Judgment :- Oral Judgment: S.A. Bobde, J. 1. Rule, returnable forthwith. Heard by consent of the learned Advocate for the parties. 2. The petitioners have challenged the order dated 6-1-2010 passed by the respondent No.1-the State of Maharashtra by which the earlier order postponing the elections to the Agriculture Produce Market Committee, Ralegaon has been cancelled and the elections are directed to be held. The petitioners have also challenged the consequential order dated 8-1-2010 passed by the District Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Yavatmal directing the appointment of an Administrator on the A.P.M.C., Ralegaon. 3. The petitioners are the Agriculture Produce Market Committee, Ralegaon, District Yavatmal; the Vice-Chairman of the said A.P.M.C.; and an agriculturist of village Kinhi. The A.P.M.C., Ralegaon was constituted for a period of five years. The first meeting was held on 26.4.2004 and the term expired on 25-6-2009. Thereafter the Government exercised powers under Section 14(3-A) of the Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1963 and postponed the elections for a period of six months i.e. upto 25-12-2009. The term of the Committee was not extended. 4. Apparently, elections to as many as 25 Agricultural Seva Sahakari Societies at the village level had not been held. The matter was brought to this Court and this Court by an order dated 24-11-2009 held that the elections to the Agricultural Seva Sahakari Societies should be held before the elections to the A.P.M.C. are declared. 5. On 23-12-2009 the respondent No.1 State of Maharashtra issued an order in the name of the Governor of Maharashtra postponing the elections from 26-12-2009 by a period of six months on the following ground; that the Director of Marketing has formed an opinion to that effect, that this Court has passed an order directing that the elections to the Seva Sahakari Societies should be held first and that season of cotton and soyabean have commenced the said crops are coming into market in large quantities and it would not be proper to interrupt the sale and purchase due to the elections. This order was issued under Section 14(3-A) of the Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1963. 6. Thereafter much before the end of the period for which the elections are postponed the State suddenly decided to cancel the earlier order postponing the elections. This was done by the impugned order dated 6-1-2010. This order was issued under Section 14(3-A) of the Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1963. 6. Thereafter much before the end of the period for which the elections are postponed the State suddenly decided to cancel the earlier order postponing the elections. This was done by the impugned order dated 6-1-2010. This order is significantly not issued by or in the name of the Governor of Maharashtra, but is issued by the Joint Secretary, State of Maharashtra simply stating that the postponement of elections made by the earlier order dated 23-12-2009 is cancelled. The order further directs the District Deputy Registrar of Cooperative Societies to supercede the Board of Directors of the A.P.M.C. and appoint an Administrator. In pursuance of this order, the District Deputy Registrar has issued the other impugned communication dated 8-1-2010 referring to the impugned order of the State Government dated 6-1-2010 and directing that the offices of the Directors of the petitioner- A.P.M.C. shall be vacated and directing the appointment of an Administrator till the first meeting of a newly elected committee under Section 15 of the Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1963. Both these communications are challenged in this writ petition. 7. Mr. Paliwal, the learned Advocate for the petitioners primarily submitted that the impugned order dated 6-1-2010 passed by the respondent No.1 under the signature of the Joint Secretary is illegal not having been issued by an order in the name of the Governor of Maharashtra as required by Article 166 of the Constitution of India, even though the earlier order postponing the elections was so issued and authenticated under Article 166 of the Constitution of India. According to the learned Advocate, the respondent No.1, having postponed the elections to the A.P.M.C., Ralegaon by order or in the name of the Governor of Maharashtra, was bound in law to withdraw the same if it wished to do so in a like manner i.e. by order or in the name of the Governor of Maharashtra. Not having done so, the impugned order withdrawing the earlier order by which elections are postponed is contrary to Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, which reads follows :- “21. Not having done so, the impugned order withdrawing the earlier order by which elections are postponed is contrary to Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, which reads follows :- “21. Power to issue, to include power to add to amend, vary or rescind notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws – Where, by any Central Act or Regulations, a power to issue notifications, orders, rules, or bye-laws is conferred, then that power includes a power, exercisable in the like manner and subject to the like sanction and conditions (if any), to add to, amend, vary or rescind any notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws so issued” 8. The learned Advocate General for the State of Maharashtra submitted that the order withdrawing the earlier order must be taken to be in compliance with Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, even though it is not issued by order or in the name of the Governor of Maharashtra; since it has been substantially issued in like manner as required by Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 by following the same procedure that was followed in issuing the earlier order. 