ORDER : M. Venugopal, J. W.P. No. 7808/2003: 1. The Petitioner has filed this writ petition praying for an issuance of a writ of certiorarified mandamus in calling for the records pertaining to the order dated August 28, 1999 in Memo No. 144-24/Disc/SO(TS)/99, passed by the 2nd Respondent imposing a punishment of stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect and the order dated September 27, 1999 in Memo No. 20(22)/144-24/Disc/CSO/99 and the order dated October 13, 1999 in Memo No. 20(24)/144-24/Disc/CSO/99 passed by the 1st Respondent, modifying the punishment into stoppage of one increment with cumulative effect and to quash the same and also to direct the Respondents, to pay all arrears and attendant benefits. 2. The Petitioner on December 27, 1961 joined as a Security Guard (Sainik) in the 1st Respondent Corporation. He was promoted as Hawildar in the year 1979. Later, he was promoted as a Jamedar in the year 1990. He was promoted as an Assistant Inspector in the year 1992 and as senior Inspector in the year 1994. 3. The Petitioner served in the Special Branch Security Force for 15 years and in the Vigilance Department for 8 years. 4. According to the Petitioner, he was given the meritorious Awards onseveral occasions in appreciation of his good Vigilance work. He was given a cash Award of Rs. 45/- in appreciation of his meritorious service as per proceedings dated April 21, 1983. Likewise, he was given the cash Award of Rs. 45/- for his meritorious service as per proceedings dated January 25, 1986. Also, by means of proceedings dated July 17, 1989, he was given a cash Award of Rs. 60/- in appreciation of his meritorious service. The Petitioner on August 19, 1999 was working in 3rd shift at TPTC Office Security point. One S. Palanivel, was working in TPTC Office as indcoserve worker. It is the case of the Petitioner that the said Palanivel was informed by the Chief Engineer to stay in the office with the Security Personnel during night hours in order to help them and that he was allowed to stay for several years and this fact was known to all the higher officials in the Security Department. Even as per practice in force and as usual S. Palanivel was allowed to stay in the office during the night on August 19, 1999. Even as per practice in force and as usual S. Palanivel was allowed to stay in the office during the night on August 19, 1999. Palanivelu's son Sasikumar studying in 10th standard came to the office to see his father for taking treatment as he was not well. Since there was no bus to his native village Muthandi Kuppam, he also stayed with his father on that day. 5. When the Petitioner was on duty during 3rd shift at TPTC Security Point, the Deputy Security Officer R. Sundaram and the senior Inspector S. Bharatha Mani came on rounds and visited his duty point and on their arrival, he received them with salute and was doing his duty with care and diligence. While this being so, the 2nd Respondent issued a charge memo dated August 23, 1999 to the Petitioner alleging that he was sleeping in the office when they came on rounds and also allowed a society worker and his son to stay with him in the office unauthorisedly. 6. When the charge memo was served on August 24, 1999, he informed the officials that he would receive the memo after consulting the Association of security staff, since the office bearers of their Association informed him that they would meet and talk to the Deputy Chief Security Officer. Before ever, the office bearers of the Union could meet him and talk to the Deputy Chief Security Officer and before the receipt of the charge memo and submission of his explanation, the 2nd Respondent straight away passed final orders imposing the punishment of stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect. 7. The stand of the Petitioner is that, in the order, it was mentioned that he refused to receive the charge memo dated August 23, 1999 when it was served on him on August 24, 1999 and August 25, 1999 and therefore, he was voluntarily deprived of the opportunity to furnish his explanation on the charges and also on the purported refusal to receive the charge memo. Further, the 2nd Respondent, without conducting any enquiry to prove the charges levelled against him, has passed straight away a final order dated August 28, 1999 awarding the punishment of stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect by not following the principles of natural justice and the procedures established by law. 8. Further, the 2nd Respondent, without conducting any enquiry to prove the charges levelled against him, has passed straight away a final order dated August 28, 1999 awarding the punishment of stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect by not following the principles of natural justice and the procedures established by law. 8. The Petitioner filed an appeal to the 1st Respondent through his letter dated September 13, 1999 as against the order passed by the 2nd Respondent dated August 28, 1999 with a request to set aside the punishment imposed by the, 2nd Respondent. The 1st Respondent, through his order dated September 27, 1999, altered the punishment as stoppage of one increment with cumulative effect. The 1st Respondent/Appellate Authority had failed to provide an opportunity to the Petitioner to project his case by ordering for an enquiry. 9. The 1st Respondent, in its counter, has taken a stand that the punishment in question has been imposed during 1999 and that the Petitioner has filed the present writ petition in the year 2003, after a delay of nearly 4 years and also that the Petitioner has sought for voluntary retirement in the year 2001 and accordingly, he has been relieved on voluntary retirement from September 30, 2001 and therefore, the writ petition is to be dismissed. 10. The 1st Respondent also contends that on August 19/20, 1999 the Writ Petitioner has been posted at Thermal Power Station Training Centre on 3rd shift duty and during the night inspection at 00.35 hours, the Deputy Security Officer, Sundaram along with Bharatha Mani, Senior Inspector found the writ Petitioner sleeping, while on duty, along with unauthorised individuals S. Palanivel and his son P. Sasikumar, at the location, after locking the Main Gate from inside. That apart, he was improperly dressed, such as with slippers and no head gear. When he was woken up, he had no explain to answer for permitting a Society Worker and his son to stay and sleep with him unauthorisedly along with his two bi-cycles with all utensils and two gas stoves and two highly inflammable L.P. Gas cylinders, inside the restricted areas. The Inspection Team also obtained a statement from the Society Worker who along with his son unauthorisedly was sleeping with the writ Petitioner. The Inspection Team also obtained a statement from the Society Worker who along with his son unauthorisedly was sleeping with the writ Petitioner. The aforesaid acts constituted misconduct punishable under the Sub-rule XXV, read with Sections Xii, Xiii, Xiv, Xvi of Rule 18(i)2 of Chapter VII of the NLC Security Force Regulations. A charge memo dated August 23, 1999 has been issued to the Petitioner calling for written explanations. 11. The charge memo dated August 23, 1999 was endeavoured to be served on the Petitioner on August 24, 1999 and August 25, 1999 at his duty point, but he refused to receive the same and endorsements have been made by the Superintendents on duty on August 24, 1999 and August 25, 1999. Inasmuch as the Petitioner wantonly and knowingly refused to receive the charge memo dated August 23, 1999, he is deemed to have voluntarily given up the opportunity to offer explanation to the charge memo. Being a member of the Security Force, refused to receive communication from the superiors also amounted to misconduct and unbecoming of member of the Security Force. 12. The Disciplinary Authority proceeded, as per the NLC Security Force Regulations, and passed a final order dated August 28, 1999 based on the available materials awarding a punishment of 'stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect' and also specified that an Appeal will lie against the final order to the Deputy Chief Security Officer within 14 days from the date of receipt of the order. 13. The writ Petitioner on September 13, 1999 preferred an Appeal to the Appellate Authority and as a matter of fact, he has not denied the fact that he has refused to receive the charge memo dated August 23, 1999. In the Appeal, the Petitioner has not challenged the final order dated August 28, 1999 on the basis of procedural defects or that no enquiry has been conducted before passing the final order of punishment. But the Appellate Authority on humanitarian grounds, while considering the Appeal, reduced the punishment awarded to one of 'stoppage of one increment with cumulative effect' by order dated September 27, 1999. 14. But the Appellate Authority on humanitarian grounds, while considering the Appeal, reduced the punishment awarded to one of 'stoppage of one increment with cumulative effect' by order dated September 27, 1999. 