Judgment A.N.Jindal, J. 1. Satnam Singh accused-appellant (herein referred as the accused) has preferred an appeal against the judgment dated 01.04.2002, passed by Addl. Sessions Judge, Jalandhar, convicting and sentencing him as under :- Under Section Sentence 307 IPC Rigorous imprisonment for a period of five years and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/- 323 IPC Rigorous imprisonment for a period of six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- 324 and 498-A IPC Rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- each. 2 The complainant Surjit Kaur (herein referred as the complainant) lodged the case against the accused (her own husband) on the allegations that she was working as a lady health visitor and was married to the accused about sixteen years prior to the occurrence. From the marriage, a daughter namely Preet Sandhu was born. They were residing together at Kothi No. 74/2, Garden Colony, Jalandhar. She has levelled allegations that after ten years of the marriage, the accused had started compelling her to bring Rs. 5,00,000/- from her parents in lieu of the plot which she had inherited from her father by way of will . He also compelled her to part with all the golden ornaments which were lying in the locker and transfer her share in the house, half of which was in his name. He was also accusing her for not giving birth to a male child. 3. On 01.03.1997 at about 11:00 a.m., when the complainant was doing her household work, the accused came there and exhorted that she would be killed and after grabbing her entire property, he would contract the second marriage. He inflicted an iron rod blow on her fore-head and a knife blow on the right side of her chest, consequently, bleeding started from the wounds. Thereafter, he gave kick blows on her left shoulder, left wrist, back and other parts of the body. Resultantly, she fell down on the ground. Tulsi Ram and Sukhwinder Singh came at her rescue. Raj Mohan Singh, brother of the complainant, had also arrived at the spot, who took her to civil hospital. The aforesaid statement, recorded by the police Ex.PD on 02.03.1997 by Sub Inspector Bhupinder Singh was sent to the police station on the basis of which FIR Ex. PD/2 was recorded. The accused was arrested. Raj Mohan Singh, brother of the complainant, had also arrived at the spot, who took her to civil hospital. The aforesaid statement, recorded by the police Ex.PD on 02.03.1997 by Sub Inspector Bhupinder Singh was sent to the police station on the basis of which FIR Ex. PD/2 was recorded. The accused was arrested. On completion of investigation, he was challaned. 4. Finding a prima facie case against the accused for the offences under Sections 307, 324, 323, 498-A IPC, he was charged to which he pleaded not guilty and opted to contest. 5. In order to substantiate the charges, the prosecution examined Dr. Ajay Sahni (PW-1), complainant Surjit Kaur (PW-2), Sukhwinder Singh (PW-3), Dalip Singh, Draftsman (PW-4), Dr. Jaswant Singh Bath (PW-5) and Sub Inspector Bhupinder Singh (PW-6). 6. When examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C., the accused denied all the allegations and pleaded his false implication in the case. However, he further pleaded that he was arrested on 01.03.1997 in the morning. The injuries were fabricated by Surjit Kaur in order to put pressure upon him to lease the house. However, no evidence was led in defence. 7. The trial resulted into conviction. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant, while assailing the judgment, has urged that no such incident took place whereas the complainant, being working lady in Health Department, in connivance with the doctors of the hospital, succeeded in getting a false medical report against the accused. Even according to the doctor, Injury No. 3 is not covered by Section 307 IPC. The matrimonial dispute was given the shape of a criminal case in order to put pressure upon him so that he may part with one-half share in the house and the remaining half share is already in her name and she is residing in the said portion. There was no chance of his re-marriage after such a long lapse of time. He has further urged that there is a long unexplained delay in lodging the FIR. Though the complainant may be in some unconscious state then Sukhwinder Singh, who is alleged to be present at the time of occurrence could make a statement to the police for registering the case against him. The aforesaid arguments were opposed by Mr. O.P. Dabla, Deputy Advocate General, Punjab, who was assisted by Mrs. Harpreet Kaur Dhillon, Advocate, for the complainant. 9. Arguments heard. Record perused. 10. The aforesaid arguments were opposed by Mr. O.P. Dabla, Deputy Advocate General, Punjab, who was assisted by Mrs. Harpreet Kaur Dhillon, Advocate, for the complainant. 9. Arguments heard. Record perused. 10. There is no dispute with the fact that the parties were married to each other in the year 1981 and a female child was born out of their wedlock. Even according to the complainant, they lived peacefully for 10 years and thereafter the accused started demanding dowry. The occurrence in the case took place on 01.03.1997 at 11:00 a.m. when she was present in the house and the FIR was recorded on 2.03.1997 at 4:45 p.m. However, the delay in lodging the FIR stands explained as the complainant became unconscious on that day. On the next day, Investigating Officer, after getting fitness certificate of Surjit Kaur from the doctor, recorded her evidence. It has also come on record that the appeal against the dismissal of the divorce petition between both the parties is pending in the High Court. It is also not disputed that the house No. 74/2, Garden Colony, Jalandhar, was in the joint name of accused and the complainant. The motive, as alleged by the complainant besides the demand of dowry and cruelty, is that the accused was compelling her to transfer her share in the aforesaid house, in his name. The trial Court appears to have appreciated the evidence in the right perspective. As such, the story with regard to the causing of injuries by the accused is difficult to disbelieve. 