Judgment :- (This HRRP is filed u/s 46(1) of Karnataka Rent Act, against the order dated 23.10.2009 passed in H.R.C. 134/2006 on the file of the Chief Judge, Court of Small Causes, Bangalore, allowing the petition filed under section 27(2)(r) of Karnataka Rent Act., etc.) The Revision Petition has questioned the correctness and the legality of judgment passed in HRC 124/2006 by the Chief Judge, Small Causes Court, Bangalore dated 23.10.2009. The parties are referred to as per their rank before court below. 2. The petitioner initiated eviction proceedings against one Sri. Hussain in HRC No.10437/1998 on the file of the 1st Additional Small Causes Judge, Bangalore under the then Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 under Section 21(1)(h) & (j) seeking eviction of Mr. Hussain in respect of premises Shop No.59, Sultanji Gunta Road, Civil Station, Bangalore which had been morefully described in the petition as schedule premises in the said petition. It was contended in the said petition that they required the petition schedule premises for their bonafide use and occupation, i.e., 1st petitioner Mr. Mohammed Noor was without any avocation and intended to start business in cold storage for animal food in the schedule shop as well in the adjacent shops which is under the tenancy of Dr. Jayaprakash and it was contended that it is ideal and suitable for the 1st petitioner’s proposed business and it was contended that keeping this requirement also into consideration the petition schedule property was purchased by them. It was also contended that respondent is a statutory tenant under petitioner whereby they claimed no notice of attornment of tenancy is required to be given as provided under the provisions of Transfer of Property Act to the respondent. On service of notice, respondent therein i.e., Mr. Hussain initially appeared and was represented though Mr. Narayan I. Naik, Advocate and on his no objection to engage any other Advocate Sri. Janardhan, Advocate appeared and no statement of objections were filed. 3. Thereafterwards, petitioner No.1, Mr. Mohammed Noor came to be examined as PW 1. There was no cross-examination and it was taken as nil. 4. In the said HRC petition an application came to be filed under Order 1 Rule 8(a) by one Mr. Nirmal K. Jain son of Sri. Kastur Chand seeking permission of the court to come on record as one of the respondent. There was no cross-examination and it was taken as nil. 4. In the said HRC petition an application came to be filed under Order 1 Rule 8(a) by one Mr. Nirmal K. Jain son of Sri. Kastur Chand seeking permission of the court to come on record as one of the respondent. It was contended in the affidavit supporting the application that he is in possession of the petition schedule premises and there is no relationship of landlord and tenant between him and the petitioners therein and he was paying rent to Arul Migu Pandrinathar Temple, Tiruchi. The said application came to be resisted by the petitioners therein by filing a detailed objections and thereafterwards, said application came to be dismissed by order dt: 31.03.2003 and same has reached finality since it was not challenged. 5. Thereafterwards, the eviction petition HRC.10437/1998 came to be dismissed for non-prosecution by order dt: 29.11.2004. On dismissal of the same HRC 134/2006 came to be filed by the petitioners under Section 27(2)(b)&(r) and Section 31 of the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 before the Principal Judge, Small Causes Court, Bangalore on 01.04.2006. Mr. Hussain was arrayed as 1st respondent and Nirmal K. Jain was arrayed as the 2nd respondent. The 1st respondent on service of notice remained absent and as such came to be placed exparte. Respondent No.2 entered appearance and filed objections to the main petition on 4.3.2007. The contentions raised in the petition was that petitioners under sale deed dated 29.8.2008 had purchased the entire building for valuable consideration in which the petition schedule premises is situated and tenancy of the 1st respondent was duly attorned and 1st respondent is the tenant under petitioner paying a monthly rent of Rs.100/-and tenancy commence on 1st day of every English Calendar month and ends on last day of the month. It was further contended that 2nd respondent is the sub tenant of 1st respondent occupying petition schedule shop. 6. It was further contended that they required schedule premises for their own use and occupation, including the adjacent shops occupied by another tenant Dr. Jayaprakash for commencing business of cold storage for sale of non-vegetarian products like, mutton, chicken, fish and vegetables to eke out his livelihood. It was also contended that first petitioner is aged more than 65 years and as such possession was sought for by invoking Section 31 of Rent Act, 1999. 7. Jayaprakash for commencing business of cold storage for sale of non-vegetarian products like, mutton, chicken, fish and vegetables to eke out his livelihood. It was also contended that first petitioner is aged more than 65 years and as such possession was sought for by invoking Section 31 of Rent Act, 1999. 7. Second respondent by filing a detailed statement of objections, contended that eviction petition was not maintainable since petitioners were not the owners of petition schedule property. It was contended that property was belonging to Sri. Lakshmaiah Naidu and during his life time he executed a will on 11.05.1930 creating life interest in favour of his mother Smt. Govindamma and after her demise it should go to Arul Migu Pandarinathar Temple, Tiruchi. It was contended that said Govindamma had not right to alienate the schedule property and said the alienation by Smt. Govindamma in favour of Sri. Sundarajulu Naidu for valuable consideration on 20.12.1943 is not binding. It was also contended that Arul Migu Pandarinathar Temple. Tiruchi had filed a suit for declaration and possession of the schedule property in O.S.No.3684/2004 which was pending on the file of the City Civil Court, Bangalore and this respondent has also been arrayed as one of the defendant, as also the petitioners. On all these grounds amongst others respondent No.2 sought for dismissal of eviction petition. Petitioners in order to prove their claim got examined one witness namely first petitioner as PW1 and got marked Ex.P-1 to Ex.P-23. Respondent No.2 got himself examined the RW-1 and no documents were marked. Trial Court on considering the evidence and pleadings on record by its order dated 23.10.2009 allowed the petition under Section 27 (2) (r) of Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 and granted 4 months time from the date of order for the respondent to vacate and deliver vacant possession of the petition schedule premises. The petition filed under Section 27(2)(b) and Section 31 of the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 came to be dismissed, and said dismissal order of the petition have not been questioned or challenged. However, the respondent No.2 has filed the present revision petition under Section 46(1) of the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 questioning the correctness and the legality of the eviction order passed by the court of small causes in HRC No.134/2004 dated 23.10.2009. 8. However, the respondent No.2 has filed the present revision petition under Section 46(1) of the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 questioning the correctness and the legality of the eviction order passed by the court of small causes in HRC No.134/2004 dated 23.10.2009. 8. During the pendency of eviction petition respondent-tenant filed an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC seeking for rejection of the petition on the ground that, there was no jural relationship between the parties and also on the ground that small causes court has no jurisdiction to try the petition on the ground that he has been considered as a rank trespasser by the landlord themselves. This application came to be resisted by the petitioner/landlord by filing their objections on 19.02.2008. Trial Court has recorded in the order sheet dated 11.04.2008 that said issue is left open to be considered at the time of the disposal of the main matter. 9. I have heard Sri. M.D. Raghunath, learned counsel appearing for the Revision petitioner/tenant on behalf of M/s. Legal Axis and Smt. Prabhamani, learned counsel appearing for the respondent/landlord. 10. Sri. M.D. Raghunath, has raised several issues including maintainability of eviction petition and same are conscised herein below. 1. The suitability or otherwise in a petition under Section 27(2)(r) has to be considered with reference to presumption raised in favour of the landlord which is rebuttable presumption and the said rebuttable presumption has been discharged by the respondent in the instant case. 2. When the application filed under Order 7 Rule 11 is still pending, court below ought not to have passed orders on merits and non-consideration of this has resulted in prejudice to the respondent. 3. Section 43 of the Act is a mandatory provision and petitioners have themselves contended that respondent No.2 is a rank trespasser and hence the Court of Small Causes could not clutch the jurisdiction and give its verdict. 4. When there is dispute with regard to the jural relationship, the court below ought to have referred the parties to Civil court to establish their title and it could not have adjudicated the claim. 5. 4. When there is dispute with regard to the jural relationship, the court below ought to have referred the parties to Civil court to establish their title and it could not have adjudicated the claim. 5. The alleged requirement of the landlord even if it is to be accepted as existing on the date of the filing of the eviction petition would be without prejudice to the revision petitioners right and by virtue of eviction orders passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in respect of four other shops, the need or requirement is met since other four shops are available to the petitioners and there is no need or necessary to evict this respondent in the instant case. 6. Rebuttable presumption cast on the respondent having been rebutted by establishing that other four shops are available to the landlord and landlord has failed to discharge the burden cast on them or establish that same is not suitable. Hence, it is to be held that respondent has not discharged their burden. 7. Title deed on which the petitioners claim right over schedule property is not a completed document there is also no registration in the eye of law in as much as there is a deficit stamp duty required to be paid and same having not been paid it is not a completed registration as required under Section 17 (b) of the Registration Act. 8. When the dismissal Order passed under Section 27(2)(b) is not challenged petitioner cannot contend that 2nd respondent is a sub tenant of 1st respondent. 