent No. 3 Shri Ashok Kumar Agarwal and they are not liable to make any further payment to the appellant or his associates (Lohia group), contending, inter alia, that pursuant to the aforesaid order dated December 31, 2001, passed by the Company Law Board, the entire amount towards the principal in respect of the entities in annexures P4 and P5 to the main application, has been paid and keeping in view the status of the project in question and the investment made therein by the Agarwal group, a prayer was made to pass an order waving the payment of any interest by the applicants therein and/or by the company to the appellant and/or his associates. (ix) The Company Law Board upon hearing learned Counsel for the parties and on perusal of the materials made available before it as well as the pleadings of the parties, has held that on account of the circumstances beyond the control of respondent No. 1 company and other contesting respondents (Agarwal group), the basis on which the rate of interest was fixed by it in the order dated December 31, 2001, no longer subsist and as such the Agarwal group is justified in seeking the relief for waiver of the interest. The Company Law Board accordingly directed that the interest payable pursuant to the order dated December 31, 2001, passed by it would be payable up to August 31, 2002, i.e., the date fixed for payment of the principal sum and the interest vide the aforesaid order dated December 31, 2001 and directed payment of the same to the appellant by September 15, 2005. Hence the present appeals. 3. I have heard Mr. S.N. Mukherjee, learned senior Counsel appearing for the appellant, Mrs. M. Hazarika, learned senior Counsel appearing for respondents Nos. 1 and 3, Mr. K. Agarwal, learned Counsel appearing for respondents Nos. 8 to 20, Mr. R.J. Baruah, learned Counsel appearing for respondents Nos. Hence the present appeals. 3. I have heard Mr. S.N. Mukherjee, learned senior Counsel appearing for the appellant, Mrs. M. Hazarika, learned senior Counsel appearing for respondents Nos. 1 and 3, Mr. K. Agarwal, learned Counsel appearing for respondents Nos. 8 to 20, Mr. R.J. Baruah, learned Counsel appearing for respondents Nos. 2 and 4 and Mr. K. Goswami, learned Counsel appearing for respondents Nos. 21 to 30. 4. Mr. Mukherjee, learned senior Counsel for the appellant referring to the order dated December 31, 2001, passed by the Company Law Board in C.P. No. 82 of 2000 as well as the provisions in Sections 397 and 398 of the Act has submitted that any order including the order passed by the Company Law Board under Section 397/398 of the Act being enforceable, under Section 634A of the Act, like a decree passed by a civil court, there cannot be any differentiation of the order passed by the Company Law Board in exercise of its equitable jurisdiction, as the Company Law Board under Section 397 of the Act is empowered to make such order, as it thinks fit, for bringing to an end the matters complained of, it having passed the order for payment of interest at 20 per cent, on the principal amount due and payable to the appellant. It has further been submitted that the Company Law Board having decided the application in C.P. No. 82 of 2000 vide order dated December 31, 2001, cannot subsequently alter the same, more so, when such order has attained finality, the appeal preferred by the contesting respondents under Section 10F of the Act before the High Court having been dismissed, and when the appellant filed the application in C.A. No. 41 of 2004 for execution of the order dated December 31, 2001, passed by the Company Law Board. According to learned Counsel, the Company Law Board though has no power to review its order, it has reviewed its earlier order thereby restricting the payment of interest at 20 per cent, up to August 31, 2002, i.e., the date by which the Company Law Board had directed the contesting respondents to pay the principal and the interest accrued thereon, which amounts to favouring the defaulter in making the payment pursuant to its order dated December 31, 2001. According to learned senior Counsel, even the answering respondents knew that they are liable to pay interest till the date of actual payment and as such in the application filed in C.A. No. 99 of 2005 they prayed for waiver of the interest payable. 5. Relating to the order dated June 15, 2004, which is under challenge in C.A. No. 8 of 2004, it has been submitted that since the direction contained in order dated December 31, 2001, passed by the Company Law Board in C.P. No. 82 of 2000 is enforceable by it, in the same manner as if it was a decree made by a court in a suit, the Company Law Board is not correct to observe that the order passed by it is not in the nature of a money decree and hence the amount paid by the contesting respondents towards satisfaction of the order dated December 31, 2001, cannot first be adjusted against the interest on the principal amount, more so when in effect the application filed by the appellant in C.A. No. 41 of 2004 was for enforcement of the order dated December 31, 2001. Learned senior Counsel further submits that since under Section 397 of the Act, the Company Law Board is empowered to make such order, as it thinks fit, in an application filed under Section 397 of the Act alleging oppression, and such order is enforceable under Section 634A, the claim of the appellant for adjustment of the amount paid against the interest payable on the principal amount due, cannot be rejected on the ground that such order was passed in exercise of the equitable jurisdiction. 