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Madras High Court · body

2010 DIGILAW 3098 (MAD)

M. Ravichandran v. R. Ellappan

2010-07-27

G.RAJASURIA

body2010
Judgment : Inveighing the judgment arid decree dated 23.8.2006 passed by the learned VII Judge, Court of Small Causes (Rent Control Appellate Authority) in R.C.A. No. 190 of 2004 modifying the fair and decreetal order dated 29.10.2003 passed by the learned XVI Assistant Judge, Court of Small Causes (Rent Controller) in R.C.O.P.No.1469 of 2000, this civil revision petition is focused. 2. Heard both sides. 3. Compendiously and concisely, the relevant facts absolutely necessary and germane for the disposal of this civil revision petition would run thus: i) The respondent herein filed R.C.O.P.No.1469 of 2000 as against the tenant for evicting him on the following grounds: 1. There is wilful default in paying the rents by the tenant; 2. The premises concerned is used for the purpose other than that for which it was leased; and 3. Additional accommodation by invoking Sections 10(2)(i), 10(2)(b) and 10(3)(c)of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act. Whereupon the revision petitioner herein/tenant filed counter. ii) During enquiry on the side of the petitioner/landlord, the landlord examined himself as P.W.1 and marked Exhibits P-1 to P-14. On the side of the respondent/tenant R.W.1 and R.W.2 were examined and Exhibits Exhibit R-1 to R-27 were marked. Ultimately, the Rent controller dismissed the RCOP as against which appeal was filed by the landlord. The appellate authority after hearing both sides modified the order of the Rent Controller by ordering eviction on the ground of additional accommodation under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. iii) Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the order of the Appellate Authority, the tenant filed, this CRP on various grounds, which could tersely and briefly beset out thus: a) The appellate Court failed to take into consideration the fact that the landlord’s son even before the filing of the RCOP left India and he has been staying in America and studying and he is not doing business in any part of the building, in which the demised premises is forming part. b) Even though it was averred in the RCOP that the landlord’s son wanted to start the PCO business and also business in issuing xerox copies and in job typing yet he failed to establish the same before the Court. b) Even though it was averred in the RCOP that the landlord’s son wanted to start the PCO business and also business in issuing xerox copies and in job typing yet he failed to establish the same before the Court. c) The Rent Controller correctly appreciated the facts and held that the landlord’s son was studying MS Technology in America and in such a case, the requirement on behalf of such a son by the father/landlord will not attract Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. d) The Appellate Authority failed to take into consideration the fact that the landlord’s son is gainfully employed in America after completing his educational course. As such, the revision petitioner prays for setting aside the order of the Appellate Authority and for restoring the order of the Rent Controller in dismissing the R.C.O.P. 4. The learned senior counsel for the revision petitioner reiterating the grounds of revision would develop his arguments, which could tersely and briefly be set out thus: i) The landlord’s son, at no point of time conducted any business but it is the landlord who has been conducting business. In fact, the landlord was earlier a Government servant and hence, he could not because of the conduct rules, carry on any business but he in the name of his son started the PCO. ii) When the landlord’s son even before filing of the RCOP started staying in America and studying and thereafter carrying on with his avocation and earning, the question of such a son of the landlord expanding his business in xerox machine operation and job typing is something which cannot be countenanced. Accordingly, the learned senior counsel prays for setting aside the order of the Appellate Authority by allowing this revision. 5. Whereas the learned counsel for the respondent/landlord by way of countering the arguments as put forth on the side of the tenant, would submit thus: a) There is no hard and fast rule that for the purpose of attracting Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, the land lord’s son should necessarily be physically present in India and do his business for himself. b) The landlord’s son happened to be the franchisee of PCO and the terms and conditions of it would clearly empower such a franchisee to run the PCO by employing persons under him. b) The landlord’s son happened to be the franchisee of PCO and the terms and conditions of it would clearly empower such a franchisee to run the PCO by employing persons under him. Similarly, job typing and issuing of photocopies also could be performed with the help of other employees. c) If a proposition is laid down for the purpose of attracting Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, the person concerned should necessarily be physically present and carrying on business then that would amount to interpreting the aforesaid provision of law differently quite antithetical to the one, which is not contemplated under it. Even for argument sake, if it is taken that the son of the landlord is going to be there in America for a pretty more long time, yet the facts and circumstances of this case would