Judgment :- 1. The petitioners approach this Court with a prayer to call for the records relating to C.C.No.547 of 2009 on the file of the learned Judicial Magistrate No.II, Dindigul and quash the same 2. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would submit that the 1st petitioner is the Branch Manager of the Cholamandalam D.B.S. Finance Limited and he is arrayed as A2 in the case and the 2nd petitioner is the bonafide purchaser of the vehicle from the 1st respondent. The case of prosecution is that one Vimala has availed loan for purchasing of lorry and executed the loan agreement and repayment schedule and further since the said Vimala is default in repayment and sold the vehicle to 3rd party and hence the clause 11 of the said loan agreement, the vehicle has been re-possessed and hence, the defacto complainant/second respondent, who is in possession of the vehicle has given a complaint and on the basis of the said complaint given by him, a case has been registered in crime No.700 of 2009 for the offence under Sections 379 and 406 of I.P.C and final report has been filed before the learned Judicial Magistrate No.II, Dindigul, which was taken on file in C.C.No.547 of 2009. Since it is admittedly a civil matter, the seizure of the subject vehicle was pursuant to the power of re-possession set out in the agreement between the financier and the borrower. No force was employed nor any musclemen were utilized for effecting the re-possession and the lorry has been taken back by the defacto complainant/2nd respondent as per the order of this court. Therefore, continuing to prosecute the petitioner can only be called as gross abuse of legal process and hence, he prayed for allowing of the petition. To substantiate his case, he relied upon various decisions of the Apex Court. 3. The learned Government Advocate (criminal side) would submit one Vimala on 01.10.2007 has obtained loan for a sum of Rs.3,80,000/-for purchasing a lorry bearing Registration No.KA 1B 7778 and the monthly EMI is Rs.15,269/- and since she did not repay the amount, the 1st petitioner repossessed the vehicle and the defacto complainant/2nd respondent purchased the same for a sum of Rs.4,50,000/- whereas the worth of the lorry is Rs.7 lakhs. Thereafter, the petitioners/accused stolen the vehicle from the defacto complainant and sold the same to one Subramani, who is the 2nd petitioner and hence the 2nd respondent, who has purchased the vehicle from Vimala, has filed a private complainant against the petitioners and also filed a petition under Section 451 of Cr.P.C and get back the vehicle from the Court. The 4th and 5th accused had filed a quash petition before this Court in Crl.O.P.No.5578 of 2008, but the same was dismissed on 04.08.2009 and now the petitioners have filed this quash petition once again and hence, he prayed for the dismissal of the petition. 4. Considering the rival submission made by either side, this Court has to consider whether the matter is civil in nature. While considering the order passed in Crl.O.P.No.5578 of 2008, the petition to quash the F.I.R. in crime No.255 of 2008 on the file of the respondent police, but the same was dismissed in view of the submission made by the learned Government Advocate (crl. side) submitted that charge sheet has already been filed before the learned Judicial Magistrate, Dindigul and the same was taken on file in C.C.No.261 of 2009 and nothing survives in this petition. Hence, the dismissal of stating that charge sheet has been filed before the learned Judicial Magistrate concerned will no way affect the present petition. 5. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would submit that since the 1st petitioner has given loan for a sum of Rs.3,80,000/- to one Vimala for purchasing of vehicle and the E.M.I is Rs.15,269/- but the said Vimala was chronic defaulter and the learned counsel for the petitioner has filed the loan agreement. Considering the said loan agreement, Article 11 deals with repossession, termination and company's right. Article 10 deals with events of default. Since, the borrower was default in payment, the 1st petitioner as a manager, he is entitled to repossess the vehicle. 6. At this juncture, it is appropriate to consider whether the act of the petitioner is amounts to an offence under penal laws. Article 10 deals with events of default. Since, the borrower was default in payment, the 1st petitioner as a manager, he is entitled to repossess the vehicle. 