6. Learned senior Counsel in support of his contentions has placed reliance on the decisions of the apex court in Gojer Brothers P. Ltd. v. Ratan Lal Singh reported in AIR 1974 SC 1380 , in Industrial Credit and Development Syndicate v. Smt. Smithaben H. Patel reported in [1999] 96 Comp Cas 1 : [1999] 3 SCC 80, in Manish Mohan Sharma v. Ram Bahadur Thakur Ltd. reported in [2006] 131 Comp Cas 149 : [2006] 4 SCC 416, of the Calcutta High Court in Hanuman Prosad Verma v. Stock and Finance Ltd. reported in [1985] 58 Comp Cas 338 SC and in Shaw Wallace and Co. Ltd. v. Ghoom Investment Co. P. Ltd. reported in [2003] 2 CHN 484. 7. Mrs. Ltd. v. Ghoom Investment Co. P. Ltd. reported in [2003] 2 CHN 484. 7. Mrs. Hazarika, learned senior Counsel appearing for the contesting respondents referring to the decision of the Company Law Board dated December 31, 2001, passed in C.P. No. 82 of 2000 has submitted that the direction for payment of interest was passed in exercise of the equitable jurisdiction and as such the Company Law Board is within its jurisdiction to alter the same, keeping in view the fact situation of the case and the difficulties faced by the answering respondents, more so, when the Company Law Board in the order dated December 31, 2001, gave liberty to the parties to approach it, in case of any difficulty in implementing and for any consequential directions. According to learned senior Counsel, the answering respondents pursuant to the liberty given to approach the Company Law Board in case of any difficulty in implementing the order, had approached the Company Law Board in C.A. No. 99 of 2005 and the Company Law Board having taken into consideration the entire facts and circumstances of the case has restricted the payment of interest up to August 31, 2002, by which date the answering respondents were directed to pay certain amount with interest, however, rejecting the prayer of the answering respondents to waive the payment of interest totally as directed earlier. Mrs. Hazarika submits that the application filed by the appellant in C.A. No. 41 of 2004, from its contents and the prayer made therein, is not an application for enforcement of the order dated December 31, 2001, passed by the Company Law Board, which in any case being an interim order and understood as such by the appellant, there is no question of enforcing the same. According to Mrs. Hazarika, what the Company Law Board intended in its order dated December 31, 2001, being to compensate the appellant, and the contesting respondents having paid the appellant the substantial amount pursuant to such order, the appellant has in fact been compensated. According to Mrs. Hazarika, what the Company Law Board intended in its order dated December 31, 2001, being to compensate the appellant, and the contesting respondents having paid the appellant the substantial amount pursuant to such order, the appellant has in fact been compensated. It has further been submitted that since the order dated December 31, 2001, was passed by the Company Law Board in exercise of its equitable jurisdiction, the same cannot be treated to be in the nature of a money decree, so as to entitle the appellant to adjust the amount paid by the contesting respondents, pursuant to the aforesaid order dated December 31, 2001, against the interest first and the remaining against the principal. 8. Mr. Mukherjee, learned senior Counsel for the appellant in reply to the arguments advanced by learned senior Counsel for the contesting respondents has submitted that, because the liberty has been given to the parties to approach the Company Law Board vide its order dated December 31, 2001, it cannot be said that the said order was an interim and not a final order. Referring to the said order dated December 31, 2001, it has been submitted that the application filed by the appellant under Section 397/398 of the Act was decided and certain amount was directed to be paid and all the interim orders passed earlier were vacated and as such the said order is a final order enforceable under Section 634A of the Act. Learned Counsel appearing for the other respondents have supported the argument advanced by Mr. Mukherjee, learned senior Counsel for the appellant. 9. I have considered the submissions of learned Counsel for the parties and also perused the materials made available on record of the appeals as well as the various orders passed by the Company Law Board including the orders impugned in the present appeals. 10. Mukherjee, learned senior Counsel for the appellant. 9. I have considered the submissions of learned Counsel for the parties and also perused the materials made available on record of the appeals as well as the various orders passed by the Company Law Board including the orders impugned in the present appeals. 10. From the facts narrated above as well as the arguments advanced by learned Counsel for the parties, the questions of law which arise for determination in these appeals are: (A) In Company Appeal No. 8 of 2004: (i) Whether the order dated December 31, 2001, passed by the Company Law Board in C.P. No. 82 of 2000 is final disposing of the application filed under Section 397/398 of the Act and enforceable under Section 634A of the Act and if so, whether the amount paid by the contesting respondents to the appellant pursuant to the said order dated December 31, 2001, is to be appropriated first against the interest payable and only thereafter against the principal amount? (B) In Company Appeal No. 4 of 2005: (i) Whether the Company Law Board can alter the direction contained in the order dated December 31, 2001, passed in C.P. No. 82 of 2000, by restricting the payment of interest at 20 per cent, up to August 31, 2002, only, after the said order dated December 31, 2001, has been affirmed by the High Court in an appeal preferred by the contesting respondents under Section 10F of the Act and in the absence of any challenge to the liberty given to the parties to approach the Company Law Board in case of difficulties in implementing the award, by the appellant? 