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2010 DIGILAW 3052 (MAD)

Bombay Motor House v. C. K. Sundaram(Died)

2010-07-23

G.RAJASURIA

body2010
Judgment :- 1. Animadverting upon the order dated 29.4.2010 passed by the III Additional Subordinate Judge, Coimbatore, in R.C.A.No.74 of 2007, confirming the order dated 21.10.2005 passed by the II Additional District Munsif, Coimbatore, in RCOP No.17 of 2000, this civil revision petition is focussed. 2. Compendiously and concisely the relevant facts absolutely necessary and germane for the disposal of this revision petition would run thus: (a) The deceased C.K.Sundaram filed the RCOP No.17 of 2000 before the II Additional District Munsif, Coimbatore, seeking eviction of the revision petitioners/tenants herein by invoking Section 10(3)(a)(iii) and 10(3)(c)(d) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. Counter was filed by the revision petitioners/tenants herein.Whereupon enquiry was conducted. (b) On the side of the landlords, the P4 therein examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.P1 to P15 were marked. On the side of the tenants, R2 therein examined himself as R.W.1 and marked Exs.R1 to R4 and Ex.C1 was marked as the Court document. (c) Ultimately, the Rent Controller ordered eviction. As against which, appeal was filed by the tenants and the appellate Court slightly modifying the reasons furnished by the Rent Controller for ordering eviction, confirmed the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller on the ground of personal requirement of R2-C.S.Rajesh Kanna for having his dental clinic in the demised premises. 3. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the orders of both the Courts below, the tenants filed this revision on various grounds, the gist and kernal of them would run thus: (i) The Rent Controller as well as the appellate authority failed to take into consideration that the landlords failed to prove their case with reference to the ingredients as contemplated under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act consequent upon the death of the original petitioner in the RCOP, namely, C.K.Sundaram. The entire facts as found detailed and delineated in the petition got changed, but the same was not taken into account by the appellate authority. (ii) The appellate authority, without discussing on the bona fide requirement of the landlords simply accepted their contention and ordered eviction. The entire facts as found detailed and delineated in the petition got changed, but the same was not taken into account by the appellate authority. (ii) The appellate authority, without discussing on the bona fide requirement of the landlords simply accepted their contention and ordered eviction. (iii) The 2rd respondent herein completed his degree of Bachelor of Dental Surgery in the month of April 1996 and he had his clinic in the same building, wherein the demised premises is forming a part, ever since 1992 onwards, so to say, on the back portion of the building in which the demised building is situated. Thereafter he voluntarily left that portion and started his practice elsewhere in a rented premises and he is having lucurative practice there in the tenanted premises. (iv) The requirement of R2 herein to shift his clinic from his tenanted premises to the demised premises herein is not bona fide and it is purely for the purpose of evicting the tenants. (v) In fact, the deceased C.K.Sundaram – the original petitioner in the RCOP required the same demised premises for his residential purpose and that was not established before the Court. (vi) The law applied by the Rent Controller as well as the appellate authority is not proper in the facts and circumstances of this case. (v) The appellate authority, on coming to know that out of the four grounds set out for seeking eviction two grounds were rejected by the lower Court, should have rejected the other two grounds also, on which the Rent Controller based his order of eviction. (vi) The appellate authority did not take into account the hardship that would be caused to the tenants in the event of evicting them, so to say, the relative hardship was not considered by the appellate authority. (vii) On the earlier occasion the same C.K.Sundaram filed the RCOP No.223 of 1990 for evicting the tenants on the ground of personal occupation and that ended in compromise, whereunder he received a huge sum of Rs.3 lakhs as advance and also got the rent enhanced. In such a case, he was not justified in once again filing the fresh RCOP on as many as four grounds. (viii) Absolutely there was no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of the tenants. In such a case, he was not justified in once again filing the fresh RCOP on as many as four grounds. (viii) Absolutely there was no bona fides on the part of the landlords in seeking eviction of the tenants. Accordingly, the revision petitioners/tenants pray for dismissing the RCOP itself after setting aside the orders of both the Courts below. 