JAYANT PATEL, J. ( 1 ) RULE. Mrs. Pahwa, learned counsel for respondent No. l Bank which is the main contesting party waives notice. So far as the other respondents are concerned, respondent no. 2/e is served but nobody has appeared and the other respondents have refused. Even otherwise also, main contest is between the petitioners and respondent No. l bank, and in view of the order passed hereinafter, their presence may not be required at this stage. ( 2 ) THE short facts of the case appear to be that as per the petitioners, they have purchased a unit on 11. 09. 2003 which is located in GIDC and the gidc thereafter transferred the property on their name and the regd. sale deed is also executed. It appears that prior thereto the Bank had filed lavad Suit No. 689 of 1998 for the recovery of the amount of rs. 14,60,323/- with accrued interest @ of 19% per annum and in the said suit the prayer was also made against the property in question, since, as per the bank, the same was mortgaged with the bank by the predecessor in title of the petitioners. It appears that in the deposition of guarantor Babubhai ranchodbhai Raiyani, it had come on record that he had already sold the property to one Yusufbhai Bharmal. However, no actions were taken by the plaintiff Bank to implead the said purchaser as party. As per the petitioners, the property is purchased by them from Yusufbhai Bharmal and thereafter GTDC has executed a lease deed by transfer of the property in their favour. It appears that the learned nominee without joining the said purchaser as the party and without making any observations for the so called transaction of sate of the property pending the suit, passed the award on 30th October, 2004 for recovery of the amount of Rs. 14,60,323/- with interest @ of 19% from 01. 04. 1998 till the realization. The learned Nominee also observed that the amount may be realized from the property in question also. 14,60,323/- with interest @ of 19% from 01. 04. 1998 till the realization. The learned Nominee also observed that the amount may be realized from the property in question also. The respondent No. 1 Bank thereafter resorted to the proceedings under the Securitization and reconstruction of Financial Assets and enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as 'the securitization Act') which was subject matter of the petition being S. C. A. No. 23200 of 2005 before this Court and in the said petition ultimately the Bank declared that they shall not resort to the proceedings under the Securitization act for recovery of the amount but shall resort to the proceedings under the gujarat Cooperative Societies Act and the petition came to be disposed of accordingly. ( 3 ) THE petitioner, thereafter, has preferred appeal before the Tribunal. But, as there was delay in preferring the appeal, the application for condonation of delay was also submitted. Together with the said application, the petitioner-applicant also moved an application for leave to prefer appeal as third party. The Tribunal passed the common order on the application of condonation of delay as well as for leave to prefer appeal, whereby both the applications have been rejected. It is under these circumstances present petition before this Court. ( 4 ) HEARD Mr. Shah for the petitioner and Mrs. Pahwa for respondent bank. ( 5 ) AS observed earlier, the main contest is between the petitioner and the respondent Bank and the other parties cannot be said as directly affected by the appeal of the present petitioners filed before the Tribunal at this stage and in any case they have refused to accept the service and one of the respondents was served but he has chosen not to appear. ( 6 ) IT is an admitted position that the appeal No. 899 of 2004 preferred by the predecessor in title of the petitioner viz. Babubhai Ranchodbhat Raiyani who was party to the proceedings before the Nominee, is pending before the Tribunal awaiting final hearing. Therefore, one appeal was already preferred by one of the parties to the proceedings against the very award passed by the learned Nominee before the Tribunal. Petitioner has preferred another appeal separately. Babubhai Ranchodbhat Raiyani who was party to the proceedings before the Nominee, is pending before the Tribunal awaiting final hearing. Therefore, one appeal was already preferred by one of the parties to the proceedings against the very award passed by the learned Nominee before the Tribunal. Petitioner has preferred another appeal separately. ( 7 ) IT appears from the order passed by the Tribunal that the factum of transfer of property by Babubhai ranchodbhai Raiyani had come on record of the learned Nominee prior to the award passed in favour of the respondent No. l bank. The aforesaid can be extracted from the observations of the Tribunal as under: "babubhai Raiyani in Lavad Case during the course of examination was specifically asked pointed questions about this property. Babubhai Raiyani has in his cross-examination stated that he has sold out the property of GIDC plot No. 63 under order of injunction of the learned Nominee but he has not produced the sale deed. He was asked to give the name of the purchaser but he has not disclosed the details about the name of the purchaser and has also not stated when the possession was handed over to the purchaser. After detailed cross-examination by referring the name of Yusufbhai N. Bharmal, he has stated that he does not remember having transferred the plot in GIDC. Therefore, under these circumstances, when the order of injunction was operating against defendant No. 2 babubhai Raiyani, Yusufbhai N. Bharmal or present appellant cannot be stated to be bonafide purchaser in