attract Section 10(3) (c) of the Act. d) The learned counsel for the respondent/landlord also by producing at the time of hearing, the copy of the terms and conditions for the installation and maintenance and operation of PCO would invite the attention of this Court to those terms and conditions and submit that the said licence is for unlimited period and in fact the Department of Telecommunications even before BSNL came into the picture, granted such licence and unless it is cancelled, it is deemed that it is still in existence. No more evidence could be produced because the business carried on by the landlord’s son is such that no submission of any accounts is required to be made to any authority. e) The appellate authority properly took into account the facts and circumstances and applied the law properly and ultimately set aside the order of the Rent Controller and allowed the RCOP by ordering eviction, warranting no interference by this Court in revision. Accordingly, he prays for dismissal of the revision. 6. The points for consideration are as to: 1. Whether the Appellate Authority was justified in its findings that the business of the landlord’s son was not seriously challenged by the tenant and that the son of the landlord would return from abroad soon to look after his business? 2. Whether the Appellate Authority was justified in disagreeing with the view taken by the Rent Controller and in ordering eviction? 3. Whether there is any perversity or illegality in the order passed by the Appellate Authority? Point Nos. 2. Whether the Appellate Authority was justified in disagreeing with the view taken by the Rent Controller and in ordering eviction? 3. Whether there is any perversity or illegality in the order passed by the Appellate Authority? Point Nos. 1 to 3: 7. All these points are taken together for discussion as they are inter-linked and interwoven, entwined and interconnected with one another. 8. At the outset itself, I would like to refer to certain decisions, which emerged concerning Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. (i) S.R.Babu v. T.K.Vasudevan and Others, AIR 2001 SC 2881 : (2001) 8 SCC 110 certain except from it would run thus: “10. Sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus: “11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use.” 11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use. 12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation. 13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. 13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act. 14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters.” (ii) Rasi Silks by its Partner K. Arunachalam v. Rasi Silks T.A. Venkatachalam, (2007) 3 MLJ 998 : 2007 (3) CTC 152 an excerpt from it would run thus at p. 1001 of MLJ: “12…..Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 1-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will out-weigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A. Loganatha Naicker v. S.R. Balasundaram Mudaliar, (1974) 2 MLJ 256 , it was held thus: “It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act.” 21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and Others, (1999) 1 MLJ 233 , this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant.” (iii) The learned senior counsel for the revision petitioner also cited the decision of this Court in Kotti Kotti Stores v. A.M. Rangabashyam (2004) 2 MLJ 683 : 2004 4 L.W.725. A mere poring over and perusal of those judgments would highlight and spotlight the fact that for the purpose of attracting Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, there should be immediate bona fide requirement for expanding the business and in connection with that to the extent possible there should be objective evidence and the Court has to necessarily take into account the relative hardship of the tenant and correspondingly the benefit, which the landlord would derive by evicting the tenant. If out of the two, if hardship of the tenant outweighs the benefit, then the RCOP for eviction should be dismissed; on the contrary, if the benefit of the landlord outweighs the hardship, then the RCOP should be allowed. 9. It is found specified in para No.20 of the Appellate Authority’s judgment that the tenant could very well shift his premises else-where but the appellant’s son’s business immediately requires additional space. 10. I would like to point out that such a finding is not based on any objective evidence. The appellate authority also held that the business of the appellant’s son, was not seriously challenged by the tenant. Once again, factually that is not correct, because the parties are fighting at arms length on that point. As per the tenant, even before the filing of the RCOP itself, the landlord’s son left for America; he studied MS Technology and settled in a job there and earning. Once again, factually that is not correct, because the parties are fighting at arms length on that point. As per the tenant, even before the filing of the RCOP itself, the landlord’s son left for America; he studied MS Technology and settled in a job there and earning. However, the appellate authority would simply observe that the expansion of landlord’s son’s business is more important than the tenant continuing his business therein the demised premises and that too ignoring the specific contention of the tenant that it is the landlord who is doing business from day one and at no point of time, the son did any business in the demised premises. 