6. At this juncture, it is appropriate to consider whether the act of the petitioner is amounts to an offence under penal laws. In K.A.Mathai alias babu and another V. Kora Bibbikutty and another reported in (1996) 7 Supreme Court Cases 212, wherein the Supreme Court has held as follows: “It is more than clear that the hire-purchase agreement with the financier was entered into much prior in time, whereafter the agreement of sale between A-2 and the complainant took place, and which was subject to the rights of the financier. It is even otherwise understandable that A-2 could not have passed a better title of the bus to the complainant than that she had acquired for herself under the hire-purchase agreement. Though we do not have the advantage of reading the hire-purchase agreement, but as normally drawn it would have contained the clause that in the event of the failure to make payment of instalment/s the financier had the right to resume possession of the vehicle. Since the financier’s agreement with A-2 contained that clause of resumption of possession, that has to be read, if not specifically provided in the agreement, as part of the sale agreement between A-2 and the complainant. It is, in these circumstances, the financier took possession of the bus from the complainant with the aid of the appellants. It cannot thus be said that the appellants, in any way, had committed the offence of theft and that too, with the requisite mens rea and requisite dishonest intention. The assertion of rights and obligations, accruing to the appellants under the aforesaid two agreements, wiped out any dishonest pretence in that regard from which it could be inferred that they had done so with a guilty intention. “ 7. In Charanjit Singh Chadha and Others V. Sudhir Mehra (2001) 7 Supreme Court Cases 417, wherein the Apex Court has held as follows: The hire-purchase agreement in law is an executory contract of sale and confers no right in rem on the hirer until the conditions for transfer of the property to him have been fulfilled. Therefore, the repossession of goods as per the term of the agreement may not amount to any criminal offence. Therefore, the repossession of goods as per the term of the agreement may not amount to any criminal offence. The agreement (Annexure P-1) specifically gave authority to the appellants to repossess the vehicle and their agents have been given the right to enter any property or building wherein the motor vehicle was likely to be kept. Under the hire-purchase agreement, the appellants have continued to be the owners of the vehicle and even if the entire allegations against them are taken as true, no offence was made out against them. 8. In Sardar Trilok Singh and Others V. Satya Deo Tripathi reported in 1979 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 987, wherein, the Apex Court has held as follows: We are clearly of the view that it was not a case where any processes ought to have been directed to be issued against any of the accused. On the well-settled principles of law it was a very suitable case where the criminal proceeding ought to have been quashed by the High Court in exercise of its inherent power. The dispute raised by the respondent was purely of a civil nature even assuming the facts stated by him to be substantially correct. Money must have been advanced to him and his partner by the financier on the basis of some terms settled between the parties. Even assuming that the agreement entered on March 29, 1973 was duly filled up and the signature of the complainant was obtained on a blank form, it is to be noticed that the amount of the two monthly instalments admittedly paid by him was to the tune of Rs 3566 exactly at Rs 1783 per month. The complaint does not say as to when these two monthly instalments were paid. In the first information report which he had lodged he had not stated that the third monthly instalment was payable on July 31, 1973. Rather, from the statement in the first information report it appears that the instalment had already become due on July 28, 1973 when the complainant went out of Kanpur according to his case. The question as to what were the terms of the settlement and whether they were duly incorporated in the printed agreement or not were all questions which could be properly and adequately decided in a civil court. The question as to what were the terms of the settlement and whether they were duly incorporated in the printed agreement or not were all questions which could be properly and adequately decided in a civil court. Obtaining signature of a person on blank sheet of papers by itself is not an offence of forgery or the like. It becomes an offence when the paper is fabricated into a document of the kind which attracts the relevant provisions of the Penal Code making it an offence or when such a document is used as a genuine document. Even assuming that the appellants either by themselves or in the company of some others went and seized the truck on July 30, 1973 from the house of the respondent they could and did claim to have done so in exercise of their bona fide right of seizing the truck on the respondent’s failure to pay the third monthly instalment in time. It was, therefore, a bona fide civil dispute which led to the seizure of the truck. On the face of the complaint petition itself the highly exaggerated version given by the respondent, the appellants went to his house with a mob armed with deadly weapons and committed the offence of dacoity in taking away the truck was so very unnatural and untrustworthy that it could take the matter out of the realm of civil dispute. Nobody on the side of the respondent was hurt. Even a scratch was not given to anybody. Considering the same, as per the agreement, the 1st petitioner is entitled to re-possess the vehicle and hence, re-possessed the vehicle. Since the second respondent, who is alleged to be the purchaser from Vimala, has not repaid and discharged the amount, the petitioner is entitled to repossess the vehicle as Manager. 