These are two Special Appeals i.e. 387 of 2010 and 388 of 2010 which were shown in the Computer List for being heard and thus in presence of counsel for both sides, as requested by them, both appeals were taken up for hearing. 2. Sri Neeraj Upadhyay, learned Advocate and Sri K. R. Sirohi, learned Senior Advo­cate appeared for the appellant in both ap­peals and Sri Yashwant Singh, learned Ad­vocate appeared for the respondent side in both matters. 3. It is to be mentioned here that Sri Yashwant Singh, learned Advocate is the counsel in both writ petitions i.e. writ peti­tion Nos. 7212 of 2010 and 10196 of 2010 against which present appeals arise. 4. Before we proceed to deal with the merit in these appeals we are to observe that large number of writ petitions cognizable by the learned single Judge and against various other orders, the matter being entertainable by the Division Bench in the Special Appeal forum and few Special Appeals against the final de­cision of the learned single Judge being pend­ing before the concerned Division Bench were earlier asked to be clubbed with these two Special Appeals on the premises that same questions are involved in all the mat­ters whereas it is not so, for the simple rea­son that these two appeals are against just an interim order passed by the learned single Judge in two writ petitions referred above in which reliefs sought are not as the impres­sion was gathered by the other Bench (Divi­sion Bench) referring/clubbing all the mat­ters by the order dated 25.3.2010 in writ pe­tition No. 6331 of 2010. 5. This being the simple situation instead of going into the merits of each and every writ petition and other cases individually, cog­nizable by the learned single Judge or other­wise by the Division Bench we by the earlier detailed order dated 20.8.2010 directed other matters to be detached, by noticing the sub­mission and anxiety of all the advocates present and thus these two Special Appeals are to be heard and decided. 6. Our directions in this respect after no­ticing the submission of learned advocates is contained in the order dated 20.8.2010 passed in Special Appeal No. 387 of 2010. 7. 6. Our directions in this respect after no­ticing the submission of learned advocates is contained in the order dated 20.8.2010 passed in Special Appeal No. 387 of 2010. 7. We are to add here that a reference is required to be made to the larger Bench only where there is a conflict of opinion in Divi­sion Bench judgments and the consideration is required by a larger Bench consisting of more Judges as judicial discipline obliges learned single Judge or a Division Bench to follow a Bench decision or a decision of the Bench of larger quorum. There has to be con­flict and then expression of disagreement by the Bench having the same quorum and then situation of reference may arise. 8. The situation not being so, as is clear from all the orders making reference to a larger Bench (three Hon'ble Judges) that ap­pears to be not needed. 9. Reference in this respect can be given to a recent decision given in the case of Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community and an­other v. State of Maharashtra and another re­ported in AIR 2005 SC 752 , the observation in this respect which is relevant is to be quoted "Since no reference made by any Bench of any strength at any time for hearing by a larger Bench and doubting the correctness of the Constitution Bench decision in the case of Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb's case held that order dated 18.3.1994 by two-Judge Bench could not be construed as an order of reference - Since at no point of time the Chief Justice of India directed the matter to be placed for hearing before a Constitution Bench or a Bench of seven-Judges -Hence held that matter should be placed for hearing before a Constitution Bench (of five Judges) and not before a larger Bench of seven Judges." 10. The similar view was expressed by the Apex Court in the case of Pradip Chandra Parija and others v. Pramod Chandra Patnaik and others reported in AIR 2002 SC 296 of which reference has been given in the case of Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community (supra). 11. The observation in this respect as is contained in judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community (supra) is hereby quoted: "Pradip Chandra Parija (supra) clinches the issue. 