4. The learned Senior counsel appearing for the tenants placing reliance on the grounds of revision would set forth and put forth his arguments, the warp and woof of them would run thus: (a) The earlier RCOP No.223 of 1990 was filed by C.K.Sundaram being a practising Advocate, on the ground that he wanted the very same demised premises for his personal occupation, so to say, to set up his office and he had also detailed and delineated about the avocation of his other family members. However, without prosecuting further, he got the matter compromised and he was in receipt of a fabulous sum of Rs.3 lakhs and he agreed for the extension of tenancy for the further period of five years on enhanced rent. While so, subsequently, purely with an intention to evict the tenants by hook or by crook, he did choose to file this RCOP No.17 of 2000 on the following four grounds: (i) Eviction on the ground of C.K.sundarams personal occupation for his residential purpose even though the demised premises, as of now, is a non-residential one. (ii) Eviction on the ground of additional accommodation for conducting soap business by the first respondent herein-the wife of C.K.Sundaram. (iii) Eviction on the ground of personal occupation of C.K.Sundarams son C.S.Rajesh Kanna/R2 herein, to set up his dental clinic. (iv) Eviction on the ground of personal occupation of C.K.Sundarams daughter Anitha Kumar-being a Doctor, who has been in America. (b) The Rent Controller rejected the ground Nos.(i) and (iv), but ordered eviction on ground Nos.(ii) and (iii) supra without any basis. (c) The appellate authority rejected the ground No.(ii) also, but confirmed the eviction order based on ground No.(iii) supra. (d) The appellate authority without discussing the facts before him, in the light of the ingredients as contemplated under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act, simply held as though the tenants should not dictate terms and accordingly ordered eviction. (c) The appellate authority rejected the ground No.(ii) also, but confirmed the eviction order based on ground No.(iii) supra. (d) The appellate authority without discussing the facts before him, in the light of the ingredients as contemplated under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act, simply held as though the tenants should not dictate terms and accordingly ordered eviction. (e) In the same building wherein the demised premises is situated, in the rear portion C.K.Sundarams Son C.S.Rajesh Kanna was having his Dental clinic and the other floors, namely, the first and second floors, as of now, are vacant and there is no denial of such facts by the landlords, even then the appellate authority, without application of mind simply ordered eviction on the ground that C.K.Sundarams son C.S.Rajesh Kanna is in bona fide requirement of the demised premises. (f) The requirement of R2 herein is not for doing any commercial business in the demised premises, but only to have his Dental clinic, which is not a commercial one. (g) Even though there is no finding on the part of the Rent Controller and the appellate authority that the grounds which they rejected were fraught with falsities, yet they did not accept these grounds and that would cannote and denote that the landlords did not approach the Court with clean hands and whereupon the Courts below were enjoined to infer that the landlords intention was not bona fide in seeking eviction of any one of the four grounds. Accordingly, the learned counsel prays for dismissal of the RCOP itself after setting aside the orders of the Courts below. Alternis visibus, the learned Senior counsel would pray for remanding the matter to the appellate authority to consider afresh adhering to the points argued by him before this Court. 5. Per contra, by way of torpedoing and pulverising the arguments as set forth and put forth on the side of the revision petitioners/tenants, the learned counsel for the respondents/landlords would submit his arguments, which could tersely and briefly, pithily and precisely be set out thus: (i) Simply because the Courts below rejected some of the grounds put forth by the landlords in the process of seeking eviction that it does not mean that the rest of the grounds also should have been rejected by them. (ii) The requirement of R2 herein for having his clinic in the demised premises cannot be stated that it is not for his business purpose and nowhere it is found stated that the premises should be required only for doing commercial business. What Section 10(3)(a) (iii) of the Act contemplates isonly the term business and setting up the Dental clinic by R2 herein is for his own business, which he has been already doing in his tenanted premises admittedly. (iii) The authorities under the Rent Control Act are not expected to consider the relative hardship while applying Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act, however, the position is different if Sec.10(3)(c) of the Act has to be applied for ordering eviction. (iv) Simply because the earlier RCOP ended in compromise that it does not mean that the present RCOP, which has arisen out of the subsequent arisal of the cause of action should be dismissed. In fact, after the expiry of the five years extended period, as per the compromise earlier entered into between the parties, the present RCOP has been filed by C.K.Sundaram during