14. The Second Appeal dated October 9, 1999 has been filed by the Petitioner before the Deputy Chief Security Officer and the Appeal has been considered by the Chief Security Officer in detail and the same has been rejected confirming the punishment of stoppage of one increment with cumulative effect as per proceedings dated October 13, 1999. 15. The 1st Respondent has taken a specific plea that NLC Security Force Regulations does not require or contemplate any enquiry before imposing any penalty, except in case of dismissal and removal. Indeed, Regulation 20 speaks as follows: (ii) The Disciplinary Authority or any other authority superior to it, shall, at its discretion, institute an enquiry against any member of the Security Force before imposing on him any of the punishments listed in Regulation 18(ii) above. (iii) No order of dismissal or removal shall be made, except after holding an enquiry against a member of the Security Force concerned in respect of the alleged lapse on his part. and in and by which no enquiry is visualised before awarding the punishment of 'stoppage of one increment with cumulative effect'. 16. It is the case of the 1st Respondent that the Petitioner has been imposed with the punishments for various misconducts committed by him, ever since he joined the Corporation and the same runs as below: (1) Fined Rs. 5/- for sleeping (Proc. No. 218/DSO-H/65, Dt. October 15, 1965) ** (2) Fined Rs. 7/- for sleeping (Proc. No. 257/DSO-H/65, Dt. November 29, 1965)** (3) Fined Rs. 10/- for sleeping (Dt. February 22, 1966) (4) Fined Rs. 10/- (Proc. No. 49/DSO-II/66, Dt. July 15, 1966) (5) Fined Rs. 3/- for deserting duty place (Proc. No. 58/DSO-II/66, Dt. July 8, 1966) (6) Fined Rs. 5/- for deserting duty place (Proc. No. PR/200/DSO-II/68, Dt. November 15, 1968) (7) Fined Rs. 10/- for sleeping (Proc. No. 41/DSO-E/68-2, Dt. January 30, 1969) (8) Stoppage of one increment for sleeping (Proc. No. 04/Disc/SO/M-1/89, Dt. August 1, 1989) (9) Stoppage of one increment with cumulative effect for sleeping permitting to keep Gas Cylinder and other utensils and permitted unauthorised use of Company's property and violation of instructions vide Memo No. 144-24/Disc/SO(TS)/99, Dt. 10/- for sleeping (Proc. No. 41/DSO-E/68-2, Dt. January 30, 1969) (8) Stoppage of one increment for sleeping (Proc. No. 04/Disc/SO/M-1/89, Dt. August 1, 1989) (9) Stoppage of one increment with cumulative effect for sleeping permitting to keep Gas Cylinder and other utensils and permitted unauthorised use of Company's property and violation of instructions vide Memo No. 144-24/Disc/SO(TS)/99, Dt. August 22, 1999 read with Memo No. 20(22)/144/24/Disc/CSO/89, Dt. September 27, 1999. (**During 1965 his basic pay was Rs. 85/-only). Moreover, only on two occasions during the year 1983 and 1986, he has been given cash rewards for meritorial service along with others. 17. The main contention of the 1st Respondent is that the Petitioner has approached this Court with unclean hands in the year 2003 after retiring from service voluntarily in the year 2001 and that the impunged orders are based on materials and there is no illegality or arbitrariness while passing the said orders. W.P. No. 7809/2003: 18. The Petitioner has filed another writ petition praying for an issuance of certiorarified mandamus in calling for the records, pertaining to the order in Memo No. 111/CCR/Rmks/A4/CSO/97 dated July 27, 1998. passed by the 3rd Respondent, and communicating the adverse remarks and the order in Memo No. 111/CR Remarks/CSO/99 dated July 30, 1999 passed by the 2nd Respondent rejecting the appeal and confirming the order of the 3rd Respondent and to quash the same. Further, the Petitioner has consequently prayed for issuance of direction to the Respondents to give him Time Bound Promotion as Superintendent Grade-II with effect from March 1, 1998, with all arrears and consequential benefits upto the date of his retirement. 19. According to the Petitioner, he was given Time Bound Promotions from one post to other upto the post of Senior Inspector in time and in accordance with the Time Bound Promotion Scheme in force, he was eligible and entitled to the Time Bound Promotion to the post of Superintendent Grade-II, which carry higher scale of pay with effect from March 1, 1998. But he was not given the promotion to the post of Superintendent Grade-II with effect from March 1, 1998. He made a representation to the authorities concerned in this regard. But he was not given the promotion to the post of Superintendent Grade-II with effect from March 1, 1998. He made a representation to the authorities concerned in this regard. However, by a proceeding dated July 27, 1998 of the Assistant Personnel Manager/S & FS, he was informed that an adverse remarks have been entered into his service record for the period from April 1, 1997 to March 31, 1998. In fact, he was informed in the aforesaid proceedings that his conduct during the period from April 1, 1997 to March 31, 1998 was highly unreliable. No knowledge of security. Does not command respect from his subordinates. Rumour Monger.' 20. The stand of the Petitioner is that he was not given any notice before the adverse remarks being entered into his service record and also that he was not provided with any opportunity, he preferred an Appeal dated September 21, 1998 to the Chief Security Officer and requested him to expunge the above aforesaid adverse remarks. He explained in detail how the adverse remarks were not correct and stated that it was a motivated one. He made a representation dated January 29, 1999, since there was no reply from the Chief Security Officer and made a request for Time Bound Promotion granted to him as Security Superintendent Grade-II, inasmuch as his juniors were given Time Bound Promotions. Again, he made a representation dated June 25, 1999 praying for his Time Bound Promotion, as there was no reply from the Chief Security Officer. The Deputy Chief Security Officer rejected his appeal, by means of an order, dated July 30, 1999. 21. The Petitioner made a representation dated February 1, 2000 to the General Manager (TA), Security and Fire Services with a request to set aside the punishment and also to grant him the promotion to the post of Superintendent Grade-II which was due from March 1, 1998. He submitted a mercy petition dated April 4, 2000 to the Director (Personnel), to set aside the punishment and also with, a request to promote him to the post of Superintendent Grade-II. Further, he submitted his representation dated August 9, 2001 and November 15, 2002 for which no reply was given. 22. He submitted a mercy petition dated April 4, 2000 to the Director (Personnel), to set aside the punishment and also with, a request to promote him to the post of Superintendent Grade-II. Further, he submitted his representation dated August 9, 2001 and November 15, 2002 for which no reply was given. 22. The Respondents, in its counter, have taken a plea that the present writ petition suffers from the principles of delay and latches and that the impugned order communicating the adverse remarks was of the year 1998 and the same was confirmed in Appeal in the year 1999 and that the present writ petition has been filed by the Petitioner in the year 2003 after a delay of nearly 5 years and that too after the voluntary retirement of the Petitioner in 2001 based on the Voluntary Retirement Scheme and hence, the writ petition is to be dismissed. 23. The Respondents' case is that the writ Petitioner was relieved from the services of the 1st Respondent Corporation on voluntary retirement on his own accord without any protest or claim with effect from September 30, 2001 and when the Petitioner opted for voluntary retirement without reserving any claim whatsoever, he has no right to make any claim in regard to his past service, that too after his retirement. After the Petitioner's voluntary retirement under the Voluntary Retirement Scheme, there was no master-servant relationship existed between the Petitioner and the Respondents on the date of filing of the writ petition. The Petitioner joined the 1st Respondent Corporation in the year 1961 as a Security Guard and was promoted under the Time Bound Promotions from time-to-time subject to eligibility and satisfying the norms and in the year 1994, the Writ Petitioner was promoted as senior Inspector. His services were normal duties as rendered by any member of the Corporation Security Force and there was nothing extraordinary in his service career. In fact, his service record contains several punishments for various misconducts committed by him. 24. His services were normal duties as rendered by any member of the Corporation Security Force and there was nothing extraordinary in his service career. In fact, his service record contains several punishments for various misconducts committed by him. 24. The Respondents project a stand that the Time Bound Promotions to the Employees are not automatic and the Time Bound Promotions are given to the employees based on completion of prescribed period in a particular post in a lower grade subject to satisfying other conditions such as performance during the qualifying period, good rating in Annual Performance Appraisal for preceding 3 years from the date of eligibility and disciplinary proceedings were pending at the time of consideration for promotion. 