11. After arguing for sometime, learned counsel for the appellant has stressed only that even if the entire evidence is accepted, no offence under Section 307 IPC is made out. Before I proceed to determine this issue, I need to reproduce the statement of Dr.Ajay Sahni (PW-1), who had medico legally examined the complainant on 01.03.1997 at 2:20 p.m. and observed the following injuries on her person :- 1. Incised wound 1cm x 1.5cms x depth not probed in the right hypochondrium region of the abdomen (from the centre of the last rib of the chest extended downwards) guarding of muscles present. It corresponds to the shirt worn by the patient. Injury was advised for surgical specialist opinion. 2. Lacerated wound 2.5cms x 2.5cms on the left frontoparital region of the skull, clotted blood present around the injury, complaining of giddiness. It corresponds to the shirt worn by the patient. Injury was advised for surgical specialist opinion. 2. Lacerated wound 2.5cms x 2.5cms on the left frontoparital region of the skull, clotted blood present around the injury, complaining of giddiness. X-ray was advised for the injury. 3. Complaining of pain in the lower abdomen. No external mark of injury. Deep tenderness present in the supra pubic region. Her LHP was 7.2.1997. It was kept under surgical experts opinion. 4. Bluish contusion 3" x 1-= " on the top of the left shoulder. 5. Bluish red contusion 3" x 2" on the centre of the left forearm. 6. Red contusion 2" x 1" on the back and lower part of the left chest. 12. The doctor further observed that at the time of her medical examination, the complainant was conscious and complaining of giddiness. He kept injuries No. 1 and 3 subject to surgical opinion and injury No. 2 was subject to x-ray examination whereas injuries No. 4 to 6 were declared as simple. The weapon, used for injury No. 1, was observed as sharp and for remaining as blunt. Probable duration of injuries No. 1 and 3 was within six hours and rest of the injuries was within 48 hours. He proved the MLR Ex.PA and pictorial diagram, showing the seat of injuries Ex. PA/1. However, on receipt of the surgical opinion from Dr. J.S. Bath, Injury No. 1 was declared as simple in nature whereas injury No. 3 was declared dangerous to life. The operation notes, as recorded by Dr.J.S.Bath, on injury No. 3 are as under :- "The patient had distention abdomen with tenderness and guarding in lower abdomen, tachycardia and fever. Ultra sound abdomen revealed minimum free fluid in the pelvis. Patient kept on intravenous fluid, riles tube and indwelling catheter till 07.03.1997. Above findings are suggestive of haemoperitoneum. 13. Dr. Ajay Sahni (PW-1), while elaborating his opinion with regard to injury No. 3 stated that injury could be dangerous to life. The relevant part of his statement reads as under :- "I was pre-medical before joining the medical education. I have not studied Shakespere and Milton in English. It is correct that auxiliary verb could denotes uncertainty about effect. When I used the word could, that means that I am not definite about the fact. The relevant part of his statement reads as under :- "I was pre-medical before joining the medical education. I have not studied Shakespere and Milton in English. It is correct that auxiliary verb could denotes uncertainty about effect. When I used the word could, that means that I am not definite about the fact. It is correct that when I gave my opinion regarding injury No. 3, I used the word could. Q : When you gave your opinion regarding injury No. 3 and its nature, you have used the word could meaning thereby that you were not definite about the nature of that injury, am I correct ? Ans : As per the report of surgical specialists opinion, since the report was in the past and the patient came out of that shock so the word could was used by me. Q : Whether you were definite about the nature of injury No. 3 at the time of tendering opinion ? Ans: Yes. I was definite about the nature of injury No. 3 at the time of tendering opinion. Q : Why did not you give the opinion, that injury No. 3 was dangerous to life ? Ans : I did not give opinion that the injury No. 3 was dangerous to life because that injury did not prove to be dangerous to the injured. Q : Whether the opinion now given by me, that injury No. 3 was not dangerous to life, is correct ? Ans : Yes. The opinion given by me today in the Court is correct. 