9. Even a scratch was not given to anybody. Considering the same, as per the agreement, the 1st petitioner is entitled to re-possess the vehicle and hence, re-possessed the vehicle. Since the second respondent, who is alleged to be the purchaser from Vimala, has not repaid and discharged the amount, the petitioner is entitled to repossess the vehicle as Manager. 9. It is appropriate to consider the ingredients of Sections 405 and 379 of I.P.C., which read as follows: Sec. 405 of I.P.C:- whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property, dishonestly, misappropriates or convert to his own use that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that property in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract, express or implied, which he has made in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract, express or implied, which he has made touching the discharge of such trust, or wilfully suffers any other person so to do, commits “criminal breach of trust”. Sec.379 of I.P.C - Whoever commits theft shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both. 10. Considering the same, as per the agreement, I am of the view that the offence under Sections 406 and 379 of I.P.C has not been made out. At this juncture, it is appropriate to consider the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for the 2nd respondent in Bhopal Singh V. State and another reported in 1999 CRI.L.J. 2746, is not relevant to the facts of this case. Because, the said case is in respect of the interim custody of the vehicle. In that case, it was decided that the vehicle registered in name of financier and not in name of owner and hence, the interim custody granted in favour of financier, the financier transferring the vehicle in violation of terms of 'supurdaginama' in favour of another and hence, the sale is not valid and the subsequent purchaser is not entitled. There is no quarrel over the proposition, the said petition was not filed for quashing the petition. 11. The learned counsel appearing for the 2nd respondent would also rely upon the decision in C.T.Faisal Vs. There is no quarrel over the proposition, the said petition was not filed for quashing the petition. 11. The learned counsel appearing for the 2nd respondent would also rely upon the decision in C.T.Faisal Vs. Official Liquidator and Another reported in (2007) 2 M.L.J. 50 and submits that the creditor is not the 'owner' of vehicle and the right of the creditor would be extinguished, once the loan amount is discharged. But, admittedly, as per the version of the complaint, the loan amount is not discharges and hence, the above decision is not applicable to the facts of this case. Here, the document filed is only the loan agreement, where a specific Article for re-possess of the vehicle in the event of default payment and the events of default are incorporated in Article 10 of the loan agreement. 12. The learned counsel appearing for the 2nd respondent has also relied upon the decision in Tarun Bhargava V. State of Haryana and another reported in AIR 2003 Punjab and Haryana 98, wherein, it has been held as follows: Forcible repossession without intervention of the Court may involve commission of an offence and what offence has been committed will depend on facts of an individual case. The judgments of the Supreme Court in hire purchase cases holding that in a hire purchase agreement the owner cannot be guilty of theft of his own property will not be applicable to cases where the transaction, in substance, is a loan transaction, as in a loan transaction the ownership will be of the borrower and the principle applicable to a hire purchase agreement will not apply. 13. As already discussed, the Supreme Court has held that it is only a civil in nature and the criminal liability will not be fascinated the petitioner. Considering the decisions relied on by the learned counsel appearing for the 2nd respondent, the same are not relevant to the facts of this case since the petitioner is the Branch Manager, working in a finance company, who lend loan for purchasing of vehicle to the tune of Rs.3,80,000/- to one Vimala, who has entered in to a loan agreement, in which Article 11 deals with the re-possession, termination and company's right and Article 10 deals with events of default. The borrower Vimala has committed default in payment of instalments and she sold the same to the defacto complainant and hence the petitioner being the manager of the said Bank, has no other option as per the Article 10 and 11 of the loan agreement and he is entitled to repossess the vehicle. The second petitioner is only the subsequent bonafide purchaser for value and hence had not committed any offence and no primafacie case has been made out against the second petitioner. 14. In such circumstances, I am of the opinion that no criminal liability would be fascinated upon the petitioners and hence this criminal original petition is liable to be allowed. 15. In fine, the criminal original petition is allowed and the proceedings in C.C.No.547 of 2009 on the file of the learned Judicial Magistrate No.II, Dindigul is hereby quashed against these petitioners. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.