his life time itself. (v) The Advocate Commissioners report which forms part and parcel of the record would amply make the point clear that contrary to the contention of the tenants side the first and second floors of the demised premises are not vacant and the portions adjacent to the demised premises are under the occupation of the first respondent herein for doing her business in soap. Furthermore, the Commissioners report would also reveal the exact physical features of the entire building including the first and second floors, and those features would speak that the I and II floors are under the occupation of the respondents herein/landlords for their residential purpose. Accordingly, the learned counsel for the respondents/landlords would pray for dismissal of the revision petition. 6. The points for consideration are as under: (i) Whether the requirement of R2 herein for shifting his Dental clinic from his tenanted premises to the demised premises herein could be termed as one not for his business purpose within the meaning of Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act? (ii) Whether the Courts below, on rejection of some of the grounds set out by the landlords should have rejected the other grounds also? (ii) Whether the Courts below, on rejection of some of the grounds set out by the landlords should have rejected the other grounds also? (iii) Whether the Rent Controller as well as the appellate authority failed to apply the ingredients of Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act to the facts and circumstances of this case properly and whether their judgments are fraught with perversity or illegality? 7. Points (i), (ii) and (iii) : All these points are taken together for discussion, as they are interconnected and entwined, interlinked and interwoven with one another. 8. At the out set itself I would like to differentiate and distinguish Sec.10(3)(a)(iii) and Sec.10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act and in this connection, I recollect and call up the following few decisions: (a) In respect of the cases which arise under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act, the following decisions could fruitfully be cited. (i) 1998 MADRAS LAW JOURNAL (SUPP) 18 – RAM NARAIN ARORA V. ASHA RANI AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus: "8. . . . . . Therefore, he submitted relying on the decisions in Meenal Eknath Kshirsagar v. Traders and Agencies, (1996) 5 S.C.C. 344 and Ram Dass v. Ishwar Chander, (1988)3 S.C.C.131, that the view taken by the High Court must be upheld. 9. Sec. 14(1)(e) of the Act read as follows: "14(1)(e) that the premises let for residential purposes are required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him, if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the premises are held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation.(Italics supplied) 10. In making a claim that the suit premises is required bona fide for his own occupation as a residence for himself and other members of his family dependent on him and that he has no other reasonably suitable accommodation is a requirement of law before the court can state whether the landlord requires the premises bona fide for his use and occupation. In doing so, the court must also find out whether the landlord or such other person for whose benefit the premises is required has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation. In doing so, the court must also find out whether the landlord or such other person for whose benefit the premises is required has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation. It cannot be said that the requirement of the landlord is not intermixed with the question of finding out whether he has any other reasonably suitable accommodation. If he has reasonably suitable accommodation, then necessarily it would mean that he does not require the suit premises and his requirement may not be bona fide. In such circumstances, further inquiry would be whether that premises is more suitable than the suit premises. Therefore, the questions raised before the Court would not necessarily depend upon only the pleadings. It could be a good defence that the landlord has other reasonably suitable residential accommodation and thereby defeat the claim of the landlord." (ii) 1995(II) CTC 452 – SANKARANARAYANAN V. PALANISWAMI, certain excerpts from it would run thus: "8. . . . . Section 10(3)(a)(iii) deals with the conditions for obtaining possession of a nonresidential building. The conditions required are: a) The building should be non-residential in character. b) The landlord should be carrying on business on the date of his applying for eviction. c) He should not be occupying any other non-residential building belonging to him for the purpose of his business; and d) The landlords claim is bona fide for his business needs and not based on oblique motives like trying to obtain more rent or to harass the tenant." (b) In respect of Section 10(3)(c) the following decisions could fruitfully be cited: (i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110 – S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus: "10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus: "11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use." 11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use. 12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation. 