11. The Company Law Board in a proceeding initiated under Section 397 of the Act is empowered to make such order, as it thinks fit, with a view to bringing to an end the matters complained of, provided, it is of the opinion that the company's affairs are being conducted in a manner prejudicial to public interest or in a manner oppressive to any member or members and winding up the company would unfairly prejudice such member or members, though otherwise the facts would justify the making of a winding up order on the ground that it was just and equitable that the company should be wound up. While dealing with an application under Section 398 of the Act, the Company Law Board, with a view to bringing to an end or preventing the matters complained of or apprehended, is also empowered to make such order as it thinks fit, when the affairs of the company are being conducted in a manner prejudicial to the public interest or in a manner prejudicial to the interests of the company or by any reason of any material change in the management or the control of the company, it is likely that the affairs of the company will be conducted as provided in Clause (b) of Sub-section (1). Section 402 of the Act confers additional power on the Company Law Board, to pass such order as stipulated therein, while dealing with an application under Section 397 or 398 of the Act, without prejudice to the generality of powers under the said provisions of law. Clause (g) of Section 402 of the Act confers jurisdiction on the Company Law Board to pass such order, which in its opinion is just and equitable, while passing an order on the application filed under Section 397/398 of the Act. Section 634A of the Act provides how an order passed by the Company Law Board is to be enforced. It provides that any order made by the Company Law Board may be enforced by that board in the same manner as if it were a decree made by a court in a suit pending therein. The Company Law Board can, in case of its inability to execute such order, send the same to the court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the registered office of the company situated, when such an order was passed against the company or where the person concerned voluntarily resides and carries on business or personally works for gain, when the order is against any other person, for execution. The proviso to the said provision stipulates that the said provisions shall not be applied on or after commencement of the Companies (Second Amendment) Act, 2002, which has admittedly not been enforced till date. 12. The proviso to the said provision stipulates that the said provisions shall not be applied on or after commencement of the Companies (Second Amendment) Act, 2002, which has admittedly not been enforced till date. 12. The said provisions of the Act, therefore, make it clear that the Company Law Board, apart from passing orders, as it thinks fit, while dealing with an application under Section 397/398 of the Act, is also empowered to pass any such order, which in its opinion is just and equitable. The validity of an order passed by the Company Law Board, therefore, is to be judged in the backdrop of its power to pass such orders, as noticed above. 13. In the cases in hand, the Company Law Board passed the order dated December 31, 2001, in C.P. No. 82 of 2000 requiring the Lohia group to surrender the company to the Agarwal group, subject to payment of the value of the shares held by the Lohia group and return of the investment brought into the company by the said group along with interest thereon at 20 per cent, per annum, having held that the company's affairs are being conducted in a manner oppressive to Lohia group. By the said order, the entire principal and the interest was directed to be paid on or before August 31, 2002. While disposing of the said application filed under Section 397/398 of the Act, a further order, however, was passed by the Company Law Board granting liberty to the parties to approach it, in case of any difficulty in implementing the order and for any consequential directions. While disposing of the said application filed under Section 397/398 of the Act, a further order, however, was passed by the Company Law Board granting liberty to the parties to approach it, in case of any difficulty in implementing the order and for any consequential directions. From the nature of the said orders passed by the Company Law Board, it is, therefore, evident that first part of the order, i.e., requiring the Lohia group to surrender subject to payment of value of the shares held by the said group and return of all investments brought into the company by the Lohia group along with interest thereon was passed in exercise of the jurisdiction conferred on it by Section397/398 of the Act and the second part, i.e., granting liberty to approach it again, in the event of any difficulty in implementing the said order and for any consequential directions thereunder, was passed in exercise of the jurisdiction conferred by Section 402 of the Act, as the Company Law Board in the order passed under Section 397/398 is also empowered to provide for any other matter, which in its opinion is just and equitable. From the order dated December 31, 2001, it also appears that such order was passed by the Company Law Board, as it was in the opinion that because of complete lack of confidence between the two groups, each alleging fabrication of documents by the other side, and/or both the groups were found to be acting in a manner prejudicial