11. In para No.18 of the judgment, the Appellate authority has held that as per the version of the landlord, his son would return from abroad soon and he will look after the business and for that also there is no objective evidence. 12. At the time of hearing the revision, both sides produced the formats relating to PCO. The learned counsel for the landlord produced the photocopy of the document issued by the Department of Telecommunications viz., the copy of the licence containing the terms and conditions for the installation of PCO in the name of landlord’s son Premkumar. However, the learned senior counsel, for the tenant produced the format issued by the BSNL concerning franchisee agreement relating to PCO. There are some difference between the two. However, the learned counsel for the landlord would submit that no time limit is found prescribed in the format issued by the Department of Telecommunications. However, the learned senior counsel for the tenant would submit that three year’s period alone is found stipulated in the licence relating to PCO. Be that as it may, there are certain issues to be gone into as to whether the franchisee of PCO can, by being in America operate the business through his father, for which the learned counsel for the landlord would submit that lex loci, i.e., the law of the land, does not prohibit such Indian citizen being in a foreign country and doing business in PCO through his relative in India and unless there is a legal embargo, the question of taking a view different from the one taken by the Appellate Authority would not arise. 13. 13. However, the learned senior counsel for the tenant would try to view the matter from a different angle. Here the landlord’s son even before filing of the RCOP left for America for his higher studies and there is nothing to indicate that at any point of time, he actively carried on with the business adjacent to the demised premises so as to pray for expansion of his alleged business. 14. At this juncture, I would like to point out that hypothetically the matter should not be decided. No doubt I would even agree with the suggestion of the learned counsel for the landlord that an individual need not physically present throughout the day or throughout the year to look after his business in a particular place and that is quite obvious. But here, the issue is somewhat different. The landlord files an application on the ground that his son is in immediate need of expanding his business and in such a case, in view of the dictum found enunciated in the aforesaid decisions, there should be immediate requirement. It is no doubt the elusive term ‘immediate requirement’ was considered in various decisions and if the requirement would arise in the immediate future, then also it could be taken that there is bona fide requirement attracting Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. But, on the other hand, if the main avocation of the person concerned is entirely different from the business alleged in the petition, then the decision of this Court in Kotti Kotti Stores v. A.M. Rangabashyam (supra) would be attracted. 15. As such, I would not like to decide this case on hypothetical proposition that a person even by being in a foreign country can have his business here and he can also pray for expansion of his business within the meaning of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. But here, the specific plea of the landlord in the RCOP is that his son has commenced business in PCO/STD/ISD in the said shop portion and he requires the demised premises for his immediate expansion of his business. The present RCOP, virtually was filed for the purpose of expanding such business immediately. As such, the tenor of the wordings in the RCOP itself is to the effect that the petitioner’s son was in immediate need of expanding his business. The present RCOP, virtually was filed for the purpose of expanding such business immediately. As such, the tenor of the wordings in the RCOP itself is to the effect that the petitioner’s son was in immediate need of expanding his business. But, the fact remains that even anterior to the filing of the RCOP in the year 2002, the landlord’s son left for America and he has been there only. In fact, the learned counsel for the landlord also during argument invited the attention of this Court to the fact that the most the landlord’s son can be there in America till the end of September 2011 and beyond that he could not stay there. Of course, the landlord would also contend that the PCO licence in the name of his son did not get expired and unless it is cancelled, it is deemed to be in vogue. 16. Whereas the learned senior counsel for the tenant vehemently opposing those versions, which came forth from the side of the landlord would contend that those facts per se would demonstrate and display that there was no evidence on the landlord’s side that his son would return from abroad and do business, by getting his business expanded etc. In the absence of any evidence, the Court cannot indulge in conjectures and surmises and give any finding in that regard. Over and above that, the learned senior counsel for the tenant would stress upon the fact that once it is established before the Court that the landlord’s son’s main avocation or business is not the one as alleged in the petition but something else in America, then that itself is sufficient to hold that the landlord’s son, who is flourishing in America, is not in bona fide requirement of the demised premises of expanding his alleged business. 