14. The crux of the statement made by Dr. Ajay Sahni (PW-1) is that Injury No. 3 was not dangerous to life and it could be dangerous to life. It may further be observed that any injury which is not properly treated could attract any septicaemia or infection and prove fatal, secondly at no such of time, the condition of the injured during the period of her treatment, never deteriorated and continued improving. No operation was conducted but she was treated conservatively and the said treatment proved to be successful. The surgical notes do not reveal any tear to any sensitive part of the body just like peritoneum, liver or kidney. No operation was conducted but she was treated conservatively and the said treatment proved to be successful. The surgical notes do not reveal any tear to any sensitive part of the body just like peritoneum, liver or kidney. The accused is stated to have caused injuries to the complainant for not transferring her share in the property in his name from where it could be found that he could get nothing after killing her. As such, on her murder, the property was not to devolve upon him. Again it is pertinent to mention here that the complainant is stated to have suffered injuries at the hands of the accused by one rod blow, one knife blow, fist blows and leg or kick blows which indicate that he never intended to kill her but may be having some ill will or annoyance on account of the continuous strained relations between them that he caused injuries but he never wanted to take her life. Neither from the nature of the injury it appears that he had any knowledge to cause such injury which was sufficient to cause death nor from the circumstances it is established that he had requisite intention to commit such offence. Had he any such intention then he would have repeated the knife blows and taken her life, therefore, in such circumstances, no offence under Section 307 IPC is made out. 15. It is sufficient to justify the conviction under Section 307 IPC if such act is done with requisite intent. It is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. Although, the nature of injury actually caused, may often give considerable assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused, such intention may also be deduced from other circumstances and may even, in some cases, be ascertained without any reference at all to actual wounds. The Section makes a distinction between the act of the accused and its result, if any. The Court has to see whether the Act, irrespective of its result was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the Section. An attempt in order to be criminal need not be the penultimate act. It is sufficient in law, if an intent is present coupled with some overt act in execution thereof. The Court has to see whether the Act, irrespective of its result was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the Section. An attempt in order to be criminal need not be the penultimate act. It is sufficient in law, if an intent is present coupled with some overt act in execution thereof. Such observations were made by the Apex Court in case Lachman Singh v. state of Haryana, 2006(3) RCR (Criminal) 904. But in the instant case, even the intention of the accused, as discussed above, is not proved to be such that he wanted to take life of the complainant and the knowledge is a fact to be objectively proved by the doctor. The doctor has nowhere stated that injury, as received by the complainant, was dangerous or imminently dangerous to life. The words dangerous to life are equivalent to the endangering life and such acts are still distinctive from the words "dangerous to life" as used in Clause VIIIth of Section 320 IPC which is punishable under Section 326 IPC. The distinction between the words dangerous to life and endangering life came to be determined by a Division Bench of this Court in Atma Singh v. State of Punjab, 1980 Crl.L.J. 1226 it was held as under :- "The expression `dangerous is an adjective and the expression endanger is verb. An injury which can put life to in immediate danger of death would be an injury which can be termed as dangerous to life and, therefore, when a doctor describes an injury as dangerous to life he means an injury which endangers life in terms of Clause (8) of Section 320 IPC, for, it describes the injury dangerous to life only for the purpose of the said clause. He instead of using the expression that this was an injury which `endangered life described it that the injury was dangerous to life, meaning both the times the same thing." 16. Thus, while examining the case from any other angle, the doctor has nowhere opined that injury was dangerous to life or sufficient to cause death but he has stated that it could be dangerous to life and he has further explained that he was not definite if injury was dangerous to life. Thus, while examining the case from any other angle, the doctor has nowhere opined that injury was dangerous to life or sufficient to cause death but he has stated that it could be dangerous to life and he has further explained that he was not definite if injury was dangerous to life. Keeping in view the opinion made by the doctor, injury No. 3 on the person of the complainant cannot be termed as dangerous to life, falling within the purview of Section 307 IPC. However, such injury having been caused on the vital part of the body caused with a blunt weapon (kick blow) and the injured could not perform the daily pursuits for more than 20 days, the injury could be termed as grievous in nature. 17. No other argument has been raised. 18. Resultantly, this appeal is partly accepted; impugned judgment qua the offence under Section 307 IPC is set aside and the conviction, as awarded in aforesaid Section as such, is converted to Section 325 IPC. 19. While arguing on the quantum of sentence, it has been urged that the accused has already undergone one year and five months out of substantive sentence of five years and the occurrence took place way back on 01.03.1997, therefore, some lenient view could be taken. 20. Resultantly, while upholding the conviction of the accused under Section 325 IPC, the same is reduced to one year and five months without any alteration in the sentence of fine. Fine awarded under Section 307 IPC will be treated as fine under Section 325 IPC. The conviction and sentence qua other offences shall remain intact. It is further made clear that all the sentences shall run concurrently.