9. The respondent would get a right to take a plea whether the transaction of sale is a sham transaction when the sale deed is used as a tool for the purpose of evicting the respondent from the petition schedule premises. 10. A. On these grounds he seeks for allowing of the revision petition and dismissal of the eviction petition filed by the petitioners before court below. 11. The learned counsel has relied upon the following decisions in support of his submissions: 1. Regarding rebuttable presumption a. ILR 2004 Kar 3288. G. Shoukath and others vs. V. Chandraprakash b. (2004) 3 SCC 589 P. Suryanarayana (dead) byLR’s vs. K.S. Muddugowramma C. ILR 2003 Kar 3871 Smt. Yashoda Bal vs. Smt. Lakshmamma d. (2008) 10 SCC 685 Somanathasa Baddi vs. Chanabasappa and others 2. Regarding rebuttable presumption a. ILR 2004 Kar 3288. G. Shoukath and others vs. V. Chandraprakash b. (2004) 3 SCC 589 P. Suryanarayana (dead) byLR’s vs. K.S. Muddugowramma C. ILR 2003 Kar 3871 Smt. Yashoda Bal vs. Smt. Lakshmamma d. (2008) 10 SCC 685 Somanathasa Baddi vs. Chanabasappa and others 2. Regarding Jural relationship a. AIR (2002) 1 SC 90 Rajendra Tiwary vs. Basudeo Prasad and another b. 2003 (1) KCCR 385 Ayesha Begum vs. Shahzadi c. 2007 (1) AIR Kar R 377 R. Abbaiah Reddy (deceased by LRs) and others vs. Udaya Chandra d. 2009 (6) AIR Kar R 112 Smt. Sabitha Devi and another vs. Smt. S.K. Shreedevi 3. Regarding sale deed (not registered in the eye of law): a. AIR 1962 AP 226 Nandigam Ramarao and others vs. Burugupalli Srikrishnamurthi and others b. AIR 1960 J & K 112 Nabir Ganai vs. Mohd. Ismail Ganai and others c. AIR 2009 Calcutta 182 Jyotirmay Bhattacharya, J. Arun Bhusan Guha and others vs. Amal Roy and another d. AIR 1961 SC 545 4. Regarding Sham Transaction A. Air 1982 SC 1213 Devi Das vs. Mohan Lal b. AIR 1961 SC 545 c. Air 1961 SC 1747 Ram Saran Lall and others vs. Mst. Domini Kuer and others On the basis of the above he seeks for allowing of the revision petition. 12. Per contra Smt. Prabhamani, learned counsel would contend that similar plea namely regarding jural relationship had been raised by other tenants in respect of same premises in HRC 1563/1998, 1564/1998, 1565/1998, 1566/1998 and the rent court had held against the tenants which was the subject matter of HRRP 417, 426, 427 and 428/2003 before this Court and this Court had allowed the revision petitions by order dated 9-1-2004 and directed the landlord to approach the Civil Court for getting his title cleared which was taken up in appeal by the landlord before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.4871-4874/2005 and the Hon’ble Supreme Court by its order dated 8-8-2005 had allowed the Civil appeals and set aside the order passed by this Court and directed that the proceedings should go on before the Rent Court and accordingly the proceedings had continued in those proceedings. By relying upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court passed in Civil Appeal No.4871-4874-2005 she would contend that same is squarely applicable to the facts of the present case and accordingly prays that petitioner herein would not be entitled to take such a plea and accordingly prays for rejection of the revision petition. 13. She would also contend that presumption under Section 27(r) is mandatory and the said presumption has been raised in favour of the landlord in the instant case and thus she submits that there is no infirmity in the order passed by the Court below. 14. She would also contend that in respect of four shops for which eviction petitions were instituted by her client seeking eviction of the tenants on the ground that their two sons by name. Sahil Pasha and Suhail Pasha intend to run mutton stall and garment shop in the premises by altering the same has been accepted by the Court below and by order dated 12-3-2007 had allowed the eviction petition and same was confirmed by this Court in HRRP No.291, 292/2007, 293/2007 and 298/2007 dated 20-6-2008 and it cannot be said that the requirement of the landlord is satisfied when the said orders came to the affirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeals 7502-7505/2009 which was for the benefit of petitioners’ sons. Accordingly she prays for dismissal of the revision petition. 15. Regarding the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner with regard to the registration of sale deed she would contend once the document is registered and entered in Book.No.1 it is deemed to be registered and not rejected and has relied upon the provisions of the Indian Registration Act and the Karnataka Registration Rules, 1965. 16. In reply to the contention raised with regard to the tenant taking a plea of Sham transaction she would contend that there is no pleadings in the statement of objections filed or evidence let in and hence tenant has no locus standi to question the sale deed. 17. 16. In reply to the contention raised with regard to the tenant taking a plea of Sham transaction she would contend that there is no pleadings in the statement of objections filed or evidence let in and hence tenant has no locus standi to question the sale deed. 17. She would also contend that in the cross-examination R.W.1 tenant himself admits that he is a tenant and it cannot be construed as a stray admission and this vital admission is taken note of by the trial Court and accepted the plea of the landlord and accordingly she submits that on the basis of the admission by tenant itself, it is to be held that there is no merit in the contention now raised. 18. With reference to the contention regarding jurisdiction of the trial Court adjudicating raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner she would contend that there was no pleading and it was not the subject matter for consideration by the Court below and it cannot be raised now for the first time before this Court. 19. With regard to the jural relationship of Landlord and tenant she would contend that first respondent Mr.Hussain had been placed ex parte, R.W.1 in cross-examination admitted, he is a tenant under a temple but no documents are produced to show as such and there is attornment notice issued Ex.P.15 and 16 and thus there is a statutory attornment and accordingly request the Court to reject the contention raised by the revision petitioner. 20. In so far as the contention with regard to the application under Order VII Rule 11(d) filed before trail Court it is contended by her that said application came to be filed on the ground that there is no jural relationship of land lord and tenant by virtue of final order now having been passed, it is deemed to have been rejected and accordingly submits that said contention cannot be accepted. She would also contend that respondent was not a tenant at any point of time under temple and no scrap of paper is produced before the trial Court and in view of the admission by respondent No.2 i.e., revision petitioner herein presumption under Section 116 of the Evidence Act will have to be raised and tenant would be estopped from contending and raising the issue regarding jural relationship. She contends that revision petition itself is not maintainable since tenant has not deposited the entire arrears of rent and hence under Section 45 of the Rent Act petition is liable to be dismissed as not maintainable. In so far as the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner with regard to the alternate accommodation if available to the landlord namely four shops obtained pursuant to the orders passed by the Apex Court she would contend that it was required for the sons of the petitioners and the requirement pleaded in those petitions would have no bearing in the instant case and sons of the petitioner including petitioner herein have sought eviction of the respondent-tenant from the petition schedule premises as well as adjacent premises occupied by Dr. Jayaprakash for their use and occupation in order to establish a mutton stall and establish a cold storage. Elaborating her submission on this issue she would contend that the present revision petitioner was very much aware of the proceedings pending before the Court and as such he has not made any effort to produce the pleadings of those case before the Court below or this Court to rebut the presumption to be raised in favour of the landlord. In support of her submissions she relies upon the following judgments: (i) ILR 2008 Kar. 390 Mrs. Anuradha Shenoy Vs. N. Nanjappa Re: Order VII Rule 11(d) of Code of Civil Procedure (ii) ILR 1994 Kar 2264 Anar Devi Vs. Nathu Ram Re: Estoppel Section 116 of the Evidence Act. (iii) ILR 1985 Kar 2367 Swamydas Vs. Krishnan Re: Jural relationship (iv) (a) ILR 1989 Kar. 1555 M/s. Popular Automobiles Vs. N. Veeraswamy (b) ILR 2004 KAR. 4782 Silva Uddin Vs. Nagaraju Re: Statutory attornment (v) (2002) 1 SCC 90 Rajendra Tiwary Vs. Basudeo Prasad Re: Title to the Suit schedule premises. 21. In reply to the submission made by Smt. Prabhamani, Sri Raghunath would contend that in the interlocutory application filed by the tenant in HRC No.10437/1998 objections came to be filed by the petitioner landlord contending therein that the respondent/tenant is a “rank trespasser” and as such when the landlord themselves have treated the respondent tenant as “rank trespasser” the natural corollary would be that there existed no jural relationship of landlord and tenant and nothing requires to be proved by the tenant. He would also contend when he is treated as a trespasser, the question of payment of rent does not arise and under Section 3(e) of the Rent Act, the landlord means a person who for the time being is receiving or is entitled to receive, the rent of any premises, whether on his own account or on account of or on behalf of or for the benefit of any other person as enumerated in the sub-section and since the very jural relationship is denied the question of paying the rent or depositing the rent which has already been paid to Pandarinath temple would not arise. Elaborating on this he would submit that from the date of petition the rent has been deposited before this Court and hence the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that Revision petition is not maintainable ought not to be accepted. He would also submit that trial Court has dismissed the petition under Section 27(2)(b) of the Rent Act namely with regard to the sub-letting and the landlords have not filed any petition challenging the said order and the same has become final and thus it would be too late in the day for the landlords to contend that first respondent-had sub-let the premises to the second respondent i.e. revision petitioner. 