to each other resulting in the company's welfare being affected and because of such act on the part of both the groups, the project in which substantial amount had been spent came to a standstill. From the nature of the said order dated December 31, 2001, it is evident that the same was a final order passed in a proceeding instituted under Section 397/398 of the Act. The final character of the said order would not be changed, as the liberty was given to the parties to approach the Company Law Board in case of difficulties in implementing the said order, which part of the order was passed in exercise of the power under Section 402 of the Act. 14. The final character of the said order would not be changed, as the liberty was given to the parties to approach the Company Law Board in case of difficulties in implementing the said order, which part of the order was passed in exercise of the power under Section 402 of the Act. 14. The order of the Company Law Board dated December 31, 2001, though in stricto sensu is not a decree passed by the civil court under the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, it, however, can be enforced by the Company Law Board, under Section 634A of the Act, in the manner as if such order was made by a court in a suit pending therein. The order passed by the Company Law Board, therefore, is executable in the same manner in which a decree passed by the civil court is executed. The Company Law Board may enforce its own order or may send the same to the court for its execution, in the case of its inability to execute such order, though as noticed above, the order passed by the Company Law Board is not a decree as such passed by a civil court. 15. The Company Law Board in its order dated December 31, 2001, passed in C.P. No. 42 of 2000, as discussed above, directed payment of certain amount with interest at 20 per cent, per annum with further direction to repay the entire principal and the interest by August 31, 2002. Such interest was directed to be paid from the date of receipt of the funds by the company till the date of payment. The Agarwal group unsuccessfully challenged the said order in the High Court in an appeal under Section 10F of the Act. Such interest was directed to be paid from the date of receipt of the funds by the company till the date of payment. The Agarwal group unsuccessfully challenged the said order in the High Court in an appeal under Section 10F of the Act. The Agarwal group, therefore, subject to the order that may be passed by the Company Law Board, in view of the liberty given to the parties in case of any difficulty in implementing the said order and for any consequential directions to be passed thereon, which order was passed in exercise of the jurisdiction conferred by Section 402 of the Act, is bound to pay the principal and the interest as awarded by the Company Law Board and such order relating to the payment of principal and interest takes the character of a decree passed by a civil court under the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code for the purpose of its enforcement under Section 634A of the Act. 16. There being no specific direction in the said order dated December 31, 2001, passed by the Company Law Board relating to the mode of payment of the amount and how any amount paid pursuant to such order is to be appropriated, the money paid by Agarwal group to Lohia group is first to be applied in payment of the interest and then when it is satisfied, in the payment of the principal amount, as held by the apex court in Industrial Credit and Development Syndicate [1999] 96 Comp Cas 1 : [1999] 3 SCC 80. The order of the Company Law Board being executable, as if it is a decree passed by a civil court, the principle of law laid down by the apex court in the said judgment shall also be applied in respect of the order passed by the Company Law Board. 17. By order dated June 15, 2004, which is the subject-matter in Company Appeal No. 8 of 2004, the Company Law Board has rejected the contention of the Lohia group for adjustment of the amount paid, towards the interest first, by holding that the order dated December 31, 2001, was not a money decree and as such the said principle cannot be applied, more so, when such an order was passed on equitable ground. The said ground, in view of the aforesaid discussion, cannot be sustained in law and hence set aside. The said ground, in view of the aforesaid discussion, cannot be sustained in law and hence set aside. 18. By the other order dated July 19, 2005, which is the subject-matter in Company Appeal No. 4 of 2005, the Company Law Board while rejecting the prayer of the Agarwal group for waiver of interest has directed that the payment of interest at 20 per cent, per annum would be restricted to August 31, 2002, keeping in view the various difficulties faced by the Agarwal group in implementing the order dated December 31, 2001. As held above, the Company Law Board in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 402 of the Act had passed an order giving liberty to both the parties to approach it, in case of any difficulty in implementing the order and also for consequential directions. The order dated December 31, 2001, though was challenged in the High Court by Agarwal group in the appeal filed under Section 10F of the Act, the same, however, had been dismissed without interfering with the order passed by the Company Law Board. The Lohia group had also not challenged such directions contained in the said order giving liberty to the parties to approach the Company Law Board in case of any difficulty in implementing the order and for any consequential order. The Lohia group, in fact, has filed the application being C.A. No. 41 of 2004 seeking certain further directions, by taking advantage of such liberty given, wherein the Company Law Board has passed the order dated June 15, 2004, which has already been dealt with in this judgment. An application was also filed by the Agarwal group, registered and numbered as C.A. No. 99 of 2005, where the Company Law Board has passed the order dated July 19, 2005, restricting the payment of interest up to August 31, 2002, keeping in view the difficulties faced by the Agarwal group in payment of interest while, however, rejecting the prayer of the Agarwal group to totally wave the interest payable under order dated December 31, 2001. 