13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act. 14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters." (ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152 – RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus: "12. . . . . . The appellant has no say in such matters." (ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152 – RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus: "12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256 , it was held thus: "It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act." 21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233 , this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant." 9. As such, a mere reading of those two sets of decisions would amply make the point clear that Courts are enjoined to see that the ingredients as contemplated under those provisions are satisfied depending upon the case concerned before ordering eviction and there could be no quarrel over such a proposition. 10. As such, a mere reading of those two sets of decisions would amply make the point clear that Courts are enjoined to see that the ingredients as contemplated under those provisions are satisfied depending upon the case concerned before ordering eviction and there could be no quarrel over such a proposition. 10. Here, the Courts below ordered eviction by invoking Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act and in such a case the contention on the side of the tenants that the relative hardship was not considered by the Courts below is neither here nor there. If at all the Court is enjoined to apply Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, the question of looking into Section 10(3) (e) and the first proviso appended to it, so to say, the bona fide requirement of the landlord and the relative hardship would arise. 11. Nowhere in the first proviso appended to clause (e) of Section 10(3) of the Act, the hardship of the landlord is contemplated. What is contemplated in the said proviso is the hardship that would be caused to the tenant in the event of ordering eviction and the court has to see whether that hardship will outweigh the benefit, which the landlord as such would be getting on evicting the tenant. On the one hand, the for a concerned under the Act should consider the hardship on the side of the tenant, if eviction is ordered; on the other hand, the courts are not bound to consider the hardship on the side of the landlords. But what the court should consider is the benefit or advantage that the landlord would be getting by evicting the tenant. Ultimately it should be assessed as to which of the two would weigh more and accordingly a decision has to be rendered. 12. If the benefit/advantage would outweigh the hardship, then eviction could be ordered. In other words, if the tenants hardship outweighs the advantage of the landlord then no eviction should be ordered and this should be the proper approach. It may appear at first blush, the distinction sought to be made by me is one between tweedledum and tweedledee; between rock and a hard place; between six of the one and half a dozen of the other but in my opinion, the distinction is one between chalk and cheese. It may appear at first blush, the distinction sought to be made by me is one between tweedledum and tweedledee; between rock and a hard place; between six of the one and half a dozen of the other but in my opinion, the distinction is one between chalk and cheese. From the available evidence, the court should consider what probable benefit that the landlord would be getting by evicting the tenant and it has to be seen what are all the probable hardship to which the tenant would be put into, if he is evicted from the demised premises. As such, hardship of the tenant, vis-a-vis, the benefit/advantage of the landlord should weigh in the mind of the authorities under the Rent Control Act. 13. So far this case is concerned, the Court is not enjoined to consider the relative hardship, but on the other hand, the Court is bound to consider the bona fide requirement of R2 herein. 14. At this juncture, I recollect and call up the maxim Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus False in one thing, false in everything. 15. This proposition has not been accepted by the Honourable Apex Court in India. In catena of decisions, the Honourable Apex Court highlighted that in India that maxim cannot be pressed into service at all. Furthermore, indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the Courts below nowhere in their judgments stated that the landlords approached the Court with false pleas. Not accepting certain pleas of landlords is one thing, but giving a finding that their pleas are fraught with falsities or mala fides is entirely a different thing. As such, in the absence of any finding given by the Courts below that the landlords approached the Court with falsity, it cannot be pleaded by the tenants that the other grounds also should have been rejected, consequent upon the rejection of a few grounds. 