22. With regard to the availability of the alternate premises raised with reference to rebuttable presumption Sri. Raghunath would contend that rebuttable presumption that tenant has to lead or tender would be making available before the trial Court about the alternate premises being available and once the said fact is demonstrated by way of evidence the burden shifts on the landlord to prove that said alternate premises is not suitable for the landlord and in the instant case he would contend that respondent-landlord has failed to establish the non-suitability of the available alternate shops to the respondent/landlord and they have not rebutted this evidence which burden lies on them. Hence, he contends that requirement of the landlord cannot be accepted to exist and it is to be held that said need is met by virtue of the four vacant shop premise being available. Hence, he contends that requirement of the landlord cannot be accepted to exist and it is to be held that said need is met by virtue of the four vacant shop premise being available. He would also contend that in the four eviction petitions which has been referred to by the learned counsel for the respondent/landlord in one matter, objections had been filed and in three other petitions objections have not been filed and in the matter where objections had been filed there the tenant had paid the rent to the landlords and as such the said plea raised by the tenant with regard to jural relationship came to be negatived by the trial Court and confirmed by this Court and approved by the Hon’ble Apex Court and he would contend in the instant case the said facts are not present since a specific plea has been raised on this issue and evidence has been let in and petitioner landlord has been cross-examined. Accordingly he prays that contentions raised in the revision petition be accepted and the revision petition be allowed and the eviction petition filed by the respondent herein be dismissed. 23. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties the following points arise for my consideration: (i) Whether the revision petition presented by the respondent-tenant is maintainable? Or liable to be dismissed under Section 45 of the Rent Act for non deposit of the rents alleged to be due? (ii) Whether the sale deed dated 28-9-1989 marked as Ex.P.14 cannot be construed as a registered document and no rights flow from it in favour of the purchaser and as such the petition is not maintainable? (iii) Whether the transaction of sale as reflected in the sale deed dated 28-9-1989 as per Ex.P.14 should be construed as sham transaction and whether such a plea is available to the respondent-tenant? (iv) Whether the petitioners before the Court below have established the jural relationship between the parties and whether the interlocutory application filed under Order VII rule 11(d) should have been independently considered and on not being considered order impugned herein is vitiated? (v) Whether the respondent-tenant has established by rebuttable presumption that the petitioner-landlord possessed alternate premises suitable for his need and can be utilised for the purpose of the said business? (v) Whether the respondent-tenant has established by rebuttable presumption that the petitioner-landlord possessed alternate premises suitable for his need and can be utilised for the purpose of the said business? (vi) Whether the order passed by the Court below suffers from any infirmity either in law or on facts? (vii) Whether the petition filed before the trial Court is not maintainable since the petitioner had not pleaded that the schedule premises if less than 14 square meters and also the rent of the petition schedule is less than Rs.3,500/- and as such the petition was liable to be dismissed? (viii) To what order? 24. In order to appreciate the rival contentions raised by the parties it would be necessary to narrate the facts which are not in dispute before considering the points formulated herein above. 25. The petitioner claims to have purchased the property in question including petition schedule premises under registered sale deed dated 29-9-1988. Immediately on purchase of the petition schedule premises along with other portions from its erstwhile owners, petitioners have got issued notice of attornment from there vendor Sri. Sathyanarayana Murthy as per notice of attornment dated 29-8-1998. Thereafterwards the petitioners have also issued notice of attornment dated 12-9-1998. But notice of attornment issued on behalf of the petitioner has been returned with a postal shara ‘returned to the sender’. The said returned postal cover is also available in the trial Court records. These three documents namely notice of attornment issued by Sathyanarayana Murthy, notice of attornment issued by the advocate of the petitioner and returned postal covers have been marked as Exs.P15, P.16 and P.17 respectively. 26. Thereafterwards eviction petition came to be filed against one Sri. Hussain in HRC 10437/1998 under Section 21(i)(h) & (j) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961. In the said proceedings notice to the respondent tenant Sri. Hussain came to be issued by the Court below. On service of notice respondent therein entered appearance through an advocate by name Sri. Narayana I.Naik who filed vakalathnama on 15-2-1999. Thereafterwards on 22-5-2000 Sri.Janardhan, Advocte filed vakalath on behalf of respondent/Hussain with no objection from previous counsel. The said two vakalathnamas filed in HRC No.10437/1998 came to be marked as Ex.P.3 and P.4 in the instant case before trial Court. Narayana I.Naik who filed vakalathnama on 15-2-1999. Thereafterwards on 22-5-2000 Sri.Janardhan, Advocte filed vakalath on behalf of respondent/Hussain with no objection from previous counsel. The said two vakalathnamas filed in HRC No.10437/1998 came to be marked as Ex.P.3 and P.4 in the instant case before trial Court. Above said Hussain did not file statement of objections nor contested the matter as could be seen from the order sheet of HRC 10437/1998 which has been produced before Court below and marked as Ex.P1. 27. During the pendency of the said eviction petition No.10437/1998 an interlocutory application came to be filed by Sri. Nirmal Kumar Jain under Order 1 rule 8(a) read with Section 151 of Code of Civil Procedure to come on record as one of the respondent. The said application has been got marked by the petitioner as Ex.P.8 in the instant case before the Court below. The said application came to be resisted by the alleged landlords by filing the objections to the same which was also produced and got marked as Ex.P.9. The said interlocutory application after adjudication came to be rejected by order dated 31-3-2003 and same has reached finality. The certified copy of the said order has been marked before the trial Court as per Ex.P.10. When the said eviction petition was at the stage of cross examination of P.W.1 it came to be dismissed for default by order dated 29-11-2004. These facts are not in dispute. 28. Now I propose to take up the contentions raised by the learned advocates for answering the points formulated herein above chronologically. 29. RE: Point No.1: The learned counsel for the respondent herein Smt. Prabhamani has raised an initial objection as to the maintainability of the revision petition itself. It is contended by her that under Section 45 of the Act, the revision petitioner tenant would not be entitled to prefer and prosecute the revision petition until and unless he deposits the entire arrears of rent before this Court. It is to be noticed at this juncture that eviction petition before the Court below is filed under only Section 27(2)(b) and (r) and Section 31 of the Karnataka Rent Act and no claim is made for arrears of rent. In the revision petition which is filed by the tenant it is stated to the following effect. It is to be noticed at this juncture that eviction petition before the Court below is filed under only Section 27(2)(b) and (r) and Section 31 of the Karnataka Rent Act and no claim is made for arrears of rent. In the revision petition which is filed by the tenant it is stated to the following effect. “Note: The rents from January 2006 to February 2010 at the rate of Rs.100/- per month have been deposited before this Hon’ble Court along with separate memo”. In paragraph 9 of the statement of objections filed before the Court below, the revision petitioner tenant has contended that petitioners have failed to prove the title over the suit property and the petition is hit by provision of Section 43 and also that there is no jural relationship of landlord and tenant between the revision petitioner and the respondents herein. It is curious to note that the revision petitioner-tenant has not whispered anything with regard to payment of rent other than in the statement of objections or in his examination-in-chief before the Court below and only in the cross-examination he contends that he has paid the arrears of rents. The tenant had initially taken a contention that he was paying rents at the rate of Rs.100/- per month to the temple and since 7 or 8 years (i.e., from the year 2000) he has stopped paying rents to the temple. In the instant case as noticed above, the petitioner tenant has deposited the rents for the period January 2006 i.e., the date on which the eviction petition namely HRC 134/2006 came to be filed before the Court below till the date of filing of the revision petition. When the respondent landlord has not demanded the arrears of rent and has not filed an application for stopping of the proceedings under Section 45 or when they have not filed the petition under section 27(2)(a) for recovery of alleged arrears of rent, it cannot be said that petition is not maintainable on account of nonpayment of rents. Admittedly the revision petitioner has raised a dispute with regard to jural relationship as to title to the suit schedule property. Admittedly the revision petitioner has raised a dispute with regard to jural relationship as to title to the suit schedule property. As such, I am of the considered opinion that present revision petition is held to be maintainable and accordingly point No.1 is answered by holding that the present revision petition is maintainable before this Court and the objections raised by the respondent landlord is hereby rejected. 