17. As has been already held by me, this case cannot be decided hypothetically by taking into account the proposition that an Indian can be in a foreign country and get expansion of his business by attracting Section 10(3)(c), of the Act. There should be material evidence to the effect that the landlord’s son is need of the demised premises for his immediate use, which means that within a reasonable time, there should be a chance of the landlord’s son coming to India and doing business effectively. There should be material evidence to the effect that the landlord’s son is need of the demised premises for his immediate use, which means that within a reasonable time, there should be a chance of the landlord’s son coming to India and doing business effectively. As such, in this factual matrix, I am of the considered opinion that the line of the approach of the Appellate authority, is not correct and he should have addressed himself to the factual position properly. 18. Trite the proposition of law is that the Appellate Court is the last Court of facts and it is expected to thoroughly go into the facts. As per Rule 16 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Rules, 1974 the Appellate authority has got the power to take additional evidence also. 19. At this juncture, I would like to refer to the recent decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Speedline Agencies v. T. Stanes and Company Limited (2010) 6 SCC 257 : (2010) 5 MLJ 962. Certain excerpts from it would run thus: “13.1. In Hasmat Ravi v. Raghunath Prasad this Court held (SCC pp 112-14 para 14) “14. ……..If a landlord bona fide requires possession of a premises let for residential purpose for his own use, he can sue and obtain possession. He is equally entitled to obtain possession of the premises let for non-residential purposes if he wants to continue or start his business. If he commences the proceedings for eviction on the ground of personal requirement he must be able to allege and show the requirement on the date of initiation of action in the Court which would be his cause of action. But that is not sufficient. This requirement must continue throughout the progress on the litigation and must exist on the date of decree and when we say decree we mean the decree of the final Court. Any other view would defeat the beneficial provisions of a welfare legislation like the Rent Restriction Act. But that is not sufficient. This requirement must continue throughout the progress on the litigation and must exist on the date of decree and when we say decree we mean the decree of the final Court. Any other view would defeat the beneficial provisions of a welfare legislation like the Rent Restriction Act. If the landlord is able to show his requirement when the action is commenced and the requirement continued till the date of the decree of the trial Court and thereafter during the pendency of the appeal by the tenant if the landlord comes in possession of the premises sufficient to satisfy his requirement, on the view taken by the High Court, the tenant should be able to show that the subsequent events disentitled the plaintiff, on the only ground that here is tenant against whom a decree or order for eviction has been passed and no additional evidence was admissible to take note of subsequent events. When a statutory right of appeal is conferred against the decree or the order and once in exercise of the right of appeal is preferred the decree or order ceases to be final. What the definition of “tenant” excludes from its operation is the person against whom the decree or order for eviction is made and the decree or order has become final in the sense that it is not open to further adjudication by a Court or hierarchy of Courts. An appeal is a continuation of suit. Therefore a tenant against whom a decree for eviction is passed by trial Court does not lose protection if he files the appeal because if appeal is allowed the umbrella of statutory protection shields him. Therefore it is indisputable that the decree or order for eviction referred to in the definition of tenant must mean final decree or final order of eviction. Once an appeal against decree or order of eviction is preferred, the appeal being a continuation of suit, the landlords need must be shown to continue to exist at appellate stage. If the tenant is in a position to show that the need or requirement no more exists because subsequent events, it would be open to him to point out such events and the Court including the appellate Court has to examine, evaluate and adjudicate the same. Otherwise the landlord would derive an unfair advantage. If the tenant is in a position to show that the need or requirement no more exists because subsequent events, it would be open to him to point out such events and the Court including the appellate Court has to examine, evaluate and adjudicate the same. Otherwise the landlord would derive an unfair advantage. An illustration would clarify what we want to convey. A landlord was in a position to show that he needed possession of demised premises on the date of the suit as well as on the date of the decree of the trial Court. When the matter was pending in appeal at the instance of the tenant, the landlord built a house or bungalow which would fully satisfy his requirement. If this subsequent event is taken into consideration, the landlord would have to be non-suited. Can the Court shut its eyes and evict the tenant? Such is neither the spirit nor intendment of Rent Restriction Act which was enacted to fetter the unfettered right of re-entry. Therefore when an