11. The observation in this respect as is contained in judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community (supra) is hereby quoted: "Pradip Chandra Parija (supra) clinches the issue. The facts in the case were that a Bench of two learned Judges expressed dissent with another judgment of three learned Judges and directed the matter to be placed before a larger Bench of five Judges. The Constitution Bench considered the rule of 'judicial discipline and propriety' as also the theory of precedents and held that it is only a Bench of the same quo­rum which can question the correctness of the decision by another Bench of the co-ordi­nate strength in which case the matter may be placed for consideration by a Bench of larger quorum. In other words, a Bench of lesser quorum cannot express disagreement with, or question the correctness of, the view taken by a Bench of a larger quorum. A view of the law taken by a Bench of three Judges is bind­ing on a Bench of two Judges and in case the Bench of two Judges feels not inclined to fol­low the earlier three-Judge Bench decision then it is not proper for it to express such dis­agreement; it can only request the Chief Jus­tice for the matter being placed for hearing before a three-Judge Bench which may agree or disagree with the view of the law taken earlier by the three-Judge Bench. As already noted this view has been followed and reiter­ated by at least three subsequent Constitution Benches referred to hereinabove." 12. There are certain more observations in the judgment of the Apex Court which are to be quoted here: "(5) In the interest of certainty, a decision ought not to be overruled merely because the Law Lords consider that it was wrongly de­cided. There must be some additional reasons to justify such a step (the 'precedent merely wrong' criterion) (Knuller v. DPP, 1973 AC 435, 455). There must be some additional reasons to justify such a step (the 'precedent merely wrong' criterion) (Knuller v. DPP, 1973 AC 435, 455). "(7) A decision ought to be overruled if in relation to some broad issue or principle it is not considered just or in keeping with con­temporary social conditions or modern con­ceptions of public policy (the 'unjust or out­moded' criterion) (Jones case (supra)); Conway v. Rimmer, ((1968) AC 910, 938)." "(2) A Bench of lesser quorum cannot doubt the correctness of the view of the law taken by a Bench of larger quorum. In case of doubt all that the Bench of lesser quorum can do is to invite the attention of the Chief Justice and request for the matter being placed for hear­ing before a Bench of larger quorum than the Bench whose decision has come up for con­sideration. It will be open only for a Bench of co-equal strength to express an opinion doubt­ing the correctness of the view taken by the earlier Bench of co-equal strength, whereupon the matter may be placed for hearing before a Bench consisting of a quorum larger than the one which pronounced the decision laying down the law the correctness of which is doubted." 13. Another observation by the Apex Court in the case of Kerla State Science & Technol­ogy Museum v. Rambal Company and others reported in 2006 All. CJ 1889: (2006 AIR SCW 4008) can be referred at this place to help our approach. "8. We find that before learned single Judge there was practically no dispute that there was breach of conditions of contract. In fact learned single Judge noted the position as follows: "The question of termination of contract with effect from 25.11.1989 is not disputed. Petitioner did not challenge the termination or­der. As per the terms of the contract, if it is re-tendered, the difference in the retender amount and the loss suffered have to be paid by the petitioner apart from the liquid dam­ages." "10. Considering the rival submissions learned single Judge held that in view of the nature of contention the matter should be heard by a Division Bench." "11. Unfortunately the Division Bench did not consider the contentions which were raised before the learned single Judge. It also did not record any positive finding as to whether the document relied upon by the appellant clearly established admission of a breach of contract. Unfortunately the Division Bench did not consider the contentions which were raised before the learned single Judge. It also did not record any positive finding as to whether the document relied upon by the appellant clearly established admission of a breach of contract. The portion of the order of learned single Judge, quoted above, suggests that there was no dispute when read in the context of the letter dated 14.2.1990." "12. As rightly contended by learned coun­sel for the appellant the basic issue related to the question whether the demand was barred by limitation. As noted above the Division Bench of the High Court did not examine this question." 