9. The learned Advocate General primarily relied on a decision of R. Chitralekha vs. State of Mysore and others, 1964 SC 1823 for the proposition that though the order in question there was defective in form it was open to the State Government to prove by other means that such an order had been validly made and that the provisions of Article 166 of the Constitution of India are only directory and not mandatory in character and, if they are not complied with, it can be established as a question of fact that the impugned order was issued in fact by the State Government or the Governor. Therefore, the learned Advocate General submitted if it can be established that the subsequent order withdrawing the earlier order was issued by substantially following the procedure followed earlier, the subsequent order would be sustainable. It was further submitted that the earlier order postponing the elections in this case was issued by the State Government by order and in the name of the Governor after considering the letter of the Director of Marketing and after referring to various circumstances. 10. This decision was expressed by an order made in the name of the Governor of Maharashtra. 10. This decision was expressed by an order made in the name of the Governor of Maharashtra. According to the learned Advocate General, since the subsequent order dated 6-1-2010 has also been issued by the State Government though with reference to a letter of the District Deputy Registrar dated 22-12-2009, the subsequent order must be taken to have been issued in like manner, particularly since there is no statute which regulates the procedure for issuing such order. The submission in short is that since both orders are based on some report of an officer and are based on decisions taken by the State Government the subsequent order must be taken to have been issued in like manner. 11. Since the main contention of the respondent-State is that on the basis of the Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court cited (Supra) that it is permissible for the State to establish as a question of fact that the impugned order was issued in fact by the State Government or the Governor, it is necessary to examine whether the procedure adopted by the State while issuing the earlier order was complied with while withdrawing the order subsequently, particularly since there is no statute which regulates the procedure. At the outset, is may be observed that it is not sufficient for the State Government to point out that the subsequent order was also issued by the State Government and therefore, Section 21 is complied with. Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 requires the subsequent order to be issued in like manner. The term in “like manner” clearly connotes a similarity in the manner in which the order is issued, not merely a formal similarity in the statement that it is issued in the name of the Governor. 12. Section 21 of the Bombay General Clauses, 1897 imposes an important administrative safe-guard. In fact, it ensures that an order made in the name of Governor of the State after having gone through and vetted by high Officers does not suffer a withdrawal or a negation through some other channel, by-passing those officers who were instrumental in the issuance of the initial order and thereby by-passing the reasons for issuing the first order. In fact, it ensures that an order made in the name of Governor of the State after having gone through and vetted by high Officers does not suffer a withdrawal or a negation through some other channel, by-passing those officers who were instrumental in the issuance of the initial order and thereby by-passing the reasons for issuing the first order. It may not be possible to insist that every officer in the chain be the same when the subsequent order is issued, but at least the officers who gave the main inputs to the Government and on the basis of whose opinion the first order was issued must be the same. It is, therefore, necessary to see whether the sound principle of administration enacted by Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 has been followed in the present case. 13. On a plain reading of two orders i.e. earlier order postponing the election and subsequent order withdrawing the earlier order, Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 has not been complied with. The earlier order postponing the election was passed on the specific recommendations of the Director of Marketing, who is the Head of Department under the Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1963 and is also the Commissioner of Co-operation under the Co-operative Societies Act. That Officer had cited the following reasons for postponing the elections namely; that the elections of the Seva Sahakari Societies, which forms the collegium which elect Directors to the A.P.M.C., had not been held and that this Court had ordered that those elections be held before the A.P.M.C. elections. The Director had also stated that purchase and sale of cotton and soyabean had started and elections would disrupt the purchase and sale of those commodities. The purchase and sale of these commodities are vital to the needs of the community. It is on the basis of the report of the Director of Marketing that the Government came to the decision that the elections to the Marketing Committee should be postponed. Now while withdrawing this decision, it appears that the channel from which the original inputs were obtained by the Government for taking the decision, is completely ignored. It is on the basis of the report of the Director of Marketing that the Government came to the decision that the elections to the Marketing Committee should be postponed. Now while withdrawing this decision, it appears that the channel from which the original inputs were obtained by the Government for taking the decision, is completely ignored. The subsequent order merely makes a reference to the impugned earlier order dated 23-12-2009 postponing the elections and then in a cursory and terse manner states that the earlier order postponing the elections of the A.P.M.C., Ralegaon is hereby cancelled. There is no reference whatsoever to the opinion of the Director of Marketing which was taken in the first instance for postponing the elections, but there is a reference to some letter written by a District Deputy Registrar of Yavatmal without even referring to its contents. The substance of the procedure followed earlier has not been followed; the form in which the earlier order was expressed has not been followed. As stated earlier, the subsequent order has not been issued by order and in the name of Governor. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the term in 'like manner' which refers to both form and substance has not been complied with while issuing the impugned order. 14. Smt. Dangre, the learned Additional Government Pleader for the respondent who supplemented the submission on behalf of learned Advocate General relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ram Bali Rajbhar vs. The State of West Bengal and others, (1975) 4 SCC 47 . In that case, their Lordships held that an order by the State Government to revoke or modify a detention order would be sustainable if it was done in a similar and not identical manner and there was nothing illegal if the State Government referred a second representation to the Advisory Board under Section 14 of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act in conditions analogous to those in which the reference could be made under Section 10 of the Act. Their Lordship observed “in other words, the subsequent reference would result from a necessarily implied power of the Government, to act, so far as possible, in a like manner to the one it has to adopt in confirming or revoking the initial detention order under Section 12 of the Act.” The facts of that case as well as scheme of the law under which it was decided are not similar to the present case. Even otherwise we have come to the conclusion that the Government has not acted as far as possible in a like manner adopted while making the first order. The respondents have not demonstrated that it was not possible to follow substantially the same procedure that was followed when making the initial order, and who asked the Government to cancel the earlier order. Strangely the letter of the District Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies dated 22-12-2009 referred to in the subsequent order is not even addressed to the Government but is a letter written by the District Deputy Registrar to the Director of Marketing stating that it might be appropriate to appoint an Administrator for the petitioner-APMC and soliciting the opinion of the Director of Marketing. Significantly, for reasons best known to it, the Government did not wait for the opinion of the Director of Marketing and acted on the letter written by the District Deputy Registrar to the Director of Marketing, though only a copy of the letter was endorsed to it. 15. It was contended by Shri Ghare, the learned Advocate for the intervenor that the impugned order to supercede the petitioner-APMC has been passed under Section 15-A of the Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1963. According to the learned Advocate, the term of the Committee of the A.P.M.C. was not extended at any point of time under Section 14(3) of the Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1963. Since the term of the Committee had admittedly expired on 25-12-2009, the power to supercede this Committee and appoint an Administrator could have been exercised independently of the issue of postponing of the elections. Therefore, merely because the order withdrawing the postponement of election is liable to be set aside, the order appointing an Administrator does not become vulnerable. 16. Since the term of the Committee had admittedly expired on 25-12-2009, the power to supercede this Committee and appoint an Administrator could have been exercised independently of the issue of postponing of the elections. Therefore, merely because the order withdrawing the postponement of election is liable to be set aside, the order appointing an Administrator does not become vulnerable. 16. We see no merit in this argument since the question is not whether the power to appoint an Administrator can be exercised independently of the order to postpone the elections or cancel such postponement, the question is whether in fact this power has been exercised independently. We find that the impugned order withdrawing the order postponing the elections itself gives a direction to the District Deputy Registrar to take action for appointing an Administrator since the Government has decided to withdraw the order postponing the elections. In quiet obedience, the District Deputy Registrar has referred to the order directing him to appoint an Administrator and complied with it. We thus find that the District Deputy Registrar has acted under dictation in regard to powers which he is supposed to exercise independently. We are thus of the opinion that the impugned order directing an Administrator is vitiated and liable to be set aside on this ground also, vide Purtabpur Co. vs. Cane Commissioner, AIR 1970 SC 1896 . 17. We accordingly set aside the impugned order dated 6-1-2010 passed by the respondent No.1 and subsequent impugned order dated 8-1-2010 passed by the respondent No.2. We make it clear that the authorities are free to take such actions, as may be advised in accordance with law, in regard to holding of elections. Petition allowed with costs. Rule made absolute in above terms. Steno copy of this order be furnished to the parties, as per rules.