action is brought by the landlord under Rent Restriction Act for eviction on the ground of personal requirement, his need must not only be shown to exist at the date of the suit, but must exist on the date of the appellate decree, or the date when a higher Court deals with the matter. During the progress and passage of proceeding from Court to Court if subsequent events occur which if noticed would non-suit the plaintiff, the Court has to examine and evaluate the same and mould the decree accordingly. This position is no more in controversy in view of a decision of this Court in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu where Justice KRISHNA IYER speaking for the Court observed as under: “4. This position is no more in controversy in view of a decision of this Court in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu where Justice KRISHNA IYER speaking for the Court observed as under: “4. ……We affirm the proposition that for making the right of remedy claimed by the party just and meaningful as also legally and factually in accord with the current realities, the Court can, and in many cases must, take cautious cognizance of events and developments subsequent to the institution of the proceeding provided the Rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously obeyed.” ……..Therefore, it is now incontrovertible that where possession is sought for personal requirement it would be correct to say that the requirement pleaded by the landlord must not only exist on the date of the action but must subsist till the final decree or an order for eviction is made. If in the meantime events have cropped up which would show that the landlord’s requirement is wholly satisfied then in that case his action must fail and in such a situation it is incorrect to say that as decree or order for eviction is passed against the tenant he cannot invite the Court to take into consideration subsequent events. He can be precluded from so contending when the decree or order for eviction has become final. In view of the decision in Pasupuleti case the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Taramal case must be taken to have been overruled and it could not be distinguished only on the ground that the definition of “tenant” in the Madhya Pradesh Act is different from the one in Andhra Pradesh Act. Therefore, the High Court was in error in declining to take this subsequent event which was admittedly put forth in the plaint itself into consideration. In the present case, Clause 6 (Legal Proceedings) of the scheme of amalgamation makes it clear that with effect from the effective date i.e. 1.4.2005 all proceedings in which the transferor company was a party be continued, prosecuted and enforced by or against the transferor company as if the scheme had not been made. In view of the above specific clause coupled with other clauses of the scheme and taking note of the fact that the transferor company in its entirety merged with the transferee company, the above decision is not directly applicable to the case on hand”. 25. In view of the above specific clause coupled with other clauses of the scheme and taking note of the fact that the transferor company in its entirety merged with the transferee company, the above decision is not directly applicable to the case on hand”. 25. Particularly in matters governed by the Rent Acts to take into account subsequent events would inflict hardship on the landlords, in a case like the present one. In this context, it was held in SCC para 9 of Joginder Pal v. Nava Kishore Behal that: “9.The rent control legislations are heavily loaded in favour of the tenants treating them as weaker Sections of the society requiring legislative protection against exploitation and unscrupulous devices of greedy landlords. The legislative intent has to be respected by the Courts while interpreting the laws. But it is being uncharitable to legislatures if they are attributed with an intention that they lean only in favour of the tenants and while being fair to the tenants, go to the extent of being unfair to the landlords. The legislature is fair to the tenants and to the landlords-both”. 26. It is pointed out by Mr. Parasaran, learned senior counsel that the tenant, in the present case, is an affluent Company and is not a tenant falling under the category of weaker Sections of tenants of small properties. He further submitted that the principle of taking into consideration subsequent even is to be confined only to appeals on the principle that an appeal is a continuation of the proceedings and the Appellate Court exercises all the powers of the trial Court. (Vide Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul v. Keshwar Lal Chaudhuri FC at p. 13) 27. In the present case, subsequent event of amalgamation of a company took place during the pendency of the revision in the High Court. Though subsequent events which have occurred during the pendency of a revision petition in the High Court or when the matter was pending before this Court, have been taken into consideration by this Court in some cases, the question as to the difference between the exercise of jurisdiction in appeal and revision was not argued or decided in those cases. .28. In a revision under Section 25 of the Act, the Court is exercising restricted jurisdiction and not wide powers of the appellate Court. .28. In a revision under Section 25 of the Act, the Court is exercising restricted jurisdiction and not wide powers of the appellate Court. In Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works v. Rangaswamy Chettiar it was held: “3. …….Therefore, despite the wide language employed in Section 25, the High Court quite obviously should not interfere with findings of fact nearly because it does not agree with the finding of the subordinate authority. The power conferred on the High Court under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act may not be as narrow as the revisional power of the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure but in the words of UNTWALIA, J., Dattonpant Gopalvarao Devakate v. Vithalrao Maruthirao Janagaval; ‘it is not wide enough to make the High Court a second Court of first appeal.” 