25. According to the Respondents, Annual Performance Report pertaining to the period from April 1, 1997 to March 31, 1998 in respect of the Petitioner was initiated by the then Deputy Security Officer in June 1998, wherein it was recorded in an overall appraisal column "Spreading rumors. Petition writer Under observation". The 2nd Respondent (Reviewing Authority) had recorded his overall rating on June 9, 1998 as "Highly unreliable. No knowledge of security. Does not command respect from his subordinates. Rumour monger". The adverse remarks, in the Annual Performance Report, were communicated to the Petitioner as per proceedings dated July 27, 1998 by the 3rd Respondent. The Petitioner received the impugned order dated July 27, 1998 and acknowledged the same. Later, the Petitioner preferred an Appeal dated June 25, 1999 to the 2nd Respondent. The 2nd Respondent, by proceedings dated July 30, 1999, had rejected the Appeal. The Petitioner has not challenged the order dated July 27, 1998 in the appeal dated June 25, 1999 on the basis of procedural defects or no notice was given to him before passing the order dated July 27, 1998. 26. The substance of the contention of the Respondents, as seen from the counter, is that the rules governing the Performance Appraisal do not require or contemplate that an individual must be given an opportunity prior to the recording of adverse remarks. However, as per the rules, the Petitioner filed an appeal dated June 25, 1999 and the same was considered and rejected by proceeding dated July 30, 1999. The adverse remarks made against the Petitioner were justified and was based on the record in the performance of duties and behavior during the course of his duty. However, as per the rules, the Petitioner filed an appeal dated June 25, 1999 and the same was considered and rejected by proceeding dated July 30, 1999. The adverse remarks made against the Petitioner were justified and was based on the record in the performance of duties and behavior during the course of his duty. Since he suffered adverse remarks during the period April 1, 1997 to March 31, 1998 in his Annual Performance Appraisal, the claim for promotion to the post of Superintendent Grade-II with effect from March 1, 1998 on time scale is not tenable. 27. The Petitioner, who joined in the year 1961 in the 1st Respondent Corporation, on two occasions during the year 1983 and 1986, was given the Cash Rewards for the meritorious along with others. He was awarded with 9 punishments which were made mention of in the counter filed by the Respondents in W.P. No. 7808/2003 for the various misconducts committed by him. 28. In short, the stand of the Respondents is that the proceedings of the 3rd Respondent dated July 27, 1998 and the proceedings of the 2nd Respondent dated July 30, 1999 are legal and valid and further that the adverse remarks to the Petitioner were communicated within a reasonable time of recording the same. W.P. No. 7808/2003: Contentions, Discussions and Findings: 29. According to the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner, the Respondents cannot impose a punishment of increment cut with cumulative effect, which is a major penalty without holding an enquiry and without giving an opportunity to the Petitioner and as such, the impugned orders have been passed in violation of the principles of fact, the orders so passed are arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 30. It is the further contention of the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the Respondents, after holding that the charges levelled against the Petitioner were serious in nature, cannot pass final orders imposing the penalty of stoppage of increment with cumulative effect and without getting an explanation from the Petitioner and without holding enquiry and proving the charges, as visualised under the certified Standing Orders as well as the Security Force Regulations. The Learned Counsel for the Petitioner submits that the allegation that the Petitioner refused to receive the charge memo is not true and correct one and also the Petitioner has not been given any opportunity to rebut this allegation and also by referring this allegation in the final order, the entire procedure for disciplinary action has been dispensed with without any basis or justification. 31. Expatiating his arguments, it is the contention of the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner that even assuming without admitting that the Petitioner refused to receive the charge memo, it may give raise to another charge memo and it cannot be a ground to dispense with an enquiry, without resorting to other modes of service and without receiving an explanation. 32. The Learned Counsel for the Petitioner urges before this Court that even the purported refusal to receive the charge memo will not amount to waiver or giving up of an opportunity on his own and indeed, when no explanation has submitted by the Petitioner and when he does not participate in the enquiry, it will not amount to admission of guilt so as to pass a final order and even such a case, the Respondents shall pass an ex parte enquiry and prove the charges in the manner known to law before awarding any punishment, but the Respondents have not resorted to this kind of procedure established by law. 33. That apart, the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner submits that the Director (Personnel) has called for remarks on Petitioner's Mercy Petition dated August 9, 2001, from the Deputy Chief Security Officer, who has submitted his remarks mentioning that his services were meritorious and that he was honest and sincere and also recommended to revoke the punishment order and to give him the promotion to the post of Superintendent Grade-II and even after the report, the punishment orders have not been set aside and that the Petitioner has not been given the promotion. 34. Continuing further, the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner brings it to the notice of the Court that the Petitioner has retired from service under Voluntary Retirement Scheme and due to the punishment, he has suffered enormous loss and also in his terminal and V. benefits. 35. 34. Continuing further, the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner brings it to the notice of the Court that the Petitioner has retired from service under Voluntary Retirement Scheme and due to the punishment, he has suffered enormous loss and also in his terminal and V. benefits. 35. Advancing his arguments, the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner submits that only after serving the charge memo to the Petitioner, the authorities concerned can take a decision in the matter and the certified Standing Order speaks of service by RPAD and without serving a charge memo, no punishment can be awarded by the authorities concerned and if any punishment is awarded without serving the charge memo, then the same is not acceptable, legal evidence in the eye of law. 36. The Learned Counsel for the Petitioner contends that for the charge memo dated August 23, 1999 issued to the Petitioner, when it has been sought to be served on him, his statement has been, that he will receive the charge memo after consulting the office bearers of his Union and in reality, no charge memo has been served on the Petitioner and no explanation has been received from him by the authorities concerned and in the absence of refusal to receive the charge memo by the Petitioner, the authorities might have issued another charge memo, but they have not issued the same. Also, it is the submission of the, learned Counsel for the Petitioner that even by RPAD the charge memo dated August 23, 1999 might have been served on the Petitioner and also the other mode of serving the charge memo may also be published in the Newspaper by means of an advertisement and the authorities, in short, cannot cut-short the procedure for their convenience. 37. To lend support of his contention that no workmen shall be punished without issuance of charge memo issued to him and the receipt of explanation submitted by him after providing due opportunity thereto, the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner refers to Standing Order 47 1(a)(b) pertaining to major punishments which runs as follows: No workman shall be punished till a written memorandum of charges, setting forth the circumstances appearing against him and the nature of the misconduct involved and requiring his explanation, has been issued to him, and he has been afforded a reasonable opportunity to submit his explanation in writing. 38. 