30. RE:Point No.2: The revision petitioner has taken up a contention that the sale deed dated 28-8-1998 marked as Ex.P.14 is not a complete document and it cannot be construed as duly registered and as such the petition is not maintainable. To buttress his argument, the learned counsel for the revision petitioner has relied upon the following decisions: (i) AIR 1961 SC 545 (ii) AIR 1962 AP 226 (iii) AIR 1960 J & K 112 (iv) AIR 2009 Cal 182 . The principle enunciated in these judgments are as follows: (i) AIR 1961 SC 545 Ram Saran Lall & others vs. Mst. Domini Kuer & others The registration under the Registration Act is not complete till the documents to be registered has been copied out in the records of the Registration office as provided under Section 61 of that Act. Section 47 of the Registration Act has nothing to do with the completion of the Registration and nothing to do with the completion of the sale that the instrument is one of sale. A sale which is admittedly not complete until the registration of instrument of sale is complete cannot be said to have been completed earlier because by virtue of Section 47 the instrument by which it is effected after it has been registered commences to operate from an earlier date. (ii) AIR 1962 AP 226 . Nandigam Ramarao and Others. Vs. Burugupalli Srikrishnamurthi and Others. Date of transfer is date of Registration and not date of execution of transfer deed. Fiction of relation back does not apply. Registration Act. (1908) Sections 47 and 75. (iii) AIR 1960 J & K 112. Nabir Ganai V. Mohd. Ismail Ganal and others. Registration Act, (1908) Section 47 – As Between Parties registered documents takes effect from the date of its execution-But as between third parties it takes effect from the date of registration. (iv) AIR 2009 Cal 182 Arun Bhushan Guha & Ors. V. Amal Roy & Anr. 20. Nabir Ganai V. Mohd. Ismail Ganal and others. Registration Act, (1908) Section 47 – As Between Parties registered documents takes effect from the date of its execution-But as between third parties it takes effect from the date of registration. (iv) AIR 2009 Cal 182 Arun Bhushan Guha & Ors. V. Amal Roy & Anr. 20. Fact remains that the registration of the said deed of conveyance was kept in abeyance till March, 2006 due to non-payment of deficit stamp duty. The registration of the said deed was thus completed in March, 2006 on payment of deficit stamp duty. It is settled law of the land that in view of the provision contained in Section 47 of the Registration Act, once the registration of the document is completed, the title of the purchaser relates back to the date of execution of the document. Thus, the purchaser became the owner of the suit property with effect from 14th November, 2002 though the registration of the said deed was completed in march, 2006. 21. But question arose as to what is the position in law about the title of the property during the interregnum period between the date of execution of the deed and the date of completion registration of the said deed as per the Registration Act.” 27. As such, this Court is of the view, that so long as the registration is not completed, the purchaser cannot project himself as the owner of the property in question, though it is true that all trappings of ownership are traceable from the date of execution of the deed after its registration is completed. 31. By relying upon these decisions and contending that the said decisions are applicable with all force to the facts of the present case, he would contend that property was undervalued in the instant case and as such the document when presented for registration was kept pending and no registration was done and subsequently the respondent landlord has not produced the certificate for having paid the deficit stamp duty and since the deficit stamp duty is not paid, there is no registration in the eye of law and when there is no registration in the eye of law, no rights flow from the deed and as such the petition filed itself was not maintainable is the contention of the learned counsel for the revision petitioner. Section 17(1) of the Registration Act reads as under: “17. Documents of which registration is compulsory- The following documents shall be registered, if the property to which they relate is situate in a district in which, and if they have been executed on or after the date on which, Act No.XVI of 1864, or the Indian Registration Act, 1866 (20 of 1866), or the Indian Registration Act, 1871 (8 of 1871), or the Indian Registration Act, 1877 (3 of 1877), or this Act came or comes into force, namely- (a) instruments of gift of immovable property; (b) other non-testamentary Instruments which purport or operate to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right, title or interest, whether vested or contingent, of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, to or in immovable property; (c) Non-testamentary instruments which acknowledge the receipt or payment of any consideration on account of the creation, declaration, assignment, limitation or extinction of any such right, title or interest; and (d) Leases of immovable property from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year, or reserving a yearly rent; 32. He would also draw the attention of the Court to the cross-examination of P.W.1 dated 2-7-2008 which reads as under; “It is true that Pandarinatha temple filed O.S.No.3684/2004 against me and all tenants in respect of petition schedule building for declaration of their ownership and for possession. It is not true to say that the sale deed under which I am claiming the ownership of the petition schedule premises has not confirmed any right on me and that I am not the owner of the petition schedule premises.” “The registered sale deed is still with the sub-registrar office as it is determined as an under valuation. Since 1998 I have not paid the deficit stamp duty. It is not true to say that my statement that it is determined as undervalued is false. It is not true to say that original documents is handed over to me from the sub-registrar office on the date of registration itself.” 33. On the basis of this admission elicited in the cross-examination learned counsel for the tenant revision petitioner would contend that document in question namely sale deed dated 29-8-1998 marked as Ex.P.14 has no force in law as it is not a complete document after registration. 34. On the basis of this admission elicited in the cross-examination learned counsel for the tenant revision petitioner would contend that document in question namely sale deed dated 29-8-1998 marked as Ex.P.14 has no force in law as it is not a complete document after registration. 34. It is seen from the document which has been produced by the respondent that it bears a seal of Sub-Registrars Office which is to the following effect: Karnataka 35. In order to appreciate the said contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner for being accepted or being rejected, it is necessary to extract other relevant provisions of the Registration Act which casts an obligation on the Registration Officer to register a document when presented for registration. The same can be found in Section 34 and 35 of the Registration Act. The said provisions of Registration Act namely Sections 34 and 35 are extracted herein below: “34. Enquiry before registration by registering officer: (1) Subject to the provisions contained in this part and in Sections 41, 43, 45, 69, 75, 77, 88 and 89, no document shall be registered under this Act, unless the persons executing such document, or their representatives, assigns or agents authorized as aforesaid, appear before the registering officer within the time allowed for presentation under Sections 23, 24, 25 and 26: Provided that, if owing to urgent necessity or unavoidable accident all such persons do not so appear, the Registrar, in cases where the delay in appearing does not exceed four months, may direct that no payment of a fine not exceeding ten times the amount of the proper registration fee, in addition to the fine, if any, payable under Section 25, the document may be registered. (2) Appearances under sub-section (1) may be simultaneous or at different times. (3) The registering office shall thereupon- (a) Enquire whether or not such document was executed by the persons by whom it purports to have been executed: (b) Satisfy himself as to identity of the persons appearing before him and alleging that they have executed the document; and (c) In the case of any person appearing as a representative, assign or agent, satisfy himself of the right of such person so to appear. (4) Any application for a direction under the proviso to sub-section (1) may be lodged with a Sub-Registrar, who shall forthwith forward it to the Registrar to whom he is subordinate. (5) Nothing in this section applies to copies of decrees or orders. 35. Procedure on Admission and Denial of Execution Respectively (1)(a) If all the persons executing the document appear personally before the registering officer and are personally known to him, or if he be otherwise satisfied that they are the persons they represent themselves to be, and if they all admit the execution of the document, or (b) if in the case of any person appearing by a representative, assign or agent, such representative, assign or agent admits the execution, or (c) if the person executing the document is dead, and his representative or assign appears before registering officer and admits the execution, the registering officer shall register the document as directed in Sections 58 to 61, inclusive. (Emphasis supplied by me) (2) the registering officer may, in order to satisfy himself that the persons appearing before him are the persons they represent themselves to be, or for any other purpose contemplated by this Act, examine any one present in his office. (3)(a) If any person by whom the document purports to be executed denies its execution, or (b) if any such person appears to the registering officer to be a minor, an idiot or a lunatic, or (c) if any person by whom the document purports to be executed is dead, and his representative or assign denies it execution, the registering officer shall refuse to register the document as to the person so denying, appearing or dead; Provided that, where such officer is a Registrar, he shall follow the procedure prescribed in part XII: 32[provided further that the State Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, declare that any Sub-Registrar named in the notification shall, in respect of documents the execution of which is denied, be deemed to be a Registrar for the purposes of this sub-section and of part XII.) Under Sub-section (1) of Section 35, the Registering Officer will admit the execution of the document when presented before him and is compelled to register the document if the ingredients of Section 35 are fulfilled. A