Rakesh Tiwari, J.:- 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 2. The writ petition has been filed with the prayer for quashing of the order dated 30.9.2010 passed by Addl. District Judge, Kanpur Nagar in Misc. Case No. 77/74/2003, appended as Annexure-8 to the writ petition. 3. The brief facts of the case are that the plaintiff/respondent filed an application under Section 21 (1) (b) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 which was registered as Rent Case No. 33 of 1992 for release of one room shop in Premises No. R/O 78/32, Bhagat Singh Market, Bhagat Singh Road, Anwarganj, Kanpur under the tenancy of the petitioner. The rent case no. 33 of 1992 was allowed directing the petitioner to vacate the disputed shop. The petitioner along with other proforma respondent preferred an appeal no. 98 of 1995 under section 22 of the Act before the District Judge, Kanpur which was dismissed in default on 28.4.2000. 4. A restoration application was filed on 31.5.2000 for restoring the rent appeal which was registered as Misc. Case No. 30/74/2000 which was also dismissed for non-prosecution on 21.10.2000. 5. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that he came to know about the order dated 21.10.2000 for the first time on 6.3.2002 and filed restoration application supported by an application under section 5 of Limitation Act for recalling the order as well as for restoring the misc. cases no. 30/74/2000 to its original number. The aforesaid misc. restoration application was registered as case no. 6/74/2000 which too was dismissed in default on 18.10.2003 by the Additional District Judge, Kanpur. Thereafter, on 20.10.2003 another restoration application which was registered as misc. case no. 77/74/2003 was filed for restoring misc. case no. 6/74/2000. On 30.9.2010, the Additional District Judge, Kanpur dismissed the misc. case no. 77/74/2003. 6. Aggrieved by the order dated 30.9.2010 passed by Addl. District Judge, Kanpur by which misc. case no. 77/74/2003 was dismissed, the petitioner has come before this Court in this writ petition. 7. case no. 77/74/2003 was filed for restoring misc. case no. 6/74/2000. On 30.9.2010, the Additional District Judge, Kanpur dismissed the misc. case no. 77/74/2003. 6. Aggrieved by the order dated 30.9.2010 passed by Addl. District Judge, Kanpur by which misc. case no. 77/74/2003 was dismissed, the petitioner has come before this Court in this writ petition. 7. From restoration application filed by the petitioner in the court below, it appears that the petitioner wanted to remain in disputed shop by hook and crook and as such he got his case dismissed in default again and again and thereafter filed restoration applications one after another in order to prevent the release order passed in favour of the landlord. According to the findings recorded by the court below, the act of the petitioner was deliberate. 8. Relevant portion of order dated 30.9.2010 passed in misc. case no. 77/74 of 2003 is quoted below: @ Hindi @ 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a judgment rendered in the case of M.K. Prasad vs. P. Arumugam reported in 2001 (44) ALR 752, wherein the apex court considering delay condonation application has held that party concerned should have been more vigilant, but on his failure to adopt extra vigilance, ground for ousting him from the litigation, the court should have kept in mind the judgment impugned and the extent of property involved between the parties. 10. Relevant paragraphs no. 7 and 8 in this regard are produced as under: 7. In construing Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Court has to keep in mind that discretion in the section has to be exercised to advance substantial justice. The Court has a discretion to condone or refuse to condone the delay as is evident from the words "may be admitted" used in the section. While dealing with the scope of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, this Court in Ramlal and others v. Reewa Coalfields Ltd. held: "Section 5 of the Limitation Act provides for extension of period in certain cases. It lays down, inter alia, that any appeal may be admitted after the period of limitation prescribed therefore, when the appellant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within such period. This section raises two questions for consideration. It lays down, inter alia, that any appeal may be admitted after the period of limitation prescribed therefore, when the appellant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within such period. This section raises two questions for consideration. First is, what is sufficient cause; and the second, what is the meaning of the Clause "within such period"? With the first question we are not concerned in the present appeal. It is the second question which has been decided by the Judicial Commissioner against the appellant. He has held that " within such period" in substance means during the period prescribed for making the appeal. In other words, according to him, when an appellant prefers an appeal beyond the period of limitation prescribed be must show that he acted diligently and that there was some reason which prevented him from preferring the appeal during the period of limitation prescribed. If the judicial Commissioner has held that "within such period" means "the period of the delay between the last day for filing the appeal and the date on which the appeal was actually filed" he would undoubtedly have come to the conclusion that the illness of Ramlal on February 16 was a sufficient cause. That clearly appears to be the effect of his judgment. That is why it is unnecessary for us to consider what is "a sufficient cause" in the present appeal. It has been urged before us by the appellant that the construction placed by the Judicial Commissioner on the words "within such period" is erroneous. In construing Section 5 it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. In other words, when the period of limitation prescribed has expired the decree-holder has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree as beyond challenge, and this legal right which has accrued to the decree-holder by lapse of time should not be light-heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the Court to condone delay and admit the appeal. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the Court to condone delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the Court in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice. As has been observed by the Madras High Court in Krishna v. Chathappan: "Section 5 gives the Court a direction which in respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way in which judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised upon principles which are well understood; the words 'sufficient cause' receiving a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fide is imputable to the appellant". 8. Again in The State of West Bengal v. The administrator, Howrah Municipality and others and G. Ramegowda, Major and others v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore this Court observed that the expression "sufficient cause" in Section 5 of the Limitation Act must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays be condoned in the interest of justice where gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fide is not imputable to the party seeking condonation of delay Law of limitation has been enacted to serve the interest of justice and not defeat it. Again in N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, this Court held that acceptability of explanation for the delay is the sole criterion and length of delay is not relevant. In the absence of anything showing mala fide deliberate delay as a dilatory tactics, the Court should normally condone the delay. However, in such a case the Court should also keep in mind the litigation expenses incurred or to be incurred by the opposite party and should compensate him accordingly. In that context the Court observed: "It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the Court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. In that context the Court observed: "It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the Court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the Court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammelled by the conclusion of the lower court." 11. From the reading of the above paragraphs it is crystal clear that the court has come to the conclusion that while deciding the application for setting aside the ex-parte decree, the court should have kept in mind the judgment impugned, the extent of the property involved and the stake of the parties. The court further come to the conclusion that the inconvenience caused to the respondent for the delay on account of the appellant being absent from the Court in this case can be compensated by awarding appropriate and exemplary costs. 12. The learned counsel for the petitioner states that his client is ready to deposit exemplary costs of Rs.50,000/- for the inconvenience caused to the respondent within a period of 15 days from today in the court below for restoration of the case on the condition that he will appear before the court below on the next date fixed in the case and argue the matter. He further submits that as Parwana Dakhal had been issued, the court below on an application being Misc. Case No. 7/23/01 moved by the petitioner, has stayed the proceedings of Parwana Dakhal by order dated 31.7.2010. 13. He further submits that as Parwana Dakhal had been issued, the court below on an application being Misc. Case No. 7/23/01 moved by the petitioner, has stayed the proceedings of Parwana Dakhal by order dated 31.7.2010. 13. Order dated 31.7.2010 passed on application of the petitioner for recall of Dakhal Parwana reads thus: "Heard J.D./applicant learned counsel and perused the file. From the perusal of the papers, it seems that some proceedings related to the suit are pending. Hence, grounds are sufficient. Parwana is stayed till further orders. Fix 11.8.2010 for further order." 14. The petitioner has neither filed copy of the application for recall of the Dakhal Parwana nor the order dated 31.7.2010 though the affidavit in the writ petition has been sworn on 5th October 2010. 15. Further, perusal of application no. 74/2000 for restoration of the application for the first time shows that the pairokar/petitioner was present in court and was searching for his advocate from pre lunch cession but he could not trace out his advocate and consequently the case was dismissed in default. 16. The ground taken in the second restoration application is that a person by name Shiv Kumar used to come from the chamber of his advocate D.K. Sharma who used to take money and inform him about the date fixed in the case but when he did not come for over two months, petitioner enquired about the case and was informed that the case has been dismissed for non-prosecution on 21.10.2000. 17. On the third occasion when the aforesaid two applications were listed for restoration the petitioner stated in restoration application that he was sitting in the court and before the case was called out he went to call his advocate and thereafter came back and sat in the court. When he enquired from the peshkar about his case after court, he was informed that his application has been dismissed in default. 18. It is evident from he ground taken by the petitioner that his counsel never attended the case and all the restoration applications were yet got filed through him. Every time the pairokar of the petitioner was not in the court at the time when the case was called out. On all the three occasions he was not able to contact his advocate. Every time the pairokar of the petitioner was not in the court at the time when the case was called out. On all the three occasions he was not able to contact his advocate. The court below has rightly come to the conclusion that there is no explanation why the restoration application was filed on 6.3.2002 after period of two years when the earlier application had been filed on 2.10.2000. The advocates note the dates in the diary which is updated every day. He had admittedly been informed by the reader in the recess that despite case having been dismissed no one application was moved by the advocate of the petitioner. 19. Thus, the court below has rightly come to the conclusion that cause shown is not sufficient and act of non-appearance of the petitioner and his counsel in the case is deliberate for which the explanation given by him in the facts and circumstances of the case is not plausible. 20. For all the reasons stated above, the Court is not inclined to interfere in this case as the the petitioner has not come before the Court with clean hand. 21. The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed. Petition Dismissed.