14. In this connection various observations made in a a recent decision given by the Apex Court in the case of Official Liquidator v. Dayanand reported in (2008) 10 SCC 1 : (AIR 2008 SC (Supp) 1177) can be quoted here : "In State of Punjab v. Devans Modern Breweries Ltd. [ 2004 (11) SCC 26 ], the Court reiterated that if a co-ordinate Bench does not agree with the principles of law enunciated by another Bench, the matter has to be referred to a larger Bench. In Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community v. State of Maharashtra [ 2005 (2) SCC 673 ]: ( AIR 2005 SC 752 ) the Constitution Bench interpreted Article 141, re­ferred to various earlier judgments including Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. V. Mumbai Shramik Sangha (supra) (sic), Pradip Chandra Parija and others v. Pramod Chandra Patnaik and others (supra) and held that "the law laid down in a decision delivered by a Bench of larger strength is binding on any subsequent Bench of lesser or co-equal strength and it would be inappropriate if a Division Bench of two Judges starts overruling the decisions of Division Benches of three Judges. The Court further held that such a practice would be det­rimental not only to the rule of discipline and the doctrine of binding precedents but it will also lead to inconsistency in decisions on the point of law; consistency and certainty in the development of law and its contemporary sta­tus - both would be immediate casualty" In relation to the issue of hearing, grant of stay and then reference to the Larger Bench, by treating the matter like a Public Interest Litigation (General Interest) and thus refer­ence to the Larger Bench although there is no final decision in the matter either by the learned single Judge or by the learned Division Bench and there is no note of any conflict in any decisions, the matter came to be considered by a Full Bench of our own court in a recent matter i.e. Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 34179 of 2010 : (Reported in 2010 (4) ESC 2933 (All)) Smt. Maya Dixit and others v. State of U. P. and others. 15. The observation made by the Full Bench of this Court which is of guidance and to sup­port our view is to be quoted here: "Thus, this would make it clear that even if a Bench was hearing a matter assigned to it as per the assignment and if in the course of hear­ing it proceeds to consider reliefs not sought in the petition, but which will fall within the PIL jurisdiction, then the Bench is bound to direct the Registry to place the matter before the learned Chief Justice for appropriate di­rections or before the appropriate P.I.L Bench. In other words, if that Bench is not assigned PIL work, it cannot proceed to hear the mat­ter. 19. Insofar as the 3rd question is concerned it is now settled law that an interim order does not decide the issue in the petition finally. In­terim orders are normally based on a prima facie finding. No ratio decidendi can be culled out from an interim order. An issue of a con­flict between two judgments of co-ordinate Benches can only arise if there is a conflict in the ratio decidendi of judgments of the co­ordinate Benches. In­terim orders are normally based on a prima facie finding. No ratio decidendi can be culled out from an interim order. An issue of a con­flict between two judgments of co-ordinate Benches can only arise if there is a conflict in the ratio decidendi of judgments of the co­ordinate Benches. If a learned Bench has passed an interim order which, according to the party, could not have been passed, the rem­edy for such a party would be to take recourse to the remedy of law which it may have. The issue whether the same has been settled by a Bench of the Court sitting at Lucknow or the principal seat at Allahabad is immaterial. A learned Bench can only refer a matter if it finds that there is a conflict between the ratio of judgments by two Benches of coordinate ju­risdiction or if it Finds that it cannot agree with the view taken by another Coordinate Bench. In our opinion, therefore, the third question as raised also could not have been referred. (Emphasis supplied by us) 20. We are surprised at the stage at which the reference was made. Normally a reference is made after hearing the parties on merits and the learned Bench arrived at a conclusion that it does not agree with the view taken by an­other co-ordinate Bench, which has earlier de­cided the law. In this case, a strange proce­dure has been followed. Interim relief was first granted, the matter was not finally heard, and without considering the merits of the matter, a reference has been made. In our opinion, this was a strange procedure. We express, therefore, our anguish at the manner in which this reference is made." (Emphasis supplied by us). 16. The decision of the Full Bench of our own court, referred to above, was brought to the notice of the Apex Court although in a different context in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil)…..of 2010CC 14694-14695 of 2010. The Apex Court approved the decision of the Full Bench given in the case of (Smt. Maya Dixit). 17. 16. The decision of the Full Bench of our own court, referred to above, was brought to the notice of the Apex Court although in a different context in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil)…..of 2010CC 14694-14695 of 2010. The Apex Court approved the decision of the Full Bench given in the case of (Smt. Maya Dixit). 