16. I also hark back to the maxim Acta exteriora indicant interiora secreta – External acts indicate undisclosed thoughts. 17. It is obviously clear that only by the over acts what is there in the heart of a person could be understood and even a devil cannot understand what is in the heart or mind of a person. 18. Here it has to be seen as to whether the requirement of the landlords is bona fide or not. 19. 17. It is obviously clear that only by the over acts what is there in the heart of a person could be understood and even a devil cannot understand what is in the heart or mind of a person. 18. Here it has to be seen as to whether the requirement of the landlords is bona fide or not. 19. In addition to the judgments cited by me supra under Section 10(3)(a)(iii), the learned counsel for the respondents/landlords also cited the following decision of the Honourable Apex Court: 1998 (III) CTC 679 – SARLA AHUJA V. UNITED INDIA INSURANCE COMPANY LTD., certain excerpts from it would run thus: "14. The crux of the ground envisaged in clause (3) of Section 14(1) of the Act is that the requirement of the landlord for occupation of the tenanted premises must be bona fide. When a landlord asserts that he requires his building for his own occupation, the Rent Controller shall not proceed on the presumption that the requirement is not bona fide. When other conditions of the clause are satisfied and when the landlord shows a prima facie case, it is open to the Rent Controller to draw a presumption that the requirement of the landlord is bona fide. It is often said by courts that it his not for the tenant to dictate terms to the landlord as to how else he can adjust himself without getting possession of the tenanted premises. While deciding the question of bona fides of the requirement of the landlord, it is quite unnecessary to make an endeavour as to how else the landlord could have adjusted himself." 20. Trite the proposition of law is that no Court is expected to proceed on the preconceived notion or on the presumption that the landlord approaches the Court only with lack of bona fides and that the Court should not expect much more than what normally a landlord could place before it in the form of evidence. 21. Trite the proposition of law is that no Court is expected to proceed on the preconceived notion or on the presumption that the landlord approaches the Court only with lack of bona fides and that the Court should not expect much more than what normally a landlord could place before it in the form of evidence. 21. Here, it is beyond controversy that R2 herein is having his dental clinic in a tenanted premises i.e at room No.14, 1st floor, V.G.Center, M.G.Complex, Gandhipuram and the appellate authority appropriately and appositely, correctly and convincingly commented upon the conduct of the tenants plea and stated that it is not for the tenants to dictate terms that the place in which R2 now conducting his clinic is more suitable than the demised premises herein. It is for the landlords to take a decision. 22. At this juncture I recollect and call up the maxim- Rerum suarum quilibet est moderator et arbiter – Everyone is the regulator and disposer of his own property. Accordingly, R2 herein, who is expected to decide his own affairs as well as his own fate of his business, is the best judge for himself to choose whether he should have his practice in the tenanted premises or he should shift his business to his own premises, which is under the occupation of the revision petitioners herein. He in his wisdom could decide and in fact he has decided to shift his business from the tenanted premises to the demised premises herein which cannot be questioned by the tenants on any ground. 23. The perusal of Ex.C1 the Advocate Commissioners report would pellucidly and palpably make the point clear that in the rear portion of the building R1-the wife of C.K.Sundaram is doing her soap business and the Advocate Commissioner, at the time of his visit actually noticed the barrels and other materials for preparation of soap. In fact, on the tenants side there was an attempt to point out that that rear portion is suitable for R2 herein to shift his clinic and that he need not necessarily focus his attention on the demised premises. But here, the factual position would reveal that R1 herein is doing her soap business in the said portion. 24. In fact, on the tenants side there was an attempt to point out that that rear portion is suitable for R2 herein to shift his clinic and that he need not necessarily focus his attention on the demised premises. But here, the factual position would reveal that R1 herein is doing her soap business in the said portion. 24. The appellate authority adverted to the said fact and even went to the extent of pointing out that R1 could confine her business in that portion, over which there is no appeal by the tenants also. 25. Regarding the first and second floors are concerned, the Commissioner meticulously counted even the number of steps constituting the stair case concerned and also detailed and delineated, portrayed and parodied as to what are all he noted in the first and second floors. There is nothing to find fault with that and Ex.C1 would connote and denote that the first and second floors are under the occupation of the landlords for residential purpose and it is not for the tenants, as correctly commented by the appellate Court, to dictate terms to the landlords. 