Judgment Kanwaljit Singh Ahluwalia, J. 1. Present Regular Second Appeal has been filed by Municipal Corporation, Jalandhar, through its Commissioner against the judgment and decree dated 20.1.1984 passed by the Sub Judge First Class, Jaiandhar in a suit for permanent injunction filed by the plaintiff-respondent - Surinderjit Singh restraining the defendant - Municipal Corporation, Jaiandhar from recovering an amount of Rs.22,116/- from him on account of house tax for the years 1979-80, 1980-81 and 1981-82 in respect of Bhojan Bhandar/Eaateen situate in the premises of Old District Courts, jalandhar. The findings were affirmed by the learned lower appellate Court. 2. It was pleaded in the suit that the plaintiff-respondent was running a Bhojan Bhandar/Canteen from the premises owned by the State Government at the Old District Courts at G.T. Road, Jaiandhar. Plaintiff-respondent has obtained the premises from the State Government through the Deputy Commissioner, Jaiandhar on lease in an open auction. The lease was extended from time to time and the yearly rent of the premises was Rs.1.30 lacs. The State authorities have permitted the plaintiff-respondent to raise temporary construction in the courtyard. The Municipal Corporation, Jaiandhar issued three bills to the plaintiff demanding house tax. The total amount which the plaintiff was called upon to pay was Rs.22,116/- on account of house tax for the years 1979-80, 1980-81 and 1981-82. The Municipal Corporation, Jaiandhar appeared and took a preliminary objection that Civil Court had got no jurisdiction to try the suit.After completion of pleadings, the following issues were framed:- "1. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties? Onus on the parties. 2. Whether the suit in the present form is not maintainable? OPD 3. Whether the Civil Courts do not have jurisdiction to entertain the present suit? OPD 4. Whether the plaintiff has locus standi to file the present suit? OPP 5. Whether the suit has been properly valued for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction? OPP 6. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the injunction prayed for? OPP 7. Relief." 3. The Court of Sub Judge First Class, Jalandhar held that the suit was maintainable. However, it held that since the Municipal Corporation had acted in utter violation of the provisions of the Municipal Corporation Act, 1976, therefore the Civil Court could decide the suit. OPP 6. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the injunction prayed for? OPP 7. Relief." 3. The Court of Sub Judge First Class, Jalandhar held that the suit was maintainable. However, it held that since the Municipal Corporation had acted in utter violation of the provisions of the Municipal Corporation Act, 1976, therefore the Civil Court could decide the suit. The Court further held that it was an admitted case of the parties that the plaintiff tenant was tenant on lease and his tenancy was terminated on 31st March, 1982. The Court further held that there is no evidence that the plaintiff respondent has raised any construction. It was, thus, concluded that the demand made by the defendant- appellant was not justifiable. 4. Aggrieved against the same, Municipal Corporation had filed an appeal. The appellate Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the findings returned by the trial Court. 5. A substantial question of law which arises for consideration of this Court, can be formulated as under:- "Whether the Civil Court will have jurisdiction to entertain the suit for injunction in respect of house tax?" 6. Counsel for the appellant has relied upon Municipal Corporation, Ludhiana through its Commissioner and others v. Raghbir Kaur and another, (2009-4)156 PLR 130, where this Court has placed reliance upon the judgments of Honble Apex Court in Munshi Ram and others v. Municipal Committee, Chheharta AIR 1979 Supreme Court 1250, and held that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred in respect of any matter pertaining to assessment of house-tax. Reference has also been made to Kelash Nath v. Municipal Committee, Batata AIR 1962 Punjab 389 (Full Bench), Ramesh Kumar and others v. The Municipal Committee, Gardaspur and others AIR 1981 P&H 295 (D.B.), M/s Rama Krishna Rice Mills v. Municipal Committee, Sultanpur Lodhi 1985 - 1)87 P.L.R. 221 (D.B.) and N.D.M.C. v. Satish Chand (deceased) by L.R. Ram Chand AIR 2003 S.C. 3187. In Raghbir Kaurs case (supra), it was held as under:- "7. The Courts below have decreed the suit for the reason that in the written statement or in evidence, the Corporation has not disclosed any basis of increase of house-tax. Whether the house-tax is liable to be increased and to what extent, falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Municipal Authorities under the Act. The Courts below have decreed the suit for the reason that in the written statement or in evidence, the Corporation has not disclosed any basis of increase of house-tax. Whether the house-tax is liable to be increased and to what extent, falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Municipal Authorities under the Act. Such is the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in Munshi Rams case AIR 1979 SC 1250 (supra), wherein it has been held to the following effect: "23. From a conjoint reading of Sections 84 and 86, it is plain that the Municipal Act, gives a special and particular remedy for the person aggrieved by an assessment of tax under this Act, irrespective of whether the grievance relates to the rate or quantum of tax or the principles of assessment. The Act further provides a particular forum and a specific mode of having this remedy which is analogous to that provided in Section 66 (2) of the Indian Income-Tax Act, 1922. Section 86 forbids in clear terms the person aggrieved by an assessment from seeking his remedy in any other forum or in any other manner than that provided in the Municipal Act. 24. It is well-recognized that where a Revenue Statute provides for a person aggrieved by an assessment thereunder, a particular remedy to be sought in a particular forum, in a particular way, it must be sought in that forum and in that manner, and all other forums and modes of seeking it are excluded. Construed in the light of this principle, it is clear that Sections 84 and 86 of the Municipal Act bar by inevitable implication, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court where the grievance of the party relates to an assessment or the principle of assessment under this Act." 8. Relying upon the aforesaid judgment, the Honble Supreme Court in N.D.M.C. s case AIR 2003 SC 3187 (supra) again reiterated the principle enunciated in Munshi Rams case (supra). Before this Court a Division bench in M/s Rama Krishna Rice Mills case (1985-1) 87 PLR 221, (supra) considered the earlier judgments of Division Bench of this Court in Ramesh Kumars case AIR 1981 P&H295, (supra) and held that in Ramesh Kumars case (supra) the question whether the assessment and competition of house-tax could be challenged in the Civil Court wherein it was held that such challenge is not maintainable before the Civil Court. It was held that challenge before the Civil Court in respect of assessment not made on the basis of fair rent is not maintainable. It was held that merely raising the legality of the assessment order is beyond the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. 9. Though the aforesaid judgments are in respect of Sections 84 and 86 of the Punjab Muncipal Act, 1911, but the said provisions are pari materia to Sections 146 and 149 of the Punjab Municipal Corporation Act, 1976 . Therefore, the enunciation of law as laid down in above judgments is applicable to the facts of the present case as well." 7. In view of the ratio of law laid down in Raghbir Kaurs case (supra), the findings of both the Courts below are set aside. However, a perusal of the record reveals that no opportunity was given to the plaintiff-respondent to submit his objections. Accordingly, the appellant - Municipal Corporation is directed to issue fresh notice to the respondent and pass a fresh speaking order, in accordance with law, after affording an effective opportunity of hearing to the plaintiff-respondent.