19. 19. The contention of the appellant (Lohia group) that the order dated December 31, 2001, having been affirmed by the High Court in Company Appeal No. 1 of 2002 vide its judgment dated January 29, 2004, the Company Law Board cannot pass the order dated July 19, 2005, its order having merged with the order passed by the High Court in appeal, cannot be accepted as the High Court did not interfere with the order passed by the Company Law Board giving the liberty to the parties to approach it again in case of any difficulties in implementing the order and reserving its jurisdiction to pass further order. Such liberty having been given by the Company Law Board, in exercise of its power conferred by Section 402 of the Act, as discussed above, as well as in its equitable jurisdiction, no fault can be found with the Company Law Board in passing the order dated July 19, 2005, keeping in view the difficulties faced by the Agarwal group. The question whether the Agarwal group in fact faced any difficulties or not is a question of fact, which cannot be challenged by the Lohia group before the High Court, as an appeal under Section 10F of the Act lies only on the question of law and not on the question of fact. 20. There is no dispute to the proposition of law enunciated by the apex court in Gojer Brothers P. Ltd. AIR 1974 SC 1380 , that when an appeal has been preferred, the decree to be executed is the decree of the appellate court, as the decree passed by the trial court merges in the decree passed by the appellate court. In the instant case also the direction contained in the order dated December 31, 2001, passed by the Company Law Board relating to the payment of principal and interest having been affirmed by the High Court such direction naturally merges with the order passed by the High Court in an appeal under Section 10F of the Act. In the instant case also the direction contained in the order dated December 31, 2001, passed by the Company Law Board relating to the payment of principal and interest having been affirmed by the High Court such direction naturally merges with the order passed by the High Court in an appeal under Section 10F of the Act. It however, does not mean that the Company Law Board, in the absence of any challenge and in the absence of interference with the order contained in the said order dated December 31, 2001, granting liberty to the parties to approach it again, cannot entertain the subsequent application pursuant to the liberty granted by it to the parties, since such an order was passed under Section402 of the Act. The appellant, in fact, took advantage of the said liberty and filed the application, which is the subject-matter in Company Appeal No. 8 of 2004. 21. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Hanuman Prosad Verma [1985] 58 Comp Cas 338, has no application in the case in hand. The decision of the Calcutta High Court in Shaw Wallace and Co. Ltd. [2003] 2 CHN 484, cannot also be applied, in view of the facts and circumstances of this case, as narrated above. There is also no dispute to the proposition of law as enunciated by the apex court in Manish Mohan Sharma [2006] 131 Comp Cas 149 : [2006] 4 SCC 416, that the words "any order" used in Section 634A of the Act indicates all orders made by the Company Law Board on an application under Section 397/398 and as such are enforceable like decrees without any limit on the nature of the order passed by the Company Law Board. In the instant case, a liberty, however, was granted to the parties to approach the Company Law Board in case of any difficulties in implementing the orders. Such liberty granted by the Company Law Board by the said order dated December 31, 2001, as noticed above, has not been challenged by the appellant (Lohia group) and, therefore, the direction for payment of principal and interest naturally has to be subject to the further order that may be passed by the Company Law Board. Such liberty granted by the Company Law Board by the said order dated December 31, 2001, as noticed above, has not been challenged by the appellant (Lohia group) and, therefore, the direction for payment of principal and interest naturally has to be subject to the further order that may be passed by the Company Law Board. There is no doubt that the direction for payment of principal and interest, subject to the subsequent modification that may be made pursuant to such liberty granted, is executable by the Company Law Board or by any other court under Section 634A of the Act. 22. In view of the above, while allowing the appeal being Company Appeal No. 8 of 2004, Company Appeal No. 4 of 2005 stands dismissed. The amount paid by the Agarwal group pursuant to the order dated December 31, 2001, passed by the Company Law Board in C.P. No. 82 of 2000 shall first be appropriated against the interest payable up to August 31, 2002 and the remaining amount shall be appropriated against the principal amount. 23. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case the parties are, however, directed to bear their own costs.