17. The observation made by the Apex Court in the case of State of U. P. and others v. Neeraj Chaubey : (2010 AIR SCW 5851 : 2010 (6) ALJ 674) and others is hereby quoted below: "In this regard, it is brought to our notice that the Full Bench decision of the same High Court of Allahabad, while answering the ref­erence made to a larger bench in W.P. No. 34197 of 2010 (Smt. Maya Dixit and others v. State of U. P. and others) decided on 13.9.2010, dealt with the issues involved herein." "In view of the decision of the Full Bench of the High Court of Allahabad, which we hold is in accordance with law and in con­sonance with the rules and retirement." 18. It is with this approach, when on 20.8.2010 Learned Advocates of both side requested to detach other cases, by giving needed direction, we are now to deal with these two appeals. 19. Two orders of learned single Judge passed in writ petition No. 7212 of 2010 on 24.2.2010 and dated 26.2.2010 passed in writ petition No. 10196 of 2010 which are interim orders giving some positive mandate are under challenge in these appeals. 20. Pursuant to the reference made by Hon'ble the Acting Chief Justice when first these appeals were heard on 16.4.2010 ar­guments were advanced about powers of Hon'ble Chief Justice and about the grant of interim order and thus after considering the matter, interim stay was granted to the orders of learned single Judge. 21. As these appeals are to be finally de­cided we are again to notice the reliefs so claimed in both the writ petitions in which orders were passed which will facilitate us in forming the opinion. 22. Besides noticing the relief so claimed, the submission as made by the learned Ad­vocate for the High Court on 16.4.2010 and also on 27.8.2010 and at the same time of Sri Singh, counsel for the writ petitioners will also be useful to be noted. 23. 22. Besides noticing the relief so claimed, the submission as made by the learned Ad­vocate for the High Court on 16.4.2010 and also on 27.8.2010 and at the same time of Sri Singh, counsel for the writ petitioners will also be useful to be noted. 23. Relief claimed in writ petition No. 7212 of 2010 is hereby quoted for conve­nience: 1. Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of Mandamus commanding the respondents to permit the petitioner for par­ticipation in interview for direct recruitment of car drivers. 2. Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of Mandamus commanding the respon­dents, if the petitioner found eligible, appoint­ment letter of direct recruitment of car driv­ers be issued. 3. Issue any other suitable writ, order or direction as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case. 4. Award cost of this petition in favour of the petitioner." 24. Relief claimed in writ petition No. 10196 of 2010 is hereby quoted for conve­nience: "i) issue, a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to consider the candidature of the petitioner on the post of the peon for which application has been submitted on dated 11.1.2010 and earlier application dated 11.1.2007 and 03.01.2006 was duly recommended by the Hon'ble Justice R.P. Mishra and Justice C.P Mishra. Ii) Issue, a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents if the petitioner is suitable and fit for appoint­ment on the post of the class IV and appoint­ment letter be issued to him. Iii) To issue any other order or direction which the Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case; iv) To award the cost of the petition to the petitioners." 25. The statement made by the learned counsel for the High Court on 16.4.2010 is noted below: "Sri S.P Gupta, learned Senior Advocate during course of argument made statement that the High Court is ready to consider the claim of the petitioner as and when occasion will arise and thus writ petition needs to be dismissed as infructuous with the aforesaid direction." 26. Statement made by the learned coun­sel who appeared for the High Court on 27.8.2010 is quoted hereunder: "During the course of argument, apart from arguing the matter on the merits about various observations of the learned single Judges, Sri Upadhyay again reiterated the earlier submis­sion so advanced by Sri S. P. Gupta, learned Senior Advocate that the High Court is ready to consider the claim of the petitioner as and when occasion will arise and thus irrespective of various issues which are said to be involved, writ petition be disposed of in the light of the aforesaid stands/statement." 27. Statement made by Sri Yashwant Singh, learned Advocate who appears for the peti­tioner as noted on 27.8.2010 is quoted here­under: "Sri Yashwant Singh, learned Advocate be­ing very fair to the Court, to the appellant side and to his client submits that if that consider­ation is directed and there is statement in this respect from the appellant side then practi­cally relief so claimed in the writ petition stands received and thus the matter may be dealt with accordingly." 