26. No doubt, on the earlier occasion RCOP was filed by the same C.K.Sundaram for occupying the demised premises for setting up his advocate office. Subsequently, there was a compromise and he agreed for five years extension. It is also an admitted fact that only after the expiry of the said five years, the present RCOP was filed. 27. The learned counsel for the landlords would invite the attention of this Court correctly and appropriately to the relevant portions of the RCOP concerned filed by C.K.Sundaram and point out that the earlier RCOP for eviction was mainly on the ground of setting up the petitioners office and incidentally in that earlier RCOP he pointed out about the occupation and avocation of his family members. However, after expiry of the said extended period of five years as per the compromise, the present RCOP has been filed based on the subsequent arisal of the cause of action. Hence, in such a case I would like to agree with the argument as put forth on the side of the learned counsel for the landlords. 28. However, after expiry of the said extended period of five years as per the compromise, the present RCOP has been filed based on the subsequent arisal of the cause of action. Hence, in such a case I would like to agree with the argument as put forth on the side of the learned counsel for the landlords. 28. The learned Senior counsel for the tenants would submit that it is one thing to pray for eviction on a specific ground, but it is entirely a different thing to speak for eviction on various grounds, which are in fact not coherent and consistent also. 29. No doubt, with regard to one and the same demised premises measuring an extent of nearly 600 sq.feet as many as four grounds were found set out for eviction of the tenants in the original RCOP. The question might arise as to how in the event of eviction those four family members would adjust themselves in the demised premises. 30. In my considered opinion it is a matter of concern among the landlords themselves and it is not for the tenant to get himself worried or floored, flummoxed or perplexed, confused or bamboozled of the landlords alleged problem. It is not uncommon on the part of the landlords to seek eviction on various grounds and it is for them to adjust among themselves. Once they get eviction of the tenants either they would partition the demised premised among themselves or adjust themselves in multifarious ways and as such I am of the view that the approach of the landlords cannot be found fault. 31. Considering the pro et contra, so to say, the pros and cons of the matter, I find that R3 herein requires the demised premises for his genuine and bona fide purpose of shifting his dental clinic to the demised premises herein from his tenanted premises. Ultimately, I could see no infirmity or perversity in the order passed by the appellate authority by invoking Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act and accordingly I could see no merit in this revision. 32. Ultimately, I could see no infirmity or perversity in the order passed by the appellate authority by invoking Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act and accordingly I could see no merit in this revision. 32. I am fully aware of the fact that this Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Act is having more revisional powers than exercising its revisional powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India or under Section 115 of the C.P.C. Having that in mind alone I have analysed the factual submissions made on either side and I could see that there is nothing to indicate that the landlords are having any mala fide intention in evicting the tenant. In fact R3 is really in need of the premises to set up his own clinic in a fitting manner. 33. Hence in this view of the matter I would like to dismiss the revision. However, taking into consideration the fact that all along the tenants have been carrying on their business in the demised premises, they would be requiring sufficient time to vacate it. 34. Whereupon, the learned counsel for the tenants would submit that the tenants would require at least a years time to vacate the premises. Per contra the learned counsel for the landlords would submit that already in the litigative process the tenants gained much time and in such a case granting of one more year would cause discomfiture to the landlords. 35. I am of the view that bystriking a balance, six months time from this date could be granted for eviction, as the revision petitioners/tenants, being business people, would take that much time to vacate the demised premises. Accordingly, it is granted, subject to payment of rent regularly by the rents. An affidavit shall be filed to that effect within 15 days from this date. 36. In the result, the civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is dismissed.