38. It is the contention of the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner that if no charge memo would serve on the Petitioner, then, no punishment can be imposed upon him and the authorities cannot presume guilt and therefore, the orders of the Respondents are not in accordance with law. 39. The Learned Counsel for the Petitioner submits that the Management has to prove the charges beyond doubt and in the instant case, the punishment awarded by the 2nd Respondent imposing a stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect is a major penalty and in the present case, the Management has not given opportunity to the Petitioner to examine the witness and therefore, the orders of both the Respondents are vitiated in law. 40. In support of his contention the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner relies on the decision of this Court in K. Govindaswamy V. I. Tamil Nadu Civil Supplies Corporation Limited represented by its senior Regional Manager, Madras 600 086 and Anr. 1998 Writ L.R. 486 wherein this Court has held as follows: withholding of increments of pay simpliciter without any hedge over it, certainly comes within the meaning of 16(1) (b) of the said Rules. But, when penalty was imposed withholding two increments, i.e., for two years with cumulative effect, it would indisputably mean that the two increments earned by the employee would be cut off as a measure of penalty for ever in his upward march of earning higher scale of pay. The punishment imposed on the Petitioner, would attract Rule, 16(2) of the said Rules. Accordingly, as per the procedure, the Petitioner shall be given opportunity for personal hearing and to examine witnesses specified by him and he shall be permitted to submit his explanation thereafter. Admittedly no one was examined on the side of the Corporation/Management and no opportunity was given to the Petitioner to examine his witnesses as claimed by him in the Questionnaire form. Hence the contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner is well founded and the punishment imposed on the Petitioner is vitiated. 41. He also relies on the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in 1996 VII AD 821 (SC) wherein it is laid down as follows: Though the Respondent had been avoiding to give his reply the Appellants have not conducted any enquiry. 41. He also relies on the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in 1996 VII AD 821 (SC) wherein it is laid down as follows: Though the Respondent had been avoiding to give his reply the Appellants have not conducted any enquiry. Since the Respondent had avoided to submit the reply, he has forgone his right to submit his reply. Nonetheless, the Appellants are absolved of the duty to hold an ex parte enquiry to find out whether or not the charge has been proved. In the event of the Enquiry Officer finding that the charge is proved, he would submit his report to the disciplinary authority. The disciplinary authority should communicate the copy of the enquiry report to the Respondent and seek an explanation for the proposed action thereon. If the Respondent submits any explanation the same may be taken into consideration and appropriate order may be passed according to law. Until then, the Respondent must be deemed to be under suspension. 42. The Learned Counsel for the Petitioner seeks in aid of the decision of this Court in K. Lakshmanan v. Government of Tamil Nadu and Anr. 1992 I LLJ 380 wherein it is held that '...It is elementary that in case the department wishes to rely upon the statement of a witness, an opportunity must be granted to the employee concerned to subject that witness to cross-examination. The Appellate Authority has merely reproduced the show cause notice in toto exept to say that there were no new tacts to mitigate the charges. This is wholly an uneatisxactoxy way of dealing with the appeal against punishment by the Appellate Authority." 43. Besides the above, it is the contention of the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner that one who makes an allegation against the particular person must prove the case. Also, it is the contention of the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the Petitioner went on voluntary retirement and the present writ petition has been filed in the year 2003 and really, the Petitioner has waited for the orders from the Director (Personnel) for his representation dated August 9, 2001 and since no reply has been forthcoming, the Petitioner has filed the writ petition and there is no limitation under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for filing of the writ petition by the Petitioner and since the. Petitioner has assigned reasons in the writ petition, W.P. No. 7808/2003 filed by him is perfectly maintainable in law. 44. In this regard, the Learned Counsel, for the Petitioner relies on the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in Ajaib Singh Vs. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum-Processing Service Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 wherein it is held that 'Reference of industrial dispute to Labour Court is not subject to limitation under Article 137 of the Limitation Act and further it is laid down that burden to raise the plea of delay/latches lies on the Management etc.' 45. Per contra, the Learned Counsel for the Respondents submits that the Petitioner belongs to Security Branch and his duty is to gone the entire area and he along with two outsiders was found sleeping on August 19, 1999 around 00.35 hours while doing duty on 3rd shift at Thermal Power Station Training Centre and by the Deputy Security Officer Sundaram along with Senior Inspector Bharathamani, who were on inspection round and since sleeping on duty was a grave charge, he was given the charge memo dated August 23, 1999 to be served on him and when the charge memo was sought to be served on him on August 24, 1999 and August 25, 1999 at his duty point, he refused to receive the same and to that effect endorsements were made by the Superintendents on duty on August 24, 1999 and August 25, 1999 and since the Petitioner refused to receive the charge memo dated August 23, 1999, he was deemed to have given up his right of opportunity to submit his explanation to the charge memo and that as per NLC Security Force Regulations, the Disciplinary Authority had passed the final order dated August 28, 1999 and imposed the punishment of stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect and later on, an Appeal being preferred by the Petitioner, the Appellate Authority reduced the punishment to one of stoppage of one increment with cumulative effect by order dated September 27, 1999 and moreover, the Petitioner has filed a Second Appeal dated. October 9, 1999 to the Deputy Chief Security Officer and the said Appeal was rejected as per proceedings of the Chief Security Officer dated October 13, 1999. 46. October 9, 1999 to the Deputy Chief Security Officer and the said Appeal was rejected as per proceedings of the Chief Security Officer dated October 13, 1999. 46. It is the contention of the Learned Counsel for the Respondents that when the Petitioner was very much available at duty point on August 24, 1999 and August 25, 1999, he refused to receive the charge memo dated August 23, 1999 and therefore, there was no need for the Respondents to serve the charge memo dated August 23, 1999 to the Petitioner by RPAD or serving the charge memo at his residence does not arise and that too when he was not suspended from service. 47. The contention of the Respondents is that the Petitioner is governed by Security Force Regulations of Neyveli Lignite Corporation and the Petitioner is bound to receive the charge memo dated August 23, 1999 when it was endeavoured to be served on him on August 24, 1999 and August 25, 1999 respectively and it is not open to the Petitioner to say that he will receive the charge memo after consulting the Association of Security Staff and office bearers thereto and inasmuch as the refusal to receive the charge memo by the Petitioner has been endorsed by the Superintendents on duty on August 24, 1999 and August 25, 1999, then, the conduct of the Petitioner in refusing to receive the charge memo in the presence of Superintendents on duty who made necessary endorsements thereto amounted to 'refusal of service' and hence, the Authorities were correct in proceeding further and awarding the punishments impugned in the writ petition. 48. The Learned Counsel for the Respondents submits that Regulation 20 of NLC Personnel Manual Volume-I speaks of Procedure for imposing penalties and only in case of dismissal or removal and enquiry is contemplated as per Regulation 20(a)(ii). 49. 48. The Learned Counsel for the Respondents submits that Regulation 20 of NLC Personnel Manual Volume-I speaks of Procedure for imposing penalties and only in case of dismissal or removal and enquiry is contemplated as per Regulation 20(a)(ii). 49. The Learned Counsel for the Respondents projects a plea that the Petitioner is a senior Inspector and he is not a workman and since; he has refused to receive the charge memo dated August 23, 1999 on August 24, 1999 and August 25, 1999 respectively, he has not submitted his explanation and since the Petitioner committed misconduct of sleeping while on duty, the same was punishable u/s 18(i)2, Xii, Xiii, Xiv, Xvi of Chapter VII of the NLC Security Force Regulations and a charge memo was issued to him calling for his written explanation but he has refused to receive the same and therefore, the Disciplinary Authority proceeded in the matter as per NLC Security Force Regulations and passed the final order dated August 28, 1999 of imposing the punishment of stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect and later, in Appeal, the Appellate Authority reduced the punishment from 'stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect' to 'stoppage of one increment with cumulative effect' etc. 50. The forcible contention of the learned Counsel for the Respondents is that the NLC Security Force Regulations empowers the Disciplinary Authority or any other authority superior to it, to exercise his discretion in the matter of conducting an enquiry before imposing punishment of stoppage of increments with cumulative effect except in case of dismissal or removal and therefore, the contention of the Petitioner is that no enquiry was conducted as against the Petitioner in regard to the refusal of charge memo dated August 23, 1999 is untenable in law and equally, it cannot be contended on behalf of the Petitioner that there was a violation of principles of natural justice. 