28. In the light of the reliefs so claimed in both of the writ petitions and in view of the statement so made by the learned counsel for the High Court on 16.4.2010 and 27.8.2010 and concession made from petitioner's side any consideration on merits may not be re­quired and the appeals/writ petitions are to be disposed of in the light of concession so made. 29. We are to just observe that in the light of eight grounds so taken by the writ peti­tioner and two reliefs claimed in the writ pe­tition No. 7212 of 2010 and similarly in the light of the four grounds and the two reliefs claimed in writ petition No. 10196 of 2010 the scope and powers of the Hon'ble Chief Justice was not required to be addressed. 30. We have already quoted the reliefs of both the writ petitions. Although the grounds so taken in both the writ petitions we have not quoted but that we have perused and that: may be a matter of perusal. 31. We are to straightway observe that any argument or evidence beyond the pleadings may not be admissible and in fact in variance to the pleadings and specially the relief so claimed the direction in no way can be justi­fied. 31. We are to straightway observe that any argument or evidence beyond the pleadings may not be admissible and in fact in variance to the pleadings and specially the relief so claimed the direction in no way can be justi­fied. Even if a vague and uncleared pleadings may be available in a particular manner but if on that shaken foundation if no relief is claimed then the court is not there to get a substitute traced for the petitioner. 32. Basic thing is thus for any kind of claim either in the suit or in appeal or writ petition, what relief you have claimed either specifi­cally or even in the alternative. 33. In the decision given by the Apex Court in the case of Union of India v. EID Parry (India) Ltd. Reported in (2000) 2 SCC 223 : ( AIR 2000 SC 831 ), in para 4 of the judg­ment following observation was made- "The suit was filed for recovery of excess demurrage allegedly charged by the appel­lant from the respondent. The claim depended upon the Goods Tariff Rules, specially the rule quoted above, which authorises the respon­dent to claim damages in respect of the en­tire block of wagons supplied to a party which does not empty those wagons at the siding within the time permitted for that purpose. There was no pleading that the rule upon which the reliance was placed by the respon­dent was ultra virus the Railways Act 1890. In the absence of the pleading to that effect, the trial court did not frame any issue on that question. The High Court of its own pro­ceeded to consider validity of the rule and ultimately held that it was not in consonance with the relevant provisions of the Railways Act. 1890 and consequently held it was ultra virus. This view is contrary to the settled law that a question which did not form part of the pleadings or in respect of which the parties were not at variance and which was not the subject matter of any issue, could not be de­cided by the Court. The scope of the suit was limited. The pleadings comprising the aver­ments set out in the plaint and the defence put up by the present appellant in their writ­ten statement did not relate to the validity of the rule struck down by the High Court. The scope of the suit was limited. The pleadings comprising the aver­ments set out in the plaint and the defence put up by the present appellant in their writ­ten statement did not relate to the validity of the rule struck down by the High Court. The High Court therefore travelled beyond the pleadings in declaring the rule to be ultra virus. The judgment of the High Court, therefore. On this question cannot be sustained. 34. In another decision given by the Apex Court in case case of M. Chinnasamy v. K.C. Palanisamy and others reported in (2004) 6 SCC 341 : ( AIR 2004 SC 541 ), observation as made is quoted below: "It is an elementary rule in pleading that, when a state of facts is relied it is enough to allege it simply, without setting out the sub­ordinate facts which are the means of prov­ing it, or the evidence sustaining the allega­tions." "It is now well-settled principle of law that evidence adduced beyond the pleadings would not be admissible nor any evidence can be permitted to be adduced which is at vari­ance with the pleadings. The Court at a later stage of the trial as also the appellate Court having regard to the rule of pleadings would be entitled to reject the evidence where for there does not exist any pleading." 35. In a recent judgment given by the Apex Court in the case of Union of India v. R. Bhusal reported in 2006 All. CJ 1905 : (2006 AIR SCW 3854) in respect to an order passed by the High Court beyond the pleadings and the reliefs so claimed and on account of non consideration of the case in its proper per­spective while disposing of the appeal, the following observations were made : "6. Learned counsel for the appellant sub­mitted that the High Court did not consider the case in its proper perspective and allowed the writ petition over-looking the fact that there was no challenge to the performance criteria adopted and determination on the basis thereof. 