view of Section 52 of the Transfer of Properties Act. " ( 8 ) THE aforesaid clearly goes to show that the factum of property already transferred by Babubhai raiyani, who was one of the parties to the proceedings, was already there on record of the learned Nominee and inspite of the same Yusufbhai N. Bharmal or the petitioner were not impleaded as party to the proceedings. The Tribunal has observed that the appellant cannot be said to be bonafide purchaser in view of Section 52 of the transfer of Properties Act. It is the case of the petitioner that he had no knowledge of any injunction of the learned Nominee. Under these circumstances, without giving any opportunity to the petitioner, it could not be concluded by the Tribunal that whether one is bonafide purchaser or not. It is the case of the petitioner that he had no knowledge of any injunction of the learned Nominee. Under these circumstances, without giving any opportunity to the petitioner, it could not be concluded by the Tribunal that whether one is bonafide purchaser or not. Secondly, even if it is considered that the transfer was in contravention to the injunction issued by the learned nominee, the learned Nominee has power to set aside such sale but there has to be exercised of such powers by the learned Nominee on the said aspect, which appears to have been not undertaken in the award passed by the learned Nominee. Further, as observed earlier, so far as the predecessor is concerned, the aspects may be required to be examined to the extent as to whether one is bonafide purchaser or not and if one is found to be bonafide purchaser, the question of moulding the relief may arise for the consideration before the learned Nominee. The aforesaid are only prima facie observations which go to show that there is an arguable case on merits to be considered by the Tribunal in the proceedings of the appeal. ( 9 ) FURTHER, when the appellant-petitioner was not party to the proceedings before the learned nominee and he was to be directly affected by the award, judicial discretion demanded that the Tribunal ought to have granted leave to prefer appeal because power to grant the leave is essentially to be exercised for taking care of the interest of the affected party and may be that after examination of the matter on merits, such appeal may not be accepted. ( 10 ) SO far as the aspect of condonation of delay is concerned, as such, since the appellant-petitioner was not party to the proceedings, there may not be any strict application of principle of limitation or delay. However, the fact is that the appellant- petitioner came to know about the aforesaid award passed by the Nominee when the notice under the Securitization Act was issued but the same was challenged before this court in the proceedings of SCA. No. 23200 of 2005. It is only after the order passed by this Court on 24. 03. 2006 the appellant - petitioner could prefer the appeal or leave to prefer the appeal before the Tribunal. No. 23200 of 2005. It is only after the order passed by this Court on 24. 03. 2006 the appellant - petitioner could prefer the appeal or leave to prefer the appeal before the Tribunal. If the limitation is considered from the date of the qrder of this Court dated 24. 03. 2006, there may be delay but the contention of the petitioner is that the Advocate communicated about the said order at a later point of time and the appeal is preferred immediately thereafter. Under these circumstances, it appears that when there was a good arguable case on merits to be considered by the tribunal, the Tribunal could have taken the lenient view on the aspect of delay and in any case the Tribunal has also not examined the question as to whether such delay could be compensated by awarding suitable cost to the respondent No. 1 Bank or not. It appears to the Court, considering the facts and circumstances, that the delay can be compensated by awarding suitable cost to the respondent No. l bank. The amount of such compensation, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, would be Rs. 7,500/ -. ( 11 ) THE aforesaid in any case goes to show that the Tribunal has committed error apparent on the face of record in not considering the crucial aspects that there is an arguable case on merits to be considered by the Tribunal in appeal and that the delay could be compensated by awarding suitable cost which has not been undertaken by the tribunal. Hence, the impugned order passed by the Tribunal deserves to be quashed and set aside and is quashed and set aside with the further direction that leave to prefer appeal of the petitioner shall stand granted and the delay shall also stand condoned on condition that the petitioner pays the cost of Rs. 7,500/- (Rupees seven thousand five hundred only) to the respondent No. 1 Bank within a period of two weeks from today and the petitioner shall not transfer or alienate the property until the appeal is finally heard by the Tribunal. The appeal shall be considered by the Tribunal on merits and the Tribunal shall be at the liberty to pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. The appeal shall be considered by the Tribunal on merits and the Tribunal shall be at the liberty to pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. As the another appeal No. 899 of 2004 preferred by babubhai Ranchodbhai Raiyani is pending for a long time, the Tribunal shall hear and decide both the appeals of the petitioner as well as Appeal No. 899 of 2004 as early as possible, preferably within a period of 6 (six)months, from the receipt of the order of this Court. ( 12 ) THE petition is allowed to the aforesaid extent. Rule made absolute accordingly. Rule made absolute.