51. In short, the contention of the Learned Counsel for the Respondents is that the Authorities concerned had passed a valid and just order in the eye of law and therefore, the same need not be interfered with by this Court. 52. 51. In short, the contention of the Learned Counsel for the Respondents is that the Authorities concerned had passed a valid and just order in the eye of law and therefore, the same need not be interfered with by this Court. 52. It is not out of place for this Court to make a relevant mention that Section 2(b) of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 (20 of 1946) speaks of "appropriate Government" and the same is as follows: 'appropriate Government' means in respect of induatrial establishments under the control of the Central Government or a (Railway administration) or in a major port, mine or oil-field, the Central Government, and in all other cases, the State Government: (Added by Act 18 of 1982, Section 2 (w.e.f. May 17, 1982) (Provided that where any question arises as to whether any industrial establishment is under the control of the Central Government, that Government may, either on a reference made to it by the employer or the representative body of the workmen, or on its own motion and after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard, decide the question and such decision shall be final and binding on the parties.) 53. Also, the Tamil Nadu Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Rules, 1947 Section 16(n) speaks of 'sleeping while on duty'. 54. It is to be borne in mind that, the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, Section 13B speaks of the "(Ins. By Act 36 of 1956, Section 32 (w.e.f. 10.3.1957)) (Act not to apply to certain industrial establishments insofar as the workmen employed therein one person to whom the Fundamental and Supplementary Rules, Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, Revised Leave Rules, Civil Service Regulations, Civilians in Defence Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules or the Indian Railway Establishment Code or any other rules or regulations that may be notified in this behalf by the appropriate Government in the Official Gazette, apply.)" Furthermore, Section 14 of the Act speaks of the power of the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette to exempt, conditionally or unconditionally, any industrial establishment or class of industrial establishments from all or any of the provisions of this Act. 55. 55. The main aim of requiring an employee to answer to the show cause or to the charge sheet is not only to find out whether the allegations referred to or charges framed are admitted or not. But also to provide the employee concerned an opportunity to project his case or line of defence and to enable the authorities concerned to see whether the delinquent employee or the accused officer can be exonerated straight away on the basis of his explanation, if it was satisfactory or if there was put an enquiry to limit its purview to the defence actually set up. Soon after the receipt of explanation or the charge sheet, it is necessary for the Disciplinary Authority to decide whether or not to initiate a departmental enquiry. Generally, the discretion of the Disciplinary Authority cannot be questioned. 56. Generally speaking, if an Employee does not accept the delivery of the show cause notice/charge sheet, by hand, it ought to be sent as per Registered Post Acknowledgment Due and displayed on the notice board, if so provided in the Standing Orders, as opined by this Court. However, if an Employee refuses to take delivery of the letter, there must be a recording to this fact with endorsements/ signatures of the persons effecting the delivery and the witnesses thereto and an additional charge sheet ought to be issued for the misconduct of 'willful subordinates' (sic) (subordination) by refusing to accept the show cause notice/charge sheet issued by the Employer/Management. As a matter of fact, the position will be different if provision is made in the Standing Orders to the effect that if an Employee refuses to accept a show cause/charge sheet, then, he shall be deemed to have been informed in writing and in that case, the Employer/Management or the Enquiry Officer can proceed without making another attempt to serve the show cause notice or the charge sheet. 57. A perusal of the Standing Order 47(1)(a)(iii) of the 1st Respondent prefers to 'Stoppage of increments, (including stoppage at an efficiency bar) with or without cumulative effect' is a minor punishment. 58. 57. A perusal of the Standing Order 47(1)(a)(iii) of the 1st Respondent prefers to 'Stoppage of increments, (including stoppage at an efficiency bar) with or without cumulative effect' is a minor punishment. 58. At this juncture, this Court points out the case of Batta Shoe Company Pvt. Ltd. v. Gangully, which will be applicable when the workman had refused to accept the show cause notice, it cannot be said that he had no notice of the enquiry, Dhondiran Narain v. Rayon Textile Mills (P) Ltd., Mah. G&z., dated July 23, 1970 P.4184(IC-Bom). 59. In the instant case on hand, the 1st Respondent/ Management has not issued a second show cause notice to the Petitioner mentioning that he has refused to receive the show cause notice. It is to be pointed out pertinently that refusing to receive a show cause notice or a charge sheet is a separate/distinct charge. However, in the present case, the 1st Respondent/Management has not resorted to the course of issuing a second show cause notice for refusing to receive the earlier show cause notice. But, it has proceeded further as per NLC Security Force Regulations and passed the final order dated August 28, 1999 awarding the punishment of stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect and later, the Appellate Authority, on an Appeal being filed by the Petitioner, through his order dated September 13, 1999, has reduced the order of punishment from 'stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect' to 'stoppage of one incitement with cumulative effect'. 60. A perusal of the Standing Orders of the 1st Respondent/Management indicates that it does not speak of issuance of second show cause notice/charge memo, in case the first show cause notice/charge memo has been refused to be received by an Employee/ Workmen. 61. It is evident from Regulation 21 of Security Force Regulations (NLC Personnel Manual) that 'a member of the Force may appeal against an order imposing upon him any of the penalties mentioned in Regulation 18(ii) to the appellate authority within a period of 14 days from the date on which the Appellant receives a copy of the order of the punishment appealed against etc. and there shall be no second appeal'. 62. and there shall be no second appeal'. 62. In the present case before us, the Writ Petitioner has not received the charge memo dated August 23, 1999, which has been attempted to be served on him on August 24, 1999 and August 25, 1999 and the endorsements have been made by the Superintendents on duty on August 24, 1999 and August 25, 1999 and therefore, the 1st Respondent/Management has left with no other option to proceed further in the matter and accordingly, proceeded further as per NLC Security Force Regulations and passed the final order dated August 28, 1999 imposing the punishment of stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect and later, on Appeal, the Appellate Authority has reduced the order of punishment from 'stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect' to 'stoppage of one increment with cumulative effect which in the considered opinion of this Court cannot be found fault with on the ground that punishment has been awarded to the Petitioner without serving the charge memo and receiving his explanation thereto etc. 63. Coming to the plea of the Petitioner that there has been a violation of principles of natural justice and that the Petitioner has been meted out with a penalty of stoppage of increment cut with cumulative effect without holding an enquiry and without providing opportunity to him, it is to be pointed out that the object of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to prevent miscarriage of justice. The term 'Natural Justice' is known as 'common sense justice'. Justice is based on natural ideals and human values substantially. Natural justice relieves legal justice from unnecessary technicality, grammatical pedantry or logical prevarication. In short, the principles of natural justice are not a codified set of rules. However, they are ingrained into the conscience of a homo-sapien. 