8. We find that the High Court's consider­ation of the writ petition filed by the respon­dent and conclusions arrived at were beyond the pleadings. 8. We find that the High Court's consider­ation of the writ petition filed by the respon­dent and conclusions arrived at were beyond the pleadings. The High Court acted on cer­tain materials and purported concession with­out examining whether that concession was well founded and whether the appellant got an opportunity to clarify the position as re­gards the applicability of the regulations which according to the High Court had ap­plication. The basic challenge in the writ pe­tition was that the medical deficiency found by the appellant was not properly assessed. In the counter affidavit, the specific stand of the appellant-Union of India was that the medical deficiency was only one of the fac­tors while assessing suitability for permanent commission. The Union of India's specific stand was that the performance criteria fixed under the applicable policy regulations was not fulfilled by the respondent. In the rejoinder affidavit filed, there was no specific challenge as to the applicability of the either criteria or policy regulations. 9. Therefore we find no substance in the plea of learned counsel for the respondent that though the High Court apparently travelled beyond the pleadings, its conclusions are jus­tified in law." (Emphasis supplied by us) 36. At this stage we are to take note of very first ground taken by the appellants in both the appeals which is to the effect that while passing an interim order the learned single Judge has failed to consider the prayer made by the petitioners as the interim relief and to the final relief. First ground so taken in the appeals is hereby quoted: "1. Because while passing the ad interim order dated 23.2.2010 the Hon'ble single Judge, has failed to consider the prayers made by the petitioner for interim relief and the fi­nal relief. No relief, whatsoever was claimed by the petitioner against the respondents." 37. During the course of argument counsel for the appellants mainly pressed the first ground of the memo of appeal as noted from which it is clear that emphasis is that irrespec­tive of some details, as stated in the writ peti­tion, there was no relief/prayer either in the petition as the main relief or as the alternate relief or by filing any amendment application in respect to the selection process/exercise and its outcome and the select list and thus it is to be taken heavy note for our purposes. 38. 38. After referring to the aforesaid aspect in respect to the grounds and the reliefs claimed in the writ petitions filed by the writ petition­ers we are to again quote the concession made by the learned Advocate for the High Court as is noticed in the order of this Bench dated 16.4.2010. The statement as made, as referred above, is quoted here in after: "Sri S.P. Gupta, learned Senior Advocate during course of argument made statement that the High Court is ready to consider the claim of the petitioner as and when occasion will arise and thus writ petition needs to be dismissed as infructuous with the aforesaid direction." 39. On 27.8.2010, during the course of ar­gument again counsel for both the sides gave a clear concession in the open court which was so recorded on separate sheet. 40. The statement/concession of both sides already noticed, is just to be repeated for con­venience: "During the course of argument, apart from arguing the matter on the merits about vari­ous observations of the learned single Judges, Sri Upadhyay again reiterated the earlier sub­mission so advanced by Sri S. P. Gupta, learned Senior Advocate that the High Court is ready to consider the claim of the petitioner as and when occasion will arise and thus ir­respective of various issues which are said to be involved, writ petition be disposed of in the light of the aforesaid stands/statement. Sri Yashwant Singh, learned Advocate be­ing very fair to the Court, to the appellant side and to his client submits that if that consider­ation is directed and there is statement in this respect from the appellant side then practi­cally relief so claimed in the writ petition stands received and thus the matter may be dealt with accordingly." 41. Here is the simple matter where the petitioners of both writ petitions have prayed for a direction to the respondents to permit their consideration in the interview for the re­cruitment of car driver and for other class IV staff. 42. When the writ petitions were filed se­lection process was all complete. 43. No amendment application challenging exercise and its outcome and the declara­tion of result has been filed and there is no prayer for quashing the entire selection. 44. This being the fact, we are of the view that any consideration outside the purview of the relief so claimed was not at all warranted or required. 