document to be held to be completed for registration Section 60 would be the appropriate and relevant provision. A document to be held to be completed for registration Section 60 would be the appropriate and relevant provision. The same reads as under: “60. Certificate of Registration: (1) After such of the provisions of Sections 34, 35, 58 and 59 as apply to any document presented for registration have been complied with, the registering officer shall endorse thereon a certificate containing the word “registered”, together with the number and page of the book in which the document has been copied. (2) Such certificate shall be signed, sealed and dated by the registering officer, and shall then be admissible for the purpose of proving that the document has been duly registered in manner provided by this Act, and that the facts mentioned in the endorsements referred to in Section 59 have occurred as therein mentioned.” On perusal of these provisions of the Registration Act, it is to be examined whether the ingredients of Section 34, 35 and 60 are complied with in the instant case in respect of sale deed dated 29-8-1998 which is marked as Ex.P.14. The execution of the sale deed by affixing the signature of the vendor and the purchaser is admitted before the Sub-Registrar. To the said effect there is an endorsement in page No.2. It is no doubt true that an endorsement is made that the document is subjected to undervaluation. However, there is also endorsement namely as duly registered on the document itself as found therein. On each page of sale deed at the top it is mentioned as “Registered as Document No: 1176/1998-99”. Thus, it can not be held that document has not been accepted for registration. One another factor noticed by this Court is that this plea of document being not a complete document of registration was never raised before the trial Court. Neither in the evidence of the respondent it has been stated so nor in the statement of objections. It is only before this Court in revisional jurisdiction in ground No.14 it has been raised. In view of the fact that document in question satisfies the ingredients of Section 34, 35 and 60, I am of the considered opinion that contention raised by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner tenant does not merit consideration and accordingly it is rejected. In view of the fact that document in question satisfies the ingredients of Section 34, 35 and 60, I am of the considered opinion that contention raised by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner tenant does not merit consideration and accordingly it is rejected. In view of the above narrated facts judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for revision petitioner is not applicable to the facts of the case. 36. Re: Point No.3: The learned counsel for the petitioner has also raised in the revision petition in ground No.14 to the following effect; “The sale deed was a sham document and the respondents cannot claim ownership under the said document until the Registration is completed” It is also contended before the Court below that the landlord would not get right over the petition schedule premises and the alleged sale deed is not binding on the respondent-tenant. Having contended so, the learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the following judgments: (i) AIR 1982 SC 1213 Devi Das Vs. Mohan Lal. (ii) AIR 1961 SC 1747 Ram Saran Lall and others Vs. Mst. Domini Kuer and others. The principles enunciated in the said judgment are: (i) AIR 1982 SC 1213 “Where the order of eviction of the tenant in the eviction petition filed by the purchaser of the building was passed by passing the plea of the tenant that in fact there was no sale of the said building and the sale deed was a paper transaction, the order of eviction would be invalid. The view that the tenant could not challenge the validity of the sale deed executed in favour of the purchaser because the tenant was not a party to it, would not be proper. Since the lower courts failed to record the finding on this point the case was remitted to the trial Court to record finding on the question whether the sale of building to the purchaser was a bona fide transaction.” (ii) AIR 1961 SC 1747 “The registration under the Registration Act is not complete till the document to be registered has been copied out in the records of the Registration Office as provided in S.61 of the Act. Section 47 of the Registration Act has nothing to do with the completion of the registration and therefore nothing to do with the completion of a sale when the instrument is one of sale. Section 47 of the Registration Act has nothing to do with the completion of the registration and therefore nothing to do with the completion of a sale when the instrument is one of sale. A sale which is admittedly not completed until the registration of the instrument of sale is completed cannot be said to have been completed earlier because by virtue of S.47 the instrument by which it is effected, after it has been registered, commences to operate from an earlier date.” It is no doubt true that the tenant can assail a sale deed when it is sought to be used for the purpose of eviction and the burden is cast on the tenant to prove that transaction is to be tainted as a sham transaction for the purposes of evicting the tenant. If the tenant in a given situation were to raise a plea and demonstrate that for the purpose of eviction of the tenant the document has been created then there is no embargo for the Court to look into the transaction by piercing the veil and finding out the nature of transaction. In the instant case the landlord has produced the document of registration of sale deed which is at Ex.P.14. Marking of the same is not objected in the examination-in-chief. Having accepted the production and marking of the said document, it would be too late in the day for the revision petitioner tenant to contend that said transaction i.e., sale deed is a sham document. Even otherwise if the submission made by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner is accepted for being examined, it cannot be said in the instant case the present sale deed executed by the vendors of the landlords is for the purpose of evicting the tenants. A perusal of the covenants contained in the sale deed do not suggest the said fact. Yet another factor which requires to be noticed is that even in the evidence of respondent, he does not contend that said sale deed has been executed by the vendors of the petitioners for the purpose of evicting the revision petitioner. Though a suggestion has been made in the cross-examination of P.W.1 the sale deed is created for evicting the respondent the said suggestion has been denied by the petitioner landlord. Though a suggestion has been made in the cross-examination of P.W.1 the sale deed is created for evicting the respondent the said suggestion has been denied by the petitioner landlord. Even in the objection statement filed before the trial Court there is no such plea raised and the revision petitioner has been attempting to improve his case stage by stage and step by step. In view of these overwhelming factors which are glaring. I am of the considered view that contention of the learned counsel for the revision petitioner that the document in question namely sale deed marked as Ex.P.14 is to be construed as sham transaction cannot be accepted. Accordingly same is rejected. 37. Re: Point No.4: Pivotal issue in this case is in considering the rival contention raised by the parties with regard to the Jural relationship and on this point elaborate submissions have been made by the learned advocates appearing for both the parties. In order to appreciate the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties with regard to jural relationship between the parties, it would be necessary to extract Section 43 of the Rent Act which reads as under: “43. Disputes of relationship of landlord and tenant: (1) Where in any proceedings before the Court, a contention is raised denying the existence of relationship of landlord and tenant as between the parties it shall be lawful for the Court to accept the document of lease or where there is no document of lease, a receipt of acknowledgment of payment of rent purported to be signed by the landlord as prima-facie evidence of relationship and proceed to hear the case. (2) Where – (a) the lease pleaded is oral and either party denies relationship, and no receipt or acknowledgement of payment of rent as refereed to in sub-section (1) above is produced, or (b) in the opinion of the Court there is reason to suspect the genuine existence of the document of lease or the receipt or acknowledgment of payment of rent. The court shall at once stop all further proceedings before it and direct the parties to approach a competent Court of civil jurisdiction for declaration of their rights. This Court in the case of Saleem Vs. Sri. The court shall at once stop all further proceedings before it and direct the parties to approach a competent Court of civil jurisdiction for declaration of their rights. This Court in the case of Saleem Vs. Sri. Syed Yousuff & others reported in ILR 2010 KAR 427 has held that the Rent Act of the year 1999 was promulgated/introduced to enable the landlords to obtain possession of their building or premises as the case may be by extending certain benefits or conferring certain rights which flow from various provisions of the Rent Act and when there is a serious dispute with regard to the title to the property, it would be unsafe for the rent Court to embark upon the enquiry particularly when the proceedings are summary in nature and it was held by this Court in such circumstances the proper course for the trial Court would be to allow the parties to get their rights adjudicated in an appropriate Civil Court. It is held in the said judgment to the following effect: “Having regard to the object of the Act, a person, who is arrayed as a respondent/tenant in an eviction petition is bound to pay the rent and continue to pay the same. The tenant seeking to raise the contention that there is no jural relationship of landlord and tenant is one of the defences that may be set up in contesting the petition. This does not preclude the tenant from making the deposit of rent-When the respondent who is held, prima-facie, to be a tenant seeks to challenge that finding by way of a revision petition he would necessarily have to deposit the rent claimed. For otherwise, it would enable such a person to have the luxury of prosecuting the revision petition and possibly stalling further proceedings before the Trial Court, which is not the object of the Act-Further held: The object