64. It is a rudimentary plea that an individual who is required to answer a charge must know not only by the acquisition but also the testimony which the acquisition is supported he ought to be given a fair chance to hear the evidence in support of charge and to put such pertaining questions by means of cross examination as he wishes. To put it precisely, the rules of natural justice do not supplant the law but supplement it. To put it precisely, the rules of natural justice do not supplant the law but supplement it. If there is an omission to provide an opportunity to an employee to vindicate his stand, to produce witnesses or to lead evidence it will vitiate the proceedings. 65. For the term 'reasonableness' the Court of Laws judicially conscious and to be satisfied that the person against whom action is proposed had a fair chance of convicing the authority who proposed to take action against him that the grounds on which the action is proposed or nor in existent or if they exists, they do not justify the proposed action. 66. In H.C. Sarin Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, (1976) 4 SCC 765 , the Honourable Supreme Court has quoted the following passage in the judgment, of LORD DENNING, M.R., in R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (1973) 3 All ER 796 which runs as follows: The rules of natural justice must not he stretched too far. Only too often the people who have done wrong seek to invoke the rules of natural justice so as to avoid the consequences. 67. The rules of Natural Justice cannot be put on any rigid formula. It is well settled that a notice is refused to be accepted by the addressee can be presumed to have been served on him as per the decision in Harcharan Singh Vs. Smt. Shivrani and Others, (1981) 2 SCC 535 . 68. 67. The rules of Natural Justice cannot be put on any rigid formula. It is well settled that a notice is refused to be accepted by the addressee can be presumed to have been served on him as per the decision in Harcharan Singh Vs. Smt. Shivrani and Others, (1981) 2 SCC 535 . 68. In the present case, the 1st Respondent/Management has attempted to serve the charge memo dated August 23, 1999 on the Petitioner, on August 24, 1999 and August 25, 1999 at his duty point, but he refused to receive, the same and that the endorsements have been made by the Superintendents on duty and therefore, it is quite clear that the 1st Respondent/management has offered to the writ Petitioner an opportunity to receive the charge memo dated August 23, 1999 but that has not been received by the Petitioner (though he has assigned the reason he informed the officials that he will receive the charge memo after consulting the Association for Security staff etc.) and since the Petitioner has refused to receive the charge memo, it is deemed that he has given up his right to offer explanation to the charge memo and it is not open to the Petitioner to complain that there has been a violation in regard to the adherence of principles of natural justice and that he has not been provided with an opportunity to explain his stand and the contra plea of the Petitioner in this regard is not accepted by this Court. Equally, the Petitioner cannot complain that the action of the 1st Respondent/Management in proceeding further and awarding punishment etc. is in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 69. Equally, the Petitioner cannot complain that the action of the 1st Respondent/Management in proceeding further and awarding punishment etc. is in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 69. In the instant case, the Petitioner has refused to receive the charge memo dated August 23, 1999, when it has been attempted to be served on him on August 24, 1999 and August 25, 1999 respectively and the endorsements have been made on these two days by the Superintendents on duty will go to prove that he has refused to accept the delivery of show cause notice/charge memo and the facts of the present case clearly point out that refusal to accept service of charge memo/show cause notice amounts to service in law and in that view of the matter, this Court negatives the plea of the Petitioner that the 1st Respondent/Management has violated Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 70. In regard to the contention of the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the purported refusal of charge memo dated August 23, 1999 will not amount to waiver or coming up of opportunity and even when no explanation is submitted by an employee and also when he does not participate in the enquiry, it will not amount to his admission of guilt or end of the matter so as to pass final order and even in such matters, an ex parte enquiry will have to be conducted and the charges to be proved in the manner known to law, it is to be pointed out that the NLC Personnel Manual Security Force Regulations Section 20(a)(ii) enjoins the disciplinary authority or any other authority superior to it, to exercise its discretion in the matter of conducting enquiry before imposing punishment of stoppage of increment with cumulative effect except in the case of dismissal or removal and hence, the procedure to conduct an enquiry before awarding punishment is wholly at the discretion of the Disciplinary Authority or any other authority and therefore, the plea for conduct of an ex parte enquiry as projected by the Petitioner side is of little avail, in the considered opinion of this Court. 71. 71. As regards the power of Judicial Review in Article 226 of the Constitution of India enabling the Petitioner to file the writ petition, this Court pertinently points out that a judicial review of voluntary retirement under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is maintainable on the grounds hereunder: (a) If the Employer is an authority under the State; (b) The action, of such authorities should pass the tests of Article 14 of the Constitution of India; and (c) The right of an Employee in employment under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, will not be taken away except in accordance with law. 72. The V.R.S. Scheme is like or similar to resignation of an Employee rather than superannuation. The object of V.R.S, Scheme is an invitation to make an offer by the Employees to avail the benefit under it. Containing consideration e.g. An Employee is forming his left over service period for which an Employer pay some money as per Scheme, in the considered opinion of this Court. A V.R.S. Scheme takes the form of rules and unlike statutory rules, they are not to be strictly interpreted by a Court of Law. 73. It is to be pointed out that the moment an Employer/Government acpepted the notice of voluntary retirement, then, the retirement becomes effective and the relationship of master and servant stands severed. 74. A refusal to entertain a belated cause is only a rule of discretion and not law. If a person makes repeated representations after the representation of one, the same will not exonerate delay in moving the Court, the proper test to find out whether a writ petition suffers from latches/delay is whether in the circumstances of the case, the time has elapsed, can be set to be a reasonable one. 75. As per NLC Personnel Manual Security Force Regulations, Section 21, 'a member of the Force may appeal against an order imposing upon him any of the penalties mentioned in Regulation 18(ii) to the appellate authority within a period of 14 days from the date on which the Appellant receives a copy of the order of the punishment appealed against etc. As per NLC Personnel Manual Security Force Regulations, Section 21, 'a member of the Force may appeal against an order imposing upon him any of the penalties mentioned in Regulation 18(ii) to the appellate authority within a period of 14 days from the date on which the Appellant receives a copy of the order of the punishment appealed against etc. and the said Section clearly postulates that there shall be no second appeal and in the instant case on hand, after the appeal being filed by the Petitioner on September 13, 1999 as against the final order dated August 28, 1999 passed by the Disciplinary Authority imposing the punishment of stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect, the Appellate Authority on September 27, 1999, while considering the Appeal, has reduced the punishment to one of stoppage of one increment with cumulative effect and thereafter, the writ Petitioner filed a Second Appeal dated October 9, 1999 to the Deputy Chief Security Officer, who has also rejected the appeal and confirmed the punishment of stoppage of one increment with cumulative effect by proceeding dated October 13, 1999 and the repeated representations made by the writ Petitioner, will not provide him with any cause of action, in the considered opinion of this Court. 76. As far as the present case is concerned, the Petitioner has approached this Court after a lapse of four years from the date of passing of the orders on appeal by the Appellate Authority dated September 13, 1999 and also after the rejection of the Petitioner's appeal by the Appellate Authority as per proceedings dated October 13, 1999 confirming the punishment of stoppage of one increment with cumulative effect. 