29. Mr. Parasaran reiterated that the High Court having only the power of limited jurisdiction, and not powers of the appellate Court, the subsequent event which occurred during the pendency of the revision petition is not to be taken into account, the High Court will decide only as to the legality of the order under revision. 30. Coming to the expression “for its own use/occupation”, it has to be construed widely and given wide and liberal meaning. When a company wants to expand its business and amalgamates with another company, this would also be a case of “for its own use”. If a landlord which is a company cannot advance its interests in the business by amalgamating with another company by putting to use its won property, it would be unjust, unfair and unreasonable. 31. Further, the provisions of the Rent Control Act should not be so construed as to frustrate and defeat the legislation. If in a case of landlord requiring the premises for its won use, to amalgamate with another company and expands its business, the rent control legislation may clash with the provisions of the Companies Act. The Companies Act and the Rent Control Act have to be harmoniously interpreted and not to be so interpreted as to result in one Act destroying a right under the other Act. 32. As stated earlier, death of a landlord after passing the order of eviction does not ipso facto destroy the accrued right under the decree. The Companies Act and the Rent Control Act have to be harmoniously interpreted and not to be so interpreted as to result in one Act destroying a right under the other Act. 32. As stated earlier, death of a landlord after passing the order of eviction does not ipso facto destroy the accrued right under the decree. The cases which have taken into account the subsequent even in favour of the tenant are cases where during the pendency of the appeal or revision, the requirement of the landlord required it for its own business and for residential purposes of its employees. That requirement continues to exist also for the transferee Company since the entire business of the transferor company stood transferred to the transferee Company. The requirement of the Company has neither been satisfied nor extinguished. The right to evict has already crystallised into a decree to which the Company after amalgamation has succeeded by involuntary assignment. As the decree for eviction was under stay, the decree could not be executed. Once the stay is vacated or dissolved, the respondent would be entitled to execute the decree. In the present case, the amalgamation order has also preserved the said right. Hence, I am of the view that the landlord should be given opportunity to give additional evidence with regard to the likelihood of his son returning from America in the near future and carrying on with the business effectively and in that connection, the landlord’s son requires the demised premises for expanding his business. Precisely, the landlord in this singularly singular circumstances involved in this case should prove that the cause of action still persists and continues. 19. In this view of the matter, I would like to set aside the order of the Appellate Court and remit the matter back to the Appellate authority with a direction that both sides shall be given an opportunity to give additional evidence on the aforesaid line. 19. In this view of the matter, I would like to set aside the order of the Appellate Court and remit the matter back to the Appellate authority with a direction that both sides shall be given an opportunity to give additional evidence on the aforesaid line. The landlord is at liberty to adduce evidence concerning the fact that still the requirement of the son persists and there is likelihood of his son coming in the near future and expanding his business in the demised premises concerned after evicting the tenant and it is open for the tenant to adduce evidence concerning the fact that there are no such requirement on the part of the landlord’s son to expand his alleged business in the building concerned and that the cause of action does not persist or exist now. 20. The points are decided accordingly. 21. The learned counsel for the landlord echoed the cri de coeur of the landlord to the effect that for a decade or so, he has been fighting the litigation to get the tenant evicted and hence he prays that a time frame may be fixed for disposal. 22. Taking into consideration the pros and cons of the matter, I would like to direct the Appellate Authority to dispose of the RCA after entertaining evidence as observed supra with in a period of two months in an objective manner. 23. With the above direction, this civil revision petition is disposed of. No costs. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petitions are closed. Office is directed to return the original records immediately to the Appellate authority. Petition disposed of.