of the Section 45 is to disentitle the person who is in occupation of the premises and who is said to be a tenant, from contesting any original petition or prosecuting a revision petition without depositing or paying the arrears of rent or the current rent. Therefore, there is no doubt that the petitioner is required to deposit the rents claimed by the landlord before the Trial Court in the event that he wants to prosecute the present revision petition.” The Landlord in their eviction petition contended that the first respondent had been inducted by their vendor and he was a tenant under them and subsequent to the purchase of the petition schedule premises the first respondent became a tenant by virtue of statutory attornment and as such he was liable for eviction. It was contended in the eviction petition that second respondent Mr. Nirmalkumar Jain has entered possession of the premises by trespass and he has to be considered as a sub-tenant and the tenant Hussain had allowed the sub-tenant to occupy the petition schedule premises and accordingly the petition had been filed both on the ground of personal use and occupation and also on the ground of subletting. The claim for allowing the petition under Section 27(2)(b) and Section 31 of the Rent Act is admittedly negative by trial Court and while answering the point No.2 formulated by it, trial Court has held that petitioner had failed to prove respondent No.2 is sub-tenant or trespasser of petition schedule premises and has held he is only a tenant of the premises and had answered point No.2 formulated by it in the negative. The said finding namely dismissal of the petition under Section 27(2)(b) has not been questioned by the landlord by filing revision petition and said order has become final. Be that as it may, the facts which are required for considering the plea regarding jural relationship are as follows. 38. The revision petitioner tenant on being arrayed as second respondent in the present eviction petition in the Court below has filed a detailed statement of objection and has taken up a plea that there is no jural relationship of landlord and tenant between the petitioners on the one hand and the second respondent on the other. 38. The revision petitioner tenant on being arrayed as second respondent in the present eviction petition in the Court below has filed a detailed statement of objection and has taken up a plea that there is no jural relationship of landlord and tenant between the petitioners on the one hand and the second respondent on the other. It is the contention of the revision petitioner tenant that he is a tenant under Arul Migu Pandarinath temple and there is title suit in O.S.No.3684/2004 pending inter se between the said temple on the one hand and the landlord as well as the tenant on the other hand, wherein the temple who is the plaintiff in the said suit have contended that respondents 1 and 2 as tenants under them. Accordingly the said plea is raised. Even in the evidence examination-in-chief of RW-1 at paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 the averments made in the statement of objections have been reiterated by the revision petitioner tenant. 39. It is an admitted fact that in the earlier round of litigation namely in HRC 10437/1998 filed by the present petitioners (landlords) against Hussain the second respondent herein namely Mr. Nirmal Kumar Jain filed an interlocutory application under Order I Rule 8A seeking for being impleaded as respondent No.2 in the said case. In support of the said application an affidavit has been filed. The averments made in the said affidavit at paragraph 2 is relevant and as such the same is extracted: “I submit that I am in possession of the petition schedule premises and since there is a dispute between the temple and the petitioners regarding the ownership of the petitioner Schedule premises we could not pay rents to any person until the title to the same is decided by this competent court. There is no relationship of landlord and tenant between us. The monthly rent I was paying was Rs.75. After that Arul Migu Pandarinathar Temple, Tiruchi, started to claim their title over the petition schedule premises I could not pay the rents to any persons. I am in possession of the petition schedule premises and I am a necessary party to the above. Without impleading me if any eviction order is passed against the respondent who is not a possession of the same the petitioners may evict me from the petition schedule premises. I am in possession of the petition schedule premises and I am a necessary party to the above. Without impleading me if any eviction order is passed against the respondent who is not a possession of the same the petitioners may evict me from the petition schedule premises. I am carrying on business in hiring pandals, crockeries and other items on rental basis in petition schedule premises and I have invested lost of money in the business. Even though the petitioners are aware of the fact that I am in possession of the petition schedule premises for the reasons best known to them they have not made me as party just to obtain an order behind my back. I submit that if I am not permitted to come on record as one of the respondents and contest on merits I will be put to irreparable loss and hardship. On the other hand no hardship will be caused to the other side.” 40. In their objection to the said application the petitioners-respondents herein namely the landlords have taken a specific contention that impleading applicant is a rank trespasser and the said objections reads as under: “5. The impleading Applicant, Sri. Nirmal Kumar Jain has surruptuously pushed himself into the premises and is a rank trespasser having committed criminal trespass for which criminal complaint will be filed against him for committing trespass. 6. There is no jural relationship between this trespasser – impleading applicant and the Petitioner.” 41. This application on adjudication came to be rejected. It is observed while disposing of the said application that it was open for the impleading applicants to file an application under section 19 of the erstwhile Karnataka Rent Control Act 1961 for depositing the rent since a rival claim is made by a party. This application on adjudication came to be rejected. It is observed while disposing of the said application that it was open for the impleading applicants to file an application under section 19 of the erstwhile Karnataka Rent Control Act 1961 for depositing the rent since a rival claim is made by a party. It is also observed that he has not produced any scrap of paper to show that he is in occupation of the premises in what capacity and it is also observed that when the impleading applicant claims to be doing business in the petition schedule premises he ought to have produced the licence issued from the Corporation authority or any other document to establish that he is in occupation of the premises as a tenant and accordingly the Court below rejected the application in the absence of any material evidence to show or establish that he has been tenant under the vendor of the petitioner. The said order of dismissal is not challenged and it has become final. Sri. Raghunath, learned counsel for the revision petitioner tenant would contend when it is the specific case of the landlords themselves that revision petitioner is a “rank trespasser” there is no question of establishing jural relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and further contention of the landlords themselves is that tenant has occupied the petition schedule premises by way of trespasss and as such even from the pleadings there is no jural relationship of landlord and tenant and as such he contends that question of the tenant proving the negative does not arise. 42. Per contra Smt. Prabhamani contends that when there is sale deed Ex.P.14 and the notice of attornment is issued to the earlier tenant and eviction petition is filed against the earlier tenant and he did not choose to appear and contest the matter, would establish that second respondent before the Court below is attempting to lay a false claim and as such he cannot have any protection and he is deemed to be a tenant under the petitioner. She would draw the attention of the Court to the definition of landlord and tenant as defined under the Rent Act, 1999; namely Section 3(e) and 3(n) of the Act which reads as under: “3. She would draw the attention of the Court to the definition of landlord and tenant as defined under the Rent Act, 1999; namely Section 3(e) and 3(n) of the Act which reads as under: “3. Definitions:- In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires- (a) to (d) : XXX (e) “landlord” means a person who for the time being is receiving or is entitled to receive, the rent of any premises, whether on his own account or on account of or on behalf of or for the benefit of any other person or as a trustee, guardian or receiver for any other person or who would so receive the rent or to be entitled to receive the rent, if the premises were let to a tenant; (f) to (m) : XXX (n) “tenant” means any person by whom or on whose account or behalf the rent of any premises, is or but for a special contract would be, paable, and includes. (i) A sub-tenant; (ii) Any person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy, but does not include any person to whom a licence as defined in section 52 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882 (Central Act 5 of 1882) has been granted;” The Court below while considering this issue at paragraph 12 has relied upon clear admission of the second respondent regarding tenancy. The said admission is by way of suggestion made by the second respondent to P.W.1 in his cross examination and it reads as under: “It is not true to say that R-2 is a tenant under me in the petition schedule premises since beginning. It is not true to say that there is no connection between R1 and petition schedule premises. It is not true to say that at the time of purchase of the property by me R2 was in possession of the petition schedule premises.” (Emphasis supplied by me) 43. Sri. Raghunath would submit his arguments on the jural relationship in two folds namely (i) the admission by the petitioners themselves being that second respondent is a rank trespasser; and (ii) that say cannot be considered as an admission of fact. On this proposition he relies upon the decisions referred to supra namely: (i) (2002) 1 SCC 90 Rajendra Tiwary Vs. Basudeo Prasad and another (ii) 2003 (1) KCCR 385 Ayesha Begum Vs. On this proposition he relies upon the decisions referred to supra namely: (i) (2002) 1 SCC 90 Rajendra Tiwary Vs. Basudeo Prasad and another (ii) 2003 (1) KCCR 385 Ayesha Begum Vs. Shahzadi (iii) 2007 (1) AIR Kar R 377 R. Abbaiah Reddy Vs. Udaya Chandra. (iv) 2009 (6) AIR Kar R 112 Smt. Sabitha Devi & Anr Vs. Smt. S.K. Shreedevi. (v) ILR 2008 Kar 3500 M. Ethiraj Vs. Smt Farida Khanum The principles enunciated in the said decisions are as under: (i) (2002) 1 SCC 90 Rajendra Tiwary Vs. Basudeo Prasad and another “A Rent Control and Eviction – Landlord and tenant relationship – Held, the existence of, is the very foundation of an eviction petition under a Rent control statute – Therefore where such relationship is found not to be established, any further enquiry into the title of the parties is beyond the scope of a court exercising jurisdiction under such a statute – Further held, provisions of Or. 7 R.7 CPC, providing for granting of lesser reliefs, than originally prayed for on basis of facts as established, are not attracted to such a situation – Where sitting-tenant, defendant – appellant, claimed to have executed an agreement to purchase the disputed premises from the original owner, held on facts, High Court, in second appeal erred in holding that an equitable decree of eviction could be granted against him on the basis of the title of respondents, who had purchased the premises under registered sale deeds – Thus High Court erred in remanding the matter to the first appellate court because it had not recorded a finding on the question of title – Civil Procedure Code, 1908, Or. 7 R.7.” (ii) 2003 (1) KCCR 385 Ayesha Begum Vs. Shahzadi “A Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 – Section 43 When lease pleaded is oral and respondent denies relationship of landlord and tenant, it is incumbent on Court to refer the parties to Civil Court for declaration of their right. Section 43 of the Act does not refer to revision proceedings before High Court.’ (iii) 2007 (1) AIR Kar R 377 R. Abbaiah Reddy Vs. Udaya Chandra. “Karnataka Rent Act (34 of 2001), Ss. Section 43 of the Act does not refer to revision proceedings before High Court.’ (iii) 2007 (1) AIR Kar R 377 R. Abbaiah Reddy Vs. Udaya Chandra. “Karnataka Rent Act (34 of 2001), Ss. 27(2)(c), 43 – Eviction suit – Jural relationship of landlord and tenant between parties – Absence of documentary evidence like lease deed and rent receipts – Complicated dispute regarding title of landlord – Jural relationship of landlord and tenant, not established – Eviction petition, not maintainable. (Para 5).” (iv) 2009 (6) AIR Kar R 112 Smt. Sabitha Devi & Anr Vs. Smt. S.K. Shreedevi. “Karnataka Rent Act (34 of 2001), S.43- Relationship of landlord and tenant – Finding as to, given by a Civil Court while declining jurisdiction to deal with matter – Said finding was relied on by HRC Court when matter came before it – Improper exercise – Findings as to jural relationship of landlord and tenant ought to have been independently found by HRC Court – Same should be arrived at by reference to materials on record (para 8).” (v) ILR 2008 Kar 3500 M. Ethiraj Vs. Smt Farida Khanum “There cannot be any dispute that an admission is the best evidence against the party making it and though not conclusive, shifts the onus to the maker on the principle that what a party admits must to be true or may be reasonably presumed to be true so that until the presumption is rebutted, the fact admitted must be taken to be true. An admission must be examined as a whole and not in parts. It is settled law that an admission of any party has to be read in its entirety and no statement out of context can constitute admission on any fact. The Court may reject the admission if it is satisfied from other surrounding circumstances that it is untrue. The admission must be used either as a whole or not at all. It is also equally settled that the stray sentence elicited in the cross-examination could hardly be construed as admission. The apex Court in the case of Chikkam Koteswara Rao –Vs- Chikkam Subbarao speaking through Justice K.S. Hedge, has observed in this behalf thus: “This admission must be read along with the evidence given by him in his chief examination.” Thus, the evidence has to be read in its entirety in a harmonious manner. The apex Court in the case of Chikkam Koteswara Rao –Vs- Chikkam Subbarao speaking through Justice K.S. Hedge, has observed in this behalf thus: “This admission must be read along with the evidence given by him in his chief examination.” Thus, the evidence has to be read in its entirety in a harmonious manner. In this matter, if the evidence of the landlord is read in its entirety in harmonious manner, it becomes evident that the so called admission is not an admission at all with regard to they year of completion of the construction of the premises in question. The said stray sentence in the first line of cross-examination would relate to completion of construction of the entire building and not the premises in question.” 44. The principles enunciated by their Lordships in these decisions cannot be disputed. A perusal of the pleadings and the exhibits produced before the Court, it is seen that in HRC 10437/1998 when the matter was pending before Court below from 1998 second respondent before Court below i.e., revision petitioner herein slowly and by using trick and stratagem creeps in the year 2002 by filing an application for impleading. In doing so he attempts to exhibit his intelligence and skill by not stating as to when he came into possession of the petition schedule premises. His only contention is that he is in possession of the petition schedule premises and when he was inducted into the petition schedule premises by whom for what consideration and for what rent there is no whisper in the application. At the cost of repetition the said plea has to be extracted here again for better appreciation of the facts. Accordingly paragraph No.2 of the affidavit filed along with impleading application in HRC 10437/1998 is extracted herein below: “I submit that I am in possession of the petition schedule premises and since there is a dispute between the temple and the petitioners regarding the ownership of the petitioner Schedule premises we could not pay rents to any person until the title to the same is decided by this competent court. There is no relationship of landlord and tent between us. The monthly rent I was paying was Rs.75. After that Arul Migu Pandarinathar Temple, Tiruchi, started to claim their title over the petition schedule premises I could not pay the rents to any person. There is no relationship of landlord and tent between us. The monthly rent I was paying was Rs.75. After that Arul Migu Pandarinathar Temple, Tiruchi, started to claim their title over the petition schedule premises I could not pay the rents to any person. I am in possession of the petition schedule premises and I am a necessary party to the above. Without impleading me if any eviction order is passed against the respondent who is not a possession of the same the petitioners may evict me from the petition schedule premises. I am carrying on business in hiring pandals, crockeries and other items on rental basis in petition schedule premises and I have invested lost of money in the business. Even though the petitioners are aware of the fact that I am in possession of the petition schedule premises for the reasons best known to them they have not made me as party just to obtain an order behind my back. I submit that if I am not permitted to come on record as one of the respondents and contest on merits I will be put to irreparable loss and hardship. On the other hand no hardship will be caused to the other side.” The following facts clearly emerge from these pleading: (a) In what capacity the revision petitioner came into possession of the petition schedule premises he has been silent through out namely (i) in the impleading application (ii) in HRC 10437/1998 and (iii) in the present eviction petition as also revision petition apart from his evidence. (b) No documents were produced before trial Court to show that he is a tenant under the temple. No receipt or any other correspondence or letter to demonstrate that he is a tenant under the temple. When the revision petitioner claims to have paid rents to the temple which admittedly is muzarai temple governed by Government of Tamil Nadu any amounts paid to the temple would not be without any receipt. The same is also conspicuously absent. No witnesses have been examined on behalf of the revision petitioner/tenant to demonstrate that either he is a tenant under the temple or he was inducted by the temple as a tenant. In view of these facts I am of the considered view that it cannot be held that the respondent has proved that he is a tenant under Pandarinathar Temple. 45. In view of these facts I am of the considered view that it cannot be held that the respondent has proved that he is a tenant under Pandarinathar Temple. 45. Per contra the petitioner has produced the vakalathnama filed on behalf of the first respondent tenant Mr. Hussain in HRC 10437/1998 and for reasons best known having entered appearance through learned counsel to appear and contest the matter he did not choose to contest the matter and natural corollary would be to draw adverse inference against the first respondent. Be that as it may, the tenor of the cross-examination of P.W.1 demonstrates and it has back fired on the revision petitioner as is seen from the cross-examination of P.W.1 extracted herein above. It is no doubt true that a stray admission made in the cross-examination cannot be used as lever for discarding the entire evidence. The preceding paragraph and the succeeding paragraph when read together along with his cross-examination clearly depicts the fact that revision petitioner himself claims to be a tenant under respondents No.1 and 2 in respect of the petition schedule premises. The said cross-examination of P.W.1 reads as under; “There is no rental agreement in writing between myself and the respondent, after I have purchased the property, there is no documents to show that rate of rent is Rs.100/-p.m. There is also no documents to show that the 1st respondent is tenant under me. It is not true to say that R-s is a tenant under me in the petition schedule premises since beginning. It is not true to say that there is no connection between R-1 and petition schedule premises. It is not true to say that at the time of purchase of the property by me R2 was in possession of the petition schedule premises. (Emphasis supplied by me) I do not know when exactly R-2 came into occupation of the petition schedule premises. Besides filing this petition I have not initiated any legal action against R-2. I had filed HRC 10437/1998 for eviction of R-1. It is true that in that petition I had not made R-2 herein as a party. Petition copy of this HRC is Ex.P6. I do not know if in that petition R2 herein had filed application for impleading himself as a respondent.” 