43. No amendment application challenging exercise and its outcome and the declara­tion of result has been filed and there is no prayer for quashing the entire selection. 44. This being the fact, we are of the view that any consideration outside the purview of the relief so claimed was not at all warranted or required. The focus has to be on the sub­ject and the prayer so made, so that if it is made out, relief can be given to that effect. 45. The observation as has been made by the learned single Judge in their orders at quite length in respect to the powers of the Hon'ble Chief Justice and the manner of its exercise, the Bench is of the view that there was neither any occasion nor any challenge by the writ petitioner as may be found from the plead­ings, and the relief and thus it can be safely said that they were not at all needed and war­ranted in the given set of facts. The powers possessed by the Hon'ble Chief Justice as pro­vided in Article 229 of the Constitution has been always approved by the decisions of the other courts as well as of the Apex Court. 46. Reference can be given to some of the decisions of the Apex Court given in the case of Union of India v. Kali Das Batish & another reported in (2006) 1 SCC 779 : ( AIR 2006 SC 789 ) and High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan v. Ramesh Chandra Paliwal and an­other reported in AIR 1998 SC 1079 . 47. We are just noticing the provisions of Article 229 of the Constitution of India and the observation as made by the Apex Court in the case of High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan (supra). "Article 229 of the Constitution of India: Officers and servants and the expenses of High Courts- (1) Appointments of officers and servants of a High Court shall be made by the Chief Justice of the Court or such other Judge or officer of then court as he may direct:" Provided that the Governor of the State may by rule require that in such cases as may be specified in the rule no person not already attached to the court shall be appointed to any office connected with the court save after consultation with the State Public Service Com­mission. (2) Subject to the provisions of any law made by the Legislature of the State, the con­ditions of service of officers and servants of a High Court shall be such as may be prescribed by rules made by the Chief Justice of the Court or by some other Judge or officer of the court authorized by the Chief Justice to make rules for the purpose: Provided that the rules made under this clause shall, so far as they relate to salaries allowances, leave or pensions, require the ap­proval of the Governor of the State. (3) The administrative expenses of a High Court all salaries, allowances and pensions payable to or in respect of the officers and ser­vants of the court, shall be charged upon the Consolidated Fund of the State, and any fees or other moneys taken by the court shall form part of that Fund." 48. The observation made by the Apex Court in the judgment referred above is quoted be­low: "This Article makes Chief Justice of the High Court the supreme authority in the mat­ter of appointments of the High Court offic­ers and servants. 49. We have already observed in the pre­ceding paragraph that the powers of the Hon'ble the Chief Justice and manner of its exercise not being in issue, no comment or finding was at all required in the orders un­der challenge. 50. Counsel for the appellants fairly stated that the claim of the petitioners is to be con­sidered as and when occasion will arise and thus a direction in this respect may be given. 51. Sri Singh, learned Advocate who ap­peared for the writ petitioners made a clear statement that if a statement has been made from the appellant side the writ petition may be disposed of accordingly. 52. On the facts and in the given situation, we are of the considered view that any exer­cise on the issue and recording of any find­ing should not have been there and, thus writ petitions need to be disposed of while dis­posing of these appeals, keeping in mind the stand, the arguments so advanced and the con­cession from both sides. 53. In view of the statement so recorded in the orders dated 16.4.2010 and 27.8.2010 we hereby direct that the appellants in these appeals who are respondents in the writ peti­tions is to consider the claim of the petition­ers as and when situation is there. 54. 53. In view of the statement so recorded in the orders dated 16.4.2010 and 27.8.2010 we hereby direct that the appellants in these appeals who are respondents in the writ peti­tions is to consider the claim of the petition­ers as and when situation is there. 54. For the reasons given above, both ap­peals are allowed and the orders passed by the learned single Judge in the writ petitions are hereby set aside and thus the writ peti­tions stand disposed of in the light of the di­rection given above. Appeals allowed.