77. Admittedly, the Petitioner on September 30, 2001 on his own accord has opted for the voluntary retirement and has gone on voluntary retirement and when the proposal of an Employee to opt for V.R.S. has been accepted by the Employer an enforceable contract is concluded because of the simple fact that an offer made by the Employee to opt for V.R.S. Scheme does not amount to resignation in praesenti, as opined by this Court. Therefore, when the 1st Respondent/Management has accepted the voluntary retirement of the Petitioner and when the fact remains that the writ Petitioner has retired on voluntary retirement on September 30, 2001, this Court is of the considered view that his voluntary retirement has come into force and the master-servant relationship has ceased to exist and as such, the Petitioner is not entitled to approach this Court for a discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and resultantly, W.P. No. 7808/2003 fails. W.P. No. 7809/2003: Contentions, Discussions and Finding: 78. The Learned Counsel for the Petitioner submits that the Petitioner is eligible and entitled to get the Time Bound Promotion to the post of Superintendent Grade-II, which carry higher scale-of pay, with effect from March 1, 1998, as per the Time Bound Promotion Scheme in vogue and the Petitioner made a representation to the concerned authorities, inasmuch as he has not been given the promotion to the post of Superintendent Grade-II with effect from March 1, 1998 and the Assistant Personnel Manager/S & FS sent a communication dated July 27, 1998 that adverse remarks have been entered in his service record for the period from April 1, 1997 to March 31, 1998 and in the said proceedings, the Petitioner's conduct has been mentioned during the aforesaid period as 'Highly unreliable. No knowledge of security. Does not command respect from his subordinates. Rumour Monger.' 79. It is the specific contention of the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner that before an adverse entry is recorded he has not been provided with any notice and also any opportunity to present his stand and therefore, the adverse entry recorded against the Petitioner is a motivated and false one. 80. Continuing further, the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner contends that there have been no remarks whatsoever before or after the period between April 1, 1997 to March 31, 1998 as regards the Petitioner and in any event, the Respondents cannot deny promotion to the Petitioner in view of his meritorious service for more than 37 years as on March 1, 1998 and as such, the Respondents should have granted the promotion to the Petitioner at least from March 1, 1999. 81. 81. The Learned Counsel for the Petitioner also submits that to the Mercy Petition dated August 9, 2001 of the Petitioner, the Director (Personnel) has called for remarks from Deputy Chief Security Officer who has submitted his remarks stating that the Petitioner services have been meritorious and that he has been honest and sincere and also recommended to revoke the punishment order and also to give him the promotion to the post of Superintendent Grade-II and even after the said report, the punishment orders have not been set aside and that the Petitioner has not been given the promotion. 82. The other contention of the Petitioner is that he has retired from service under Voluntary Retirement Scheme and due to the punishment, he suffered a huge loss during his service and also in regard to the terminal and V.R.S. benefits. 83. The reason assigned by the Petitioner in not filing the writ petition immediately is due to the fact that since the Director (Personnel) has called for remarks on his representation dated August 9, 2001 from the Deputy Chief Security Officer and further the said officer has also submitted his remarks recommending to consider his grievance, he has been waiting for a favourable reply from the Director (Personnel) of the 1st Respondent/Management and since there has been no reply or order from the Director (Personnel) even after a long lapse of time, he has filed this writ petition. The Learned Counsel for the Respondents submits that the Time Bound Promotions to the Employees are not as a matter of routine and automatic but such promotions are given to the Employees based on completion of prescribed period in a certain post in a lower grade, subject to satisfying other conditions like performance during the qualifying period, good rating in Annual Performance Appraisal for the proceeding 3 years prior to the date of eligibility and if no disciplinary proceedings are pending at the time of consideration for promotion. 84. The Learned Counsel for the Respondents contends that in the Annual Performance Report in respect of the Petitioner, for the period from April 1, 1997 to March 31, 1998, it has been recorded in an overall appraisal column 'Spreading rumours. Petition writer. Under observation' and also the 2nd Respondent (Reviewing Authority) has also recorded his overall rating on June 9, 1998 as "Highly unreliable. No knowledge of security. Petition writer. Under observation' and also the 2nd Respondent (Reviewing Authority) has also recorded his overall rating on June 9, 1998 as "Highly unreliable. No knowledge of security. Does not command respect from his subordinates. Rumour monger" and the said adverse remarks have been communicated to the Petitioner as per proceedings dated July 27, 1998 by the 3rd Respondent and the appeal filed by the Petitioner before the 2nd Respondent has been rejected on July 30, 1999 and there is no procedural infirmity or procedural illegality in the orders passed by the Respondents. 85. In regard' to the contention that the Petitioner must be given an opportunity of hearing before an adverse entry is recorded in his Annual Performance Report, it is the contention of the Learned Counsel for the Respondents that the rules governing the Performance Appraisal do not require that the Petitioner will have to be given an opportunity before recording adverse remarks. 86. The next limb of submission of the Learned Counsel for the Respondents is that because of the fact that the Petitioner has suffered adverse remarks pertaining to the period from April 1, 1997 to March 31, 1998, in the Annual Performance Appraisal, his claim for promotion to the post of Superintendent Grade-II with effect from March 1, 1998 on time scale is not sustainable in the eye of law. 87. Lastly, it is the plea of the Learned Counsel for the Respondents that the Petitioner has been punished by way of fine ranging from Rs. 5/- to 10/- for sleeping, for deserting duty place etc. on 7 occasions from the year 1965 to 1969 and also he has been imposed with punishment of stoppage of one increment for sleeping as per Proceedings No. 04/Disc/ SO/M-1/89, dated August 1, 1989 and finally, he has been awarded with a punishment of Stoppage of one increment with cumulative effect for sleeping permitting to keep Gas Cylinder and other utensils etc. as per proceedings of the Appellate Authority dated September 27, 1999. 88. as per proceedings of the Appellate Authority dated September 27, 1999. 88. In the affidavit filed, in W.P. No. 7809/2003, by the Petitioner has stated that he has made a representation to the concerned authorities to give him the promotion and only thereafter, by a proceeding dated July 27, 1998, the Assistant Manager/S & FS has communicated that an adverse remarks have been entered into service record for the period from April 1, 1997 to March 31, 1998 etc. 89. In support of the contention that non communication of an entry in Annual Confidential Report is violative of Article 141 of the Constitution of India and the same being an arbitrary one, the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner cites the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in Dev Dutt Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, (2008) 8 SCC 725 wherein it is observed as follows: The non communication of an entry in the Annual Confidential Report of a public servant in arbitrary because it deprives the concerned employee from making a representation and praying for its upgradation. That will amounts to violation of principles of natural justice. Even an outstanding entry should be communicated since that would boost the morale of the employee and make him work harder. 90. To lend support to the contention that even though the Petitioner has retired from service under Voluntary Retirement Scheme in the year 2001, yet, he can maintain a writ petition to quash the order dated July 27, 1998 passed by the 3rd Respondent by communicating the adverse remarks and also to quash the order of the 2nd Respondent dated July 30, 1999 in rejecting the appeal thereby confirming the order of the 3rd Respondent and further to direct the Respondents to give him Time Bound Promotion as Superintendent Grade-II with effect from March 1, 1998 etc. , the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner relies on the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in A. Satyanarayana Reddy and Others Vs. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Guntur and Others, (2008) 5 SCC 280 wherein it is held that 'If the claim has no nexus with the Voluntary Retirement Scheme, it is to be held that a proceeding u/s 33C(2) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is maintainable' Referred to larger Bench.' 91. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Guntur and Others, (2008) 5 SCC 280 wherein it is held that 'If the claim has no nexus with the Voluntary Retirement Scheme, it is to be held that a proceeding u/s 33C(2) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is maintainable' Referred to larger Bench.' 91. To prevent recourse to lengthy procedure, the Petitioner is entitled to file a writ petition, the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner cites the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in National Building Construction Corporation Vs. Pritam Singh Gill and Others, (1972) 2 SCC 1 wherein at paragraph 12, it is, among other things, observed as follows: 12. ...The propriety or necessity of thus construing the word "workman" is obvious because all parts of the Act have to be in harmony with the statutory intent. Keeping this in mind we may turn to the purpose and object of Section 33C of the Act. This Section was enacted for the purpose of enabling individual workman to implement, enforce or execute their existing individual rights against their employers without being compelled to have recourse to Section 10 by raising disputes and securing a reference which is obviously a lengthy process. Section 33C of the Act has accordingly been described as a provision which clothes the Labour Court with the powers similar to those of an executing Court so that the workman concerned receives speedy relief in respect of his existing individual rights. The primary purpose of the Section being to provids the aggrieved workman with a forum similar to the executing Courts, it calls for a broad and beneficial construction consistently with other provisions of the Act, which should serve to advance the remedy and to suppress the mischief. It may appropriately be pointed out that the mischief which Section 33C was designed to suppress was the difficulties faced by individual workmen in getting relief in respect of their existing rights without having "resort to Section 10 of the Act. To accept the argument of the Appellant, it would always be open to an unfair, unsympathetic and unscrupulous employer to terminate the services or his employee in order to deprive him of the benefit conferred by Section 33C and compel him to have resort to the lengthy procedure by way of reference u/s 10 of the Act thereby defeating the very purpose and object of enacting this provision. 92. 92. On the contrary, the learned Counsel for the Respondents cites the decision in Jayakodi Jacob D. Vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court and Another, (1999) 1 LLJ 1025 wherein it is held that 'Once Voluntary Retirement Scheme is exercised and benefits received nothing remains to be done'. Further, the Learned Counsel for the Respondents draws the attention of this Court to the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in A.K. Bindal and Another Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, (2003) 5 SCC 163 wherein it is laid down as follows: Once employees opt to retire under V. and accept the benefits thereunder their rights as employees come to an end and thereafter they cannot again assert their rights and reagitate their claim for pay revision for pre-retirement period and nor can they contend that they opted for Voluntary Retirement Scheme under compulsion. 93. Yet another decision of the Honourable Supreme, Court, in HEC Voluntary Retd. Emps. Welfare Soc. and Another Vs. Heavy Engineering Corporation Ltd. and Others, (2006) 3 SCC 708 , is relied on the side of the Respondents to the effect that 'The effect of a Voluntary Retirement Scheme is cessation of the jural relationship between employer and employee.' 94. In service jurisprudence, the term 'Promotion' is a positive act of higher in status conveyed by an Employer by a written order issued in favour of the person promoted and communicated to him. An Employee has no right to a promotion. However, he has a basic right to be considered for promotion, if he satisfies the required eligibility conditions. This Court aptly points, out that the entries in Annual Confidential Report of an Employee reflected the subjective assessment though required to be made on objective yardsticks by the authorities concerned. They are administrative in character and cannot be subject to the scrutiny of a judicial forum except on the grounds of malice, mala fide and perversity. 95. An Employee has a remedy against adverse entries in Annual Confidential Report by way of submitting his representation or memorial and where he is dissatisfied with the treatment of his representation, he has a right to seek judicial review. An assessment of performance in the past year may become a criterion affecting the future prospects of an Employee. 95. An Employee has a remedy against adverse entries in Annual Confidential Report by way of submitting his representation or memorial and where he is dissatisfied with the treatment of his representation, he has a right to seek judicial review. An assessment of performance in the past year may become a criterion affecting the future prospects of an Employee. In fact, a scrutiny of the Annual Confidential Report of an Employee over a period will provide a clear impression about the quality of service rendered by an Employee. 96. It is an axiomatic principle in law that an uncommunicated entries in Annual Confidential Report of an Employee cannot be used to deny service benefit like confirmation, promotion and opportunity for deputation etc. 97. Dealing with the plea of the Petitioner that before entering adverse entries in his Annual Confidential Report, the authorities concerned have not provided him with an opportunity to project his stand, this Court points out that if the rules do not require that an opportunity to be heard is to be provided to the Petitioner before adverse entries are made against him in his Confidential Report or if the rules do not provide that adverse entries amount to a penalty for misconduct, it is not essential to make an enquiry or to provide a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the Petitioner before making adverse entries in his character roll/Annual Confidential Report. Also, it cannot be brushed aside that making of adverse entries are not equivalent to awarding of a penalty which necessitates an enquiry or a reasonable opportunity of being heard. 98. One cannot loose sight of the fact that an adverse entries ought to be communicated to the particular Employee. Adverse entries in Annual Confidential Report place, a significant role in deciding the suitability of an Employee at that stage. Consistent adverse entries depict the picture of handicap suffered by the administration because of him who made himself a burden and has not either, cared to improve upon or has not possessed the capability to do so. 99. In the present case on hand, the rules of the 1st Respondent/Management do not provide for an opportunity being given to the Petitioner to hear him before the adverse entries are recorded. 100. 99. In the present case on hand, the rules of the 1st Respondent/Management do not provide for an opportunity being given to the Petitioner to hear him before the adverse entries are recorded. 100. It cannot be gainsaid that the adverse entries in Annual Confidential Report of the Petitioner made by the Deputy Security Officer in June 1998 and also the adverse entry recorded by the 2nd Respondent (Reviewing Authority) on June 9, 1998 are based on subjective assessment and these are all executive function of the concerned authorities and the said adverse remarks have been communicated to the Petitioner within the reasonable point of time by the 3rd Respondent as per proceedings, dated July 27, 1998 and also the Appeal filed by the Petitioner has been rejected by the 2nd Respondent as per order dated July 30, 1999 and the adverse entries have been made by the Superior Officers of the Petitioner on an objective criterion though it is based on subjective assessment. However, the Petitioner, after being relieved from the services of the 1st Respondent Corporation on Voluntary Retirement Scheme with effect from September 30, 2001, has ceased to have any relationship with the 1st Respondent as Master and Servant and suffice it for this Court that he has obtained all the benefits flowing from the Voluntary Retirement Scheme and nothing more remains to be done by the 1st Respondent/Management and further that since the Petitioner has earned the adverse remarks for the period from April 1, 1997 to March 31, 1998 is ineligible for the Time Bound Promotion as otherwise due on March 1, 1998 and viewed in that perspective, W.P. No. 7809/2003 filed by the Petitioner fails. For the foregoing detailed reasonings/discussions, W.P. Nos. 7808 and 7809/2003 filed by the Petitioner are dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.