46. There is no further suggestion made to P.W.1 in this regard. It is true that in that petition I had not made R-2 herein as a party. Petition copy of this HRC is Ex.P6. I do not know if in that petition R2 herein had filed application for impleading himself as a respondent.” 46. There is no further suggestion made to P.W.1 in this regard. Admittedly on completion of the evidence of P.W.1 respondent-revision petitioner has tendered his evidence. Nothing prevented the respondent tenant to explain as to what he meant by stray suggestion made in the cross examination of P.W.1 having not explained either in his evidence or in his pleadings the one and the only inference that can be drawn is that finding of the Court below holding that there existed jural relationship of landlord and tenant is to be accepted and accordingly it is accepted. By analyzing entire evidence of P.W.1 and R.W.1 as a whole and by taking the entire evidence particularly paragraph extracted herein above it is held that there exists jural relationship of landlord and tenant. Further following judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner are squarely applicable to the facts of the present case. (i) ILR 2008 Kar. 390 Mrs. Anuradha Shenoy Vs. N. Nanjappa. (ii) ILR 1994 Kar. 2264 Anar Devi Vs. Nathu Ram. (iii) ILR 1985 Kar. 2367 Swamydas Vs. Krishnan. The Court below in paragraph 12 onwards of its judgment has succinctly considered, discussed and evaluated the evidence and has come to a conclusion that there exists relationship of landlord and tenant and I do not find any infirmity in the said judgment particularly having reconsidered and re-appreciated the evidence as well as the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner. Accordingly the finding of the Court below is confirmed. The issue regarding jural relationship having been considered by trial Court while considering the merits of the case question of considering the application filed by tenant under Order VII Rule (d) does not arise. Hence, point number 4 formulated is answered by holding that petitioners have established there exists relationship of landlord and tenant and there was no necessity for considering interlocutory application filed under Order 7 Rule 11 independently. 47. Hence, point number 4 formulated is answered by holding that petitioners have established there exists relationship of landlord and tenant and there was no necessity for considering interlocutory application filed under Order 7 Rule 11 independently. 47. Re:Point No.5: The learned counsel for the respondent tenant has contended that there are no bonafides in the petition and by way of alternative submission he would submit that even if a presumption is to be drawn that presumption is always treatd or termed as rebuttal presumption and said rebuttal presumption has been successfully discharged and the burden having been shifted back to the landlord same having been not discharged and thus contends that eviction petition is liable to be dismissed under Section 27(2)(r). In support of his contention the respondent would contend that he has raised a plea in this regard in paragraph 6 of statement of objection by controverting paragraph 6 of the pleadings raised by the petitioner in their eviction petition. He would contend that Court below had framed point No.3 and answered the said finding against the revision petitioner without considering the aspects of the rebuttal contention. In support of his contention he relies upon the following decision: (i) ILR 2004 Kar 3288 G. Shoukath and others Vs. V. Chandraprakash. (ii) (2004) 3 SCC 589 P. Suryanarayana Vs. K.S. Muddugowramma. (iii) ILR 2003 Kar 3871 Smt. Yashoda Bai Vs. Smt. Lakshmamma. (iv) (2008) 10 SCC 685 There is no dispute with regard to the principles enunciated in the above said judgments and even otherwise by a perusal of Section 27(2)(r) and the explanation thereto it clearly establishes the presumption that can be drawn in favour of a landlord is a rebuttal presumption. Elaborating his submission Sri. Raghunath contends that admittedly there are four other eviction petitions filed against the tenant of adjacent premises in HRC.No.1563/1998, 1564/1998, 1565/1998 and 1566/1998 and the said order of eviction dated 12-3-2007 came to be affirmed by this Court in HRRP Nos. 291/2007, 292/2007, 293/2007 and 298/2007 and also came to be confirmed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Civil Appeal CC 7502-7505/2009 by order dated 10-6-2009 and pursuant to the same the landlord has obtained possession of the adjacent premises namely 4 shops which would suffice the requirement of the landlord. 48. 291/2007, 292/2007, 293/2007 and 298/2007 and also came to be confirmed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Civil Appeal CC 7502-7505/2009 by order dated 10-6-2009 and pursuant to the same the landlord has obtained possession of the adjacent premises namely 4 shops which would suffice the requirement of the landlord. 48. He would also submit that in the present eviction petition which was filed along with the adjacent premises let out to Dr. Jayaprakash and contends that the ejectment suit against Dr. Jayaprakash is still pending and as such even if the claim of the petitioner is accepted he cannot make use of the present schedule premises until and unless the other tenant i.e., Dr. Jayaprakash is also evicted from the petition schedule premises and accordingly he contends that it has come in the evidence that all the walls dividing the shops are load bearing walls. The petition schedule premises and the premises in occupation of Dr. Jayaprakash cannot be made on and removal of wall in between would result in collapse of the building. Per contra Smt. Prabhamani would contend that four shops for which eviction petitions had been filed for the benefit of the sons of the petitioners namely four sons for whom eviction petition were filed and the requirement of the landlord in those four eviction petitions are different as in the instant case and eviction petition in the instant case has been filed for the benefit of first petitioner namely for the use and occupation of the landlord himself to open cold storage for storing mutton, chicken, fish and vegetables and as such these two claims in two petitions are distinct separate and hence cause of action of the two petitions are entirely different. Having considered these contentions and on perusal of the order passed in HRC 1563 and 1565/1998 and also the order passed in Civil Appeal CC No.7502-7505/2009 the following facts emanate. It is no doubt true that presumption is a rebuttable presumption. Having considered these contentions and on perusal of the order passed in HRC 1563 and 1565/1998 and also the order passed in Civil Appeal CC No.7502-7505/2009 the following facts emanate. It is no doubt true that presumption is a rebuttable presumption. The said rebuttable presumption principle when applied to the fact of the present case, it is seen that petitioners have established that earlier four eviction petitions are filed for the bonafide use and occupation of his sons and it does not come in the way of his seeking eviction of the tenant in respect of the petition schedule premises for his use and occupation and the evidence of P.W.1 clearly demonstrates that he requires the petition schedule premises for his own use and occupation. In fact Court below by considering this plea has analysed the evidence on record and has come to a conclusion that petition schedule premises is bonafide required by the petitioner for his own use and occupation and answered the same in favour of the landlord. On reconsideration and reappreciation of the evidence on record I am of the view that said finding neither suffers from any infirmity in law or on facts and accordingly contention raised by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner is rejected. 49. RE: Pont Nos.6 and 7: In view of the discussion made herein above, I am of the considered opinion that the order passed by the court below neither suffers from any legal infirmity nor it requires interference at the hands of this Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. At this juncture the learned counsel for the respondent seeks reasonable time to vacate to hand over vacant possession of the petition schedule premises to the respondent landlord and seeks 12 months’ time to vacate the schedule premises. On the other hand Smt. Prabhamani, learned counsel appearing for the respondent landlord would contend that the 1st petitioner is already aged 75 years and would like to see the fruits of the decree and as such she submits three month’s time may be granted as it would be just and reasonable according to her. Considering the contentions of the parties. I am of the opinion that if six months’ time is granted to the revision petitioner to vacate, it would meet the ends of justice since he can make alternate arrangements for shifting. Considering the contentions of the parties. I am of the opinion that if six months’ time is granted to the revision petitioner to vacate, it would meet the ends of justice since he can make alternate arrangements for shifting. Before parting with the case it would be necessary to place on record the appreciation by this Court with regard to the effective assistance rendered by the learned Advocates appearing for both the parties and in arriving at the decision. Hence, the following order is passed; ORDER (i) The revision petition is dismissed. (ii) Six months time from today is granted to the revision petitioner to quit, vacate and hand over vacant possession of petition schedule premises subject to the revision petitioner filing an affidavit by way of undertaking agreeing to vacate and hand over petition schedule premises to respondents/landlords within 6 (six) months and continue to pay the rents from February 2010 till vacating of the premises. Revision petitioner shall also undertake that he would not underlet, sublet or part with possession of the petition schedule premises during the interregnum period from March 2010 and such undertaking affidavit shall be filed within two weeks from today, failing which time granted will not enure to the benefit of Revision Petitioner and respondents 1 & 2 would be at liberty to execute the Order. (iii) The respondents 1 & 2 are at liberty to file a voucher to withdraw the rent amount in deposit before this Court, and on such voucher being filed registry shall issue cheque in favour of Respondents 1 & 2. (iv) No order as to costs.